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June 23, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Wednesday, June 23, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Tuesday, June 22, 1971

Next Date: Thursday, June 24, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

  • The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents made available transcripts of the President's news conferences; messages to Congress; public speeches, remarks, and statements; and other Presidential materials released by the White House.

    Digitized versions can be found at HathiTrust.

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

  • The Congressional Record is the official daily record of the debates and proceedings of the U.S. Congress.

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Wednesday, June 23

      President had breakfast with Mansfield this morning and apparently really laid it to him on two points. First, they went into the question of the release of the Pentagon Papers, and the President worked out a deal whereby we will turn the papers over to Mansfield and Albert, and they can figure out how to handle getting them to the proper Congressional committees, etcetera. This puts the heat completely on them. It fits in with Ehrlichman's strategy on the basis that they will then have to hold hearings, etcetera, to follow up on this, which will be an enormous problem for the Democrats to figure out how to cope with.

      The President then, after leading Mansfield on and finishing that up, indirectly led him into the question of the Mansfield amendment yesterday calling for a date certain to end the war in nine months, and the President gave him a basic ultimatum regarding the harm that the Senate did, and he rather happily described this to Kissinger and me and Ehrlichman, who was there for it, in his office. He made the point that we are in the middle of negotiations started-- that started May 31, and we'll know within a month whether the Senate action has ruined those negotiations. If so, the President will have to go on to the people and explain that the reason for the collapse was the action of the Senate, and that Mansfield will have to take that blame. He made the point to us that, if we do get to the point where we have to withdraw because the negotiations failed, he will do it with a total bombing of the North to eliminate their capability of attacking; so in order to get out, we escalate to accelerate our withdrawal.

      Henry was in and out several times in the morning, as he was getting ready to leave for London for his cover-up to his move on to Paris this weekend for the negotiations. The President made the point to him regarding Paris that, this is it: he's got to get it settled, that from here on everything is based on the domestic political outlook, and he's got to realize that. He makes the point, too, that with the Mansfield resolution, now maybe we have the excuse for flushing the whole deal. That we had to make that decision last year, either to stand up or to flush, and we made the decision to stand up, feeling that we'd never have the chance to decide it again. But now we probably do have that chance, because of the Senate resolution; and if the negotiations fail, that may be exactly what we will do.

      On the release of the material, he made the point we won't compromise codes and sources, but we are going to release other materials, and he wants to get Willard Edwards in and get him to have The Trib start demanding papers. He feels that The Times Papers incident is the yellow streak for Hubert, his Chappaquiddick, because he waffled on it. He made the point, in discussion, of his contempt for "swaydo-intellectuals,” which was kind of amusing.

      Regarding the declassification of other papers, he's determined to do everything we can to our advantage, on the assumption that we have only a year to do it, for sure. He wants to move into World War II, Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs and the murder of Trujillo. He wants me to set it up to give someone free rein in these files, and put a full team on it that's absolutely trustworthy and get it all done within this next year. Also, now that we have our man in the IRS, he wants to pull the Clark Clifford file--and also all the top supporters of the doves, the full list with a full field audit--and see what we can make of it on analysis.

      Also, Kissinger has reported to him that Teddy Kennedy is now in the position of practically being a total animal. At the opening of the Kennedy Center, he went to work on Christine Ford, who he had also propositioned at the Carlyle before he went to Paris for de Gaulle's funeral. She was on the thirtieth floor, he on the seventh. He walked up to her floor, said he wanted to screw her, and she said that they couldn't because of the press, and he said that the press will never touch me. He pulled the same thing on Edgar Bergen's daughter, according to Mrs. Bergen. So we need to take advantage of this opportunity and get him in a compromising situation if we can.

      We had a couple of political sessions today, one with Colson, at which he wanted to be sure that we lay off of LBJ, don't defend him, but no overt attack on him. Instead, attack the JFK, Eastern elite. Also, we should lay off the newspapers and go after the thief, playing up the stolen top secret documents. And, on the Mansfield amendment, for those who voted for it have to take the responsibility now for the failure of negotiations, if they do fail.

      We had another political session in the afternoon at EOB with Harlow and Dent, got into the discussion of the Democrat problems, as they go down the road to their convention, and the impossibility, almost, of their arriving at one candidate, thereby the almost virtual necessity of a fourth party. He concluded in that discussion that the basic issue really becomes patriotism, and the bad guys are the ones that make that issue for us.

      This evening we went out on the Sequoia with Connally and Shultz, Ehrlichman and Flanigan. The basic purpose was for an economic discussion and the President had Shultz lay out his view of the current status of the economy, which basically is that it's not as good as we would like, but it is basically going the right way and we should stay with our plan. Connally then pretty much confirmed this, and the discussion then became one of strategy and implementation. Primarily, how to turn off the many voices that are speaking out, so that we can get to a point where we're operating with one Administration spokesman. As a result of that discussion, the President is going to hold a meeting on Monday morning with the CEA and the concerned Cabinet officers and lay down the line to them.

      End of June 23.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings.

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    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    The NSC System

    Vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972

    • 155. National Security Study Memorandum 131, Washington, June 23, 1971

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An earlier draft of this NSSM is attached to a June 16 memorandum for the record by Deputy Executive Secretary Brewster indicating that the study stemmed from a direct Presidential order originating in part from several discussions with Connally, and that Kissinger had already discussed the draft with Irwin by phone. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Expropriation NSSM, NSC Misc. Memos)

    Vol. XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972

    Republic of Korea Troops in Vietnam and Force Modernization, April 1971-December 1972

    • 96. National Security Decision Memorandum 113, Washington, June 23, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 97–144. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

    Vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards International Production and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs

    • 197. Telegram 4337 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, June 23, 1971, 1030Z

      The Embassy reported in detail on a key meeting with Prime Minister ERIM on the opium issue. ERIM agreed to U.S. conditions on eradication, purchase, and anti-opium legislation in return for U.S. assistance to affected Turkish farmers.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Bolivia

    • 103. National Security Decision Memorandum 114, Washington, June 23, 1971., Washington, June 23, 1971

      President Nixon approved Option D for economic assistance and Option B for military assistance of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (IG/ARA) Options Paper.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, NSDM Files, NSDM 114. Secret. Copies sent to the Chairman of the JCS and the DCI. The June 14 paper is Tab B to Document 102. On June 28, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, stating that with regard to the last sentence in the NSDM, “The President’s decision intended to mean that the United States representatives in international agencies should abstain without comment if Bolivian loan requests are brought to a vote.” Copies sent to the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (Ibid.)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)