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October 29, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Sunday, October 29, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Saturday, October 28, 1972

Next Date: Monday, October 30, 1972

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    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

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  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

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Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Annotated and Unmarked News Summaries [Note: Although there was no News Summary on this date, due to the way News Summary products were compiled, you should also consult nearby days for potentially relevant materials.]

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Sunday, October 29.

      We had to go into today for the surrogates' briefing. The President was going to open for five minutes, but talked for a half an hour. Made the point that on the final week, with all the rumors that will be coming, that we must be confident, positive, not defensive. Lay out the positive line, emphasize get out to vote. Highlight the issues, but emphasize four or five key points. Get people thinking about our issues, not theirs. Draw the line positively, with no name calling, but hit hard. Go for a "vote for", not just a "vote against". On the corruption issue-- it's libelous and slanderous, it should be answered quickly, but not stay on it.

      The two big issues, are peace and pocketbook. Regarding pocketbook, the economy is moving up, we have the highest rate of growth, the lowest inflation of any major industrial nation, we're doing better than anyone else has done with the economy. We should continue these policies to hold down the cost of living. The choice here is that we continue the controls that are keeping the cost of living down; they would go back to the policies that failed. On taxes --we have a flat commitment, no increase, we can keep it by the vetoes. They would go for higher taxes, their budget would require a 50 percent increase. On higher prices --they go for a 100 percent parity in voluntary controls, and they would add 35-80 million with the welfare rolls. We're not satisfied with their record, we want more growth and more jobs. We want full employment without war and without inflation. A subsidiary issue, he feels, is crime and law enforcement, we've stopped the increase in crime, we've declared an all-out war against narcotics, and we've made nonpermissive court appointments which all should be emphasized. In foreign policy-- he referred to in detail the stop on the motorcade yesterday, where the family had a sign out saying, "please shake hands. No amnesty. Our son was killed in Vietnam." He gave a very personal, quite a long talk about the handshake, referring to his mother's hands and her hard work, and these people's hands and their hard work. And he made the point of peace with honor, not surrender; guarantee the POW's not begging; South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have a total cease-fire, not just Vietnam. That we're building a foundation for a lasting peace. He referred to the trips to Peking and Moscow, that was getting to the heart of the problem with peace, that we refused to let Vietnam obscure the big picture, especially in a historic year of 1972, where we've really developed a chance for peace for a generation. He got to the point that they may feel or wonder whether the campaign was worth it.

      Then he talked about the beautiful people who sit on the beach here, and play on the tennis courts in Newport and Palm Beach. And said but you're the lucky people, they aren't, it was hard and all that. And then talked about the de Gaulle quote about France. And then said that he feels that it's true of a person, that he's never his true self, his complete self, unless he's engaged in a great enterprise, and that we all have played a part in such an enterprise. Then he said I'm a tough anti-Communist, but I'm not anti-Chinese, anti-Russian, or anti-Polish.

      Ehrlichman hit two issues, corruption and vetoes. On corruption, he said that we should use every question as an opportunity to talk about our issues. The problem is the number of charges with no evidence and it's hard to prove a negative. If you deal with the charges on the same plane as they're made, you'll lose. We must move the answer to what you want to say. He used Chapin as an example, and the fact is, that his duties at the time he was supposed to be running the sabotage thing were to put together the Chinese and Russian trips. He made three trips to China, spent hours in that situation room, etcetera. He referred to the Sperling article, saying that the issue is not significant, because the public is unwilling to impute liability to the President on the basis of the charges offered. So, you should move from the Chapin question, and his great responsibility for these trips, and then move to a discussion of the trips and foreign policy.

      He referred to the Post article on me, and said to take that as a case study. The sources were based on two reports, and both of them have been denied. So we should make the point of how hard it is to prove a negative. On legislation, he said, the vetoes are to hold the spending in line. Regarding the Water Bill veto two and half years ago, the President sent up a $6 billion bill, which is all that can be spent. This new bill left no discretion to stop the cash flow, and our highest priority will be a new Water Bill. On the HEW veto, a continuing resolution covers the current needs, so we haven't stopped the work of the Department. The veto holds level at '72, avoids a compulsory half billion over the budget. We won't do this extra spending, because we're fighting inflation and fighting new taxes, we're building the buying power of the dollar. Also, he hit the point that the President is obliged by the Congress now to analyze 132 bills, which is 20 percent of their two year's work. While in this period, when he also has to run a political campaign and work out the war ending, which is all a good answer to hiding in the White House.

      Al Haig hit the Vietnam agreement -- the specific points: First, an international cease-fire in South East Asia, North and South Vietnam, end the bombing and the mining; second, a release of all POW's and all data on MIAs. Third, a return of all United States military forces in 60 days. Fourth acceptance of the continuous government of South Vietnam, with its leadership, its army, its police and its structure. In other words, this is not a coalition government. The details of working out the future would be left to the NLF and GVN. Five, a tripartite commission to advise and counsel only regarding democratic re-elections. So, in essence, we've moved Hanoi from a solid position that we impose a Communist government, and dismantle existing governments and armed enforcers to hold the present government. Six, the ban on the introduction of personnel and supplies to South Vietnam, except for replacement of equipment. Seventh, it preserves the territorial integrity of Cambodia and Laos, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from those countries. Eighth, provides an interlocking supervisory bodies, and an international conference within thirty days. He says this is a very major achievement and a major concession on Hanoi's part.

      He then pointed out how it varies from McGovern's position. He would withdraw totally in 90 days unilaterally, he would leave the return of POW's to the good will of Hanoi, where we have a solid commitment in 60 days. He would leave Asians fighting Asians; we have a succession of the end all fighting. He would not include Cambodia and Laos; we've locked them in firmly. He would withdraw all support from Thieu and the GVN, and, in the short term, this would mean a Communist takeover with the blood baths, and so forth; where we have continuity of the GVN and have turned over the solution of the long-term to the parties involved.

      Then, he turned to why and how did this happen. First, the May 8 decision to bomb and mine had a major effect on Hanoi's political politburo. Second, the President has always viewed this in the total context, and Peking and Soviet trips were very significant regarding their support of Hanoi. Third, the November 3 speech in 1969, which outlined the course of Vietnamization, and meeting the challenges that came along the way, plus Cambodia, Laos, May 8. On all, we moved positively and strongly to each challenge, we got there, not from softness, naivete, or compromise, but from strength, determination to do the right thing, even if it stirred up opposition. Where do we stand now? We would not have gone public, Hanoi forced it. They went public on their own, so Kissinger laid out the precise status in his press briefing. Its Hanoi who is pressing hard for a fast settlement, why?: One, because they're fearful of a victorious President, after November 7, and that he would be less compromising; and two, on the battle field they have optimum conditions for a settlement now, because they have their troops in place. They could claim maximum control, but this is largely a facade, which will shrivel fast. We've insisted that Saigon's views be given appropriate weight, the President has instructed that we will not be stampeded into a precipitous settlement with any loose ends, and we've got to get them worked out. But once, they're nailed down and will settle as quickly as possible. Given the goodwill of Hanoi, we expect we'll work this out within a matter of weeks. We have a promise, therefore, of long term peace in Southeast Asia.

      Bill Rogers then emphasized the President's overall accomplishments -- that peace is the overriding issue, but it's like good health, you don't talk about it unless you don't have it. Negotiation versus confrontation, which the President talked about. Bill compared to now versus 1968 -- in all areas where we now have negotiations underway: Korea, the North and South are having their first discussions because of the President's leadership, we've lived up to our treaty obligations; Laos -- the government and the Pathe et lao -- that they are now negotiating; India and Pakistan are having their first discussions in memory; Cypress-- Greeks and Turks are discussing; East and West Germany are negotiating. Overall, the world is more peaceful, we came into office with two and a half wars going, Vietnam, Nigeria, and the Middle East. Now there's a cease-fire in the Middle East, we've ended the war in Africa, there are no casualties in Vietnam, and we're withdrawing from there and from other areas. Also, conditions are much more peaceful in the US-- the campuses, streets, and so forth. We should emphasize that President Nixon is the world leader in the positive peace, and recognized as such throughout the world. One of the big pieces of evidence is the Soviet support of his re-election, in spite of McGovern's plan to surrender in Vietnam and in effect to the Soviets. We tend to forget the image the President has throughout the world. But all of what he's done is not for plaudits or bouquets, but because he's building a structure for peace. We have scheduled now the European Security Conference next year, the NBFR Conference in mid-year, Middle East negotiations, hopefully. He hit McGovern's proposals to abandon Taiwan, and recognize the PRC, even the PRC didn't ask for that. On the Japanese seat in the Security Council, we had already done it. And dropping Latin- American Treaty relations would be a disaster. He emphasized that we follow a bipartisan policy, based on mutual security since WWII, and that Vietnam is a question of national morality. We have fought with the Vietnamese and have committed to support them, to prevent a Communist takeover by force. They've relied on us, and we've got to back them up. McGovern wants to get out, with no agreement on POW's, just hope, and take all our equipment with us, and provide no more economic aid. This would be directly contradictory to all we have stood for, it would assure the direct collapse of South Vietnam, complete surrender to the enemy. We should answer McGovern head on, it's deceitful and he knows it. Regarding the point that it was timed for the election, that we could have done it before -- Hanoi answers that, because nothing could have been done before October 8th, this is bunk, a disgraceful comment, he knows better. Someone should ask McGovern if he still supports his Vietnam policy. Now that we have these concessions from Hanoi, does he still support his policy 1000 percent? If not, he has to agree with the Nixon proposal, if so, we can hit him on the fact that the Nixon proposal is much better.

      End of October 29.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

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  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24-December 13, 1972

    • 78. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan), Washington, October 29, 1972, 12:10 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 16, Chronological File. No classification marking.

    • 79. Letter From President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu, Washington, October 29, 1972

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1). No classification marking. In a conversation with U. Alexis Johnson on October 31, 6:15 p.m., Kissinger commented: “Yeah, we sent a really scorching Presidential message to Thieu.” (Transcript of telephone conversation; ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 16, Chronological File) Reviewing the letter at Kissinger’s request, Bunker wrote: “I think the President’s letter could not be improved upon in substance or tone. It is exactly what is needed at this moment if Thieu is to be prevented from painting himself inextricably into a corner.” (Backchannel message 241 from Saigon, October 30, 1055Z; ibid., NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1))

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Persian Gulf States

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

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Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)