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October 20, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Wednesday, October 20, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Tuesday, October 19, 1971

Next Date: Thursday, October 21, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Wednesday, October 20th. The President started the day this morning by calling Malek and me in to ask whether any of our recent high-level women appointees are lawyers, and if so, how many years they have practiced, and so on. This obviously relating to his decision on the two Supreme Court appointments.

      Later in the morning, Ziegler came in for guidance on how to handle Court questions in the briefing. The principal question being whether the appointments would be this week. The President told him to answer that the AG has submitted the names for the advice of the ABA, that their recommendations will be considered but they will not be final, and the nominations will be coming forward in due course. For guidance, he told Ron that we may make it this week but he's not sure. And he said that he could use the point that the ABA is meeting later than we thought they would on the, to review the recommendations. He told Ron to say that, in fairness, he should remind them that the President said not to speculate, and that the stories regarding only six candidates were erroneous, and he told Ron to play it loose. He also told him to use a phrase regarding the ABA, on the point that after the experience that we've had on this nomination, we're not going to have nominees in the future pilloried by the press without having his side adequately presented first, so we will not submit future names to the ABA.

      The President made several allusions during the day to the plans for nominations, but never said anything specific and made the point that he wasn't going to tell anybody this time, which apparently also includes me. Late this afternoon, he called to say, rather triumphantly, that he'll announce both nominations tomorrow night at 7:30. He wants Ziegler to make that announcement to the press immediately. I called Ron and told him so, and he felt that he wanted to hold up until tomorrow, because he's got the press thoroughly confused on the thing now, and he wants to let that story run tomorrow, and then, at the 11:00 briefing tomorrow morning, say that the President will go on television tomorrow night. I told Ron to go over and talk to the President about that, and he did, and the President agreed to the change.

      The President then called me again to say that he needed a fast writer to help on his text for tomorrow night, so should we, so, so, so should enlist Safire. He said he wouldn't tell him tonight who the nominees would be, he could get started on that tomorrow. But in the meantime, the line would be of the vital importance of the Court, the effect the Court has, that there were many good people recommended, the two I've chosen are the best qualified, etcetera. He seems to be pretty pleased about the nominations. I think he's going for people who have not been on the list of six that was submitted to the ABA and probably who have not been speculated much about. My own guess would be that it would be the fellow from Virginia who is the former head of the American Bar Association, I can't remember his name, and Howard Baker, although I think it might well be one of those two plus Mulligan from New York. The theory on the woman is that the ABA is not going to approve her, and therefore, he'll let her pass and blame them for it.

      We also had a discussion on the Secretary of Agriculture appointment. The Malek staff recommendation being Senator Bellman, with Earl Butz as second choice. His crew all rule out Louie Nunn completely. The President, at first, at first glance, ruled out Bellman and said to take Butz. Then the more he got to thinking about it and listened to the argument on it, he decided to talk to Harlow. He called him and ended up buying Bryce's argument that Butz is a Benson symbol and that the President's question on Bellman, whether he understands the intricacies, is not a problem—Harlow assures him that he does. So he told me to try to sell Mitchell on Bellman. I called John, and he doesn't buy him at all. He’s still holding out for Louie Nunn.

      We got into the problem of Bill Rogers's feeling that he should take a trip to Moscow to set up the President's trip in the same way that Henry, that Henry's doing in Peking. The President is adamant that he is not to do this. He talked to me first...

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 15, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 1 [AC-15(B) Sel 1]
      Duration: 1 minute 5 seconds

      …and said I, we should try to find a way for Bill to go to Russia, but not to advance the President's trip. Maybe have him go with Stans on an economic mission, for instance. But in any event, we've got to anticipate the problem and pull it out in advance.

      A little later in the morning, he had Haig in to talk about this, and made the suggestion. Stan, or Haig shot it down on the basis that Bill's pushing for a European Security Conference and would take this opportunity to maneuver on that, which would be very bad. The President bought that. They agreed instead that we'd have Rogers go to Europe, work on the Four-Powers, and maybe the other European allies as a preliminary to the Russia trip, get them properly briefed etc., and also, they're going to have him go to work right away on Latin America setting up a Latin American summit meeting probably in Brasilia in December. The President feels this will divert him sufficiently, but I'm not sure it will.
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      He told me to talk to Rogers and also make the pitch that the Secretary of State should not go because it isn't the right, to Moscow, it isn't the right thing to do. We have diplomatic relations with them, and we should handle the setup through the channels, and it would not be the right way to posture Bill. We talked also a little about China plans, and the President wanted me to be sure to have Haig remind Henry that the President must see Chou En-lai and Mao alone, separately, without Kissinger, because he has done this with all other heads of state. He wants at least one meeting with each of them with only interpreters present, and these are to be in addition to all other meetings. We must have them on some occasion. He makes the point that not only do we need to do it because of the other countries, but so as to make it clear that Henry isn't manipulating the entire operation, but rather the President is clearly in command.

      End of October 20th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings.

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    Managing the Department of State

    Vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    Foreign Economic Policy

    • 81. Telegram From the Mission to the OECD to the Department of State, Paris, October 20, 1971, 1617Z

      Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Office of International Monetary Affairs: FRC 56 77 68, Briefing Books, 1970-1975, EPC Meeting 11/18-19/71. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Stockholm, Tokyo, and USEC.

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Secretary-General Succession

    Chinese Representation in the United Nations

    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    Military and Diplomatic Stalemate, October 11, 1971-January 26, 1972

    • 271. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 20, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–63, SRG Meetings, Cambodian MAP, 10/18/71. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

    Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

    South Asia Crisis, 1971

    Vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974

    April 15, 1971-March 11, 1972

    Vol. E-13, Documents on China, 1969-1972

    • 36. Memoranda of Conversation, Beijing, October 20, 1971, 4:30-4:40 p.m. and 4:40-7:10 p.m., Beijing, October 20, 1971, 4:30-4:40 p.m. and 4:40-7:10 p.m.

      President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai introduced each other’s entourages and spoke informally for 10 minutes before convening formally. Kissinger relayed President Nixon’s personal commitment to improving relations between China and the U.S. He and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai agreed that the two nations had divergent ideologies but convergent interests, especially in ending the war in Indochina, easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and preventing conflict between India and Pakistan. Technical arrangements for Nixon’s trip to China were also discussed.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President-China Material, HAK visit to PRC, October 1971, Memcons-originals. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on either memorandum. A handwritten notation reads “informal memcon.” There are also numerous handwritten notes written throughout the memoranda. Ellipses in the source texts. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

    • 37. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai’s Extemporaneous Toast, Beijing, October 20, 1971, Beijing, October 20, 1971

      Chou hailed the restoration of contact between China and the United States, praised Chairman of the Communist Party of China Mao Tse-tung, President Nixon, and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, and referenced the ongoing Sino-American talks.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President-China Material, China-HAK October 1971 visit. No classification marking. Published from a copy that indicates it was the English translation of the Chinese remarks.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)