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January 14, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Friday, January 14, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Thursday, January 13, 1972

Next Date: Saturday, January 15, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at Camp David, Maryland

  • The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents made available transcripts of the President's news conferences; messages to Congress; public speeches, remarks, and statements; and other Presidential materials released by the White House.

    Digitized versions can be found at HathiTrust.

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Friday, January 14th. The President's at Camp David.

      I went into the office for the first half of the day and worked at home in the afternoon on my opus. We had some bad economic news today. The GNP figures revised downwards will be out, also the wholesale price index is up eight-tenths, which means the '72 deficit projection will be way up. We had announced in September it would be about $28 billion, now it turns out it's going to be over $35 billion, which will be a tough one to live with.

      The President called this afternoon to say he'd been thinking about the Tuesday night Vietnam announcement. He wants me to try to get Rogers on board regarding it. That’s been the one thing he's been worrying about, in conjunction with that announcement, because he's afraid of Rogers's adverse reaction.

      He said, first, the President's been doing a lot of thinking since this blew on the Pentagon Papers, or the Anderson papers. The problem is the guy also has the dope on the secret negotiations. We don't know if he's given it to Anderson, but there's a good chance that Anderson has it. Second, anyway, the President thought we should surface the secret talks at some time, running through the history, plus the Thieu offer to resign, plus a deadline in six months. Third, he thinks the worst way for this to come out is via Anderson with his distorted view. Fourth, he thinks it's best for the President to do it, and make the offer publicly. The President thinks the channel's blown now anyway, so now everything goes into the Porter channel. He'll say that everybody, including Rogers, agreed that we should explore the offer of withdrawal in six months, cease-fire, etcetera. He'll inform Laird just beforehand, he doesn't want to argue about it. He'll say here's the offer we've made, and add a couple things. Rogers is not to tell anyone in his shop about this. As he went on building the case on the phone, he says this has the advantage of defusing the deadline issue and the POW issue, so that they know we've been trying and have gone the extra mile. It gives credibility to what Rogers and the President have implied regarding the use of other channels. He'll have Porter lay this on the table at the negotiations Thursday morning. I'm to say this is a decision the President has made on his own. That Kissinger is not too hot for it, because he wants to continue the private channel, but the President thinks it's too late, we have to go open. The President has asked for the record and will write the speech himself. The President feels Rogers will be against this for the wrong reason, which is that Kissinger was doing the negotiations, but that we've got to talk him into accepting it. The President thinks now is the time to go public and make our October offer public. The President will shape it up a little more. He says Rogers may not know about the Thieu resignation and some other factors in it, but he knows about the thing in general. There's also the advantage of defusing the issue at the beginning of Congress. In other words, also Anderson's guy has the information, therefore, we're sitting on a time-bomb. He wants Rogers's cooperation. It’s a tight decision, but we want his help. We'll get the leaders together two hours ahead of the announcement, and then go public for our country. And Thursday morning, Porter puts it out in Paris. We'll be making a peace offer at the start of Congress, like we did in October of '70, and buy time for a couple of weeks before China. Also, we have to do it before the North Vietnamese offensive begins, so it doesn't look like we're dealing from weakness. This way, it puts them on the bad side of the psychological issue if they attack after the offer, and it'll answer the seven points publicly, which we've never done. It has to be, so there's to be no discussion. I'm to tell Rogers that the President will probably want him to look it over on Monday afternoon.

      He also told me to tell him about the Muskie rumor, and the fact that we have an open-and-shut circumstantial case against the Anderson guy, but no witness, so we can't move on it.

      I called Rogers, and went through all of this with him. He reacted reasonably well, said that he only had one question, which is that we shouldn't make all the papers public. There's a problem if Kissinger makes them pub--, makes public what was offered, what they said, how many meetings, etcetera, and all the details. He thinks we should avoid all the secret mumbo-jumbo and just cover the general substance of the talks.

      This morning the Attorney General and I had our meeting with Henry and with AI Haig, as a follow-up to our meeting with Bill Rogers, in an attempt to try and solve that problem. Henry kept interrupting us as we tried to start telling what the situation was. And we had to listen to a 45 minute tirade from him, at the end of which he emotionally said, tell me what your proposition is, and I'll do it. I'm not here to strike a treaty with the President. Every time when we tried to tell him, he'd interrupt again, and go off. He made a lot of sort of random points.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 17, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 18 [AC-17(B) Sel 15-1]
      Duration: 10 seconds

      He said that Marvin Kalb in Bermuda told Kissinger that his attack on Kissinger came from the highest level of the State department. Henry is convinced that's Rogers.
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Kissinger says he's caught in a dilemma with the President, because the President doesn't want details on any of the matters. So Kissinger does them, and that creates an endless battle with the State Department. Then when the things blow up, the President wants to go through the whole thing and find out what happened and get in the middle of it.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 17, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 18 [AC-16(B) Sel 15-2]
      Duration: 2 minutes 31 seconds

      On India-Pakistan, he said WASG is an action body, not a policy body, and there were seven SRG meetings which is policy. The President met four times with these groups, made clear what his policy was. And Kissinger came back from the India last summer convinced that there'd be a war told the President so. The President said give this to Rogers, he's got to have something to handle.

      Rogers's approach was to turn it over the UN, and give them a $1 million relief fund. Consistently, we said publicly that if war came, we would cut our aid to India. When we did cut the aid, the announcement was distorted. So the President had to fight for the President's policy at WASG. State refused to take the President's direction.

      At one meeting, Kissinger asked what was in the pipeline, and State said, we've been ordered by the Secretary not to tell you. Rogers never said he disagreed with the policy, but the sabotage went on consistently underneath.

      He says the real problem in this is Rogers. The bureaucracy has some degree of loyalty to Rogers and does what he wants. When challenged Henry says he can't demonstrate any incident of Rogers's violation or refusal to carry out an order, but they're there all over the place.

      Kissinger never sees Dobrynin without first submitting talking points to the President and an immediate report afterwards. He has records of falsified reports from State, cables distorted from what we were told, and so on. He says Rogers is totally self-willed, totally incompetent, and totally self-centered. He made the point that State was the one that put the question of sending arms to Pakistan through a 3rd country on the agenda and then they let the President take the blame for raising it and being tricky. Rogers's position is that whatever Kissinger does, Rogers is opposed, such as the Berlin Agreement, etcetera. Rogers talked to the President on, about Taiwan in Key Biscayne while Henry was sick according to Henry's view. He says, "they" say that everything we do is subordinated to getting on television with the China trip. Attorney General made the point that we have to have a modus operandi, so Rogers knows enough to satisfy him. Kissinger agreed that he'll tell Rogers whenever the President tells him to. Kissinger says the problem is that Rogers will blow his top on everything that he doesn't do. Whenever he's called in advance, he puts the President through hell, so we have to wait until the last minute to tell him. The problem is, if Kissinger tells Rogers he's conducting side negotiations on the Mideast, he'll blow up.
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      When it was all over, we ended up not having accomplished a great deal, but at least we didn't lose any ground, I don't think.

      The question of Shakespeare's resignation also came out, and both Kissinger and the AG agreed that it was imperative that Shakespeare not resign, and Henry agreed that he would move to try to keep him on track.

      Kissinger called me later in the day to say that...

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 17, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 19 [AC-17(B) Sel 16 ]
      Duration: 25 seconds

      ...in regard to the meetings with the Israelis, Sisco told Haig yesterday that he was talking with them about planes, but he never mentioned that he was talking about negotiations. Yet, we know from Rabin that they did talk about negotiations. So Henry wants me to make the point to Rogers that we want substantive, advanced notice so that we can register objections. They've got to tell us ahead, with sufficient advanced notice, so that we can object and be in on the planning.
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      That's the point that hasn't gotten across to Rogers, at least at this stage.

      End of January 14th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    The NSC System

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Appointments of Senior UN Personnel

    Vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972

    Malta

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    International Environmental Policy

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    International Environmental Policy

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    Oceans Policy

    Vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972

    Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 159. Telegram 249 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 14, 1972, 1145Z

      The Shah emphasized that although it would be a “blessing” for the United States to maintain its port facilities in Bahrain, he wished to be informed in advance if Washington planned to withdraw, so as to style himself as head of the group advocating withdrawal.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN-US. Secret; Nodis.

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    Bangladesh, December 1971-December 1972

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Bolivia

    • 109. Telegram 265 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, January 14, 1972, 1810Z., January 14, 1972, 1810Z

      Ambassador Siracusa concluded that compared to a year before, Bolivia was more politically stable and economically vibrant. However, budget woes and the threat of terrorism by guerrillas clouded the current situation.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Santiago, and USCINCSO.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

  • The White House Photo Office collection consists of photographic coverage of President Richard Nixon meeting with prominent social, political, and cultural personalities; speaking engagements and news conferences of the President and various high-ranking members of the White House staff and Cabinet; Presidential domestic and foreign travel, including Presidential vacations; social events and entertainment involving the First Family, including entertainers present; official portraits of the President, First Family, and high-ranking members of the Nixon administration; the 1969 and 1973 Inaugurals; the President’s 1972 Presidential election campaign appearances (including speeches) and other official activities of the White House staff and the President’s Cabinet from January 20, 1969 until August 9, 1974 at the White House and the Old Executive Office Building; other locations in Washington, DC, such as The Mall; and the Presidential retreats in Camp David, Maryland, Key Biscayne, Florida, and San Clemente, California. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    Roll WHPO-8285 Photographer: Knudsen, Robert L. | Color or B&W: B&W

    • Frame(s): WHPO-8285-, University of Nebraska Track Team. 1/14/1972, Washington, D.C. Steps of White House. University of Nebraska Track Team.
    • Frame(s): WHPO-8285-, University of Wisconsin Track Team. 1/14/1972, Washington, D.C. Steps of White House. University of Wisconsin Track Team.
    • Frame(s): WHPO-8285-, U.S.C. Track Team. 1/14/1972, Washington, D.C. Steps of White House. U.S.C. Track Team.

  • The White House Communications Agency Videotape Collection contains “off-the-air” recordings of televised programs produced between 1968 and 1974. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • WHCA-4969
      Dick Cavett Show. U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME).
      Eastern Educational Network
      Runtime: 01:29:23
    • WHCA-4985
      Weekly News Summary I.
      Undetermined
      Runtime: 1:30

      1. Smith/Matney: GNP up; prices are rising, Stein. Time Code Start: 00:00. Keywords: gross national product, market value, products, goods and services, labor, property, economy, economics, budgets, finances, recession, inflation, money, wages, costs, unemployment, prices, reports. Network: ABC.

      2. Smith/Reynolds: Muskie on the road in Wisonsin. Time Code Start: 01:58. Keywords: Senators, Presidential elections, campaigns, campaigning, candidates. Network: ABC.

      3. Reasoner/Peterson: General Abrams to step down. Time Code Start: 05:16. Keywords: Armed Forces, military, leaders, officials, retirement. Network: ABC.

      4. Smith: Commentary on "More". Time Code Start: 06:53. Keywords: news, reports. Network: ABC.

      5. Chancellor/Lewis: Cambodia war action. Time Code Start: 08:39. Keywords: Cambodia, Vietnam War. Network: NBC.

      6. Chancellor: Laos and the Vietnam war. Time Code Start: 12:47. Keywords: Laos, Vietnam War. Network: NBC.

      7. Brinkley's Journal: American Legion members express options on draft evaders. Time Code Start: 15:35. Keywords: veterans, organizations, speeches, military, conscription, evasion, selective service, lottery, laws, Vietnam War, conscientious objectors, political offenses, pardons, draft evasion. Network: NBC.

      8. Chancellor: Wholesale prices and inflation. Time Code Start: 19:50. Keywords: economy, economics, budgets, finances, recession, inflation, money, wages, costs, unemployment, prices, reports. Network: NBC.

      9. Cronkite: Economic indicators. Time Code Start: 20:38. Keywords: economy, economics, budgets, finances, recession, inflation, money, wages, costs, unemployment, prices, reports. Network: CBS.

      10. Cronkite/Jones: Vietnam report. Time Code Start: 23:25. Keywords: Vietnam War. Network: CBS.

      11. Sevareid: News, publicity, and fame. Time Code Start: 29:52. Keywords: celebrities. Network: CBS.

Context (External Sources)