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January 11, 1972

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, January 11, 1972, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, January 10, 1972

Next Date: Wednesday, January 12, 1972

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, January 11.

      President didn't call me in till 11:30 this morning. He came in late and worked alone for quite a while. Raised the question of our planned meeting of Attorney General with Rogers and me, and had some guidance on the line to use. He said we should put it on the basis that this is going to be a very difficult year for the President, and for all your little problems he has a hundred big ones, and we've got to discontinue finding ways to make his job harder. Bill's been good that way, but it does create problems-- but he does create problems for Kissinger. He had me come over to the EOB a little later, just after noon, and I was over there for a couple hours. He resumed the Rogers line. Made the point that we can't have two children on the President's hands. The President has every confidence in Rogers, but the State Department leaks like a sieve. That some State guy said that Pat Nixon's trip was totally political because she wanted all black faces around her, that Bill's got to realize that we just can't put everything on the diplomatic wire. He said to put it in terms of the tough campaign coming up, look at the President's week: Romney, the leaders, Stans, farewell to Hughes, Bartzell, Dutch Prime Minister Colombo, the State of the Union, the Cabinet meeting, preparing for China, plus all of Ehrlichman's domestic crap. Said we should tell him we will keep Rogers posted on China, but not down to the bowels of the State Department. President doesn't trust Marshall Green, not that he's bad, he's just loose. He does trust Alex Johnson, but not Irwin, who's not smart enough. He said I've got to think of a way to get around Rogers, not go on a frontal assault that I should play to his vanity. Make the point that we know Kissinger's difficult and so on, but we can't have a change at this point. Sisco to Iran would be OK, and that should be explored. Point out that Rogers has got to be ruthless and selfless. Let Rogers know how much handling the President has to do. Armed with all this sensational advice, we set up the meeting.

      Fortunately, Rogers walked into it by calling me this morning to say that he'd like to be cut in on the China trip, but he's heard nothing, although Henry told him he'd send him copies of all the cables and everything. He says we've got to realize we have to work closely together. It's important to keep State filled in so that everyone knows what the other one is going to do, and he'd like to be in on Haig's briefing. This played directly into the first point we wanted to get a concession from him on for Kissinger, which is the fact that we need to know what he's going to do, just as much as he needs to know what we are. And that he's got to inform the White House before he meets with Ambassadors, etcetera. Then he got onto the Anderson papers, said that since his talk with the Attorney General he had issued orders that no one at State is talking at all to the press, but the Kraft column today showed that there's still divisiveness, and that someone's being untruthful. This led him the second point, which is that we need to be protective of each other, not critical of each other.

      Which played right into Kissinger's second point, that an attack on Henry is equivalent to an attack on the President. So Mitchell and I met with Rogers for two hours at 4:00 today. Made the points that the President suggested and tied them to the points Rogers suggested, and said we have got to work out a means of dealing with all of this. We admitted that Henry was a problem in himself, but that he is essentially we've got to develop ways of working with it. Rogers said the basic problem he has is that he simply doesn't trust Henry. That he-- Henry has lied to him and he has admitted it, saying he was lying under orders, and that's the only time he did lie, but that leads Rogers to distrust everything that Henry says. Bill feels, therefore, that when he gets instructions from Henry or any kind of information, that he's got to question it, and that sets up a very difficult working relationship. He also hit some of his other sort of standard complaints about Kissinger's desire for publicity, and everything, but the important thing was his lack of trust. He also said that he's got to have a direct line of communication with the President, so that when he does question something, or want to raise a caution or something, that he can do it directly to the President without going through Henry. Mitchell and I agreed that he can use me as his conduit to the President directly, and Rogers thought that was fine. Then we agreed we had to set up a method so that Rogers would keep us posted on all meetings he has with the Soviets or the Israelis, etcetera. Rogers agreed that he would, if Kissinger would notify Rogers regarding all of his meetings, unless the President tells him not to notify. The basic principle to apply is whatever one of the three knows on foreign policy, all three should, between Kissinger, Rogers, and the President. Bill argued also that the President should have a few meetings regarding the China trip, including Kissinger, Rogers, and Haig, to provide some opportunity for discussion. He reviewed some of the India-Pakistan stuff and the other problems. Said the State Department never leaked; I confronted him with the State Department quote from The New York Times Sunday, and he was a little distressed about that, but says he hasn't any ability to control the leaks any more than he's now doing so, and I think that's probably true.

      He called me later to say that he had been thinking about my challenge to him at the meeting that he wasn't keeping us posted on his meetings with Dobrynin, etcetera and said he has reported all meetings with Dobrynin, except the one before his last trip home: that he has no—and he gave me some rundown on that—said he has no interest in keeping any of these secret, and that he will be happy to always send a report of conversation, which he pretty much does now.

      President called me at home to see how the meeting had gone. He had left for Camp David while we were in the meeting. He said we do have to find a way to bring Rogers in on the China things. We should tell Haig to find a way to present it without getting in to the sensitive parts of it. He said that Mitchell and I should now meet with Haig and Kissinger together, Kissinger can't expect that this is a one way street, he's got to cooperate both ways. He told Kissinger to "back channel" Ambassador Martin to put the Colombo visit off, and made some other schedule changes as he continues to try to keep himself completely clear.

      He's really concerned about the speech writing problem because Ray blew the fourth draft of the State of the Union, and he thinks we really have trouble on that score. He asked that I look into the idea of totally revamping of the speech writing operation. At our earlier meeting today, the President also got into considerable analysis and pondering of the Hallett critique, in which Hallett really blasted a lot of the things we're doing. President feels, however, that we're in better shape than it appears, although the bombing in December hurt us, at least momentarily on the polls, but he thinks that's just a blip. I reviewed, in the-- during the course of the Hallett discussion, George Shultz's outline from our staff meeting last night as to the key issues and what our posture is on them. President asked that Shultz write a paragraph for him on the Spirit of America idea, as contrasted to pushing for being number one. He feels he should go to two press conferences per month on television, at 7:30, and he wants to do the high school press conference and the worldwide press conference. He said he had been thinking that, regarding the campaign: what he would do in the last two weeks was six huge night rallies in the Astrodome and such places, to show huge crowds and great support, but now he's thinking maybe that isn't the best approach. He thinks we need to poll the question Hallett raises on Muskie's image of a strong, thoughtful man versus Nixon as pure cosmetics. He said he might want to consider the possibility of a joint appearance with Muskie. I don't know why in the world he would do so. Regarding youth, we have to find a way so that they're not all against us. We need some action on the bomb Muskie crew, especially Agnew, that he's got nothing to gain in fighting the press anymore, but he should brutally attack Muskie, leaving Hubert and Teddy alone for now, since Muskie's way out front. President spending the night at Camp David, presumably to work on the State of the Union.

      End of January 11th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    Foreign Economic Policy

    Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972

    Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    Special Meetings of the Security Council

    • 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, Washington, January 11, 1972, 2217Z

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by David C. Halsted and H. J. Feldman; cleared by Morris Rothenberg, Peter C. Walker, Donald S. Spigler, and David D. Newsom; and approved by Assistant Secretary DePalma. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Lusaka, Conakry, Dakar, Kinshasa, London, and Paris.

    Vol. XXI, Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

    • 204. Paper Prepared by the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group, Washington, January 11, 1972

      Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0095, 334, DPRC. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper, but it was apparently prepared by the DPRC Working Group. Odeen sent the paper on January 11 to DPRC Working Group members, including Spiers; Clarke; Tucker; Dam; Stein; Lee; Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the Department of State; and Major General John H. Elder, Jr., Deputy Director, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, JCS. The paper summarized a lengthier study, entitled “U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture” and completed by the DPRC Working Group on January 3. That study included a 108–page Executive Summary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–105, DPRC Meeting, Strategic Objectives Posture, 6/27/72)

    Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972

    Iran 1972

    • 158. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 11, 1972

      Kissinger recommended that the President authorize $942,000 in military grant funds for Iran, above the $500,000 limit for countries designated “economically developed.”

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Box 1282, Iran Economic 1/1/72–12/31/72. No classification marking. Tab A is not published. Nixon signed the Determination on January 12. (Ibid.)

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)