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April 13, 1973

Introduction

This almanac page for Friday, April 13, 1973, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Thursday, April 12, 1973

Next Date: Saturday, April 14, 1973

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Friday, April 13.

      Another long Watergate day, as I spent a good part of the day locked in my office working on my revised statement, for whatever purpose we decide to use it. There were, however, several major external developments.

      Colson reported to Ehrlichman this morning that he had reports that Jeb Magruder had met with two different reporters and also had met with Mitchell this week. And that he was putting out the story that Mitchell was not involved at all in the Watergate, and that he had discussed specifically with me both the idea of bugging and the Watergate in particular. He claims he also had the same discussions with Colson. Chuck's conclusion from this was that Magruder and Mitchell were conspiring together to sink Colson and me in their own self-defense, on the theory that if they could get that much blood, the whole effort would be dropped and Mitchell would be clear.

      This he covered in some detail with John, and John reported to the President and to me, and that started the whole track of revised thinking and emotion. Then, a little later, while I was over talking that over with the President, John was meeting with John Dean and he came over to report a whole new chain of events, which was that Dean's lawyers had met with the US Attorneys and come up with a whole new insight into the process of the case at the grand jury. According to this theory, they have the case totally made on Magruder and almost total on Mitchell and they have no doubt that they will complete it, and they intend to bring indictments on both of them about May 15.

      The indication from them is that they have nothing on anyone in the White House, which, of course, there's no way that they could have, and that they have no intention of trying to develop anything in that direction. They are interested in the post-June area and will be trying to develop the material in that as they go along, and they apparently feel they have some pretty good leads into that.

      In the process, I had Larry check with Magruder, and he came back with an extremely interesting telephone conversation, which, fortunately, he taped, in which Magruder denied meeting with the reporters, denied having talked with Mitchell yet, but then spelled out his position, which is the recognition that he's had it. And the decision to tell the story or, at least, probably to, he hasn't made the final decision, but if he talks at all he will tell the true story, which will be rough for Mitchell, but it will, of course, clear the White House, specifically me. As would the current grand jury development.

      In a follow-up conversation, Jeb admitted to Larry that he had had a conversation with a reporter, but he had covered the same old ground, denying anything and telling the standard story, which doesn't jibe with Colson's information.

      Colson originally, though, told Ehrlichman he had a tape recording of this interview, but when I called him to say I'd like to hear the tape, he said he didn't have a tape, he had a transcript, so I said he should bring the transcript over and we'd review it, and then he said, well, he didn't actually have the transcript, but someone else did, so I asked him if he'd get it, and then he backed off on that and said he'd try but wasn't sure he could. Which sort of shoots some holes into his story.

      The thing was boiling along in that direction, with the Magruder tape being the best thing we've gotten yet on clearing things up at our end, although he does say he will, to a degree, implicate Dean, and to a minor degree, Strachan, and, of course, to a major degree, Mitchell. He-- while we were working on that, Ehrlichman got a call from Colson, who said that he and his lawyer partner, Shapiro, needed to come over immediately and see John. They came over and reported that they've learned that Hunt is going to tell the whole story to the grand jury on Monday at 2:00, which set in a new chain of events, at least on the thinking side, as to whether we can get out in front of them, whether there's a way to bring the whole thing to a focus now, have Mitchell step forward and clean the whole thing up, or have Magruder do his pitch early and get things moving in that way. They apparently also, that's Colson and his partner, have some information about the results of the Vesco grand jury which is also probably going to indict Mitchell, as is a grand jury in Washington that's looking into some contractor named Klein, who supposedly gave money to Mitchell. That is involved in some way in the Vice President matter that he raised with me the other day.

      So, right now we're in the midst of pursuing a whole range of alternatives. Ehrlichman and I met with Dean for quite a while this afternoon to try to run out some of the possibilities and figure whether there's any way we actually can bring the thing to a head this weekend. Ehrlichman's main goal in it seems to be to try to get the thing on the record as having come from the White House, so the President breaks the case and cleans the thing up.

      My view is that it's better to let it run through the grand jury, get the case broken, and then the President can say that this shows, as it certainly does, that he was following the right course right from the beginning of letting the legal process run in the proper way, so that it brings the guilty people to account and protects the innocent people, which all of these hearings and innuendoes have not done. I strongly feel that's the best route for us, but we'll get back at it tomorrow and see what we can develop.

      One interesting point that I didn't mention last night was the long talk I had with Kissinger, who came into my office to say that every time that he meets with the President still, the President starts out by saying are you sure you don't feel we ought to dump Haldeman on this, and Kissinger then makes the pitch for why not, and the President says well, that's exactly my feeling, too, and Henry feels the President is just testing him on this each time, but can't quite figure it out. He feels strongly that I'm being had by Ehrlichman and any others who argue that I should make a statement or be the first one up at the Ervin hearings, because, if I am, that will put the whole focus of the thing on me and set me as the basis for any judgments or actions that they take from there on. He strongly feels that others should do that, that any explanations and so forth should be made by Ehrlichman or some functionary at the White House rather than me. He's somewhat in agreement with the Ziegler theory, which now is that the President should make a statement, but that definitely I should not. If the President does it, it should just be a straight White House statement that covers whatever ground we want to cover. In any event, I'm drafting my statement to have it ready.

      Henry made the interesting comment that, if the President does let me down or let the situation develop to the point where I have to get out, he, too, will leave, because he would refuse to serve in a White House that would permit such a thing to happen. I think he really feels that his own position would be untenable without me here, and also that the same chain of events that would permit that to happen could also get him, and that he'd be better off to get out ahead of time. Besides that, I think he has some desire to get out anyway, and would use this as a means of doing so. In any event, I don't think the President has that in mind, because his conclusion generally comes out that they've got to keep me covered.

      In any event, I don't see how there's any way that they can gain anything by dropping me anyway, because the case simply doesn’t hold, especially now, of course, but I mean even before the developments of today. Today's developments pretty well lock the thing on Mitchell and Magruder, with a few others possibly falling with them. The President now is very concerned, as would be expected, about Mitchell and Jeb, but especially Mitchell and is adamant that we are not to be the ones to bring him down, which, of course, we won't be, since the case is 90 percent made already. As everybody's been saying, we come closer and closer to the moment of truth, and this finally may well be it. We'll determine tomorrow morning what immediate steps to take, and there's a strong feeling that now is the time to take them.

      End of April 13.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974

    Summit Preparations; Jackson-Vanik Amendment; Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, December 1972-April 1973

    Vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

    Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

    Vol. XXXIX, European Security

    Opening Negotiations, December 1972-July 1973

    • 136. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 13, 1973, 10:05-11:03 a.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office.

    Vol. E-3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973-1976

    Drug Control, 1973-1976

    • 147. Memorandum From the Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (Miller) to Members of the Opium Shortage Committee, Washington, April 13, 1973

      Miller updated the committee members on discussions with pharmaceutical manufacturers’ representatives about an anticipated licit opium shortage and potential government responses.

      Source: National Archives, RG 170, Acc. # 89–0022, Box 1. No classification marking. The Committee on Opium Shortage included representatives from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Food and Drug Administration, the Special Action Office on Drug Abuse Prevention, the General Services Administration, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. A memorandum from Ingersoll to Krogh, January 17; National Archives, RG 170, Acc. # 89–0022, Box 1, Opium Shortage Study, indicated that the stockpile consisted of 847,974 pounds of opium and 42,000 pounds of morphine.

    Vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976

    Bolivia

    • 61. Letter From Bolivian President Banzer to President Nixon, La Paz, April 13, 1973

      Summary: Banzer informed Nixon that he was disturbed by the announcement of the sale of U.S. reserves of strategic minerals, which, by depressing tin prices, would harm the Bolivian economy. Banzer noted that no amount of U.S. assistance could compensate for the lower tin prices.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, President Banzer, Bolivia, 1971–1974. No classification marking. The text is a translation prepared by Language Services; Banzer’s original letter in Spanish is ibid. On April 6, Banzer expressed similar concerns to U.S. officials in La Paz. (Telegram 1961 from La Paz; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Nixon’s reply to Banzer’s letter is referenced in the source note to Document 63.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)