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April 18, 1973

Introduction

This almanac page for Wednesday, April 18, 1973, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Tuesday, April 17, 1973

Next Date: Thursday, April 19, 1973

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Wednesday, April 18.

      The President had me in at 8:00 this morning. Said that if this thing goes the way it might, and I have to leave, he wants me to take all the office material from his machinery there and hold it for the library.

      Reviewed some of the items; wants to figure out when the meeting was with Dean. Make the point that the President had no knowledge until he got into this, which is, of course, true, but we have to be objective on Dean, don't get carried away with our attitude on him. At that point, he had Ziegler in to discuss Dean's threat to Ziegler. Ziegler should tell Dean that no one's hitting him. The President is obviously very concerned about how he handles Dean. Not to appear to be hitting him. Dean said to Ziegler, I can't take this rap. I'll have to call in some friendly reporters and so on. Wanted Ehrlichman to fill the President in on the circumstances regarding putting him on the case. Ziegler kept coming back to the point, you don't need to worry about Dean because he's completely lost his credibility, which was missing the President's point. He doesn't want Ron to hit Dean on his loss of credibility or confidence in him. The President told Ziegler to say, today, to Dean, that the President said specifically no one is to be thrown off on the basis of hearsay. We're not throwing anyone to the wolves. The "full of holes" line in the paper regarding the Dean report did not come from the White House. We're not going to characterize anything from here. And he sent Ziegler out to call Dean, then made the point that where Dean has the gun to our head is on the pre-Watergate stuff on national security, and on the Hunt blackmail report, which is also national security.

      Ehrlichman and I have to figure out how to handle the Dean thing. Ziegler came back in, said Dean said, the President is out front in this. Ziegler reassured him there was no focus on any individual and he seemed to be in pretty good shape. Dean said he understood, but you have to keep in mind the Dean report also involved the 21st discussion with the President. The President said, don't leave the impression that the Dean report was false. Told Ron that. And Dean said, I understand the position you're in. The important thing is we now have the President out in front on this. The President wants to get Dean in with Ziegler, but I think we talked him out of that.

      Then at noon we talked about what Ron should say and decided that he should take the position of no comment, now, because he's been advised by the legal authorities that any comment on this case could prejudice the prosecution or the rights of defendants. Therefore, he will make no further comment, period.

      The President had Ehrlichman and me come up to Camp David with him for dinner and to spend the night tonight. Talked about it in general terms on the way up, and then while we were waiting for dinner, Ziegler called. Said that Henry Petersen had called him to say Carl Bernstein from the Post had called him and talked to Burke, his assistant, and told him to tell Petersen that they have the whole story. The Magruder aspects and the O'Brien/Bittman aspects, they said. And Petersen thinks this refers to the McCord statement and on the thing that Hunt's lawyer presented demands to the White House, which were met to keep Hunt's silence. Petersen said to Ziegler that he has held this up, the fact they have it, for ten days now trying to pursue it through the process of the grand jury. Ziegler asked him what it meant by the O'Brien aspects, what names were involved, and Petersen said we didn't ask the Post, because we didn't want to have to respond. But he would assume it would be Mitchell, LaRue, Dean, and principal White House people. Ziegler said, what principal White House people? And Petersen said, it pains me to refer to it and didn't give him the names. Petersen told him to let the President know, and he said he'll know what we're talking about. Ziegler then also talked to Dick Burke on a callback, and he said Petersen was talking to Bernstein again at that time. Ziegler told him to call back.

      Petersen called him back, said that Bernstein said he had information from three sources that he was going to run tomorrow, naming Mitchell and Dean, with no reference to anyone else. Saying they were involved in large amounts of cash payments to keep the defendants silent. Thus, it's likely that this will involve Mitchell, Dean, O' Brien, Bittman. He doesn't know if they have Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Bernstein was calling various people at the White House also to get comment. Says he's running the story and wants to check it before it's played, so we told Ziegler to talk to him, and he did.

      Petersen referred to the fact that O'Brien and Bittman are lawyers and they're terribly distressed. He said we'd hoped to beat the press on this. I went over to Aspen for dinner with the President and reported this to him. He had already had the same report from Petersen, who he had called to raise cain with him, on ordering him not to get into the testimony on what Hunt was involved in with national security. Petersen told the President Dean had already told him about the Hunt break-in in California.

      Ziegler then called and said they're also going to say that Magruder has been before the U.S. Attorney and will testify at the grand jury tomorrow. That he will directly implicate Mitchell and Dean in the pre-planning and directly implicate them in the payments to the defendants after the fact.

      Garment talked to Bernstein to see what he could get out, and he says basically the same thing. That Magruder on Saturday, over the weekend, gave a full statement and so on, and also that an attorney came out to California on April 3 and discussed the whole thing with Ehrlichman, this was not in a negative way. This would relate to post-payment activities. Bernstein volunteered that the story will say that the President had no knowledge, that indictments are expected, shortly, on Dean and Mitchell. Didn't mention a Magruder indictment.

      The dinner was rather painful, because the President got into the whole problem of whether John and I should go. He said the points to consider are: one, whether we're nailed in open court by Magruder, which we can't let happen; or two, if we leave, will it buy them off on the indictment; and third, by constant nibbling as we stay here, we can be destroyed. We don't want to be destroyed, therefore, we have to move. We have to figure out another strategy. Get out and then fight like hell. We have to deal in two dimensions. First, the court, and second, the Ervin Committee. The President will not allow Weicker and Scott to force him to move on us. We should move ahead of them and fight it.

      The President keeps saying during this that he hasn't decided. But he went through quite a thing in an emotional way about how Ehrlichman and I would always have the use of Camp David regardless of what happens, for the next three and a half years, and that he wasn't emotional, but he really is, and that this was a terribly painful thing and so on and so on. I think it really was, and it is, hard for him, but it's also counterproductive for us spending the time going around and around on the same ground with him, when we should be developing our own case for our interest and his. It was clear, though, that his feeling was that there was no real way out, except for us to pull out and fight, rather than trying to stay.

      [End of April 18.]
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. XXXIX, European Security

    Opening Negotiations, December 1972-July 1973

    Vol. E-9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973-1976

    Saudi Arabia

    • 85. Airgram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, Jidda, April 18, 1973

      Summary: The Embassy provided its first quarterly assessment of governmental and economic developments in Saudi Arabia for 1973.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1970–73, POL 2 Saudi Arabia. Secret. Drafted by T. McAdams Deford (POL); cleared by Eugene Bird (POL/ECON); approved by DCM Horan. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Dhahran, Khartoum, Kuwait City, London, Manama, Rabat, Sana’a, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, CHUSMTM, CINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, and DIA. On the Khartoum incident, see Document 81.

    Vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976

    Peru

    • 283. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Richardson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 18, 1973

      Summary: Richardson recommended to Kissinger that a SRG be convened to review U.S. policy towards Peru.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 793, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret. On April 18, Richardson sent a copy of the memorandum to Rogers. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL PERU–US) Belcher’s February 23 telegram is referred to in the source note to Document 282. On March 23, in telegram 1894 from Lima, Belcher informed the Department of Peru’s “probable imminent decision” to purchase Soviet MIGs. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) NSDM 199, December 26, 1972, is Document 640 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972. No SRG meeting on Peru was held.

    Uruguay

    • 334. Telegram 1176 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State, Montevideo, April 18, 1973, 1940Z

      Summary: The Embassy reported that “a period of relative political calm” had been reached since the February crisis, and assessed the factors among the military, President Bordaberry, economic development plans, political parties, the left, and the public that might influence future events.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 14 UR. Confidential. Repeated for information to Southcom and DIA. Airgram A–27 from Montevideo, March 3, reported that the rise to power of the military over a civilian political structure that had seemed stable could be attributed to a number of factors, including longstanding Uruguayan economic troubles, the relative prestige of the military versus the government bureaucracy and politicians, Bordaberry’s lack of institutional support from a political party, and Bordaberry’s poor management of the crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 15 UR) In telegram 1199 from Montevideo, April 24, Ortiz reported on his April 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Blanco. Blanco asserted that Bordaberry had power over the military, which he described as anti-communist, and that the new National Security Council (COSENA) would be a useful tool to curb corruption. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

    Vol. E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976

    Philippines

    Vol. E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, Second, Revised Edition

    Western Europe Regional, 1973-1976

    • 10. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of the Treasury Shultz to President Nixon, Washington, April 18, 1973

      Summary: Kissinger and Shultz secured Nixon’s approval of their strategy for addressing the issue of EC preferential agreements with Spain and Israel.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol III Oct 72–Jun 73 (1 of 2). Confidential. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, an undated paper entitled “Negotiating Instructions on EC-Spain and EC-Israel Trade Agreements.” A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the proposed strategy.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)