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January 17, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, January 17, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, January 16, 1972

Next Date: Tuesday, January 18, 1972

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    President's Office Files

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  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, January 17th. The President had nothing scheduled for today because of speech preparation, but had no speech preparation work to do, because he dictated a long thing last night for Safire on the Vietnam speech, and has already pretty well wrapped up the State of the Union with Price.

      There's a building story again on the reopening of the Howard Hughes loan. The President said we should get out the facts, as we did in '62, point out that the loan was repaid by the transfer of property, but don't let the impression of guilt build up, as responded to in '62, and there's nothing to it now. Figures maybe we should have Klein handle it, and we discussed that possibility with Ziegler later in the morning.

      Also on the Anderson papers, Ziegler's going to say that the President, of course, is concerned about the problem on that, and we are conducting an investigation. That the President considers it important, because of the need for free discussion among advisors that we will not allow this to lead to less discussion. He totally supports Kissinger.

      On the Vietnam speech, he was a little distressed when he found out during a meeting with Kissinger that Safire had reviewed the whole memo the President had written with Henry. Because the memo referred to the speech as turgid prose etcetera, and wasn't written for Henry's consumption. That is, it was a critique of Henry's first draft, and guidance for Safire on how to deal with it.

      He had a fairly long session with Henry in there, during which he sent over, sent Manolo over to the house to bring his H.G. Wells book over. And he skimmed through it and found a devastating quote regarding the military mind and the fact that it is, by definition, mediocre, because nobody with any real intellectual talent would submit himself to the military career. He also said that, of course, Wells has the feeling that every, the solution to all problems is education for everyone, and that's a terrible idea, especially for women, says the President. He is pondering the problem we have in getting our Air Force to do what's right. Henry was making the point, in reviewing the Vietnam progress, that the Air Force, as usual, was doing everything wrong and talking about how terrible they are. The President was agreeing with that and saying the problem we have is that we have so little time. He also got into the problem of the sniping against the China trip primarily by the press people who keep saying now that we're putting all the emphasis on making a television spectacular out of it. The President points out that we have to realize the reality of the event will be overriding and that we needn't worry about the carping of the critics, which is inevitable.

      I raised the Kissinger-Rogers flap with the President today and reviewed the whole go-round of the weekend. And the President made the point that Rogers is acting in a petty way, that the Attorney General is going to have to face up to Rogers regarding the Israelis…

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 18, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 7 [AC-18(A) Sel 7-1]
      Duration: 23 seconds

      ...because we, he must not force their hand too hard at this point. We've got to forget about the right and wrong of it for now and avoid confrontation. Also, it's imperative that the President must be totally informed regarding anything with Rabin.
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      On the other side of it, the problem is that Kissinger, by sending his memo, was purposefully humiliating Rogers and he just can't do that.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 18, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 7 [AC-18(A) Sel 7-2]
      Duration: 26 seconds

      So we have the problem of how do we handle the Israelis. On the Mideast, the President has to know everything. If not through Kissinger, then it's got to be sent in through me. The European Security Conference that has to go into Kissinger and the NSC because it's a part of the agenda planning for the summit meeting. We have to shoot down Rogers's idea that the NSC is not an operating body, because they are.
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      The Attorney General also has got to make the point to Rogers that the Jews provided $8 million in the last two weeks for Humphrey last time and we’ve got to be careful about their potential influence. Also, the AG has got to make it clear to Henry that first, he was wrong to send the directive to Rogers, and second, he's got to keep quiet until we get this whole thing smoothed over.

      Later this afternoon we had a two and a half hour meeting with Connally. President had me sit in the whole thing. First part was to discuss the question of Flanigan taking on the Committee on International Economic Policy. And Connally, first of all agreed with the idea of Peterson and Hodgson taking on the role of being active around the country about jobs, and said it's a good way to show concern and analyze, a good way to show our concern is to analyze the statistics. Making the point that unemployment is not a fiscal problem, but a social problem, because the pockets of unemployment are all among the young people, and blacks, and women. The President told Connally to bring Peterson and Hodgson together and give them the order to get this going, as a major thrust to the economic policy this year. This is to be done under Connally's aegis, as the chief economic man, and then they're to report to the President.

      The President then made the point that he wants to clear up the international economic question so that there's no question where the authority lies. That Flanigan, if he takes the job, will be an inside man. The, Connally says that's the problem for the reason for the counsel to begin with. No other department has anything to do with monetary policy, and Connally isn't about to let Flanigan and his Council take that over, and Connally doesn't want State involved in monetary policy. He says the Council's purpose under the Ash Council Act concept was for trade and balance of payments and that sort of thing. So the President said that makes there's a decision then, monetary policy is under the Secretary of the Treasury. And that view is to be clearly understood that Flanigan is to take no initiatives unless requested by the Secretary of Treasury. He’s to do nothing in derogation of the Treasury's dominant role in this matter. This is an area where you can't have a group talking. There has to be one man, the Secretary of the Treasury, otherwise it corrodes our negotiating position.

      The President then said we need to be more clear on trade. First of all the question of who is Eberle under? Connally answered, he's under the President, not the State Department. The whole purpose of setting up that office of STR was to bypass State in trade negotiations. The President then said he wants to delegate his responsibility on that to Connally, because trade is so tied up with monetary policy. He wants to avoid a repetition of the San Clemente deal with Tanaka, when Stans wouldn't let Eberle meet with him separately. The point is we can't have Peterson, Samuels, Eberle, and Connally all talking with different lines, so Connally must be in charge. We don't want all of these people end running the President. Where Flanigan comes in, is, he has to know who sits at the head of the table, and that's Connally. The delegation is to John Connally, the man, not to the office to Secretary of the Treasury. Then down the road we'll move it to State. Flanigan's to look at the whole international field in terms of restructuring it during the next term, especially regarding State, Commerce, and Treasury.

      The President then wants Malek to take over Pete's White House responsibilities. Also Connally's to discuss with Pete the, his idea on raw materials development for Latin America, and so on. He also wants to put Flanigan on all these loan battles with the State, so that Kissinger doesn't have to handle those. The President agreed to meet with McNamara when he gets back from his trip and before the President goes to China, and then wants him brought in every couple months, because it's his understanding that McNamara will do what we tell him to.

      Connally then related a horror story about Weintraub at State Department who has told Chile that we'll renegotiate their loan. And a man under him, named Fisher, has said, told the Chileans that it was lucky that their decision to suspend the loan was learned after some action we'd taken, otherwise we would have killed the deal. The President was horrified at all of this. In any event, Connally's sending a memo in asking for the President's okay that the Treasury head the delegation, and that memo should be approved.

      The President then had me lay out the Buchanan thesis that maybe the professional president is the wrong political posture, and that rather we should be a fighting president and find someone or something to do battle with. Connally said until after the trips, or at least until after China, the President should take on no enemy, but at the right time, he has to come out as a fighter, and he has to have an enemy.

      The President said both parties have had it. That is, Eisenhower told him once in this office after the '56 elections: Damn the Republican Party, what we need is a new party. The President thinks maybe we should form that party after this next election, and he cites the growth of the Independents versus Republicans and Democrats. Then says to Connally he needs good advice as to what is the right posture to take. Connally says the reason the polls aren't greater at this point is that people don't think they know Nixon, so they don't go all out for him regardless of what the consequences are. They don't know how to judge Nixon. Kennedy had them memorized, mesmerized in that regard. Connally says that if a natural enemy shows at any time, we should grab it, but it would be better to wait until after the conventions. If we do anything now, we should take on our Republican opponents, but it's better not to have a fight now. When the Convention's over, we should pick out an enemy, such as unemployment, or balance of payments, or the ecology. The President went back to his earlier point and says how do you get people to know the President? Connally says you have to change your way of doing things. Like once a week you should pick a group and meet with them, maybe have a stag dinner here of 100 people, mend the fences with the hurt folks that we've let down. Like the big fun money raiser in Texas who got no recognition after the election. Should have them for dinner and have a real hair down session, tell them you need their help, and ask them how they think you're doing.

      The President said that's fine for the leaders, but how do you break through to the masses? Connally said by becoming a fighter. The President asked if he meant using more press conferences, and Connally said no, that won't do it, although you should have one of those a month. But you need to be strongly for and, or against something. You need to do it fairly soon, to start preparing. Something that touches the lives of people, like taxes or the bureaucracy. He says all people think that the President's doing an excellent job, but no one loves him, fears him, or hates him, and he needs to have all three. The good, professional president doesn't appeal to the motivating emotions. This is okay through Moscow, but it's too dangerous after that to just let it lie, even though he'd probably win anyway. At that time he's going to have to build love, fear, hate, and respect, so he has something to fall back on if the substantive things don't work out. August 5th, 15th did it, but in an abstract problem, which the people don't understand. Maybe a major shakeup in State and Defense would be the thing, where you'd get all the businessmen to applaud, at least, and you'd get equipped to compete in the world. Maybe the enemy is permissiveness—the whole field of permissiveness. We’ve gotten too soft. Be for discipline. His point is we've got to be for something and against something, and the people have to know about it. Something will come up. We can seize it, in a non-political environment. We discussed drugs as a possibility, then Connally offered Federal judges and the court, saying you should fight for a policy of reconfirmation of judges every ten years, and make them responsible to someone. Says you've got to get to the racial thing one way or another, and that may be the indirect way to do it. A great issue to oppose is integration. The President summed up that, first of all, we agree, we're better off today than we were a year ago. Secondly, that we need to establish an identity, not just as a professional president. He pointed out that he's had that before, but now he can't just float along. Connally points out the tendency today is to be against the ins in executive positions, although not in legislative, so we have to overcome that. Thus the professional president is not a good posture. We have to crystallize our support. Get people willing to get out and fight, tie people to you emotionally. The country needs emotional feelings regarding the President, but we have had the problem with the country all torn up, and we couldn't stir emotional feelings. Now we have had a year of cooling, we can heat up again. Before, they were fired up for the wrong causes, now you can stir them up for Nixon. The key one is schools and housing, that is integration, but there's a real problem with striking too early.

      President then closed the meeting by inviting Connally to come to Walkers Cay over the Lincoln's weekend. He had me walk back to the Residence with him and discussed this a little more, and then called me at home to say he wanted me to talk that whole subject over with Ray Price and get his views because he has doubts re: Price’s theory.

      End of January 17th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

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    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    Military and Diplomatic Stalemate, October 11, 1971-January 26, 1972

    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    Military and Diplomatic Stalemate, October 11, 1971-January 26, 1972

    • 291. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group, Washington, January 17, 1972, 3:09-4:05 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.

    Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972

    Preparing for Moscow and Nixon's Trip to China, January 1-March 29, 1972

    Vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972

    Thailand

    Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa

    Regional Issues

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 161. Telegram 331 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 17, 1972, 1950Z

      Ambassador MacArthur reported that the U.S. mission premises in Tehran had been subjected to four bomb explosions but that damage was not serious.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 IRAN. Confidential; Immediate. In Telegram 365 from Tehran, January 19, MacArthur related some local Iranian interpretations of the bombings, including the suggestions that they were motivated by anti-capitalism and opposition to U.S. policy in the Middle East, or designed to demonstrate the dissidents’ power and contempt for SAVAK. (Ibid.) The day prior to the explosions, a SAVAK spokesman gave a public briefing announcing the arrest of 120 dissidents over the previous 10 months, including 60 members of the Iranian Liberation Organization (Siah Kal) jailed on charges of plotting to kidnap Iranian and foreign personalities during the 2500th Anniversary celebrations. The group was accused of having received training in Iraq and at Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. (Attachment to Donald Toussaint to Jack Miklos, February 11, 1972, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 7, INT, Intelligence, General Iran, 1972.)

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 162. Telegram 8819 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, January 17, 1972, 1942Z

      Secretary Rogers asked Ambassador MacArthur to seek clarification of the Shah’s views on the continued U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, which the United States had understood were favorable.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/1/72–5/31/72. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Manama, CINCEUR, and COMIDEASTFOR.

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972

    • 206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 17, 1972

      Rogers submitted to Nixon a paper prepared in the Department of State outlining policy objectives in South Asia with the suggestion that it be circulated to the members of the NSC as a basis for discussion.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. The attached paper was Secret; Exdis. Rogers’ memorandum and the attached paper, drafted on January 15, were circulated on January 17 by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the CIA. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) An earlier draft of the paper, submitted on January 7 by Sisco to Rogers, indicates it was drafted in NEA/INC by Quainton with the concurrence of Schneider and Van Hollen. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF1–1 ASIA SE)

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972

    • 207. Analytical Summary Prepared by Members of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 17, 1972

      The summary analyzed the papers dealing with postwar issues in South Asia which were prepared for the Senior Review Group in anticipation of its meeting on January 19.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders and Kennedy transmitted the summary to Kissinger in a January 17 memorandum. (Ibid.) The reference in the summary to a Department of State options paper is to Document 206. The remainder of the papers cited in the study can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72, and ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). The paper dealing with Bangladesh and the letters from Prime Ministers Heath and McMahon are included in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume. See documents 376, 386, and 387.

    Vol. E-16, Documents on Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    • 97. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington, January 17, 1972

      Summary: Nixon, Connally, and Haldeman discussed recent Chilean elections and the Chilean debt problem.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 469–1. Sensitive But Unclassifed. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Connally and Haldeman in the Oval Office from 4:05 to 6:33 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)