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July 20, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, July 20, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, July 19, 1971

Next Date: Wednesday, July 21, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

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Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, July 20.

      President had a Republican leaders' meeting this morning. Briefed them on the China thing and then had Shultz cover the economy. Apparently it didn't go too well, especially the economy part. The President was really fed up with the attitude of the leaders. He told me to tell MacGregor that he's got to avoid these leadership meetings becoming a crying towel. He's got to brief someone to step-up and cheer a little bit. He made the point that if that had been a Democratic meeting, they would have cheered the President’s initiative and been babbling all over about it. And he sighed and said it's such hard work for the President to have to buck them up all the time, which I can certainly understand his concern about.

      Then he had Dole and Timmons in, Dole going through the motions of informing him of-- or getting his views on the Convention site. The President immediately opened the meeting by saying, any of the three sites you have in mind is acceptable to me, and the line you should use in going out to the press is to say we discussed this, and the press-- the President left it up to the committee to decide. And he really does feel it's up to the committee. On that basis, Dole says the decision will be San Diego, although he thinks the committee really would prefer Miami. But he thinks they can handle San Diego all right, that they'll be able to avoid the California political factions, etcetera, and that they can probably cut the Convention to three days, but not to the two that the President had originally requested. Dole then pointed out that it’s nec-- there's a real problem on the economy, as was evidenced in the leadership meeting, and that Shultz needs to meet with the nineteen Senators that are up for election and also the Congressmen. Dole also asked whether he should go to Taiwan or not on his trip to Vietnam; he obviously wants to do that.

      This afternoon, after a session with Kissinger, the President had Ehrlichman and me over for a talk and made the point that he had decided to have Ehrlichman go with Kissinger and Bruce on the September trip to China to handle the advancing. I didn't say anything at the time, but when Henry came in and joined the meeting later, the President raised the same point again. Henry was clearly shook by it. I too think it's a very bad idea, but Ehrlichman is dying to go to China, and this is the one way he can get in on the act, and he maneuvered it with the President this morning. Later this evening, Haig raised the question with Larry and said Kissinger was absolutely furious about the idea, that we can't have a substantive person going over to meet with them, and I think Henry will probably scuttle it, which is just as well.

      The other problem on the China trip is that we're probably going to have to take some Democratic visits to China before the President gets there. The Chinese notified Henry today that it was very difficult for them to withhold permission to visit, to other political people, as they have been doing, now that our visit is arranged. I argued strongly that we should still try to talk them out of it, on the grounds that they could welcome those people after the President’s visit, and so on. President, I think, is resigned to the fact that we're going to have to let them do it, but he's pushing hard to at least hold Mao in reserve and not have them meet with them. President makes the point that the Chinese have to have this trip––they initiated it––but we don't want to pant after them. We need to maintain our bargaining position, and we don't want to do anything that cuts that down.

      He talked to Henry on the phone, while Henry was meeting with Hugh Sidey, and told him to make the point that the difference between this-- of the difference between this trip and other Summit meetings, that the President is not just going over there to tour or to socialize and charm these people; he's going over for real, gut-level discussions. He got talking with John and me about his concern that, although he's ordered no speculation regarding the effect this will have on other countries, etcetera, we should be doing some speculating on the fact that this is a discussion between the US and China, and we should speculate to the hilt about the President’s leadership and how he brought this about. He wants Scali to run heavily with this story, making the point that the one thing you can talk about is that, thank God, we have a President who knows how to handle this kind of thing. Also bring up his forbearance during the Laos deal, that he had all the cards, but he never played them; he kept his eye on the main chance. We can say that we can't talk about the substance, but look back at this whole thing, the President didn't even tell his own staff, etcetera. Made the point that we should change the name of Air Force One, immediately, to Spirit of '76, so that’s done before the trip.

      Then Kissinger came in, and the President raised with him the point of whether we ought to consider doing the Russian Summit first, and Henry definitely says no. Instead, we should plan on Russia in the spring, but announce it before we go to Peking. This is the way he's put it to the Russians, and he wants to hang tight on that. The President told Henry he should move the preliminary trip up to September 15. He needs to get over there earlier, especially if he's going to let other political people go in ahead of us; he needs to dull the impact, especially if Kennedy turns out to be one of them. Kissinger reported on his interview with Sidey and said Sidey was very much with us all the way, but made the point that his editors are absolutely beside themselves, that it's driving them wild to think that Nixon is the one to do this, and that they just think it's terrible, which is an interesting insight into Time/Life.

      Before--then Kissinger left before he had come in, and again after he left, we had quite a discussion on the Vice Presidential thing, the President seeking John's and my views on what the situation is and how to deal with it. His feeling is that the Democrats need an issue, now that we've taken foreign policy away from them, and so they'll zero in on the economy as the substantive issue, and the VP as the way of cutting us. Also he got into quite a long talk about the question of succession, making the point that he may not live through even this term, let alone a second term, because of the possibility of accident or ill health. And that raises the question of whether Agnew is somebody that we're willing to see become President. He enumerated some of his problems: that he's dogmatic, his hidebound prejudices, he’s totally inflexible and that he sees things in minuscule terms. We then talked about what to do to get him out, and concluded that it's impossible for him to announce––such as in January, as he apparently is willing to do according to Harlow––that he will not run, because that would open a horrible battle for the nomination. Also, Agnew himself would be immediately dead once he does that.

      President then got around to raising the Connally question with Ehrlichman and made the point that the only one we could put on the ticket is Connally. We couldn't afford a battle, because out of that, Reagan would clearly come up with the nomination, which would be disastrous. The conclusion then is, if Agnew is not going to be on the ticket, he must get off by resignation. Given that, the sooner he resigns, the better. Then the President told Ehrlichman and me that we were to talk to Connally on the Vice President problem. That he-- the President wants to stay one step away from it, but I should call Connally, ask him for a couple hours of free time for John and me, and then we should just sit down and talk the problem through, see if he's got any ideas on how to approach it, so on.

      End of July 20.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    The NSC System

    Vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    Between Beijing and Moscow: Summit Announcement, July 19-October 12, 1971

    Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972

    China,January-September 1971

    • 150. Message From the United States Government to the Premier of the People’s Republic of China Chou En-lai, Washington, July 20, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Haig forwarded the message under a separate covering letter to Walters on July 20. (Ibid.) Walters delivered this message to the PRC Ambassador to France on July 21. (Walters’ letter to Haig, July 22; ibid.) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 10 and 11. In many of his reports. Walters uses the name “Kirschman” to refer to Kissinger.

    Vol. XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

    April-October 1971: Change and Reassessment

    • 81. Memorandum for the Record, Washington, July 20, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71. Secret; Limdis. Drafted July 20 by U. Alexis Johnson who sent it under cover of a letter to Kissinger on that date. In his letter, Johnson noted that his memorandum did not mention “the fact that Ushiba showed me a long letter that Prime Minister McMahon of Australia had sent to Prime Minister Sato about the necessity of Japan and Australia concerting with each other on the U.N. problem, in the light of the U.S. move to Peking that had caught them both off guard.” Holdridge forwarded Johnson’s letter to Kissinger under a July 22 memorandum, in which he observed: “The main thrust of Ushiba’s comments on the China announcement was that, since by giving only short notice to Tokyo we had pulled the rug out from under the traditional Japanese policy of close collaboration with the U.S. in foreign policy, it is now of the greatest importance that we consult closely on Chirep.” Kissinger initialed Holdridge’s memorandum. (Ibid.)

    Vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972

    Thailand

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Persian Gulf States

    • 103. Memorandum of Conversation, London, July 20, 1971

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by B. Scott Custer and approved on July 30 in U. This is Part 8 of an 8-part memorandum of conversation that recorded discussions on the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Parts 1–7 are not printed.

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    From SALT Announcement to Summit Announcement, May 27-October 12, 1971

    Vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Dominican Republic

    • 291. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1971., Washington, July 20, 1971

      The Department of State called President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s attention to the fact that the Senate Finance Committee proposed to eliminate the President’s discretionary authority for special allocations under the pending Sugar Act. The Senate’s decision came after President Nixon had already signed an undelivered letter indicating approval of a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic. The Department of State recommended that a new letter be drafted to include the caveat that any special sugar allocation would be contingent on Congress.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Ted C. signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typeset signature. Attached is a draft of a suggested revised letter. On July 22, President Nixon signed the revised letter. (Ibid.)

    Haiti

    • 402. Telegram 745 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, July 20, 1971, 2000Z., July 20, 1971, 2000Z

      In an evaluation of President Jean-Claude Duvalier’s first 90 days in office, the Embassy concluded that the new government had made an effort to maintain “an open, progressive image” and intended to cooperate with the United States. The Embassy recommended considering modest requests for bilateral assistance and the abandonment of the “cool and correct” policy toward Haiti.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 HAI. Confidential; Limdis. In a September 9 information memorandum, the ARA/NSC/IG advised its members that they would meet at the Department on September 15 to consider modification of U.S. policy toward Haiti and modest requests for bilateral assistance. (Ibid., Department of State, NSC–IG/ARA Information Memos, 1971, Lot 76 D 325) For a summary of the group’s report, see Document 404.

    Vol. E-13, Documents on China, 1969-1972

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)