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March 4, 1969

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, March 4, 1969, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, March 3, 1969

Next Date: Wednesday, March 5, 1969

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, March 4.

      This being press conference day, the President concentrated primarily on preparation. He met this morning with the bipartisan Congressional leaders. I had planned to go in a little late - while I was shaving, the phone rang - the President was checking to see if Secretary Rogers had been invited to the meeting. He had.

      I spent only a little time with President in the morning after his meeting and haircut - to get some things signed. He was relaxed and in good spirits but anxious to get to work on briefing materials.

      He worked in the office until noon - then went to the Mansion for the rest of the day.

      I had long session with Higby regarding moving the press to EOB, and other minor matters. Kind of a relaxed day. Arthur Burns in to make his case for a daily high-level staff meeting. Bud Wilkinson in to discuss his youth program problems and his feeling that President needs better physical care program.

      Press conference went very well. Did it at 9 00 pm to get prime time coverage. Ran for full hour to allow longer answers and more questions. Should get good reaction, although he didn't make any major news.
    • Handwritten diary entry (JPG)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

    • President's Daily Brief of 04 March 1969 [consult link for visuals and extent of redactions]
      The President's Daily Brief

      4 March 1969
      19
      Secret

      I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

      MIDDLE EAST
      King Husayn is letting the terrorists operate more and more openly throughout Jordan. During the recent Muslim holidays, fedayeen groups collected funds in Amman, canvassing hotels and the homes of foreigners. They have also been harassing tourists, and Ambassador Symmes is worried about possible incidents involving US nationals. Jordanian security forces are now cooperating with the fedayeen's own security patrols.

      Husayn's new modus vivendi with the fedayeen is no doubt based on a recognition of the terrorist movement's growing popularity in Jordan. The King also seems to think he can better control the fedayeen by working with them. [redacted]

      * * *

      It now appears that Moshe Dayan will defer his bid for the premiership--perhaps until the Labor Party convenes in June to decide the ranking of party leaders on the voting lists for the fall elections. Even though Dayan and his group abstained yesterday in the Labor Party vote approving Mrs. Meir's nomination as interim prime minister, he said he would stay on as defense minister. This would seem to rule out any attempt by Dayan to challenge Mrs. Meir's confirmation in the Knesset.

      EUROPE
      There is nothing significant to report.

      SOVIET AFFAIRS
      The East German and West Berlin negotiators met again this afternoon on East German initiative in a last-ditch effort to reach some meeting of the minds before the West German presidential election tomorrow. [redacted] it seems that the East Germans offered passes for Easter and discussions on passes for other holidays if the West Germans transfer the election out of Berlin. This Chancellor Kiesinger is reported unwilling to do so late in the game; hence the meeting evidently will take place as scheduled in West Berlin and there will be no holiday' passes for West Berliners.

      The checkpoints at both ends of the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn were closed to all traffic for about two hours in the afternoon. The delays were attributed to Soviet troop movements; small British and French convoys were held up, but no US convoys were involved. All other roads to and from Berlin were normal.

      There was some Soviet air activity in the vicinity of the corridors. Allied air traffic continued normally, however, and the Soviet controller in the air safety center is maintaining a business-as-usual attitude.

      [redacted]

      VIETNAM
      The Communists may have kicked off the second phase of their current offensive, at least in the highlands of II Corps. Two major enemy ground attacks occurred there in the last 24 hours. For only the second time in the war, the Communists used tanks in an unsuccessful attack on a special forces camp in Kontum Province. In the second attack, a US infantry company taking part in a sweep 30 miles to the southwest suffered heavy losses. Elsewhere in the country, action was generally low again yesterday.

      * * *

      [redacted]

      * * *

      [redacted]

      * * *

      [redacted]

      * * *

      [redacted]

      II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS

      PANAMA
      [redacted]

      The situation within the Guard [redacted] looks shaky following the removal of Colonel Martinez. Major personnel shifts and organizational changes could have had a weakening effect. Although Torrijos seems to have consolidated his position, the loyalty and unity of the Guard have not been tested since Martinez' ouster.

      [redacted]

      COMMUNIST CHINA

      The Annex today is a discussion of the Chinese Communist leadership.

      NATIONALIST CHINA - SOUTH KOREA
      [redacted]

      ETHIOPIA
      The Ethiopian government's firm response to the annual student demonstrations this year probably-ensures that the situation will stay under control over the short run. The underlying discontent, however, is deeper and more widespread than in the past and now has even penetrated into the military. The Emperor and his cabinet are said to be aware of the trouble. They are doing almost nothing, however, in the way of reforms to correct the basic problems, which are not unlike student problems elsewhere.

      The regime's foundations have been getting weaker year by year. The kind of demonstrations which the student radicals are determined to continue may find these foundations even weaker than they seem.

      THE LEADERSHIP OF COMMUNIST CHINA
      The leadership of Communist China has gone through a violent convulsion during the Cultural Revolution, one from which it will be a long time recovering. There was a massive purge of veteran party leaders in 1966. Since then, the survivors at the top of China's power structure--an inner circle of six still dominated by the venerable Mao Tse-tung--have presented a virtually unchanging public face. This appearance of stability has persisted despite violent social upheaval, bloody factional fighting, several reversals of national policy, and the political destruction of half a dozen men in the second echelon of the leadership.

      The official voices of the regime have consciously portrayed the top six as a unified team. This is misleading. Today's power center is not the loyal phalanx of Mao's lieutenants that was projected to the outside world in the regime's first 16 years. These men are, rather, a disparate group, not natural or congenial allies.

      The political elite today bears little resemblance to the monolithic Politburo of the 1950s. In addition to Mao, the inner circle includes four veteran leaders and Mao's wife. Since the spring of 1967, this inner circle has been supplemented by a frequently changing secondary elite. This group now numbers eight, all of whom are new to the apex of political power.

      The central figure and still the authority for basic policy is Mao Tse-tung. His role in the decision-making process is almost certainly decisive, but he probably does not intervene personally except on issues of major importance. [redacted] Although arbitrary and suspicious, he has been forced, in the fluid political situation of the past several years, to arbitrate among competing interest groups and, on occasion, to compromise. He clearly feels that his time is running out, but despite disappointments and reversals, he has not abandoned his romantic vision of a communized, egalitarian China nor his sense that the Chinese revolution is his own creation.

      In the early 1960s, Mao apparently detected a growing resistance to his policies from the entrenched party bureaucracy and from this convinced himself that leaders in line to succeed him would sell out his revolution and turn to Soviet-style revisionism. This fear--partly paranoia, partly justified--is the overriding factor among many which have produced the "Cultural Revolution" which he unleashed in 1966. In striking at his erstwhile subordinates and the bureaucracy they controlled, Mao virtually demolished the old party machine painstakingly built up over a period of three decades. No cohesive organization has yet risen to replace it. On the contrary, the destructive energies of the Cultural Revolution have torn the body politic into competing interest groups, each striving for power--or survival--at the expense of the others.

      During the past three years a group of leaders associated with Mao's more radical policies rose rapidly on the crest of the political turmoil. These men have tended to encourage Mao to push his revolutionary ideas and to work against the established order. In opposition to this radical group, there has developed an amorphous coalition whose chief common concerns are to restore social order, stabilize the economy, and maintain national security. The most important components of this more moderate faction have been the military command structure, especially in the provinces, and the government administrators in Peking. [redacted]

      This basic division seems to reach into the highest ranks of the leadership. Mao's designated successor Lin Piao, a brilliant military strategist who has led China's armed forces since 1959, may have lost the allegiance of some of the old-line military commanders who have been attempting to administer China's provinces by his unwavering support for Mao's disruptive social and political policies--which have included attacks on the military establishment. Lin still has followers in the army, but his present pre-eminence derives from Mao's faith in his loyalty.

      Number three in the Peking hierarchy is the durable premier, Chou En-lai. With his fine instinct for political compromise and self-preservation, Chou has adroitly managed to serve Mao while at the same time moderating Mao's more extreme policies. Throughout the Cultural Revolution he has been the chief voice of reason in China and the symbolic leader of the moderates.

      The other three figures in the inner circle, Mao's longtime ghostwriter and party theoretician Chen Po-ta, the secret police specialist Kang Sheng, and Mao's wife Chiang Ching, have been the principal leaders of the "Cultural Revolution Group"--the headquarters of the radicals. Mme Mao was a political nobody before the Cultural Revolution, not even a Central Committee member. When the Red Guards were unleashed in 1966, she quickly became the most vociferous spokesman for the militants. Public adulation accorded her has at times been exceeded only by that for Mao and Lin.

      The next echelon of leadership has reflected the shifting balance of power in the Cultural Revolution. Six of the eight members of the secondary elite are not even members of the party Central Committee, an index of how rapidly they have risen to prominence. At levels just below this group figures have risen and fallen in kaleidoscopic fashion as the Cultural Revolution passed through phases of extreme radicalism or relative moderation. The eight junior members of the top leadership have been associated together for less than a year and are themselves split politically. Five seem to have been identified with the radical and destructive aspects of the past three years--two members of the Cultural Revolution Group, the commander of the Air Force, and two members of a purge group within the military. The other three--the political leader of Peking city, the army chief of staff, and the commander of the Peking garrison--have been more closely identified with Chou En-lai and the military establishment.

      This small group of 14 leaders is highly unstable. It will probably be able to retain its superficial unity, but behind the scenes its members seem to be engaged in political fights which are eroding its cohesion and effectiveness.

      The problems of the top leadership have been compounded because the Cultural Revolution has largely destroyed the institutional framework in which political power had been embodied since 1949. The Politburo, for example, has been badly shaken by the purges and no longer represents the pinnacle of power in China. The State Council and the party Central Committee have declined even further in importance, while the party secretariat has ceased to function. As a result the top leadership has had to rely increasingly on the army--itself strained and perhaps split by the events of the Cultural Revolution--to administer the country.

      This certainly means that the views of the military establishment, and particularly those commanders who are in direct charge of most of China's provinces, carry a great deal of weight in policy formulation, but we are unclear how the military participate in the decision-making process. At present the leadership is placing great emphasis on rebuilding the battered party apparatus in preparation for the long-postponed Ninth Party Congress. As this effort goes forward friction between the military and civilian party personnel is likely, further confusing lines of authority.

      We have little good information on how decisions are reached in Peking at present, or on the relative weight of individual members of the top leadership in the inner councils of the regime. However, some kind of consensus politics seems to be at work. In contradistinction to the situation before the Cultural Revolution, when a very few top leaders--Mao, Chou En-lai, Mao's former deputy Liu Shao-chi and former party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping--took quick decisions and issued orders by fiat, most important decisions of the top leadership seem to be the result of wider discussion, considerable political infighting and frequent compromise.

      A good example of this process was the formation--over a period of more than a year--of the "revolutionary committees" that now formally govern each of China's provinces. Political patronage considerations led to an enormous amount of bickering and pulling and hauling in the setting up of these committees, both in Peking and in the provinces themselves. Complex political rivalries and alliances slowed the process and occasionally forced the reopening of questions presumably "settled." Continued bickering has also led the top leadership frequently to issue vague directives that can be and are variously interpreted at lower levels, and has hindered effective follow-through on seemingly firm orders.

      The political demise of the Red Guards in the summer of 1968 has also had an effect on the formulation and implementation of policy by the Peking leadership. Mao and his radical lieutenants now lack a ready means of stirring up mass action against the established bureaucracy. On the other hand, military commanders, who were in 1967 and 1968 clearly opposed to the destructive activities of the Red Guards, may now be more willing to carry out extreme Maoist social policies. Provincial military leaders who in 1967 were themselves under Red Guard attack are now pushing programs that bear a "made in Peking, by Mao" label. This apparent accommodation may have weakened the position of government officials associated with Chou En-lai, who have a bested interest in careful planning and rational policies. Some of these figures have recently seemed to be losing influence.

      The present leadership in Peking is in any event faced with enormous problems, some of long standing, and some engendered by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. It is most unlikely that the 14 leaders who at present are on top of the politicsl pyramid in China have a common approach to these problems, and further political infighting involving both policy questions and personal rivalries is probably in prospect.

      LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
      4 MARCH 1969

      [redacted]

      5 March 1969

      LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
      4 MARCH 1969

      I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

      MIDDLE EAST
      The Israelis claim that there has been an upsurge of sniping incidents in the Suez Canal area over the past few days and that several soldiers have been wounded, one today. The Chief of the General Staff said Israel would take retaliatory action if the Egyptian firing continued. (Press, 5 Mar 69)

      EUROPE
      There is nothing significant to report.

      SOVIET AFFAIRS
      The East Germans closed the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn again this morning for three hours, but as of 0700 EST (1300 local), traffic was moving normally on all roads between West Germany and Berlin and in the air corridors. One US convoy was held up on a trip from Berlin to West Germany. The rumored closing of checkpoints between the eastern and western sections of Berlin itself has not occurred and all are open to traffic.

      Meanwhile, the West German presidential election was due to get under way at 1000 local time. As of 0700 EST (1300 local) no results were in, but the decision of the 83 Free Democratic members of the Federal Assembly to join the 449 Social Democrats in backing Justice Minister Gustav Heinemann makes him the favorite to defeat Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder of the CDU. [redacted]

      VIETNAM
      Except for the unsuccessful attempt by assailants, some dressed in South Vietnamese military uniforms, to assassinate Prime Minister Tran Van Huong as he left his office for home at the lunch hour, the situation in Vietnam is stable. [redacted]

      II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS

      SOVIET UNION - COMMUNIST CHINA
      A TASS representative in Moscow has told our embassy that publicity was given to last Sunday's border incident because the "numbers involved" made any other course unfeasible. He said the Soviets regard the incident as a culmination of local tensions in the area and went out of his way to state that it is not regarded in Moscow as a deliberate political provocation by Peking.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Chronological File, Box 1, Folder March 3-13, 1969 [1 of 2]

    • 10:50 AM, David Rockefeller; Mr. Kissinger
      David Rockefeller
      Mr. Kissinger
      3/4/69 10 50 am

      David Rockefeller said the trip sounds as though it were sensational, and he thinks HAK was wise to persuade the President to do it. HAK agreed it worked out really well.

      DR coming to Gridiron dinner on March 15th.

      HAK agreed to meet with him on Saturday, March 15, at 4 :00 p. m. place of meeting left open at this point.
    • 10:55 AM, Secy Rogers; Mr. Kissinger
      Secy Rogers
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 10:55 AM

      R said that a few days ago Gerry Smith had been called by Senator Gore who was holding some sessions on the ABM and asked Smith to testify. Smith agreed to do it and did not know Defense had been asked and would not testify. R said Smith could not very well get out of it now unless directed to do so. K agreed and asked when Smith was testifying. R said on Thursday and he would maintain position that no decision has been made. R hopes no decision is made at NSC tomorrow. K said the decision will be made on Thursday and will be announced at 3:00 PM.

      jm
    • 11:00 AM, Ambassador Yost; Mr. Kissinger
      Ambassador Yost
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 11:00 AM

      Yost said he was calling because he had read in the paper that there would be an NSC meeting tomorrow and wondered if he should be present, K said it was not on the Middle East. Y asked if there was anything scheduled in the NSC on the Middle East in the near future. K said no but that Yost would be invited if there were a meeting on this subject. Y said he wanted to learn what happened in connection with the trip and how we proceed. K said he thinks we will be moving ahead on the four-power track. Both agreed this should wait until after Eban visit.

      jm
    • 11:05 AM, Joseph Sisco; Mr. Kissinger
      Joseph Sisco
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 11:05 AM

      Sisco said he had Rabin with him but had stepped out to talk with HAK. Sisco is telling Rabin (whom he understands is seeing HAK at 11:30) that it is better for him to hear from HAK about the trip than for Sisco to get into it.

      S said he did get over paper to HAK on Middle East for President's press conference. HAK said he had received it and will be sending it up to the President.

      Both agreed that preliminary session with President was desirable (this had been discussed the night before) and Sisco said he would try to get it laid on for tomorrow - would get Yost down as well. Sisco said he is also going to start putting something down on paper.

      jm
    • 3:40 PM, Sec. Laird; Mr. Kissinger
      Secy Laird
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 3:40 PM

      L asked whether K had made any kind of a commitment to Healey that he could come in March to see L. K said no. L said he had numerous Hill commitments and asked what K thought of his having Healey come a day or so before the NATO meeting. K said that was entirely up to L. L said Healey said K had worked out an arrangement for him to come in March - K said that was absolutely wrong.

      jm
    • 5:15 PM, Secy Laird; Mr. Kissinger
      Secy Laird
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 5:15 PM

      L said K. had mentioned a little about our discussions after the meeting tomorrow and asked whether K thought the President would want to go along fairly soon on the Sentinel. K said yes, - he thinks he may want to on Thursday. L asked whether there was any need for help on the statement. K said we would do statement here drawn from L's paper and others and then discuss with whomever L designates in his shop. L said he was concerned about whether press should be briefed. K said he though that should be done since we will not go into detail - Defense should have backgrounder as soon as possible. L said Dave could give the backgrounder on Friday. K said he thought it should be laid on for about 4:00 on Thursday, but nothing should be said about it yet. L said he and Dave will go together before the Armed Services Committee on March 18. L said he would bring all of this up tomorrow.

      Re NSC meeting tomorrow, L will just do brief five minutes then Dave will make presentation. K said Dave should go into some of the technical characteristics, etc.

      jm
    • 5:20 PM, Secy Packard; Mr. Kissinger
      Secy Packard
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 5:20 PM

      K said he was checking about the meeting tomorrow - asked if P was going to include something about defense of minuteman, etc. P said yes and described plan. P said he has got everyone together and they are all agreed and will support on uniform basis - everyone is on board. He has commitment from all the Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs. K said P should also bring up difference between system that he found and one he is orienting.

      K asked P what his judgment was about getting this through the Senate. P said he thought it could be done so long as President comes out strongly for it. K said he will.

      jm
    • 5:50 PM, Richard Helms; Mr. Kissinger
      Richard Helms
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 5:50 PM

      H said his hearing has been put off until 11:00 tomorrow morning so he is not in such a bind. H asked whether K had had a chance to talk to the President about whether H should come to the meeting at 8:30 tomorrow. K said he had not. H said he would just come and President could send him home if he did not want him. K said that would be fine but he did not think President would send him home.

      jm
    • 6:20 PM, Secy Laird; Mr. Kissinger
      Secy Laird
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 6:20 PM

      Re Sentinel - K said we should be sure everyone is saying the same thing and asked about holding up announcement until Monday. Asked if L agreed. L said yes he had been thinking about the middle of next week but thought Monday would be better. K mentioned perhaps getting out little book (question and answer type thing). L thought this was good idea and said perhpas the President could release it.

      K said he would take this matter up with the President.

      jm
    • 6:30 PM, Larry Lynn; Mr. Kissinger
      Larry Lynn
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 6:30 PM

      K said he had talked to President and they will put off decision until Monday - told L to produce some good question and answers.

      K asked L to set up meeting with Packard for Lynn and K.

      (Meeting with Packard set for 3:30 on March 5)

      jm
    • 7:10 PM, The President; Mr. Kissinger
      The President
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 7:10 PM

      President said one point he thought might come up - there may be questions on result of discussions with Lodge - new directions, etc. Asked what score is. K said that is point he failed to cover. K said President should say now the negotiations are entering new phase; getting down to hard bargaining. K said he might consider saying that even during last month there have been some indications of movement that give us some confidence for the future, which is true. President should at least indicate that we are entering new phase - indicated direction which the team should take. Something could be said along the line that issue is so complex that they will understand with so much face involved on all sides, very inappropriate to go into details. -- even ask the public to have understanding and patience. K said not to indicate forum in which this will take place. President said what if they ask if there will be private talks -- he will just say it is against the nature of private talks to even discuss it. President said we have to play it very cool. K said he should indicate we know where we are going, plan exists, some progress has been made which indicates the end of this phase. President agreed that was way to do it.

      jm
    • 7:55 PM, The President; Mr. Kissinger
      The President
      Mr. Kissinger
      3-4-69 7:55 PM

      President said one point that is not quite clear in the briefing is whether or not we consider these attacks on the cities as violations of the under standing. K said that is deliberate that it is not quite clear. K said the position we should take is that we determine what is a violation -- strictly speaking it is a violation. K said what President could say is that it is a violation of the understanding but our reaction is not automatic. President said we do not want to put ourselves in a:pox: box where we have to respond? K said not unless President wants to say he has deliberately chosen not to respond.

      jm
    • 8:45 PM, Jerome Wiesner; Mr. Kissinger
      Jerome Wiesner
      Mr. Kissinger
      8:45 p.m. 3/4/69

      Dr. Wiesner will be in Washington on Saturday (on Meet the Press on Sunday). (I think he also said Abe Chayes would be with him.) And he asked to see HAK sometime Saturday afternoon. HAK wasn't sure what his plans would be for the afternoon since he is having a guest in town, but he planned to be in the office in the morning. He left it that Wiesner would call again on Friday and they would then make a definite date.

Audiovisual Holdings

  • The White House Photo Office collection consists of photographic coverage of President Richard Nixon meeting with prominent social, political, and cultural personalities; speaking engagements and news conferences of the President and various high-ranking members of the White House staff and Cabinet; Presidential domestic and foreign travel, including Presidential vacations; social events and entertainment involving the First Family, including entertainers present; official portraits of the President, First Family, and high-ranking members of the Nixon administration; the 1969 and 1973 Inaugurals; the President’s 1972 Presidential election campaign appearances (including speeches) and other official activities of the White House staff and the President’s Cabinet from January 20, 1969 until August 9, 1974 at the White House and the Old Executive Office Building; other locations in Washington, DC, such as The Mall; and the Presidential retreats in Camp David, Maryland, Key Biscayne, Florida, and San Clemente, California. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    Roll WHPO-0438 Photographer: Atkins, Oliver | Color or B&W: B&W

    • Frame(s): WHPO-0438-, President Nixon's third news conference. Many head and shoulders shots of him in animated positions. 3/4/1969, Washington, D.C. White House, East Room. President Nixon, White House Press Corps.

    Roll WHPO-0439 Photographer: Atkins, Oliver | Color or B&W: Color

    • Frame(s): WHPO-0439-, President Nixon's third news conference. Various portrait and full length photos of Nixon speaking at the microphones. 3/4/1969, Washington, D.C. White House, East Room. President Nixon, White House Press Corps.

    Roll WHPO-0440 Photographer: Kightlinger, Jack | Color or B&W: B&W

    • Frame(s): WHPO-0440-, President Nixon during his third news conference. 3/4/1969, Washington, D.C. White House, East Room. President Nixon, White House Press Corps.

    Roll WHPO-0441 Photographer: Kightlinger, Jack | Color or B&W: B&W

    • Frame(s): WHPO-0441-, President Nixon during his third news conference. White House Press corps reporter standing to ask their question. 3/4/1969, Washington, D.C. White House, East Room. President Nixon, White House Press Corps, Ron Ziegler.

    Roll WHPO-0442 Photographer: Kightlinger, Jack | Color or B&W: B&W

    • Frame(s): WHPO-0442-, President Nixon during his third news conference. 3/4/1969, Washington, D.C. White House, East Room. President Nixon, White House Press Corps.

  • The White House Communications Agency Sound Recordings Collection contains public statements that took place between 1969 and 1974. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    P - Formal Presidential Remarks

    • WHCA-SR-P-690307
      Remarks by President Nixon in a press conference. (3/4/1969, East Room, White House)

      Runtime: 0:55:13

      Keywords: Presidential press conferences, presidential news conferences, interviews, media, Vietnam War, Indochina War

      Production credits: Audio feed supplied by WHCA; Recorded by ELB (initials of WHCA engineer)

      Original Format: 1/4-inch reel-to-reel audiotape. Original source type: Original.

  • The White House Communications Agency Videotape Collection contains “off-the-air” recordings of televised programs produced between 1968 and 1974. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • WHCA-3244
      President's [Third] Press Conference. President Richard Nixon.
      CBS
      Runtime: 01:05:16

Context (External Sources)