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July 1, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Thursday, July 1, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Wednesday, June 30, 1971

Next Date: Friday, July 2, 1971

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Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Thursday, July 1.

      In discussing the Pentagon Paper question, in one of a long series of long meetings today, President raised the point of the Hiss question again and said that Elliot Richardson has got to fire Cooke, regardless of what he thinks about him. That one of the points he kept making about Alger Hiss is that his family was beyond reproach, etcetera. He wants Ehrlichman to realize that we have a great opportunity here: that this is a conspiracy; that they are not on good ground; that we now can leak out the other bad stories. He feels this isn't the time for a Presidential statement: that he should not elevate the suppression of the Papers, and it's not a good issue for us. So maybe further down the line, after our newsbreak on the July 15th, then he can really unload. The problem is that he doesn't want to get into the Ellsberg question. So he wanted Ehrlichman to do some checking on that, with the key staff people. He really got going again on trying to get Huston, or Dick Allen, or somebody, in fast to take this whole project on, like the President took on the Hiss case. 18 hours a day, with total dedication, tracking down every lead, leaking stuff to the press. Making-- he made the point that the Hiss case was won in the newspapers, because no one would prosecute, even the FBI. Also, on the declassification thing, leak the other stories to the good newspapers, because this takes the people's eyes off of Vietnam and gets them thinking about the past. What we need is not a workman like Whitaker, but an SOB like Huston, and the President will direct it himself. He doesn't believe the Cooke story. He's convinced Cooke was working against us, within the bureaucracy. He said, don't ever have Cooke in the White House, and he was very discouraged that Elliot won't move ahead and fire him. He feels that we're being too soft on Cooke. The real question is, why did he show anything to Ellsberg? What was Ellsberg's need to know? Later, he made the point that if we can't get Elliot to fire Ellsberg then we should at least cru-- I mean to fire Cooke, we should at least crucify him in the press.

      He feels that, going back to the statement question: that we're still better off to let Ellsberg unfold a little more, before it's the right time for him to say something. We had a lot of discussions back and forth on whether to go ahead, and our final recommendation was that he should not say anything on television, but that it probably would be a good idea for him to make a basic statement at the Kansas City briefing. He's very anxious to get going on the busting out the other papers, and the declassification stuff. Still looking for names, so we suggested the idea of having Congressmen take the lead on this, like Rousselot or somebody like that, which he liked, but he still wants an inside staff man to ride herd on it.

      He developed the line, regarding The Times that the court has now said that the newspaper can print the material if it doesn't do irreparable damage. Question now is whether a newspaper has the responsibility in any standard. That is, is irreparable damage the standard that the American people-- the American press is going to hold for itself? He feels that the press is on a bad wicket, regarding the right to profit from the publication of stolen documents. They have a constitutional right under the First Amendment, and that overrides the right of America and the right of an American who is fighting for his country to stay alive. They say they don't care about the effects. If declassification is going to follow unauthorized disclosure, then the de-- the whole classification system is destroyed. There's no grounds for release on the basis that other people have it. He's very strongly pushing to cut off the security clearances of most of the people in government and all the outside organizations, like Rand and Brookings, etcetera. Buchanan's arguing harder for a Presidential statement, and again we went back and forth throughout the day on that thing. The problem being that nobody really has made a clear statement of our line, and that's bothering him.

      He had a meeting with the security declassification group that was set up under his order of January 1st; this is Rehnquist's group, and he really jumped on these poor guys who are second level bureaucrats. He told them to attack the thing frontally, to start classifying far less material, and have far greater penalties for violations of classified material, and to cut way down on the number of people with top secret clearances, setting up new classifications. He also wants to knock off the clearances for outside institutions. Don't classify to protect politically, only to protect the national security. Cut the number of documents and the number of people and then get a much stricter law, not under the Espionage Act, something with a straight criminal penalty, very stiff, for anyone who takes a classified document. He told them to expand their study to cover all previous wars. They should not be classified, and he wants them to give the President recommendations on how to declassify. This goes back to his idea on Korea, World War II, Cuba, etcetera. He says we now have the standard applied in an arrogant way to this war, because it's immoral. So it should-- shouldn't we also declassify the other wars? We can't have a double standard. He says that his purpose is not more secrecy, but less, because we classify too much, and then we can't protect it.

      He wants a new classification at an extraordinary level, like "Presidential decision" or something, with highest security and only a hundred people cleared for it. He makes the point that you can’t protect-- because you can't protect these documents and all, we've become inhibited, so we don't put things through the bureaucracy anymore. He wants to set up an ad hoc clearance for outsiders, so that they're cleared for one purpose when needed, but don't give them a permanent clearance so they can see anything. We can't worry about protecting individual reputations; we can only worry about the national security.

      He made the point that the establishment has a new intellectual arrogance which leads them to think that they know best and that the determination regarding what the public should know should be made by them. There’s a new morality where the individual determines what is moral and what is right. We can't let individuals through the government make determination: there wouldn't be any consultations, memos, or anything else. We serve a different morality. Elected officials establish the law, the courts enforce them. Those who disobey, even if they think the laws are wrong, are immoral. If the cause is right, they say it justifies breaking the law, but that's fascism: the means justify the ends. He told them to spend some time on their study and not to rush it, which is what Ehrlichman wanted him to do.

      Mitchell called late in the day and suggested that we do a polygraph on Cooke. He doesn't think we should let him off. He's talked with the guys at Defense––Buzhardt, and so forth–– and they are convinced that there's more to this then Elliot says. Also, that it would be a beautiful deterrent in the bureaucracy. The President said to have Mitchell have a tough talk with Elliot, telling him that we have to be able to fi-- answer our critics, and this is the only way we can do it.

      End of July 1.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    East-West Trade, 1969-1972

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Chinese Representation in the United Nations

    • 368. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 1, 1971, 3:17-3:35 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 21. The time of the meeting is from Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 446, Miscellany, 1968–1976)

    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    The Consequences of Operation Lan Som 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8-October 6, 1971

    Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

    South Asia Crisis, 1971

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    "One of Two Routes": Soviet-American Relations and Kissinger's Secret Trip to China, April 23-July 18, 1971

    Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972

    China,January-September 1971

    • 137. Memorandum for the President’s File, Washington, July 1, 1971

      Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, China, China Trips, July 1971 Briefing Notebook. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig met from 9:18 to 9:52 a.m. and from 9:54 to 10:26 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards International Production and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs

    • 202. Intelligence Report, Washington, July 1, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 359, Subject Files, Narcotics V. Secret; Sensitive

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1971

    • 134. Telegram 119690 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, July 1, 1971, 2015Z

      The Department of State notified the Embassy of the credit terms authorized by the Export-Import Bank for Iran’s FY 1972 military purchases.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by John Lentz; cleared by Glenn McLaughlin, Don Bostwick (XMB), and Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN); and approved by Paul H. Boeker (E/IFD/ODF).

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Panama

    • 550. Telegram 118183 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama, July 1, 1971, 0243Z., July 1, 1971, 0243Z

      Under Secretary John Irwin summarized the first meeting of the treaty negotiations, which focused on issues of jurisdiction and duration. Irwin stated that the U.S. position called for a treaty which accommodated existing defense arrangements.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. Confidential. Copies sent to USCINCSO and the Panama Canal Company. Drafted on June 30 by Finn; cleared by Curran; and approved by Finn.

    Venezuela

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)