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March 9, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Thursday, March 9, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Wednesday, March 8, 1972

Next Date: Friday, March 10, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Thursday, March 9th. At the staff meeting this morning, Shultz came up with an interesting point that he's been analyzing Connally and feels that he has a totally different point of view regarding his basic approach to politics. Whereas, we feel that we should meet each problem as it's shown in the polls and worry about how the statistics play and so forth, such as the triggered unemployment benefits that are now going out. He thinks it's a mistake to worry about the bits and pieces that we overreact and worry too much. When things are going your way, you should just let them go, not worry, work on each little thing that we're too antsy. That we should just stick with our program and defend it. We have a program regarding the elderly, the spending, inflation, so on, we should stick to them. We should brush the other guys off and not worry about them. Thus, he looks at the basics in a totally different way than we do. He's very concerned regarding our overreaction, and thinks we need more of a feeling of stability and confidence. It's an interesting point. My answer to it being, that he's a Democrat and always has been in Democratic at politics where they can do that, because the press is with them. We can't afford that luxury.

      The President got into some political follow-up things this morning, as he had me in for virtually all morning, about, three, over three hours, with Kissinger in and out during that. He had some follow-up on the primary, and some questions on Florida and so on. Then we got into the Rogers problem with Henry, and the President makes the point first, that if we try to change him, we have a huge issue. Second, that we can't put someone in now because we don't have anyone, the only one the President could consider is Rush.

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 19, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 28 [AC-18(B) Sel 19]
      Duration: 39 seconds

      The President told Henry he would see Dobrynin next week and tell him that the President is in charge of the trip. But that we've got to give Rogers some things to work on. The main problem is the Middle East where Rogers said he wants to talk to Dobrynin about it. The President and Henry don't want him to. The President wants to keep for himself South East Asia, China, SALT, the Mideast, and the decision on the European Security Conference. We need our plans on those. Rogers can handle the grain deal, environment, space docking, science, and those things. We have to look at all of this in terms of what the Communists want...
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      ...as, and then the President cited the Whitaker Chambers story regarding Taft and Korea. Saying that Taft's opposition to our going into Korea was wrong, because he was looking at it from the US point of view, where we should be look...

      [End of tape reel AC-19(A)]

      [Begin tape reel AC-19(B)]

      March 9th continued. Talking about the Rogers problem, and the analysis of dealing with the Communists, the President was…

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 19, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 1 [AC-19(B) Sel 1]
      Duration: 32 seconds

      ...making the point that, in our planning for Russia, we have to look at all times in terms of what the Communists want. And he cited Whitaker Chambers story regarding Taft, who opposed Korea, and Whitaker Chambers said he was wrong because the war there was not a war about Korea, it was about Japan, which is the way the enemy looked at it. That we've got to put ourselves in a position of the other party, and analyze what are his problems.
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      We got into the question of Kissinger on television. The President wanted Ziegler to negotiate with Kalb on a cold turkey basis, about the Kissinger interview. If it's on substance only, we're dead. If it's on background, the man, the color, and so forth, then it's worthwhile. So we have to find out: What kind of a show we have in mind? What is the purpose of the interview? The only good to go on is if it adds a new dimension, not just a review of the communiqué and so on. The question of whether the hour will deal with the positive subjects. There’s no point in putting Kissinger and us on the defensive, from our viewpoint, and creating a big stir for nothing. Our plus is the mystique of the trip. How did the trip come about, the President's planning? How the President conducted himself, his insight, technique and so on. So he wants Ron to be the devil's advocate and the question he wants to be added to what's already covered, basically, to find out what he's up to. The President and Henry agreed that Rogers trip...

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 19, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 2 [AC-19(B) Sel 2]
      Duration: 14 seconds

      ...to Poland is okay, but he can't go to Yugoslavia or Romania, because the President has already done that. It'd be gilding the lily. Poland is also more important politically.
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      Mitchell, well, the big thing today was the ITT deal again. I had a staff session where we tried to work on how to turn the thing into some positive PR. Mitchell called in the afternoon, or I called him, I guess, to check out the statement that was attributed to him in the testimony today that the President had told him to get the case settled. He said that, John said this statement had previously been in the Anderson column and in the press before, and that the facts are that Mitchell has only seen Dita Beard once in his life, and that was at the Louie Nunn thing. Mitchell never said anything like this to her, and he'll categorically deny it. He did then do it a little later in the day and it was on the TV tonight. Mitchell also said there's something fishy on the Dita Beard memo, that she's a drinking buddy of Anderson's secretary, and it may be that there's something involved there, and also in the fact that Anderson won't show the memo to anybody.

      Kleindienst called me at home tonight on the whole thing, said that Anderson had piled up today with a whole bunch of wild charges, that the press and TV are not accurately reporting the positive testimony. They’re only covering the sensational stuff today, like linking the President, and so on. As a result of this, Mitchell and Mardian have concluded that there should be a massive White House effort using our facilities to respond. Also, they think the Vice President should hit on the mischaracterization of the press. Mitchell told Kleindienst to call me. He suggested using the White House resources, first, to set up a task force over the weekend to review the testimony versus the newspaper accounts. Second, have the Vice President take it on, third, a general attack by any friendly press, Congress, government, and community people that we can get. He says that tonight Tunney, Hart, and Kennedy asked Eastland to get the SEC inside trading charges against ITT and let them romp through those, which we very definitely don't want them to do. He thinks it's clear now that the Anderson charge has been repudiated, and they're now after bigger game. And for this reason, he sort of regrets his request for the Hearing, especially since it's gone this far, but no one had ever anticipated the press and TV would come up with such unfair reporting. For instance, we could exploit the solicitor general's testimony, but the press haven't, has just barely reported it. He thinks that the fact of Hume injected the President into it on hearsay shows the serious basis that they're working on. He says that he is pretty suspicious about the whole deal now. That his hearing before the Committee for the nomination was a love fest, and everybody patted him on the back, said he was great, and all that. And that at the time he told Mitchell that something was fishy. Then right after they finished the Committee Hearing, the Anderson column came out, and Dick thinks that their plan was to air that in the full Senate and really go after him that way. He thinks that this was all contrived to come after the Committee Hearing and to force a debate on the floor of the Senate. That it's a carefully developed scheme, and that the saving grace for us now is that we've got it back in the Committee, and we're dealing with Eastland instead of with the full Senate leadership. He committed, absolutely, unequivocally, and positively that there was no possibility of any evidence of any kind that would substantiate any charge of wrongdoing on the part of any of our people.

      End of March 9th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972

    Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972

    Preparing for Moscow and Nixon's Trip to China, January 1-March 29, 1972

    • 56. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 9, 1972, 1:15-3:30 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 9 [Pt. 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held during lunch at the Soviet Embassy. This memorandum of conversation was attached to a March 20 summary memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, under which he transmitted the texts of both the March 9 and March 10 memoranda of conversation. A notation on the covering memorandum indicates the President saw it.

    Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972

    China, March-December 1972

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    Narrowing the Issues, October 19, 1971-April 18, 1972

    Vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972

    Western Europe Region and NATO

    Italy

    Vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972

    Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention

    • 251. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 9, 1972

      Guhin indicated that the President had decided not to participate in the signing ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention and forwarded an appeal from Secretary of State Rogers. The appeal noted that the absence of the President was likely to be construed as a rejection of the Soviet’s March 3 démarche (see Document 250) and as appropriate given the leading role the U.S. had taken in bringing the Convention to fruition.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent through Walsh. Below the “Recommendation” line Sonnenfeldt wrote, “I reluctantly concur in view of Sec Rogers’ appeal. HS.” Below that, Kissinger wrote, “Add that Dobrynin has appealed because Kosygin will participate,” presumably meaning that Guhin should add the information to the schedule proposal for the President. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. At the top of the memorandum is written “Rush,” with a line linking “Rush” to Kissinger’s note at the bottom. The schedule proposal is not published.

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 174. Telegram 1381 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, March 9, 1972, 5400Z

      Protesting the trials and executions of anti-government dissidents, students at the University of Tehran staged 2 days of demonstrations, which were ultimately put down by the police.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Paris.

    Iraq 1972

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Guatemala

    • 362. Telegram 1136 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 9, 1972, 1630Z., March 9, 1972, 1630Z

      Ambassador Bowdler reported that the Government of Guatemala was planning to pressure the British to withdraw reinforcements from Belize and warned that the dispute might draw the U.S. into the middle of a “Hemisphere-UK confrontation in OAS.”

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room at 4:30 p.m. on March 9. In telegram 1200 from Guatemala City, March 13, Bowdler reported that he told Herrera, that the “U.S.G. has projected itself into this dispute as far as it has because we value friendship with both countries and wish to see them settle differences in amicable way.” Bowdler also hoped that Guatemala would resume discussions with Britain on the Belize issue and refrain from taking the case to the OAS. (Ibid.)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)