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December 11, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, December 11, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, December 10, 1972

Next Date: Tuesday, December 12, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

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  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

    No Federal Register published on this date

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Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, December 11.

      The President had Dole in first thing this morning. I had talked to Bush ahead of time and worked out the arrangement with him as to how we would handle the announcement. He agreed that Dole should go out after the meeting and cover the whole thing, but say that Bush still has important work at the UN and that we'd have to do the shift after the General Assembly.

      The Dole meeting went reasonably well. Bob came in and sort of wandered through a lot of chitchat for a while, and then the President finally eased into the deal by talking about Dole's trips, saying he ought to probably go to Japan, which would keep it open. Leave the option for a spring or fall trip, look for a really good event for maximum attention, but his best advice would be to go to Russia in the summertime. And that was left that way. Then Dole raised his handicap question. The President told him to sit down with our experts and develop a good bill, as the Dole Bill, on his information center for the handicapped idea. Providing them with a single source on benefits, and so on, like a veteran can do. Some discussion of Anne Armstrong, and John Rollins for National Finance and so on. Then the President called Bush --with Dole on the other phone-- and also had Ziegler in the office at the same time to develop the line. They agreed that Bush would stay on through the session, and Dole would stay at the RNC until the January 19 meeting. And Ziegler should shoot down the nonsense that Dole was pushed out. That basically covered the Dole meeting.

      The President covered a lot of other odds and ends. Said he didn't want to meet with Colton alone on the Republican governor deal, or with the full group, but would meet with the Executive Committee. Wanted me to call Connally and tell him about Bush and get his reaction on Strauss. Wanted to be sure Colson gives Bush, Brock and Brown the book, chapter and verse on the President's activities for candidates. Wants Ehrlichman to get going on the Yorba Linda house, put someone in charge of it to keep the lawn mowed, and so on:

      Had Ehrlichman in for a couple of hours. Went through his usual dreary review of the fact that we have a dull Cabinet in the public mind, and went on and on about that stuff. Made the point that we have to get some very young people at the second level and ethnics and thinks that we're wasting Krogh, who's too good, and Whitaker, who adds nothing.

      Wanted me to get Mack Farrell locked-- keep him in the Visitor's Office, because the image does matter, plus doing a good job. And that Shultz is not impressive in selling the program as he's got to do today. That we've got no one to move around and articulate the Administration. That the Labor Under Secretary has to be a White House man. We can't handle that one solely on the Labor basis. Wants to get LaFontante and Anne Armstrong in to see him. Then gave us a long, long lecture on leadership and rambled on and on about the Georgetown set and all the problems there and then read a lot from Disraeli on the elite in London and so forth. Got into the election analysis and the fact that our margin in the suburbia was less than it was in '68 but we did better in the central cities, which is why we put together the landslide.

      Got into the Watergate thing. Feels he doesn't want to leave an aura around the White House that there are a lot of bad guys there and the President doesn't care. Says the theory of, "Just be quiet and it'll all go away" won't work. That we need something to be said. Otherwise, how can the President handle it at his first press conference? We should try just a very brief statement, but we must get something to get it out of the way. At least something that Segretti had nothing to do with Watergate. And he feels a good offense is the best defense in this kind of thing. He went through it all with Ehrlichman and said that the view now is that the President is trying to hide something or protect someone, and that we've got to go for the smallest statement we can make, but we do have to make some statement.

      I called Connally to get his reaction. He said he was mad as hell at Strauss regarding his TV thing yesterday. That he had called him and told him his remarks were ill-advised -- that he had gone out of his way to take a cut at Connally and said he had read him out of the Party and made the point, apparently, that it was a sin to have voted against McGovern, and that if that's so, they ought to set up new moral standards. He said he was pretty rough and that Strauss was quite disturbed. Connally said he may publicly ask that they censure all Democrats who voted against McGovern. He says Strauss' election won't change a thing, that he doesn't know what his deals are that he made to get the post, but that in any event, the Liberals will try to crucify him, that he brings no strength to the Party, he's just a manager. He can't bring the South in. Wallace is the leader of the Democratic South. The Southern Governors will try to keep the Party together, so will the Congressmen and Senators. For that reason, we should move in, somewhat, to let them have a place to go, but they'll need a compelling motivation. They can't go to a void or a nebulous third party. Theoretically, they'd do it in a minute, but they don't know how to do it practically. It'll take a move -- either a positive move by the Republicans or a negative move by the Democrats. We'll have to wait and see. He doesn't think Connally going Republican would do it. It wouldn't be enough, and anyway, the timing isn't now. He then mentioned that he's going to Saudi Arabia on the 15th and would like a letter to the King from the President.

      When I was in the office late this afternoon, the President was going over general political stuff with Colson, then got a phone call apparently from Haig on the Vietnam problem. Talked about considering recess for a week and that Kissinger was backed into a corner again and that there was a question about the VP option of going to Saigon, that maybe that was a bad deal.

      End of December 11.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24-December 13, 1972

    Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa

    Portuguese Africa

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Breakdown of Negotiations, November 1972-December 1972

    • 38. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, December 11, 1972, 3:10-7:15 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 31 Boulevard de la Saussaye, Neuilly-sur-Seine. All brackets are in the original.

      Kissinger, reporting to the President via a message to Haig, who was in Washington, characterized the day’s proceedings as being “composed of equal parts of insolence, guile, and stalling by the North Vietnamese.” His appraisal of what might happen next and his recommendation of what he should do was as follows:

      “It is not impossible that we could conclude the agreement tomorrow, but nothing in their behavior suggests any urgency and much in their manner suggests cock-sure insolence. They could, of course, be without instructions, and may in any event want to play with us until the last minute. The amount of work left for tomorrow is staggering and could make for a sloppy conclusion, which is precisely one of their favorite tactics. I believe in any event that I should return home tomorrow night.”

      He added:

      “All of this may prove academic, however, since we must face other facts. It is obvious that an agreement was easily achievable on any day since last Thursday. Hanoi may well have concluded that we have been outmaneuvered and dare not continue the war because of domestic and international expectations. They may believe that Saigon and we have hopelessly split and that the imminence of Christmas makes it impossible for us to renew bombing the North. If this is the case we will face a decision of major magnitude. I believe a total collapse by us now would make an agreement unenforceable. The President must also understand that an agreement at this point and under conditions that led to the collapse of South Vietnam would have grave consequences for his historic position later.”

      Kissinger concluded: “No matter what happens tomorrow I will not repeat not break off the negotiations but rather we could take the line that the two sides are close enough to continue work through diplomatic channels.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 156)

      Later that evening, Haig replied for the President:

      “The President considers that if Hanoi remains unmanageably intransigent that in any event we should not break off the talks in a formal sense. Rather, we should recess, informing them that we believe that this past week’s discussions suggest that both sides should take some time for consultations and to reconsider the gravity of the situation.

      You are returning to Washington and will be prepared to meet with them again after Christmas or before if they believe it would be constructive. We would then reseed the mines and resume military activity at an intensified pre-October pace. (You should decide whether to tell this to Tho or not.)”

      Haig then summed up:

      “I believe the President is perfectly amenable to your returning home on Tuesday [December 12] if in your judgment there is no hope of a settlement or if we would risk fundamentally our ability to ultimately achieve a workable settlement as a result of your staying longer. On the other hand, he is very clear that if you obtain sufficient movement tomorrow to indicate that a day or two more labor will resolve the matter, you should extend your stay.”

      At the same time, Haig observed: “I am absolutely convinced that the President is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and, especially, the difficulties which we have faced at the negotiating table. He is fully prepared to react strongly and to weather through a continuing intransigent position by Hanoi.” To drive home this point, Haig told Kissinger that the President had “just called again and urged that we reseed the mines tomorrow and be prepared to move immediately with around-the-clock bombing of the Hanoi area. I told him we should definitely hold on this until after tomorrow’s session and until you return. Based on the foregoing, I am convinced that there is absolutely no problem here with respect to our strategy and what must be done if it is forced upon us.” (Ibid., Document 158)

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards Terrorism, Hijacking of Aircraft, and Attacks on Civil Aviation: The Olympic Attack and the Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, September−December 1972

    Vol. E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972

    Nigerian Civil War

    • 217. Telegram 9519 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, Lagos, December 11, 1972, 0918Z

      Assistant Secretary of State Newsom reported on his 5-day visit to Nigeria, remarking on Nigeriaʼs independence and sensitivity. He noted that the United States remained popular but suffered from its civil war policy, its stand on South Africa, and the belief that the United States was unwilling to respond to Nigerian priorities on aid.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to London.

    Vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972

    Tunisia

    • 163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 11, 1972

      Kissinger recommended that Nixon respond to President Bourguiba’s recent letter by reassuring him of U.S. interest in Tunisia.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, President Bourguiba. Confidential. Sent for action. In his October 25 letter, not printed, Bourguiba renewed his request for a bilateral review of U.S.-Tunisian relations and the international scene. In Nixon’s December 12 reply, not printed, he agreed that a dialogue on bilateral matters was important, and that, while much could be communicated at the ambassadorial level, he welcomed Bourguiba’s views at any time.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

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Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)