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December 6, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Wednesday, December 6, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Tuesday, December 5, 1972

Next Date: Thursday, December 7, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    UN Finances and Reduction of the U.S. Assessment

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24-December 13, 1972

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Middle East Region

    • 35. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 6, 1972

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–212, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 32. No classification marking. Attachments not printed. In an October 6 telephone conversation, Kissinger told Morton that a $10 million project was “symbolically of great interest” to the Israelis and that he should meet with Rabin. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 16, Chronological Files) On October 18, Morton notified Kissinger that he had met with Rabin regarding Israeli plans for desalination and their request for a U.S. commitment of $10 million in support of this program. He included a timeline of significant decisions regarding desalination in Israel. (Ibid.)

    Vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974

    March 16, 1972-March 6, 1973

    • 145. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, December 6, 1972

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (INR); approved by Ghiardi; and released by Weiss. Published in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 239.

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Breakdown of Negotiations, November 1972-December 1972

    • 34. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, December 6, 1972, 10:40 a.m.-3:50 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 31 Boulevard de la Saussaye, Neuilly-sur-Seine. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

      On the day before this meeting, President Nixon sent Kissinger a message with instructions. He was not to go back to the October agreement, but was to follow a course that Kissinger and Nixon both felt would probably lead to a breakdown of the talks. That is, Kissinger was to insist that the agreement now be based on the changes negotiated in the November round. It should also include 1) a better translation of the term “administrative structure” so that the organization established by the agreement to implement the negotiated settlement could not be seen as a governmental structure and 2) a formulation that made clear that North Vietnamese troops in the South had no right to be there indefinitely.

      Furthermore, Nixon’s message continued:

      “You should make the record as clear as possible in the talks that the responsibility for the breakdown rests with the North Vietnamese. You should make a clear record of the fact that they have reneged; first as to the meaning of the agreement on the political side by reasons of the translation problem and second because they have insisted on maintaining the right of North Vietnamese forces to remain permanently in South Vietnam.”

      In anticipation of the possible failure of the talks, Nixon also focused on the military option:

      “Keeping the negotiations going with postponements, etc. is in our interest. In the meantime, however, you can assume that I will order a very substantial increase in military action against the North, including the use of B–52s over the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. I would be willing to order that tomorrow prior to the next meeting. I would like your recommendation on this. In any event we should have the whole salvo ready to go when the talks break down, if they do.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 141)

      In contrast, the Politburo directed Le Duc Tho to return to the October agreement as the basis for a settlement, telling him: “The points that were agreed to on 23 November are not good for our side.” (Message from Politburo to Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, 5–6 December 1972, in Doan Duc, et al., compilers, Major Events: The Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities during the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, volume 4, p. 355)

      In summary, the negotiations seemed to have reached absolute gridlock. While Nixon instructed Kissinger not to return to the October draft agreement, the Politburo instructed Le Duc Tho to insist on a return to it.

      Kissinger replied to Nixon’s guidance several hours later:

      “Assuming the negotiations do break off, here are my further thoughts on our course of action. We will have to take the initiative both on the military front, by drastically stepping up the bombing, and on the public relations front, by seizing the initiative with respect to explaining the negotiations. I should of course give a detailed briefing on the negotiating record which I will make as impeccable as possible from our standpoint before any breakdown. We have a strong case.” (Message Hakto 13 quoted in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 142)

      After the meeting, Kissinger filed the following report to the President:

      “We held a brutal five-hour session this afternoon at our location. Both sides reviewed the present negotiating situation and essentially stuck to their positions. I again emphasized your willingness to make a settlement but only if we got the changes needed to undertake the necessary massive effort with Saigon. Their position remained essentially as it was on Monday, i.e., offering us the choice of returning to the October agreement or exacting concessions from us in exchange for any changes they would accept. All their proposed changes are unacceptable. At the end we decided to make one final effort tomorrow in which I told them we would present our absolute minimum conditions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Tho held to his position that there would be no changes in the provisions of the agreement, but that we could discuss ʻdetails’.” (Ibid., Document 144)

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 239. Intelligence Note RECN–36 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, December 6, 1972

      The report on “Iranian Oil Negotiations” observed that the recent Saudi Arabian agreement on oil participation had inspired Iran to demand a revision of its Spring 1972 deal.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA); and approved by John F. Ghiardi (INR/Economic). Released by Leonard Weiss (INR).

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Bolivia

    • 115. Telegram 6896 from the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, December 6, 1972, 2205Z., December 6, 1972, 2205Z

      Ambassador Siracusa informed officials in Washington that President Bánzer desired to meet President Nixon in Washington. Siracusa discussed how Bánzer’s government was much more pro-United States than the Torres government, and that Bánzer would gain considerable domestic public support from a visit with the President.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BOL. Secret; Nodis. Although Bánzer was scheduled to visit Washington on October 16, 1973, he postponed the visit. On October 2, Bánzer informed the U.S. Ambassador that he could not leave the country during the announcement of controversial economic reforms because there might be significant unrest. The visit was never rescheduled. For documentation on Bánzer’s planned visit to the United States, see ibid., Box 911, VIP Visits, Bolivia President Bánzer Visit 10/31/73.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)