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January 18, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, January 18, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, January 17, 1972

Next Date: Wednesday, January 19, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, January 18th. I got in late this morning because of giving a talk at Ann's school. And the President was well launched on his morning program by then. I didn't see him until about 2:00. In the meantime I had a long session with Flanigan on the Connally-President meeting yesterday regarding Flanigan's role on the Council of International Economic Policy. Pete feels that it's impossible for him to take the job under the conditions the President has set up in terms of the franchise he's given Connally, and feels really there's no need for the council at all, under that kind of a setup. I tend to agree with him, as I said yesterday in the meeting with the President and Connally, but urged that Pete have a talk with Connally first and then with the President to see what we could work out. I have a feeling that it won't work out and that Pete's probably right in avoiding it.

      Then I met with the Attorney General, about the Kissinger-Rogers problem, brought him up to date on a flap from over the weekend as a result of Henry's directive to Bill. We agreed that we have to change Rogers's view that the NSC is for policy only and not for operations, and that we have to deal with the point that Al Haig raises of Rogers's fundamental misconception that if some matter is in the NSC and the SRG then it's Kissinger's responsibility. Otherwise everything else is State's, and therefore, they cut out State's preserve, and they misconstrue the whole purpose of the NSC system. We had Henry and Haig join us to lay down the rules to them after Mitchell and I agreed that the only way to solve this was a memorandum from the President to both Rogers and Kissinger that would both repeat the Kissinger directive, at least the contents of it, but in better form. And would instruct Kissinger that that would go to Rogers, and then instruct Kissinger to keep Rogers filled in at the President's direction. Henry went through a recitation of his problems again.

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 18, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 11 [AC-18(A) Sel 10]
      Duration: 25 seconds

      The fact of the other meetings with Rabin and that we’ve still not been informed about the aide memoir that they gave Rabin on Friday. The fact that they're haggling on planes still on Monday. And that Sisco's gradually retreating to the President's position, but he's always tying it to negotiations. That we still don't have minutes of the Friday meeting.
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      We did get notice yesterday that there was one. But we still have not been told that there was a meeting yesterday, and we have had no advance notice of any of the meetings. Henry reaffirmed his position that he's made the final decision that he will not leave because he cannot for the sake of the country, and therefore we need not do our planning on the basis of any necessity of keeping him aboard. Henry feels that we can't keep Rogers informed, because if he knows that at the beginning of the negotiation what it is we're going to do, he'll do what we did, what he did to Rush at, on Berlin at the end, which was to fly-spec them to death. He cited a whole list of horrors, like the fact that Rogers wouldn't give us his UN speech until three minutes before he delivered it, although Bush had one 24 hours ahead. Feels that Rogers shouldn't be allowed to create a situation where it's Rogers versus Kissinger, that Kissinger speaks for the President and he's not on his own, and the President can't be put in the position of arbitrating between Rogers and Kissinger.

      Henry revised his position on the European Security Conference and said that we, he now, it isn't a problem of his not being able to get the State study on it, but rather that he's set up a task force chaired by State, and Rogers refuses to go along with it on the ground that the conference is his sole territory, and he says it's a humiliation to him to accept a directive to work with a group. Although he will work it out informally, which won't work.

      Henry feels the real danger is that Rogers will mischievously wreck the whole thing, and that we've got to get him under adequate control to avoid this. Upshot of that meeting was that he agreed that we should send the memo, and Mitchell asked me to draft one, which I did, but taking a different approach as I got into it, of sending the same memo to Rogers and Kissinger directing both of them to keep the President fully informed. And thus, eliminating the problem Kissinger was worried about of a separate directive to Kissinger to keep Rogers informed, which was, is a bad position to put him in.

      I went over this with the President. He agreed with the concept of sending the memo, dictated a lot of additional language that I later reviewed with Kissinger and Mitchell, and both felt should not be used. He wanted to add such things as saying: I'm very much aware of the problems that arise, but this year, the most important thing is the success of the foreign policy initiatives that will live long after we do. It's difficult enough because of the tightrope we have to walk, but working together we will succeed. Otherwise, we will fail. It's necessary for all of us to consult closely with each other, and it's imperative that I be informed. I cannot and don't want to become involved in matters that are not of importance. But on three major issues, China, Russia, and Middle East, I want to be totally and completely informed at all times, so I've asked Haldeman to set up a procedure under this where I want to see all of the advance notice, and so on. I will keep both of you informed of whatever activities I may undertake independently, but I anticipate none at this time. The only winner from our failure to work together would be our enemies both at home and abroad. I hope we can all subordinate our personal considerations for these higher goals. Both Henry and Mitchell feel that it's ridiculous for the President to subordinate himself in this fashion. The President raised the question whether we handled Henry toughly, tough enough on this. I think we did, but it may be that we didn't, and we've got to consider that.

      Then late this afternoon Kissinger and Haig came marching in, after I'd had a long session in the President's office on mainly odds and ends and political general discussion.

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      EXEMPTED IN FULL, E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.3(h)(2), June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 18, Side A Withdrawn Item Number 13 [AC-18(A) Sel 11, 12]
      Duration: 2 minutes 16 seconds

      JORDAN
      INDIA
      PAKISTAN
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      He then used the occasion to go into the whole problem again. It's absolutely astonishing the way his main concern is the Alsop column, which attacks him. He doesn't seem to be bothered much by the other things. Henry's main concern is the press stuff that attacks him, and he isn't the least bit bothered by his own yeoman, who leaked all the Pentagon Papers. So we're back in a reasonably bad situation but probably can keep it glued together if nothing more develops.

      The President called at 6:45 to say Safire had done a fine job on the Vietnam speech. It improved on the President's outline, got it done on time, and he was really pleased. He says he's finished with the State of the Union. He’ll get a final copy from Ray at noon tomorrow.

      At the President's instruction, I talked to Price this morning about the Connally and Buchanan political strategy. Ray feels that none of that indicates any change in the State of the Union that they're right about the need for an enemy, but it should be later, but if you heat up too much too soon, people will get sick of it. He says the State of the Union isn't a fighting speech now. It plays against the political mood today, and he thinks it's a good posture to be in. It's better to make the others the self-seeking squabblers now. It should make a contrast to the opposition, and then start hitting later, but not waste it now. Lay the base for it, and then hit later. He thinks that Connally's thesis is partly valid and partly not, but in any event feels the combative mood set now would be bad, because it can't be maintained for eight months. That we should build our credibility now for an attack later. Our weaknesses are our credibility and political image and just general suspicion of government and other institutions, so the time for attack, crisis, battle, etcetera, is further down the road.

      End of January 18th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    The Intelligence Community and the White House

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    Foreign Economic Policy

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972

    • 173. National Security Decision Memorandum 148, Washington, January 18, 1972

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 148. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Appointments of Senior UN Personnel

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Chinese Representation in the United Nations

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Chinese Representation in the United Nations

    • 450. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, January 18, 1972

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Secret. Drafted by Sally Werner; cleared by David L. Stottlemyer, Robert W. Kitchen, Ernest C. Grigg, Harry E. T. Thayer, and Michael H. Newlin; and approved by Newlin. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USNATO, and the SALT delegation.

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    The Two Yemens

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    Narrowing the Issues, October 19, 1971-April 18, 1972

    • 226. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, Washington, January 18, 1972

      Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 330–77–0095, Box 7, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. On February 8 Kissinger sent Laird’s memorandum to Nixon under a covering memorandum in which he concluded that “on the offensive side, his proposal largely corresponds with our present one or makes recommenations on issues which we were already planning to consider during the recess.” Kissinger also sent Nixon a draft response, which reads in part: “I appreciate your thoughtful letter of January 18 on our SALT position. I will want to consider your ideas carefully between now and the resumption of the talks. Accordingly, your suggestions will be considered by the Verification Panel in preparation for an NSC meeting on the next phase of SALT.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972)

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    Narrowing the Issues, October 19, 1971-April 18, 1972

    Vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974

    April 15, 1971-March 11, 1972

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972

    • 208. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to President Nixon, Washington, January 18, 1972

      Raza conveyed a letter from Pakistani President Bhutto to Nixon in which Bhutto expressed appreciation for the support the U.S. gave to Pakistan during the conflict with India, and asked for continuing U.S. support as Pakistan attempted to negotiate a peace settlement and recover from the impact of the conflict.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. The text of Bhutto’s letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 28 in telegram 16271. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 US/Nixon)

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Cuba

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)