1. Home
  2. Research
  3. Almanac

December 12, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, December 12, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, December 11, 1972

Next Date: Wednesday, December 13, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 1969-1972

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24-December 13, 1972

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Persian Gulf States

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    Taking Stock

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Breakdown of Negotiations, November 1972-December 1972

    • 39. Memorandum of Conversation of a Ministers Meeting, Paris, December 12, 1972, 10:30 a.m.-1:30 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 859, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XXII, Minutes of Meetings, Paris, December 4–13, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 31 Boulevard de la Saussaye, Neuilly-sur-Seine. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

    • 40. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, December 12, 1972, 3:07-7:35 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [1 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 108 Avenue du Général Leclerc in Gif-sur-Yvette. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

      It is clear from message traffic before the meeting that the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris and the Politburo in Hanoi differed over how to proceed. A day or two before this meeting, Tho and Thuy informed Hanoi that if they presented Hanoi’s rigid approach to a draft on the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as instructed, the U.S. negotiators would reject it. In consequence, they continued, “it is possible that the talks may be suspended for a period of time and the war will continue. Even though they are not capable of protracting the war for an extended period, they will make massive concentrated attacks for a time and then request resumption of the talks. If we refuse to meet with them the war will continue and the U.S. will place the blame on us. If we announce the suspension of talks and the only remaining issue is the question of the demilitarized zone, it will be hard for us to explain our position. The public may mistakenly think that we do not want to respect the demilitarized zone and that we want to continue sending troops down into the South. If we agree to meet with them, we will be under pressure and if we simply deal with the issue of the demilitarized zone using the Politburo’s formula it will be very difficult for us to achieve acceptance of this formula, and we will also suffer additional losses in North Vietnam, losses that will have at least some effect on the situation in South Vietnam.”

      Tho and Thuy therefore recommended that Hanoi consider settling on the agreement as then negotiated: “We are not under any time pressure, but we need to recognize our opportunity. Right now the U.S. needs a settlement, but if we leave things too long we will miss this opportunity and then our pressure on them will have little effect, because everything has limits.”

      Hanoi refused to allow a more flexible response and directed Tho and Thuy to maintain the previous hard-line offer which Kissinger, as the negotiators expected, quickly rejected. (Luu and Nguyen, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris [Cac Cuoc Thuong Luong Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Tai Paris], pp. 581–582; Vietnamese edition)

      Kissinger provided a narrative of the meeting for Haig and Nixon in Washington and then an interpretation of the events vis-à-vis the future. In a message to Haig, he wrote:

      “Hanoi has decided to play for time, either because of the public split between us and Saigon; or because they have a pipeline into the South Vietnamese and know about our exchanges; or because their leadership is divided and they are still making up their minds on whether to conclude the agreement. Their consistent pattern is to give us just enough each day to keep us going but nothing decisive which could conclude an agreement. On the other hand, they wish to insure that we have no solid pretext for taking tough actions. They keep matters low key to prevent a resumption of bombing. They could have settled in three hours any time these past few days if they wanted to, but they have deliberately avoided this. For every one of their semi-concessions they introduce a counter-demand. Thus their sentence on the DMZ, which in itself is unacceptable, was counterbalanced today by the withdrawal of their proposal for the signing procedure made yesterday. Moreover, the DMZ sentence, as you recognize, takes away the significance of the respect for the DMZ. I tried in innumerable ways to get the word ʻcivil’ included but they totally refused this. Thus what they offered after supposedly more than two days of communication with Hanoi was to move a still objectionable sentence further down in the text, and even here they link all the sentences by semicolons in the same paragraph.”

      Thus, he concluded: “We now find ourselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position. We have no leverage on Hanoi or Saigon, and we are becoming prisoners of both sides’ internecine conflicts. Our task clearly is to get some leverage on both of them.” To that end, he made the following recommendations:

      “—As soon as Tho has left Paris we should reseed the mines, as heavily as possible including of course north of the 20th parallel. This is desirable in any event because the longer the mines are in DRV ports the less likely they are to violate the agreement if it is finally concluded.

      “—We should take off all restrictions on bombing south of the 20th parallel and step up our attacks, particularly by B–52s.

      “—We should resume reconnaissance activities north of the 20th parallel immediately which would serve as a warning to Hanoi.

      “—We should plan a two or three day strike including B–52’s north of the 20th parallel for early next week. Please get plans. The power plants seem attractive.

      “—I would like you [Haig] to look at the bombing situation in southern Laos. Yesterday’s noon report mentioned the fact that infiltration was much heavier because the bombing in that area had fallen off.

      “It is essential that the military perform effectively for once in the above tasks. I would not resume daily bombing north of the 20th parallel at this point until we can discuss it.”

      Giving vent to his frustration with the North and South Vietnamese, Kissinger concluded his analysis with these words:

      “The North Vietnamese strategy seems to me to be as follows: they have reduced the issues to a point where a settlement can be reached with one exchange of telegrams. I do not think they will send this telegram, however, in the absence of strong pressures. These pressures in turn cannot really be applied now because of Thieu. If Thieu had adopted a common position with us we would have an excellent ground on which to stand now with North Vietnam’s insistence on maintaining troops in the South and total refusal to recognize any aspect of sovereignty for South Vietnam. What makes it intolerable is the inability to defend an agreement that Thieu attacks. Moreover his short-sighted device for preventing a settlement has deprived us of the pressure which could bring us a settlement. His offer of prolonged Christmas truce almost guarantees that Hanoi will wait on sending the telegram until the truce breaks down or Congress is heard from. This is why the visit with Thieu is now essential and I know no one else than Agnew who can possibly do it. The present course will guarantee that Congress will cut off the funds and that everything we have striven four years to avoid will be imposed on us. If this is to happen we are better off knowing it early on than to die the death of a thousand cuts.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 163)

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S.-Cuba Hijacking Agreement, 1969-February 1973

    • 139. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Hurwitch) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 12, 1972

      Hurwitch sent Rogers the preliminary reaction of the Cubans to the possibility of returning hijackers as part of the proposed U.S.-Cuban hijacking agreement.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hurwitch. Rogers approved the recommendation but changed the language to read: “That Ambassador Masnata be instructed to suggest that one procedure that might be considered would be extradition under the 1904 treaty.” The memorandum of the meeting with the Canadians was attached but not published.

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972

    • 321. Telegram 9952 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, Islamabad, December 12, 1972, 0600Z

      Chargé Sober reported that Pakistan and India had reached agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. He speculated that further progress on implementing the Simla accord could be anticipated and he recommended a congratulatory letter from President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was announced in Pakistan on December 11. Mutual troop withdrawals to the border between the two countries were scheduled to begin the following day. (Telegram 9965 from Islamabad, December 12; ibid., POL 31–1 INDIA–PAK) The troop withdrawals were completed by December 20. (Telegram 10226 from Islamabad, December 21; ibid.)

    Afghanistan, 1969-1972

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)