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June 28, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, June 28, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, June 27, 1971

Next Date: Tuesday, June 29, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

  • The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents made available transcripts of the President's news conferences; messages to Congress; public speeches, remarks, and statements; and other Presidential materials released by the White House.

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  • Each Public Papers of the Presidents volume contains the papers and speeches of the President of the United States that were issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary during the time period specified by the volume. The material is presented in chronological order, and the dates shown in the headings are the dates of the documents or events. In instances when the release date differs from the date of the document itself, that fact is shown in the text note.

    To ensure accuracy, remarks have been checked against audio recordings (when available) and signed documents have been checked against the original, unless otherwise noted. Editors have provided text notes and cross references for purposes of identification or clarity.

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

    No Federal Register published on this date

  • The Congressional Record is the official daily record of the debates and proceedings of the U.S. Congress.

  • Decided

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, June 28.

      The President had breakfast with Speaker Albert this morning and says he really laid it on the line with him, regarding the problems created by the Mansfield Amendment and the serious potential damage to negotiations. He says that Albert seriously doubts that the House will have hearings on the New York Times papers, that they're going to hold up on that, but he is concerned that they will eventually move ahead on some adverse action on Vietnam. The President made it clear to him that if they screw up the negotiations, he will call them off, bring Bruce home and announce the reason why is the Congress––in other words, put the blame on them. He felt that he had Albert pretty well shook by this.

      Kissinger was in this morning, reviewing his schedule for announcements. As of now, he expects to announce on July 15 that we will be sending Bruce to Peking in October, and that's all we'll say at that time. Then on July 25, we would announce the end of our combat role in Vietnam. On August 1, we would announce the Russian Summit. In September, we'd have the Russian Summit. In October, Bruce would go to Peking, and in November, we would announce the President’s China visit. He feels that by October 1, we'll be out of the negotiation phase, and that will be settled; so some time prior to then we'll be able to announce the negotiations.

      The thought of both the President and Henry on the July 15 announcement on China is to take five minutes of prime time at 8:00 California time for the President to go on. The President made the comment then that we're sitting now at a great watershed in history, clearly the greatest since World War II. Henry interjected that he considered it to be the greatest since the Civil War, as far as the overall effect on the nation. We then got into some discussion of who goes to Peking. Definitely, Rogers would. Then the President raised Mansfield and Scott, which both Henry and I are very much opposed to. The President made the point that Henry must get an agreement out of Chou En-lai that no Democrat is to go to China before the President goes. The question was also raised as to how we postpone the UN date.

      As the day went on, we got into a monumental flap vis-à-vis Kissinger and the State Department, as Henry discovered in the New York Times an article that indicated that Kissinger would be going to Peking as the President’s representative sometime in '72. Henry's convinced that Rogers leaked this on purpose, in an attempt not to-- in an attempt to try and stop Henry as the negotiator with the Chinese and to break off his relations with Dobrynin. The same story had a number of accurate reports on changes in Ambassadorial assignments, which Henry feels were just put in to validate the other points. The President then told me to call Rogers, tell him that the President was damn distressed about this, that these leaks were very embarrassing and that, therefore, he's withdrawing all the Ambassador appointments and will reconsider them, and that he's doing this as a means of discipline within the Administration. After he thought about it, he decided not to raise this question with Rogers; it would only escalate the China question, which he doesn't want done. He told me to talk to Haig about keeping Henry calmed down, because there's nothing we can do; we just have to play out the game. He also said to order Ziegler to make the point that we have no comment on these speculative stories.

      The President met with his economic group: Connally, Shultz, Flanigan, Peterson, the Council of Economic Advisors, Hodgson, and Stans, who was unable to be there. And really cut loose on them this morning. He sat all alone on his side of the Cabinet table. The rest of them lined up on the Vice President’s side. As he started talking, a thunderstorm hit, and there were loud claps of thunder outside.

      He made the point that he has made a number of tough decisions regarding foreign policy in recent weeks and months, that before each of them there was a lot of opposition, from Defense, State, Joint Chiefs, etcetera, and that some of them had gone to the extreme of sending memoranda in after the decision was made, but before it was announced, giving the Department's view on the decision. He said that it's perfectly all right for them and others to do this, but the right way to express a dissenting view is in the form of a memo to the President, with the clear understanding that the memo is for the President. He then injected sarcastically, that he'll be sure once he's received it that it's marked Top Secret, so it will get out in all the newspapers. He said that we cannot have a debate in the press; it must be a debate inside, because the President must know all the views. It's fine for them to go ahead and make the record to protect their place in history, but it's unconscionable for any member of the Administration to go out and talk ahead of the decision, saying what's under consideration. This compromises the ability to make the decisions freely. It breaks the news impact of the decision, and it creates uncertainty and, by that, a lack of confidence. We cannot tolerate uncertainty by Administration people stating their views on the record.

      He made the point that the one who goes up or down on any of these decisions is not you, it's the President. If it works, I’ll give you credit; if it doesn't work, I’ll keep your views a secret. Then he referred to Cambodia and the fact that a number of people who had written memos to him on Cambodia were very happy that he had not made them public, since they were all opposed, and it had turned out to be a great success.

      Then he said the decisions on the economy now are final; we will not have a wage price board. We will have jawboning, but his way. There will be no change in tax policy now, and he doesn't want any discussion now regarding the possibility of a change in policy later. To have any confidence, there must be certainty. To have certainty, there must be one voice. So he's designating one man, the Secretary of Treasury, as the economic spokesman. He's ideally suited for this role because he doesn't leak things in advance, he doesn't whine around after a decision. The implication was quite clear here. He said that everybody in this room will follow the line announced by the Secretary of Treasury, or on occasion by the President. He knows this will be hard, because you're all experts. He then said, "I sat in that chair as Vice President for eight years, and if I disagreed, by God, I always told the President; I never told the press." There will be no more of this crap. I will hold the head of the office responsible, and he's fired if some of the-- any of this is violated. There must be a united front, from everyone in the Administration. We have a plan, we will follow it, we have confidence in it. No guidance is to be provided to the press, off the record or any other way, falling into the old shell game. Don't tell any press man anything that you don't want to see in the paper. If you can't follow this rule, or if you can't go along with the Administration decision, then get out. None of you are responsible, I am, and I'm taking the responsibility and it will work. You speak out only for the purpose of supporting the line.

      Having said that, he got up abruptly and walked out of the room, leaving them all pretty much gaping. He had Henry and me sit in, as did Ehrlichman. Henry was ecstatic afterwards and made the comment that was one of the great moments here.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      PRIVACY- Reviewed and released under Deed of Gift, DR, NARA, September 11, 2014
      Audio Cassette 10, Side A.
      Duration: 16 seconds

      He had a session with Rose and me about the Drown problem and his great concern that they’re going to ruin his California stay. Wants me to have Kalmbach take care of that for him.
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      Also apparently Rose got in and complained that she was not directing the guest list situation and that Alex had loused things up for her on that. So I’ve got to straighten that out with Alex.

      The President has dinner tonight with Chowder and Marching.

      End of June 28.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings.

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

    South Asia Crisis, 1971

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    "One of Two Routes": Soviet-American Relations and Kissinger's Secret Trip to China, April 23-July 18, 1971

    • 265. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 28, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Young forwarded a draft of this memorandum and another summarizing it for the President to Kissinger and Haig. On the issue of whether to forward the memoranda to Nixon, Kissinger wrote: “Just file.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting, which was held in General Hughes’s office, lasted from 2:34 to 3:29 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

    Vol. XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972

    Republic of Korea Troops in Vietnam and Force Modernization, April 1971-December 1972

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972

    Turkey

    Vol. XXXIX, European Security

    MBFR and the Conference on European Security, December 1970-December 1971

    • 65. National Security Decision Memorandum 116, Washington, June 28, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDMs), Nos. 97–144. Top Secret.

    Vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972

    Portugal

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards International Production and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs

    • 201. Telegram 116137 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, June 28, 1971, 0114Z

      The Department laid out the exact terms of Ambassador Handley’s agreement with the Turkish Government over opium control in order to avoid any potential misunderstanding.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Drafted by Pugh; cleared by Davies, Sisco, Connally, and Saunders; cleared in draft with Williams and in substance with Ingersoll and Wellman; and approved by Rogers.

    Vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972

    Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention

    • 232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, June 28, 1971

      Kissinger forwarded Fulbright’s April 5 letter (misdated March 5) on the Geneva Protocol, which indicated the Committee’s support of the Protocol, but cited contentious issues that needed to be addressed before it could be ratified. Kissinger, given the deadlock in the Senate over the Protocol, then requested a careful review of the situation.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Helms, Smith, Moorer, and David. Regarding the proper date of Fulbright’s letter, see the attachment to Document 230. According to an undated, unsigned note attached to Document 272, a secretary in Fulbright’s office erroneously typed March 5 prior to sending the letter to the White House.

    Conferences on Nuclear and World Disarmament and Soviet UN Initiative on Non-Use of Force

    • 326. National Security Study Memorandum 132 (Revised), Washington, June 28, 1971

      The President directed that a preliminary analysis be made of the issues involved in a five-power conference as proposed by the Soviets and provided guidelines regarding the U.S. position on the conference to be used in diplomatic contacts and press statements.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Moorer.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)