



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, June 28.

The President had breakfast with Speaker Albert this morning and says he really laid it on the line with him, regarding the problems created by the Mansfield Amendment and the serious potential damage to negotiations. He says that Albert seriously doubts that the House will have hearings on the *New York Times* papers, that they're going to hold up on that, but he is concerned that they will eventually move ahead on some adverse action on Vietnam. The President made it clear to him that if they screw up the negotiations, he will call them off, bring Bruce home and announce the reason why is the Congress—in other words, put the blame on them. He felt that he had Albert pretty well shook by this.

Kissinger was in this morning, reviewing his schedule for announcements. As of now, he expects to announce on July 15 that we will be sending Bruce to Peking in October, and that's all we'll say at that time. Then on July 25, we would announce the end of our combat role in Vietnam. On August 1, we would announce the Russian Summit. In September, we'd have the Russian Summit. In October, Bruce would go to Peking, and in November, we would announce the President's China visit. He feels that by October 1, we'll be out of the negotiation phase, and that will be settled; so some time prior to then we'll be able to announce the negotiations.

The thought of both the President and Henry on the July 15 announcement on China is to take five minutes of prime time at 8:00 California time for the President to go on. The President made the comment then that we're sitting now at a great watershed in history, clearly the greatest since World War II. Henry interjected that he considered it to be the greatest since the Civil War, as far as the overall effect on the nation. We then got into some discussion of who goes to Peking. Definitely, Rogers would. Then the President raised Mansfield and Scott, which both Henry and I are very much opposed to. The President made the point that Henry must get an agreement out of Chou En-lai that no Democrat is to go to China before the President goes. The question was also raised as to how we postpone the UN date.



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As the day went on, we got into a monumental flap vis-à-vis Kissinger and the State Department, as Henry discovered in the *New York Times* an article that indicated that Kissinger would be going to Peking as the President's representative sometime in '72. Henry's convinced that Rogers leaked this on purpose, in an attempt not to-- in an attempt to try and stop Henry as the negotiator with the Chinese and to break off his relations with Dobrynin. The same story had a number of accurate reports on changes in Ambassadorial assignments, which Henry feels were just put in to validate the other points. The President then told me to call Rogers, tell him that the President was damn distressed about this, that these leaks were very embarrassing and that, therefore, he's withdrawing all the Ambassador appointments and will reconsider them, and that he's doing this as a means of discipline within the Administration. After he thought about it, he decided not to raise this question with Rogers; it would only escalate the China question, which he doesn't want done. He told me to talk to Haig about keeping Henry calmed down, because there's nothing we can do; we just have to play out the game. He also said to order Ziegler to make the point that we have no comment on these speculative stories.

The President met with his economic group: Connally, Shultz, Flanigan, Peterson, the Council of Economic Advisors, Hodgson, and Stans, who was unable to be there. And really cut loose on them this morning. He sat all alone on his side of the Cabinet table. The rest of them lined up on the Vice President's side. As he started talking, a thunderstorm hit, and there were loud claps of thunder outside.

He made the point that he has made a number of tough decisions regarding foreign policy in recent weeks and months, that before each of them there was a lot of opposition, from Defense, State, Joint Chiefs, etcetera, and that some of them had gone to the extreme of sending memoranda in after the decision was made, but before it was announced, giving the Department's view on the decision. He said that it's perfectly all right for them and others to do this, but the right way to express a dissenting view is in the form of a memo to the President, with the clear understanding that the memo is for the President. He then injected sarcastically, that he'll be sure once he's received it that it's marked Top Secret, so it will get out in all the newspapers. He said



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that we cannot have a debate in the press; it must be a debate inside, because the President must know all the views. It's fine for them to go ahead and make the record to protect their place in history, but it's unconscionable for any member of the Administration to go out and talk ahead of the decision, saying what's under consideration. This compromises the ability to make the decisions freely. It breaks the news impact of the decision, and it creates uncertainty and, by that, a lack of confidence. We cannot tolerate uncertainty by Administration people stating their views on the record.

He made the point that the one who goes up or down on any of these decisions is not you, it's the President. If it works, I'll give you credit; if it doesn't work, I'll keep your views a secret. Then he referred to Cambodia and the fact that a number of people who had written memos to him on Cambodia were very happy that he had not made them public, since they were all opposed, and it had turned out to be a great success.

Then he said the decisions on the economy now are final; we will not have a wage price board. We will have jawboning, but his way. There will be no change in tax policy now, and he doesn't want any discussion now regarding the possibility of a change in policy later. To have any confidence, there must be certainty. To have certainty, there must be one voice. So he's designating one man, the Secretary of Treasury, as the economic spokesman. He's ideally suited for this role because he doesn't leak things in advance, he doesn't whine around after a decision. The implication was quite clear here. He said that everybody in this room will follow the line announced by the Secretary of Treasury, or on occasion by the President. He knows this will be hard, because you're all experts. He then said, "I sat in that chair as Vice President for eight years, and if I disagreed, by God, I always told the President; I never told the press." There will be no more of this crap. I will hold the head of the office responsible, and he's fired if some of the-- any of this is violated. There must be a united front, from everyone in the Administration. We have a plan, we will follow it, we have confidence in it. No guidance is to be provided to the press, off the record or any other way, falling into the old shell game. Don't tell any press man anything that you don't want to see in the paper. If you can't follow this rule, or if you can't go



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along with the Administration decision, then get out. None of you are responsible, I am, and I'm taking the responsibility and it will work. You speak out only for the purpose of supporting the line.

Having said that, he got up abruptly and walked out of the room, leaving them all pretty much gaping. He had Henry and me sit in, as did Ehrlichman. Henry was ecstatic afterwards and made the comment that was one of the great moments here.

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Audio Cassette 10, Side A.

Duration: 16 seconds

He had a session with Rose and me about the Drown problem and his great concern that they're going to ruin his California stay. Wants me to have Kalmbach take care of that for him.

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Also apparently Rose got in and complained that she was not directing the guest list situation and that Alex had loused things up for her on that. So I've got to straighten that out with Alex.

The President has dinner tonight with Chowder and Marching.



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End of June 28.