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October 17, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, October 17, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, October 16, 1972

Next Date: Wednesday, October 18, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, October 17.

      Haig was in first thing this morning with a report from Henry who says the talks are going well and he feels that he should go on to Saigon, so he will tonight. We got into some discussions about Henry's attitude, along the same lines that Haig had expressed to me yesterday. He shares the President's view that Henry is strongly motivated in all this by a desire for personally being the one to bring about the final peace settlement. Al feels this poses a major problem in that it will cause Henry to push harder for a settlement and to accept a less favorable thing than he might if he didn't have this push. He thinks that my talk with him about a successor for Haig in the second term was very helpful, in that it gave him some reassurance that he would be around in the second term, and, therefore, the pressure for him to get this settled before the election was lightened and his willingness to talk it over with Haig was greatly increased. Al urges that while Henry is gone we give every possible evidence to him that we can, of total support so that he won't feel that he has to prove anything. He agrees that under no circumstances can he go to the third stop unless the whole thing is fully settled, but he's not at all convinced that Henry fully shares this view.

      The President spoke this morning to a group of foreign labor leaders. Felt afterwards that he'd given a very thoughtful analysis of the relationship of labor and government and the history of free labor in the United States but that probably no one would notice it, that we wouldn't get any mileage out of it.

      We had a one hour Connally meeting today, a lot of talk about how great his television show was, some discussion of funds to run it, a little discussion of Connally's schedule, some of Connally's ideas on the problem of the espionage/sabotage case and some speech ideas. Then Mitchell, MacGregor and Ehrlichman joined us for the regular Tuesday political meeting.

      The President got into an analysis that as of now the polls are the same as they've been. In the next week to ten days the opposition has to break through but there's no way they can, especially if we keep on the offensive and keep them on the defensive. Some discussion on the radio speeches, Connally told him he feels that he's the most effective radio speaker in his lifetime. He then got into a question of the President's schedule. MacGregor raised it, feeling that we need some additional schedule activity in order to maintain the morale of our troops and to avoid the charge that we're taking the election for granted. Connally agreed, said the President ought to hit about eight cities in two days on ten minute airport stops in each, or consider traveling around the country the week after the election thanking people. The President basically didn't buy that argument because he feels that a stop in a state doesn't help the vote there and some of the states that Clark had suggested, he totally disagreed with. He feels he should not go back to Michigan because it'll only stir up the Ruther machine, Missouri's bad because of Eagleton, and that our problem is to avoid stirring up the opposition. Even going to Chicago is bad because of stirring Daley up.

      The key here is to show emotion and Ehrlichman suggested a national get out the vote drive. The President would go to eight states with predicted low votes to make the case that they should get a better turnout. Actually, we'd select states where we're in good shape. Connally argued that the President should only do this if he really wants to but we do need to appear that we're not taking it for granted and he also argues that going out more would help with Congress after the election which is not a valid point. The President said we'll see Operation Rescue in the next three weeks as the Democrats try to save local candidates. His going out to campaign might aggravate this because any appearance he makes has to be political. It's a tough judgment call and questioned whether with television it's a good idea.

      The basic problem is the dead spot next week between Monday and Saturday. The President talked about popping out and back from here, one stop each day on Wednesday and Thursday, but the problem then would be to have a major speech. So it got back to the airport prop stops. Then I suggested helicopter stops in tri-state areas, going to one tri-state airport and chopper to three states from there and then back to Washington. The President liked that and so did the others, and we ended up talking about Wednesday and Thursday of next week, and Monday and Tuesday of the following week for this kind of activity.

      Connally made a pitch that there was no question that he could win the election as a celluloid candidate but you get a very fragile strength through television, that you really have to be out where they can touch you. That he should go out not as a challenger, a campaigner, but as President, and not campaign against McGovern.

      After the meeting, President made the point to me that he was very much concerned about their sensitivity on his time at Camp David. He said on the travel thing he tends to agree-- not on a rational basis-- but for the compelling reason that all of them seem so strongly for it. He thinks going out to the country is not bad if he can go in a dignified, non-combative way, as my helicopter plan would provide. He thinks we don't need it, that it won't affect the election. But hat we have to live with the morale of our own forces, and that it does remove the Congressional arguments, so he suggested several combination states to work out of. To look for nonpolitical events that we could do if possible, preempting the VP or the family if we need to. He told me to go ahead and work some ideas out on this, which we'll get into I'm sure tomorrow.

      End of October 17.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Special Meetings of the Security Council

    UN Finances and Reduction of the U.S. Assessment

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Breakthrough in Paris Blocked in Saigon, October 8-23, 1972

    Vol. XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972

    Republic of Korea Troops in Vietnam and Force Modernization, April 1971-December 1972

    Vol. XXI, Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970

    Saudi Arabia

    • 166. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, Jidda, October 17, 1972, 1433Z

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 1 SAUD–US. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Brussels, Caracas, CINCEUR for POLAD, Dhahran, Djakarta, Kuwait, Lagos, London, Manama, Rome, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, Vienna, and the Mission to OECD in Paris.

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Serious Negotiations and the October Settlement, July 1972-October 1972

    • 25. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, October 17, 1972, 10:37 a.m.-10:10 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 856, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XX [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 108 Avenue du Général Leclerc in Gif-sur-Yvette. All brackets except where noted are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

      For the draft agreement that resulted from this meeting, see Appendix 2. Two days after this meeting, North Vietnam agreed to the U.S. positions on the two remaining major issues: the replacement of armaments and the release of imprisoned members and supporters of the Communist shadow government in the South, Articles 7 and 8. In the first instance, the North Vietnamese agreed to replacements on a piece-for-piece basis for those items worn out, damaged, or destroyed; in the second, North Vietnam agreed that the issue would be settled by the South Vietnamese parties after the cease-fire began. These two issues settled, the United States informed North Vietnam that “the text of the agreement can now be considered complete.” ( Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 30 and footnote 2 thereto).

      Kissinger’s next task was to present the draft agreement to President Thieu in Saigon and obtain his approval. He flew directly to Saigon from Paris and began a series of meetings with Thieu on October 19.

    Vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972

    Libya

    • 93. Telegram 189100 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, Washington, October 17, 1972, 2114Z

      The Department conveyed a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and the Libyan Foreign Minister, in which the former fended off demands for the contracted F–5s by inquiring about Libyan plans for the aircraft.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL LIBYA–US. Secret;Exdis. It was repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Drafted by Connor (USUN); cleared by AF; and approved by Michael Habib (S/S).

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)