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January 23, 1973

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, January 23, 1973, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, January 22, 1973

Next Date: Wednesday, January 24, 1973

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973

    America Leaves the War, December 30, 1972-January 27, 1973

    Vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

    Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

    • 6. Conversation Between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff (Haig), Washington, January 23, 1973

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 404–6. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig in the Executive Office Building between 9:29 and 9:50 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Settlement Accomplished: The Accords Initialed and Signed, January 1973

    • 48. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, January 23, 1973, 9:35 a.m.-1:20 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 866, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, January 8–13, 1973 [January 23, 1973]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the International Conference Center, Hotel Majestic, Avenue Kléber. All brackets, except where noted, are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed; on Tab H, see Appendix 3.

      Between January 13 and January 23, that is between the final two January Kissinger- Le Duc Tho meetings before the agreement was signed, Thieu decided to accept the agreement. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973 Documents 320, 322, and 329.

      After Kissinger had failed to get Thieu’s agreement in October, Nixon made Haig his chief emissary to Thieu. In trips to Saigon in November, December, and January, Haig delivered increasingly tough messages from Nixon, essentially ultimatums, that signaled irrevocably the United States’ intention to sign the agreement even if South Vietnam did not. Furthermore, if South Vietnam did not sign, it could not depend on future U.S. assistance. In response to this pressure, Thieu agreed. On December 19, 1972, however, he perceptively commented to Haig, when the latter delivered the penultimate ultimatum: “Given the realities of the situation, what I am being asked to sign is not a treaty for peace but a treaty for continued U.S. support.” Haig replied: “I agree with your analysis.” (Haig, Inner Circles, p. 331)

      With Thieu’s assent, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho could initial the agreement, paving the way for its formal signing by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam. The formal signing of both the four-party and two-party agreements took place on January 27 in Paris. The texts of the two agreements were identical except for the preamble and the signing paragraphs.

      Later reflections by the two U.S. principals, President Nixon as policy architect and chief strategist and Kissinger as chief operative and tactician, show how they viewed what had happened and what had been achieved. Nixon wrote: “I had always expected that I would feel an immense sense of relief and satisfaction when the war was finally ended. But I also felt a surprising sense of sadness, apprehension, and impatience. Sadness, because Lyndon Johnson had not lived a few extra days to share the moment with me and receive the tribute I would have paid him. [Johnson died on January 22.] Apprehension, because I had no illusions about the fragile nature of the agreement or about the Communists’ true motives in signing it. And impatience, because I was acutely aware of all the things we had postponed or put off because of the war.” (Nixon, RN, p. 757) Kissinger wrote: “As we approached a conclusion there was no longer in our group that elation which accompanied the breakthrough in October. The December negotiations had brought home to us the abiding mutual hatred of the two Vietnams.” Furthermore: “We had learned how thin was the veneer of affability of Hanoi’s leadership, whose single-minded quest for hegemony, we were certain, would continue after a settlement.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1465) He added: “Le Duc Tho managed even on this solemn occasion to make himself obnoxious by insisting on ironclad assurances of American economic aid to North Vietnam.” (Ibid., p. 1472)

    Vol. E-11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973-1976

    Haiti

    • 390. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 23, 1973

      Summary: The White House Situation Room reported that Ambassador Clinton Knox had been kidnapped by gunmen demanding the release of political prisoners held by the Haitian Government.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 785, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. 1. Secret. A January 24 memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, marked “OBE” (overtaken by events), noted that U.S. officials were very reluctant to use an American aircraft to take the kidnappers and the released prisoners to Mexico and that other means were being sought to transport the prisoners. (Ibid.) In circular telegram 14532, January 24, the Department informed diplomatic and consular posts in the Western Hemisphere of Ambassador Knox’s release, noting that the United States had refused to play a direct role in providing ransom or transportation to the terrorists who had held him hostage. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL 23–9 HAI)

    Vol. E-14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973-1976

    • 1. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 23, 1973

      Summary: Eliot indicated that the United States needed to reaffirm the high priority it attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that entered into force on March 5, 1970. He recommended a reaffirmation be included in President Nixon’s annual foreign policy report in order to encourage key countries to adhere to the Treaty’s provisions.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–6. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert Loftness (SCI/AE). Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. Pollack, Spiers, and Farley sent the memorandum to Eliot under cover of a January 23 action memorandum, requesting that Eliot sign the memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.) The text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 VST 483) is in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 84–91. Nixon’s “Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy,” May 3, is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 348–518. For the introduction to the foreign policy report, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 9.

    Vol. E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, Second, Revised Edition

    France, 1973-1976

    • 304. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, Washington, January 23, 1973

      Summary: Laird discussed the defense dimension of the U.S.-French relationship.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–198, Study Memorandums, 1969–1974, NSSM–175. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not published is Tab A, an undated paper entitled “Ballistic Missile Assistance.” Tab B, a draft NSSM, is ibid. Nixon did not indicate his preferences regarding Laird’s recommendations. Sonnenfeldt forwarded Laird’s memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a February 3 memorandum; he also forwarded, for Kissinger’s signature, Documents 305 and 306. Kissinger signed both documents.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)