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September 13, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, September 13, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, September 12, 1971

Next Date: Tuesday, September 14, 1971

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    No Federal Register published on this date

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Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

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    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, September 13th. Cabinet meeting first thing this morning. Bill Rogers opened by congratulating Pat on her TV last night. All the Cabinet wives were present and gave her a huge ovation. Shultz then filled in on the background of the economic program, emphasizing that things were good and getting better, but our move was to consolidate it, rather than turn it around. The President, at the end of the Shultz presentation, made the point that there was a big question of dealing with state and local government pay, as well as federal pay. And he caused a laugh by commenting that this is an area where there certainly has been no increase in productivity. Arnie Weber then explained the freeze and how it all operates. And the President turned the meeting over to Connally, asking him to cover the domestic tax thing primarily, not to put too much emphasis on the international, because most of us won't understand it. Connally said that's okay, because I can't explain it anyway. Connally then gave an outstanding pitch that lasted 28 minutes, making the opening point that this Administration, and this President, has to do a far better job on anything they do than other Presidents have had to, because the media is not for this President, or this Administration. And the situation is further aggravated by a Democratic Congress, so we have to do an outstanding job to get even a credible report on it. He then itemized the three problems that had been accumulated from the past administrations: the unemployment, inflation, and erosion of trade balances; gave the rationale for having to take the proposals and then answered the criticisms, making the point that this is not a business bonanza: that the auto and personal exemption tax moves are direct to the people; the job development thing is for small business and farmers, and provides immediate jobs as well as improving our competitive position versus foreign companies. Then on the interest rate question, he says we could have controlled those, but we felt it would be counterproductive, because we couldn't police it, and they've gone down anyway in every category. Regarding dividends, we don't have the authority, but we're moving on that anyway, by persuasion. On profits, you can't control them in a 90-day freeze, because you don't have a base and can't police it; besides, as a percent of gross national product, corporate profits here are the lowest they've been since 1938. We need greater profits, rather than less, to provide investment to provide new jobs. On the criticism that we've given up on revenue sharing and welfare reform, the point there is Congress hasn't acted on it yet, and we're just recognizing the reality of the inaction of Congress.

      Then the President called on Rogers regarding foreign policy problems. Bill emphasized that we need friends in the world, both for foreign trade and for military alliances. The problem is that we haven't been reasonable in dealing with them. We'll have to be in the future, but now we don't want to be, because they're not being reasonable. So we say to them, you help solve the problems for a change. In the past, we've solved all the problems for them. He says we'll go through a period of criticism of the US by other nations; part of it is fully justified, but we shouldn't pay too much attention to it. The strength of our economy, and the fact that we're the world's marketplace, will override all of this in the long run.

      The President then made the point that he wanted to leave the thought that we need a united front, confidence, buoyancy, optimism. We have 65 to 75 percent of all the people going for us on every facet of this program. The people want strong action taken. They understand a bold decision. We can roll over the opposition by skipping the details and the criticism and intricacies; just say the public supports this and you're an obstructionist. He made the point on foreign policy that we have to be responsible, because we're the strongest nation. But we have to have a strong economy to do anything, either in foreign aid or to maintain the nuclear deterrent. So it's to the foreign interest for us to give strong medicine to our economy. Then he got to reminiscing about Khrushchev and the kitchen debate because of his recent death and the TV coverage of it, and...

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 13, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 9 [AC-13 (B) Sel 4]
      Duration: 1 minute 55 seconds

      ...made it, the point that at the Dasha meeting after the Kitchen Debate, with all the wives present, there was a seven-hour talk back and forth covering everything. There were some lighter moments. He made the point that Khrushchev was different than other Communist leaders, because he had great vibrancy, personality, color, humor, where the others are dull, dull, dull. They're smart, but they have no morality. They're solely interested in intellectual give and take. He said that a lot of Westerners underestimated Khrushchev. He drank a lot, but he never drank when it mattered. He then told the story of the first course after the caviar at their dinner was a cold fish that was delicious. And that during the conversation, Khrushchev used Michayan as his end man. He saw that Nixon liked the fish, especially when he asked for a second helping. Khrushchev told Nixon that this was Stalin's favorite fish. Michayan said Stalin had already said that it was good for the backbone. And Khrushchev said you should have more of it; you'd better have a third helping.

      They discussed Stalin's working habits; the fact that he'd call his staff at three or four in the morning. Michayan said we couldn't get any sleep, but we sleep better now with Khrushchev as Premier. And I guess we could say that both ways.

      He then told about the Eisenhower lunch at Aspen for Khrushchev. The meeting had not gone as well as hoped for, and everyone was uptight. Khrushchev was very proud of their space accomplishments. And Eisenhower asked about vacations in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev said everyone is required to take a three-week vacation. And Eisenhower asked where Khrushchev goes for his vacation. And they talked about that a little and Eisenhower said well, I'd try to go away but the trouble is I just can't get away from the phone. Do you have that problem? Khrushchev took this very unkindly and said yes, we do have telephones and we don't have as many as you do now maybe, but we will have more than you have.
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      He said we, we need to have no illusions, the President then said that we need to have no illusions regarding the superiority of our economy; that the impressive thing about the Communist leaders is their total absolute conviction that they're going to win, and their determination to do everything to win. This makes them, who are a less able people, a real challenge in the world. This is true of their scientists, politicians, and so forth; they have great conviction and dynamism. As we look at our leader class versus their leader class, we find that we need the total absolute conviction that our system is right and that it should prevail and that we will win. There's been a tendency for many in this country, not the workers and farmers, and so forth, but among the educated—media, ministers, politicians—to lose the conviction, dedication, and confidence in the United States. If Khrushchev had going for him what we have going for us, we wouldn't have heard, we wouldn't hear a constant running down. The point is, if they, with their terribly inferior oppressive system, could have such dedication, we, with all we have, should have at least as much. So as you go out, speak up, talk strongly for our system, what it is, what it's done for the world. And if you don't, I'll have you back to have some of that fish.

      After the Cabinet meeting, he met with a business group on the Phase II guidance, and then with Bob Dole for a brief report on his Vietnam trip and a general political discussion. Nothing of any significance covered there.

      He then called Governor Rockefeller to tell him he backed him to the hilt on his move on busting up the prison strike in Attica, New York. He assured him he was right not to grant amnesty, and that the President was behind him all the way. It turns out there were seven guard hostages killed, and 32 prisoners, all black. The President made the point again to Rockefeller that we can't tolerate this kind of anarchy, and that he was solidly behind him in his move on it.

      This afternoon, he got into a little harangue on IRS investigations, saying that he had been told by Billy Graham that the IRS is currently investigating him. Fortunately, Connally was there when Graham said it, so Connally got the notes on it and was very surprised, but it is a problem. The President wants now to be sure that we get the names of the big Democratic contributors and get them investigated. Also, the Democratic celebrities, and so forth.

      We had a session with Colson this afternoon, reviewing the general status of our initiative. Things seem to be going very well. One point Colson did make, however, is that he's not been successful in getting Agnew to disavow his YAF support, and he thinks that Agnew's strategy is to try to build his own constituency here. This was a point that concerned the President a little, and he raised it again after the meeting.

      At our Shultz-Ehrlichman dinner meeting this evening, we had quite a discussion of the problem of Pete Peterson, who has not really worked into the position that either he or we want him to be in. I made the point that I don't think he ever would, because he's not basically a staff-type, he's a line manager-type. We agreed that we have to do everything we can to keep him bolstered up as strongly as possible, unless and until we can move him to another post.

      The President met with Hardin this afternoon, and Cliff told him he was planning to leave to take this post with Ralston-Purina that he's been offered. The President told him he should definitely do so, and we have to get a new Secretary of Agriculture now before November 1.

      End of September 13th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

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    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    The Consequences of Operation Lan Som 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8-October 6, 1971

    • 254. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, September 13, 1971, 11:25 a.m.-1:30 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the North Vietnamese Residence in Paris, 11 Rue Darthe. Kissinger noted in a telephone conversation with Nixon, September 8, 3:05 p.m., that Le Duc Tho had not attended the National Day celebration in Hanoi and may have been on his way to Paris. Kissinger told Nixon, “Then it would be clear something will happen.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 11, Chronological File)

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    Between Beijing and Moscow: Summit Announcement, July 19-October 12, 1971

    • 326. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, September 13, 1971, 8:45-10:40 a.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Lord forwarded a draft to Kissinger on September 15; Kissinger initialed his approval. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 19.

    Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972

    China,January-September 1971

    Vol. XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972

    Republic of Korea Troops in Vietnam and Force Modernization, April 1971-December 1972

    Vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972

    Philippines

    Vol. XXI, Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Persian Gulf States

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe, 1969-1972

    Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

    • 58. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 13, 1971

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE. Confidential. Drafted by Baker on September 4. Cleared by Davies, Skoug, and Okun (SOV) and concurred in by Symmes (H), Coerr, Huffman (H), Alexander (USIA), and Strait (OMB). Attached to the memorandum are a copy of S. 18 as amended by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on July 30; a memorandum from Abshire to Haig, August 16, on Congressional strategy regarding RFE and RL; a memorandum from Hillenbrand to Rogers, September 4; and a letter from Kissinger to Rogers, November 1. None is printed.

    Yugoslavia

    • 230. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 129, Washington, September 13, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–185, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 129. Secret. Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group for Yugoslavia. NSSM 129 is printed as Document 227.

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe, 1969-1972

    Yugoslavia

    • 231. Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 13, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 734, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. III 1 Sep 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on September 27.

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972

    Cyprus

    • 381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, Washington, September 13, 1971, 1722Z

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 69–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by DePalma and Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to London, USUN, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and EUCOM. In a September 13 memorandum to Kissinger transmitting the telegram to the White House, Eliot stated: “I am attaching for your information a telegram the Secretary today sent to our Embassies in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia which I thought you would like to see in light of the recent Senior Review Group meetings on the subject.” (Ibid.)

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    From SALT Announcement to Summit Announcement, May 27-October 12, 1971

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Discovering the Possible, May 1971-September 1971

    • 13. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, September 13, 1971, 11:25 a.m.-1:30 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the North Vietnamese Residence at 11 Rue Darthé.

      In a September 13 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger described the discussion as “the shortest meeting on record.” Le Duc Tho did not attend, and they were at an impasse and agreed not to plan another meeting. (Ibid.) Kissinger observed in his memoirs: “The absence of Le Duc Tho could leave no further doubt that we had run out the string on this series of meetings. Xuan Thuy made no effort to say anything new, in effect reading a propaganda speech of the kind put forth repetitively in the plenary sessions of Avenue Kléber. The meeting adjourned after two hours, the shortest secret session ever. We parted with the understanding that either side could reopen the channel if it had something new to say.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1036)

      Xuan Thuy had pushed for the meeting at Politburo direction. In a September 7 cable from Le Duc Tho and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, Thuy was told: “Our strategy for the diplomatic struggle at this time is directly linked to our strategy on the battlefield, so at least for the moment we cannot resolve anything with the Americans and we must instead patiently and steadfastly prolong the [secret] discussions.” (Message from Nguyen Duy Trinh and Le Duc Tho to Xuan Thuy, 7 September 1971, in Doan Duc, et al., compilers, Major Events: The Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities during the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, volume 4, pp. 299–300)

    Vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972

    Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1971

    • 144. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Douglas-Home), Washington, September 13, 1971

      Rogers encouraged Douglas-Home to urge the sheikhs to accept the tentative islands agreement, which represented the maximum that the Shah could offer.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Twinam; and cleared by Davies, Burns, Dowell, and Murphy. In Telegram 167813 to London, September 9, Sisco requested that the Ambassador ask Douglas-Home to consult with the United States prior to the Iranians if the sheikhs’ reaction to the plan should be negative, so that Washington itself could approach the disputing parties if need be. (Ibid.) In telegram 175137 to Dhahran, London, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran, September 21, the Department transmitted Douglas-Home’s reply, in which he said that “Increasingly he [the Shah] may have anxieties about having his bluff called since he cannot want to use force if he can avoid it, thus jeopardising his relations both with the Gulf States and the whole Arab world… He is, of course, as we all know, a very accomplished brinkman.” (Ibid.)

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    Afghanistan, 1969-1972

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Panama

    • 555. National Security Decision Memorandum 131, Washington, September 13, 1971., Washington, September 13, 1971

      President Nixon stated that Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations Anderson would be permitted to inform Panama that the United States would consider the possibility of a termination formula for the Canal Treaties. In addition, Anderson should attempt to obtain a guarantee from the Panamanians that the Canal would be open to all world commerce without discrimination at reasonable toll levels.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–227, NSDM Files, NSDM 131. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman, Joint chiefs of Staff, the DCI, and the Special Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations. Anderson’s August 20 letter to Nixon is referenced in the source note to Document 554.

    Vol. E-13, Documents on China, 1969-1972

    • 19. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, September 13, 1971, 8:45-10:40 a.m., Paris, September 13, 1971, 8:45-10:40 a.m.

      After confirming his upcoming 4-day interim visit to China in October, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger predicted that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would formally invite President Nixon to visit the Soviet Union during his visit to the United States to address the United Nations on September 19.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges, July 1971-Oct 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted by Lord, who sent it to Kissinger under a covering memorandum. All ellipses in the source text. The meeting was held at the Chinese Embassy. Attached but not published are Tabs B-C. Tab A is published in its entirety as Document 20.

    • 20. Message From the Government of the People’s Republic of China to the Government of the United States, Beijing, September 13, 1971, Beijing, September 13, 1971

      The message discussed whether or not the two countries should announce President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s October 20 interim visit before or upon his arrival.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, July 1971-Oct 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

    • 24. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Military Attaché at the Embassy in France (Walters), Washington, September 13, 1971, Washington, September 13, 1971

      Haig instructed Walters to inform Chinese Ambassador to France Huang Chen that President Nixon wanted his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s trip announced during the third week of September in order to avoid the impression that the announcement was a reaction to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to the United States.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, July 1971-Oct 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the message reads: “9/13/71.”

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)