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January 9, 1973

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, January 9, 1973, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, January 8, 1973

Next Date: Wednesday, January 10, 1973

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, January 9

      The President again this morning, first thing, got into the Klein role. Said he'd come up with the solution: that the deal that we should do is to make him counselor with Cabinet rank, with a secretary and a roving assignment so he can sit in on meetings, but not come in to brief leaders and so on. Make him counselor for communications, and have him work as a personal operative with no staff, or operational responsibility. And on this basis he thinks that would solve all the problems with Herb and still get the advantages from him that he thinks we would lose if he leaves. He told me to talk to Klein and say the President’s damned impressed with your personal appearances and so on, but you shouldn't be bogged down with details. You're an enormous effective advocate and salesman, so we should raise your stature to counselor. You would sit in on the Cabinet, some NSC, and leadership meetings, but it would be very clear that there is only one Press Secretary. That the President looks on you as an individual advocate handling phone calls, speeches, and most importantly TV. Things, such as your previous work to program the Cabinet and so on, that would be no longer your responsibility. So, I’ll see what you can do on that. Later on in the day, however, Ziegler got into a discussion of this with the President. And at that point the President felt we should not go ahead with Klein, so we may not have to do it.

      Kissinger called on the phone, reporting from Paris said that we would be receiving a message in an hour or so. The main reason for his call was to wish the President a happy birthday, and that some of what he had been hoping for may be coming to pass. Says he'll be there till Friday, or no later than Saturday. That there will be a proposed schedule coming to us tomorrow -- that we must keep the lid on -- on the matters that we discussed Saturday. That the cable should be confined to the President only, and tell no one else now. And then he said “I mainly wanted to wish the President a happy birthday and express my gratitude to him for letting me serve”. A little later, his report came and it was very good news. He says they got the breakthrough, and, unless the Vietnamese back down, we're in very good shape. The President had Colonel Kennedy in.

      [End of tape reel AC-29(A)]

      [Begin tape reel AC-29(B)]

      Meeting with, this is on January 9, meeting with Colonel Kennedy on Henry’s report. The President said that his guess, in looking at the whole thing, that he's not overly optimistic, that Henry is probably over-evaluating it again. Kennedy, on the other hand, thinks this is it. The President's concern is that the North Vietnamese will back down the hill tomorrow. The President says the only thing that he disagrees with Kissinger on is the massive problem in Saigon. He says he doesn't think it's like it was there now. Kennedy also says he's much more hopeful that we can pull it off with Saigon. Talked about the fact that Haig should plan to go on Sunday, or as soon as possible, but we should not tell him the news today, so that he won't have to lie over there.

      Overall, it's super good news, and the President told Kennedy to send Henry a cable saying this is the best birthday present he's had in sixty years. Obviously, he was very pleased, but he handled it in very cool fashion, didn't tell anyone else, and isn't going to, he says, and I don't think he will.

      He had a series of meetings at his initiative today. First Malek, told Fred to say -- feel free to say the President wants this or that when you're working. Made the point that you're a good manager and a judge of managers, but more important than ability is loyalty. The government must act when we speak, therefore it’s better to have a dumb loyalist than a bright neuter. For IRS, a loyal Jew would be good. It must be a loyalist. We've got to get input from Webster and Colson. The President suggested the idea of inspectors general, such as the services the State Department has, one for every Department and Agency. Have them move around and into the regions. Told Malek to see about this concept. Then he met with Ash and Ehrlichman. Emphasized the need to use Ash to sell the economy and so forth because of his credibility. We need for him to contact Arthur Burns, and he commented that Arthur played a brilliant line in the campaign and deserves great credit. Told Roy not to worry about the attacks, as a designated member of the Cabinet, your status is the same as any Cabinet officer, it's important for the Cabinet to recognize this. He'll sit on the OMB under Shultz and Weinberger, which is just a glorified Budget Bureau, with damn little on management. That you should get a good budget man to rely on, so that you don't worry about the budget details, and spend your time on the management side. Told me to talk to Bryce Harlow at the earliest opportunity and get Bryce to meet with Ehrlichman and Ash on the value of musical chairs and the Budget Bureau relations in Congress. Says the Domestic Council still has responsibility for the political input and we’re relying on the counselors on this. Told Roy to give on the little battles and fight the big ones, especially with Congress. Sometimes it's just not worth the cost to win the little ones. We need to sell the impounding case on the basis of taxes. We can't win on individual programs; we have to transfer the issue, that it leads to an undesirable tax increase. Said we really ought to get a poll thing on whether you favor government spending more if it requires a tax increase, or do you feel it's okay to spend more and have a tax increase. Spend as much time as possible on the Hill, hold hands, say the President asked you to come, and have a frank talk, etcetera.

      He met with Ken Cole, made a pitch to him that Ehrlichman has got to take more PR and Congressional responsibility and that Ken should not pile Ehrlichman up or bother him. Should help him delegate by not taking matters to him. Ken should make the decisions and don't worry about some mistakes; the President will work with him and back him. We don't need to see so much paperwork; we should cut down the volume of paper into the President. We should find occasions to bring departmental people that we’ve now have farmed out to the Departments back into the White House, especially our people from the Domestic Council and so on. Talked about doing the State of the Union in sections which will allow Congressional consultation. Instead of eight stories in one speech, we'll have eight separate stories. He told Cole to call Nelson Rockefeller on his drug deal and tell him the President is totally behind him and that he's on the right side of the issues, it is good to have the governor move out on it. The President hasn't because we don't have a clearance from Justice. Also, the President is personally kicking the asses around the government to get some contracts for New York. Told him to call Rizzo and tell him the President really feels for him on the education thing and to blame all the problems on Shapp.

      Dean reported that everybody except Liddy either has, or will be negotiating pleas of guilty, this is including McCord. Hunt has already settled on a negotiation for a guilty plea on three counts, the others have vague assurance regarding equal treatment and so on. Silbert has a problem with the judge accepting the pleas, but after the opening statement the jury impanelled they’ll take the plea and then the judge will ask if there are any higher-ups, and Hunt will say no. Liddy still has a desire to go to trial, because it puts him in better shape, and he wants to go for a pardon. Colson made the deal with Bittman regarding Hunt. This led to the deals with the other parties, so there is no involvement from the White House, it's all indirect.

      He thinks that we can probably also work Liddy, but maybe shouldn't. They'll take contempt if they're granted immunity, and that may blunt the Congress, too. He wants Mitchell to talk to DeLoach to see what he can get out of him on the LBJ thing, because if he can get that cranked up, LBJ could turn off the whole Congressional investigation.

      Late in the afternoon, the President had a long session with Colson. We got into a discussion of getting someone to buy the Washington Star, which Frank Dale wants to do. Colson made the point that it would be far better to have someone buy the Post. Got into the Webster discussion and the problem with the replacement, where we don't want just a good tax man. The President said we’d do him for the FTC and drop Lou Ainman. And the President told Colson that he needed to have our recommendations regarding PR and attack operations ready to go over with him on Friday morning, evaluating all the players and so forth. Colson says that Brennan has dropped the consideration of Tabor for Under Secretary of Labor, because when he came in to have his interview with Brennan he started talking about how terrible the bombings were, and couldn't we get those stopped, so Brennan told him he could leave. Colson's concerned about moving Webster out. Thinks we can handle it all right though if we can give him the FTC, so I'm supposed to work that out with Ehrlichman. The President left early to go for a drive with Bebe out to see Julie's new house, and then for his surprise birthday party tonight.

      End of January 9.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    America Leaves the War, December 30, 1972-January 27, 1973

    Vol. XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976

    Iran, January-August 1973

    • 1. Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 9, 1973

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Killgore, Henry L. Taylor and Henry Precht of the Political Section of the Embassy, and Escudero; cleared by Killgore; and approved by Heck. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Athens, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Colombo, Dacca, Hong Kong, Islamabad, Jerusalem, Jidda, Kabul, Kuwait, London, Manama, Moscow, New Delhi, Nicosia, Paris, Sanaa, Taipei, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Settlement Accomplished: The Accords Initialed and Signed, January 1973

    • 43. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, January 9, 1973, 9:58 a.m.-3:45 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 866, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, January 8–13, 1973 [January 23, 1973]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at La Fontaine au Blanc, St. Nom la Bretèche. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

      Kissinger began his report for Nixon on the day’s proceedings by stating: “We celebrated the President’s birthday by making a major breakthrough in the negotiations.” Kissinger then explained that he and Le Duc Tho had agreed to phrasing in the text of the agreement about the Demilitarized Zone that reflected the U.S. position, and had also made substantial progress toward finding an acceptable way to sign the agreement. Looking ahead, Kissinger added, “we now have to figure out a way to get Saigon aboard.”

      Kissinger believed that the agreement would be completed over the next few days, possibly by Friday, January 12. He cautioned, however, that the “Vietnamese have broken our heart several times before, and we just cannot assume success until everything is pinned down.”

      Despite the day’s successes, Kissinger let the President know that that progress remained fragile and that a critical element in that progress was the secrecy of the negotiations. On this he wrote:

      “I cannot overemphasize the absolute necessity that this information be confined to the President alone. There must not be the slightest hint of the present status to the bureaucracy, Cabinet members, the Congress, or anyone else. If a wave of euphoria begins in Washington, the North Vietnamese are apt to revert to their natural beastliness, and the South Vietnamese will do their best to sabotage our progress. Furthermore, we cannot afford to raise expectations before everything is firmly in concrete. A great deal of work remains on the protocols. We must keep in mind how often Hanoi has pulled back from agreements before. And we in any event still face a massive problem in Saigon. Therefore it is certainly premature to celebrate even privately.

      “What has brought us to this point is the President’s firmness and the North Vietnamese belief that he will not be affected by either Congressional or public pressures. Le Duc Tho has repeatedly made these points to me. So it is essential that we keep our fierce posture during the coming days. The slightest hint of eagerness could prove suicidal.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 256)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)