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November 14, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, November 14, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, November 13, 1972

Next Date: Wednesday, November 15, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, November 14.

      The President had Ehrlichman and me over at 10:00 this morning for a long session at Aspen. We went over the whole basic plan of how we're going to set things up, and the President bought the concept. We discussed the Vice President, wanted me to talk to him, explain that we have a tough thing to do here. That he must cut-- that we must cut all the way across including his staff. He feels that we need to keep our leverage over him, so we shouldn't break it off with him now, but we do not further his interests politically for '76. We don't want him to have the appearance of being the heir apparent; but we also don't want to appear to push him down. We should pitch the Bicentennial for him as a great opportunity. The summary then is that Agnew is not the ideal choice, but he may be the best of a bad lot. He wants Ziegler to ignore the fact of McGovern's existence in any answer to post-election attacks. Wants me to check with Mitchell on Kleindienst and some others-- the idea of using Butz as the head of the Department of Natural Resources instead of the Interior Secretary, this being much more suitable politically. Wants to work out PR on the Vietnam wrap up and also PR on the reorganization with a brief crisp paper that has good strong prose.

      He’s determined to cut the White House staff down substantially in order to take the lead in forcing other cuts. He talked to Scoop Jackson on the phone, and told him he'd see him when he gets back from Israel. Then after he hung up, said we should consider him as Secretary of Defense, Ehrlichman's to make the call on that. For Undersecretary of State he's now thinking of Bill Casey or Pat Gray, and now he's looking for other recommendations, including Henry's. Wants me to talk to Rogers, make the point that the President is closest to him, but feels that anyone who's been in for four years should go like Romney, Volpe and Laird. It would be bad if you stayed and they didn't. It's best for you to finish in a blaze of glory with the Vietnam peace signing, and then you take the lead and move out. That we'd have problems with Romney and Volpe and we need your lead to do this.

      He went through some odds and ends on meetings for tomorrow, and then at 3:30 we had a long session with Ash, Malek and Ehrlichman and Aspen, again reviewing the reorganization plan. The President made the point that the more we isolate the big man, the more we lose the real genius in the Departments because people just won't work if they don't have the access. So we have to get across the point of the satisfaction of getting the job done, and settle for the perquisites and so on. Ash said that they had a motto at Litton that it's okay to be a prima donna, providing that you can sing.

      I had an insight from this discussion-- that the President doesn't really want to work with just a few people as we’ve assumed, but rather he wants better people, that he can work with. We need to provide honor and stuff for the people who need it. We need to get people who want to do something, rather than who want to be somebody. He raised the question whether this kind of system that we're laying out will work for another President, or whether it's just designed to fit him, and he's concerned whether we're building for posterity. The decision was made to withhold the reorganization plan from Congress for a year, saying we want to try it out first. And that will preclude their turning it down and our flying it in their face.

      Again, the President called me back after the meeting, went back over the need for an Italian, a Catholic, an Italian, Irishman and four Catholics on the Cabinet. Wants Bush as Under Secretary to Treasury, because he would be good with Congress. And hits Interior, Commerce, Labor, HUD and so on where we can put the Catholics in, and Defense, if we don't get Scoop Jackson. He's now got Richardson back at HEW, and Weinberger at HUD. He also thinks we ought to try for a Catholic Republican at the National Committee. We raised the point that we wanted to move Ash as head of OMB, and the President didn't know exactly how to handle it because I lobbed it in indirectly, but we've got that set. Ash obviously wants the job, so that works out fine.

      End of November 14.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Foreign Assistance Policy, 1969-1972

    Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24-December 13, 1972

    • 107. Letter From President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu, Washington, November 14, 1972

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 104, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam, South Vietnam, GVN Memcons, November 20, 1972–April 3, 1973 [1 of 3]. Secret. Bunker delivered the letter to Thieu in a meeting on November 15. (Backchannel message 271 from Saigon, November 15, 1130Z; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 49, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Peace Talks, Chronological File, 1 Nov.–15 Dec. 1972)

    Vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972

    Proximity Talks and the Backchannel: Separate Department of State and White House Negotiating Tricks

    • 318. Telegram From the Interests Section in Egypt to the Department of State, Cairo, November 14, 1972, 1110Z

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis. A typed notation at the top of the first page reads: “Our Interests Section in Cairo reports that during a routine call on Undersecretary Fahmy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday, Fahmy indicated that Egypt has a hole card and wants the U.S. to think it is potent, in the hope that this will bring us to produce a change in Israeli policy. Fahmy observed that it is up to us (Egypt) to devise something new to inject into the situation.”

    • 319. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1972, 12:15 p.m.

      Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0094, Box 62, Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on November 16 by Brett and approved by Nutter. The conversation took place in Rush’s office and the Secretary’s Dining Room. Dayan also met with Rogers and Helms that day. (New York Times, November 15, 1972, p. 1) The meeting with Rogers is summarized in the President’s Wednesday Briefing, November 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1283, Saunders Files, Subject Files, Israel) No record of the meeting with Helms has been found.

    Vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972-1980

    SALT II, 1972-1980

    • 6. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, Washington, November 14, 1972

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–013, Verification Panel Meetings, SALT, 11/14/72. Top Secret. On November 16, Deputy Secretary of State Irwin also sent Kissinger, at his request, his advice on strategy for SALT II. Irwin suggested “that we avoid putting forth detailed proposals at the first session.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO–I–(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973)

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Guyana

    • 379. Memorandum for the 40 Committee, Washington, November 14, 1972., Washington, November 14, 1972

      The 40 Committee approved cutting covert subsidies to Prime Minister Burnham because his policy had become more anti-United States. But, if Burnham changed course prior to the national election in March, 1974, and implemented pro-United Stated policies, the 40 Committee would be advised of his new policies so it could re-evaluate the decision to terminate covert support.

      Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom stated, “40 Committee Approved on 12 December 1972.” Kissinger indicated his approval the same date in a memorandum from Ratliff dated December 5. In the memorandum, Ratliff concluded, “The key factor in this negative proposal is that Burnham has made it clear that he will win the election with or without our help.” (Ibid.)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)