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July 23, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Friday, July 23, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Thursday, July 22, 1971

Next Date: Saturday, July 24, 1971

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    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Friday, July 23rd. The main activity today was the budget meeting process. I'm missing my notes right now on the morning meeting; I'll add those later on this tape, so they'll have to be picked up. They're quite detailed and important. I'll go on to the period after that.

      Before the afternoon meeting, I reviewed with the President a new Elmo Roper poll, which shows that 64 percent of the people feel that things in this country have seriously gotten off on the wrong track, and only 23 percent feel they're going in the right direction. In asking what they feel the causes of the problems in the country today are: 47 percent say drugs; 40 percent Vietnam; 33, racial tensions; 31, people forgetting the golden rule; 30, the lack of strong leadership; 27, the economic situation. It's kind of interesting the way those stack up. The President was very intrigued by this and came back to it a couple of times later in the day. He wants to be sure that that question gets put into our future polls, and establish a trend line on it. He feels that the reason for this result is quite simple: that people are discouraged regarding the war, that they're mainly discouraged about the kids. Also, there's been an unmerciful beating by ministers, teachers, media, and leaders in general, saying that everything's going to hell. And that this is the basis of our problem, that is, the basis of our Presidential approval problem. The country can't approve of a President, if they think things are bad. So there needs to be an Administration offensive on what's right about America. Some of our successes such as China, Vietnam, etcetera, should have an enormous effect in this direction. It shows, though that what's really needed on the radio series is to pick the big issues and to be hopeful, upbeat, and say we can do something. Problem here is that if people are not satisfied, they will vote for a change in the Administration. We have to hang Congress with the status quo; blame them for the way things are and not us. Make the point that for the first time in forty years we'll have peace and jobs. He raised the question of why the environment wasn't on the Roper list, but it isn't because they gave them the list, and they don't have it on it. He makes the point that we can't just drop the leadership point. It's not a matter of just getting along with the Chinese or having peace. The key of the whole China initiative is that it establishes the authority of the President. If we try, he thinks we can really get this theme across.

      Then at the budget meeting, no, let's see, after the budget meeting, he got into some follow-up on some of the items he had covered in the morning meeting. He wanted me to get back to Cap Weinberger regarding his order to cut HUD, HEW, DOT and the independent Agencies. The point being to cut those in personnel by more than 10 percent, so that we can get an overall 10 percent cut. He wants Cap to give the President a list of the uncontrollables, where legislative recommendations could be made to reduce them, and especially where they're politically desirable for us to cut. He feels that now is the time for us to do dramatic things in the domestic area, to our constituency. He sums up the basic budget thing by saying we've got to come in with: first of all, a lower budget; secondly, a tax reform with a little reduction in taxes included; and third, a 10 percent cut in federal employees. If we can develop that combination, we'll be in good shape.

      He then got onto my cutting the Secret Service by 10 percent, also Rex Scouten and the household staff, and he wants to make sure Kissinger and the Vice President both know that they, too, have to cut at least 10 percent like the rest, as we do in the overall White House staff.

      He told me to get to Ehrlichman and have him work out a recommendation for legislation on busing that will enable him to take direct action, either a constitutional amendment, an executive order, or a law. Then he wanted to get the whole PR group in to push on the man you can trust with world leadership question.

      For the afternoon budget meeting, the basic subject was domestic policy budget, and the presentation was by Ehrlichman and his people. The President started by saying that first he wanted them to reexamine all pollution bills in terms of their current economic effect and put the brakes on where we can, without getting caught. He emphasized that economics and the economy is more important than undercutting Muskie. There's a dead loser in the question of jobs versus seatbelts. He also emphasized that getting credit for passing something in the way of legislation means nothing. It's not our Congress; we can raise hell with them. We won't get credit for anything that goes through; and we can turn the blame for what doesn't go through back to them, if we handle it right. He wants to be sure that Ruckelshaus is made to understand that jobs come first. Also on water pollution, he told them to prepare a veto message. If it's over $6 billion, he'll veto it. He's not going to go for the Muskie bill. He wants to see the effect of the Muskie bill on '73 spending and jobs. Also he said to expect no health proposals to be passed this year.

      He gave an order that there are to be no White House conferences any more for anything, no more commissions, no more councils. Then he said to prepare the veto message for the Economic Opportunity Act, which comes up in June of '72. He wants the Republicans to start working now on the Economic Opportunity Extension, load it down so he can easily veto it.

      Ehrlichman's group then made their presentation on what they considered to be the major issues, going on the thesis that ideology is not important to voters, but issues specifically are. They came up with their main issues being jobs, taxes and inflation, crime and drugs, and then some specific issues for special areas: veterans, agriculture, environment, education, aging, and health. The President established the rule that we should work the good areas, but don't write anyone off. Then they determined that the key states are California, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, Texas, Tennessee, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida. And their whole presentation was based on that concept. Regarding jobs, there are basic problems in California and New Jersey, and moderate problems in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and
      Missouri. No problem at the present time in Texas, Florida, North Carolina, or Virginia. It appears that we can clear up all of these, except leaving a moderate problem of California, Tennessee, and New Jersey, if we can get to 4.5 percent unemployment. Taxes will be discussed at the special session tomorrow. Inflation, they made the point it's increasingly difficult to achieve reductions that will cut inflation. And the President said well we'll consider the plan of wage and price controls in January, but nothing until then.

      Regarding crime, it was pointed out that over half the violent crimes are committed by teenagers; that the best things we can do are code reform, gun control, and criminal.

      [End of tape reel AC-11(A)]

      [Begin tape reel AC11(B)]

      July 23rd continued. I'm in the middle of the second budget meeting on domestic policy and in the middle of the section on crime. Point here is that we can concentrate on getting credit for the good results that we are producing. The President raised the question about prisons and what to do, saying they're a horrible disgrace and we have to do something, not worry about it too much now because there's no political value in it, but it's something we do need to handle. We need to focus on juvenile delinquency, and the President ordered them to get the whole juvenile question out of HEW and move it to Justice. This turns out to be a potent issue in the key states, because one-third of the crime is committed by one-eight, in the areas inhabited by one-eighth of the population. This clearly is potentially our plus issue.

      Next one is drugs. Basically our job is supporting the present program, along with the tougher international line. We need to prove that our program's effective. Important thing is to keep talking about it, underscore the personal identification of the President with the issue. We have to find a way to identify it. At this point, the President made the comment that, "It repels me to demagogue things, except in major areas," which practically broke Connally up, although President didn't notice it.

      On veterans, they feel we can create an issue here that will do us some good. The Vietnam veterans have been overlooked, and the key is to move more things to them. Personally, I think this is a lousy idea and a waste of time and money, but except for some cosmetic-type stuff like Ehrlichman has an idea of sending them a special card that gives them some kind of treatment, special attention, and this card would be sent from the President, which does sound like a good idea.

      On environment, the key is to balance between environment and economy.

      On agriculture, the farmers feel forgotten, but we're dealing with a two-sided coin here on prices: if we get them up for the farmer, we also raise the cost of living.

      Education came in for quite a little discussion. They proposed the voucher plan and tax credits, discussed going for a constitutional amendment for private education support. We need to weigh where things hurt versus where they help. There's a real opportunity here; we should move on it now. At this point, the President said maybe the way to solve it is to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment.

      On aging, we have some big opportunities in terms of population concentration in Florida, Missouri and Illinois, and moderately so in California, Texas, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, New Jersey, Tennes, Virginia, and North Carolina. This is something we need to hypo in the Midwest, and it's fertile ground politically, where there's no ground for us politically with the minorities. We need to do some checking on the question of the appeal of letting old folks earn more money.

      On health, we got into a by-play regarding Mills, and the President's theory was to let Mills get credit for the things that he does, because anything that builds him helps us, because he's not a viable candidate so it takes steam away from other candidates who are. He told Connally to head up a plan to make a deal with Mills, regarding getting credit for these various things. There's no real advantage to our fighting him. We should look at each play, regarding the question of giving Mills credit. It's best to let the liberal Democrats deny him the nomination, rather than our denying it to him, and thus create another break in the Democratic Party. Ehrlichman then wrapped up on the point of the failure of our presentation of what we stand for. He emphasized the issues are not national, they're regional or local; that we need to figure out how to present them regionally, based on the point that each voter individually retains only three issues, and one of them inevitably is peace. He presented some goal themes, but they're all lousy. The President raised the question of the cost of living issue and whether we can do anything on it, and pretty much concluded that we can't. Connally raised the point of how to overcome boredom and avoid decadence. And he suggested the theme of the "Decade of Dedication", which would be the decade of the 70's. He made the point that man doesn't accomplish things in times of fear, only when he has faith and confidence, that we should now shift to the job to do at home, which we can do only with dedication. Ehrlichman pointed out that we're aiming at a theme with the word "new" in it.

      The President then got into some comment on his reaction to the Roper poll, making the point that even with all we have now, physically and materially, peopl are depressed regarding the future. The end of the war will remove one of the depressants. We've got to work on drugs, but we must recognize that when they name that so high on the list, it may just be an excuse. Also though, we have a new factor: since the sixties, we have the enormous influence of the Left-Wing media, who are anti-American. Eighty percent of what they say is negative about everything, and that's where the people get their news. At the schools, the teachers used to lift the students; today they run down the country. They tell them: the system is rotten, society is no good. Ministers don't lift anymore. All the leaders are depressing: the media, the teachers, the ministers. The need in national spirit is very great, but we have a huge problem, even with the war ending.

      This generation has a total negative background. Somehow we have to reach people over the media and over the leaders. We have to give some leadership, somehow. We face a concerted, deliberate attempt, in the media and the other leadership areas, by people who hate the country, who are trying to create the conditions that they describe. The negative result of the Roper poll is the result of this. Connally interrupted to say, you should say this to the people, Mr. President; no one else can set the moral tone of this country. We should have the courage of confidence. The President said we have done great things, and we have great things to do. We've got to make the point on peace and prosperity. We haven't had this, without a war, for forty years. This is something really new in the last four years, a new era, a challenge to keep the peace. The greater challenge: what do we do with the peace? Boredom? What do they do with the time they have? We have to have great challenges. There will be a great vacuum to fill, not just a material one. We've got to get people to realize how lucky they are to be here and to be here now; that we don't create jobs at the cost of men dying. This makes the peace issue. What is this country going to be in time of peace? We need to get a little of the spirit that Americans used to have; even right after World War II, they had it for a short time. The challenge of peace is much greater than the challenge of war. And we're going to have jobs without war. What are we going to build? It's almost impossible to get the media to carry this, because they're against it. They're not like the old muckrakers, who served a useful purpose. Now we have a new leader class that's not fit to lead. People have to believe in the country, but now we have a national obsession to care, tear the country down. This shows the necessity to focus on the main issues, the hell with the Mickey Mouse stuff. We need more than a program. The country needs a purpose. Maybe we have to demagogue it. We've been program-oriented, now we need to be purpose-oriented. So, we should bite the bullet, scrape away some of the programs, put the country in a new direction, but really do it.

      Ehrlichman said we should relate all this to a key note, such as new direction. The war is over; the old programs haven't worked. We need some new directions in this country. The President made a very key point that the Liberals have let the country down, something that we can develop some. The Old Liberals used to be for things and move positively. The New Liberals are totally negative and against everything. The Liberal praise for China is for the wrong reason: they think this proves that China is right, and that we'll now have sweetness and light. That's not true. We've opened a dialogue but we have to live with, look, based on the recognition that we have to live with China, or we're going to die with them, and that's, this is hard to do, because of the other nations. We can also get the point of who gets us into war, the Liberals who are always meddling. For instance, they wanted us to go into Biafra, Pakistan, etcetera; they assassinated Diem, and built up Vietnam.

      The establishment in terms of the intellectual elite, is decadent, and it's wrong. The President is hated so by them, because they're afraid he might beat them.

      That's the end of the notes on the budget meeting. Obviously it was quite a session; it went on quite a long time, I think a little over three hours.

      Afterwards the President had Ehrlichman, Weinberger, Colson, and me join him for dinner on the Sequoia, and we had some more conversation along some of the same lines—nothing very significant.

      Earlier in the day, I talked to Bill Rogers about the President's decision to appoint Dave Kennedy Ambassador to Japan. Rogers didn't receive it very favorably, as I expected he wouldn't. Said he wanted to think about that idea. He would much prefer Dave Packard. I told him that that wouldn't work, but he said we ought to try some more.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 11, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 3 [AC-11 (B), Sel 3]
      Duration: 32 seconds

      He makes the point that the problem here is that the relations with Japan, in the future, are going to be very rocky. And he said that his meeting with the Japanese ambassador was quite moving. He made a plea with tears in his eyes that we understand them, and, and be understanding. They have all kinds of fears, and we need to recognize them. Rogers feels we need to give them a lot of mood music. He doesn't think Sato can last. And he says their upset as hell, and we should be very careful about who we send in as ambassador.
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      End of July 23rd.
    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF) [Budget Insert]
      This is an insert of the budget meeting on Friday, July 23. I was missing the notes for the morning of the 23rd, and I'll add those in here. First of all, in the staff meeting that morning we had quite a blow up as Shultz and Ehrlichman came in first thing in the morning at 8:00, and made the point that they were having problems with Kissinger because he was blocking action on the budget. He won't review the papers that are stacked up for him on the budget, and therefore they can't go ahead with the defense segment of the budget meeting. Also, he's blocking action on the international drug situation and on implementation of the intelligence review recommendations. The problem is he won’t allow anyone to act for him. He has to set up some means of delegating and he hasn't done it. As a result of their complaint, I called Henry and asked him to join us. He came in and Ehrlichman hit him pretty hard with the problem. Kissinger pretty much blew up, said he will not delegate such an important matter as a budget. And Ehrlichman said, well if you can't delegate it, then we're going to have to go around you and get it done. And he said, he would not permit them to go around him as long as he was here. At that point Henry could take no more, got up and walked out of the meeting. And that was the end of that. He did, however, sit in part of the budget meeting a little later in the morning. I walked in late, and at the time I came in, the President was giving quite a po--, powerful lecture on the point that Kennedy, Kissinger has to really cut the Defense budget, but in the right ways. He leveled some violent blasts at officer's clubs, Air Force excesses, and so forth...

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 11, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 5 [AC-11 (B), Sel 5]
      Duration: 2 seconds

      ...said we should drop NORAD and the bombers...
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ...and all that because they are useless and anachronistic. He told Henry to take thirty days and really shake the trees. Said that DPRC is just a brokering group and won't do any good. Henry said the problem is not the DPRC, it's that Laird ignores the DPRC. He says we have to get down to telling them exactly what to cut and where, rather than just letting them slice it three ways amongst the services. In other words, we have to have the President define the missions and tell them what to cut, rather than cutting everything by a certain percentage. So Kissinger wants a basic NSC meeting the first week in August, and he wants to do it, do this at the NSC meeting. Budget ceilings won't do it. They decided, therefore, the President has to determine the defense needs at the highest level. We got into the problem of base closings, said those should be done after November of '72. Henry made the point that they'll never give up a command voluntarily.

      In talking about intelligence, the President said, never has a country spent more for less. No, it's not on intelligence. Just on a general basis, the President said never has a country spent more for less defense than does America. Then he got to intelligence, said we've got to take the same approach there. The CIA tells me nothing I don't read three days earlier in the New York Times. Intelligence is a sacred cow. We've done nothing since we've been here about it. The CIA isn't worth a damn. We have to get out the symbolism; so a 25 percent cut across-the-board, get rid of the disloyal types. He told Henry to take a full month to do it; that it couldn't be done by Shultz or Weinberger; it must be in terms of strategy, not in terms of budget. Then he told Weinberger to commit the, cut the AEC 25 percent in personnel, let the scientists go back to MIT and steal documents.

      Kissinger committed for an NSC meeting in mid-August, on the basis that they've got to hear this from the President. The President then turned to Connally and enlisted his help on all this, too. He then defined intelligence as how to spend $5 billion and learn nothing.

      As they got into the budget presentation, they made the point that the budget is now 72 percent uncontrollable and 70 percent of the controllable portion is in Defense. The President ordered them to move general revenue sharing and family assistance out of the uncontrollables, also the environment; also all of the social programs, he implies he's going to cut them. Then he says he wants a story that we're cutting 10 percent of the government personnel; that people will understand. So cut all civilian agencies 10 percent, Defense 5 percent, in such a way that we can announce it. Wants an example set at the White House. As Cap Weinberger was jotting all these down on a pad, he said in an aside to me, "This is the pleasantest morning I've had in years." I made a note that I couldn't see why we didn't do what we feel is right on the budget; include everything as a controllable, even if it does require legislation to change it; and put it in our budget on that basis; then let the Congress scream, and let them fail to pass the legislation and take the blame for the deficit; so we are in the position of asking for a balanced budget and eliminating our bad, the bad programs which they screw up. I don't see why we ignore the legislative possibilities.

      The President was exploring the possibility of cutting or eliminating the federal pay increases that are programmed, and suggested announcing a wage-price freeze in January, along with the elimination of federal pay increases. He told Connally to think in these terms. Connally made the argument that we should keep the uniformity rules down, so that we don't have to change everything nationwide every time you make a necessary adjustment in one area.

      He ended up saying the base budget for '73 should be $250 billion. They should get down to that without cutting family assistance, revenue sharing or the 10 percent personnel. Said to put Defense at 75 and civilian at 175. Connally urged that we exercise our restraint in the areas of no economic vitality and encourage the areas of possible future vitality. The President, in referring to the 25 percent cut in intelligence, said it won't save a lot of money, but it will do a hell of a lot for my morale. That was the general thrust of that session. And it shook them up quite a good deal.

      End of Budget insert.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)
    • Original audio recording (MP3) [Budget Insert]

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    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    East-West Trade, 1969-1972

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Chinese Representation in the United Nations

    Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

    South Asia Crisis, 1971

    • 104. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 23, 1971, 12:50 a.m.-1:18 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, July 1971. Secret;Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on July 24. The meeting was held in Kissingerʼs office at the White House. The time of the meeting is from Kissingerʼs appointment book. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

    • 105. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 23, 1971, 4:10-5:30 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting was prepared in OASD/ISA by the Director of the Near East and South Asia Region, Brigadier General Devol Brett. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan–Jul 1971)

    Vol. XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

    April-October 1971: Change and Reassessment

    • 83. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 23, 1971, 3:15 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Kissinger approved this memorandum, which Holdridge had sent him under an August 20 memorandum.

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe, 1969-1972

    Austria

    Hungary

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

    • 188. Conversation With President Nixon, Washington, July 23, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, Ehrlichman, Shultz, Weinberger, Cole, Harper, Haldeman, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 544–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation held from 10:25 a.m. to 1:03 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

    Vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards Terrorism, Hijacking of Aircraft, and Attacks on Civil Aviation: U.S. Response to Hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Additional Anti-Hijacking Measures, September 1970-June 1972

    U.S. Policy Towards International Production and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs

    • 206. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 23, 1971

      Nachmanoff discussed the alleged involvement of Panamanian Government leaders in international narcotics trafficking. He recommended that the Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs accept an invitation to send a mission to Panama to discuss narcotics trafficking, but to do so after coordination with other relevant agencies.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 358, Subject Files, Narcotics IV. Secret; Sensitive, Eyes Only. Sent for action. Tabs A and I were attached but not published. Kissinger instructed Nachmanoff to see Haig and suggested that he check with Ehrlichman’s staffers to determine how they preferred to handle the issue.

    International Cooperation in Space, 1969-1972

    Vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972

    Morocco

    • 119. Telegram 3745 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, Rabat, July 23, 1971, 1115Z

      Ambassador to Morocco Stuart Rockwell speculated on the prospects for King Hassan’s regime. While the situation in Morocco seemed to be returning to normal, Rockwell noted that Hassan was trying to rationalize events rather than analyze the causes. Unless Hassan embraced reform, his long term prospects looked dim.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 MOR. Secret. It was repeated Priority to Soto Grande, and to CINCEUR, Madrid, Paris, COMNAVTRACOM, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Casablanca, and Tangier. In telegram 3815 from Rabat, July 27, the Embassy suggested that one consequence of the coup might be an attempt by the Moroccan regime to draw closer to the United States. (Ibid., POL MOR-US)

    • 120. Telegram 134263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, July 23, 1971, 2259Z

      In response to a query by Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo, Under Secretary Johnson offered assurances that the CIA had not been behind the plot to King Hassan.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MOR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. It was repeated Flash to Rabat and Soto Grande. Drafted and approved by Johnson; cleared in substance with Rogers and with Newsom and Eliot. In telegram 101 from Madrid, July 23, Ambassador Robert Hill had transmitted the message from Lopez Bravo that King Hassan suspected the CIA of complicity in the plot against him. (Ibid.) Also on July 23, CIA Director Richard Helms replied to Ambassador Hill: “You may tell Lopez Bravo categorically that neither CIA nor any other element of U.S. Government had anything whatsoever to do with recent plot against King Hassan.” (Ibid.)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

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