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August 16, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, August 16, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, August 15, 1971

Next Date: Tuesday, August 17, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

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    Digitized versions can be found at HathiTrust.

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

    No Federal Register published on this date

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, August 16th. Today started with the Cabinet meeting, although the President had me in for a few minutes ahead of time, generally reviewing the things from last night. He made the point that we should release the picture of the Quadriad as the men that made the decision. And, sort of reviewed some of the other odds and ends.

      At the Cabinet meeting, the President opened, explaining the reasons why we couldn't tell anyone about this move. Then he went into some of the details of the meetings at Camp David, what a marvelous team effort it was, and that he will always be grateful for it. Regarding who won and lost, that there was not agreement on every item, but in its totality, everyone fully agreed with the plan. In the final analysis, the decision had to be made, and I made it. He referred to how helpful Arthur was in the process and said that he needed strong support from everyone in the Cabinet. Connally then reviewed the problems, the drama of the change, the alternatives, the potential effects. Explained why we couldn't control interest, that it would be futile and counterproductive that we should expect the lenders to follow the spirit of the freeze. The President said it's easy to get around interest rate controls the bankers just won't loan money anyway. Burns says this morning the interest rates have come down. The President said on dividends, we can't control them legally, but we have asked for voluntary controls. Connally said the import surcharge we prefer to quotas, because the surcharge can be removed; it's not a border tax. On the job development credit, it'll give a goose now when we need it. The purpose is to upgrade productive capacity. It's time for our guys to get caught up, especially with Germany and Japan. The President said that Nelson Rockefeller said it was significant that right after the President's speech, the next commercial on TV last night was for Volkswagen. Connally said the income tax exemption acceleration is important. The President said the Liberals believe the government should get bigger, I believe in a thinned-down, lean government. Shultz hit the budget cuts. Weinberger's been unleashed, especially regarding FY '73.

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 12, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 7 [AC-12 (B), Sel 4]
      Duration: 6 seconds

      The President then cracked that he was the man who had leashed Chiang Kai-shek and unleashed Weinberger.
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      McCracken said the revenue reductions are incentive in nature that we should remember that. The President said the cut in revenues will expand the economy more than it cuts the government. The President asked the Quadriad two years ago: Isn't it time to develop a new monetary system to avoid the annual dollar crisis? The purpose is to jolt the international community into building some new stability. The President talked about the freeze, says we have it for 90 days, but it’ll break the ba--, we will break the back of inflation, somehow. We will have whatever's needed to follow the freeze. Don't leave the impression that it's on forever. The next step will not be permanent wage-price controls. That's ruled out. We will not put the economy in a straitjacket. Then there was some discussion regarding the extension of the freeze. Romney pushed for a fundamental look at the wage-price thing, just as we were taking a fundamental look at monetary policy.

      The President said how are we going to compete, and how are we going to add 20 million jobs? We've made a national decision that we can't compete in making cars, or making steel, or making airplanes. So are we going to end up just making toilet paper and toothpaste? We've got to go for a new tax structure and technology, new evaluation of antitrust. A basic structure of our bargaining position, this is the first step, and we're trying to take the long view. The President then reviewed the world economy and what we're trying to do. Said we can now negotiate a more stable monetary system and that we have to lead in this.

      Burns said the President has electrified the nation. Everything that he's done is favorable. He's given a tremendous lift of confidence to business and financial leaders. Arthur called dozens of leading central bankers. They took it calmly. They're concerned, but they were especially pleased to learn that the rebuilding process has already begun starting the meetings immediately. The initial reaction is extraordinarily good. We regret what happened to Japan, but they were due for a jolt. The President said that the Japanese problem was so important that maybe the Quadriad and Rogers should meet regarding it, especially regarding the Japanese visit. Then he told him he's having a dinner for the Japanese Cabinet, and meeting the Emperor in Alaska.

      The Cabinet meeting ended on a high note, as it had begun, and the President spent the rest of the day in the office in meetings with Colson, Connally, and others. He wants to get going on the radio speeches now, because they're on a good, high level. He commented that the power of the office is enormous, and sometimes we have to use it for showmanship, which is what this really was. His conclusion is that what the people want is the appearance of action. The problem is, we have the best staff in history in substance, but in terms of PR, we have the worst. Not his personal staff, but the Domestic Council and the other people, and the way they look at things. He wants to be sure people rem--, play back to the China thing in the dialogue on the economy thing, because the main point in both cases is leadership.

      He says we now have four points to concentrate on. First, the basic point of leadership: boldness, courage, etcetera. Second, the President as the world leader for peace the biggest leader in the world. Third, the personal family man: character, decency, a man you can respect in the White House, a first family to be proud of. Fourth, prosperity without war and without inflation. Then, down the line, we worry about the sub-issues of crime and drugs, and then, on the others, we just show compassion and interest, such as on the environment. He wants the voluntary action people to get into the Right to Read program, and he would participate if they'll do so.

      He gave Colson hell because he wants attacks, vicious attacks, on the people who put the Party above the country, the Democratic contenders. He wants to be sure Shultz carries out the personnel cuts very heavily in what he calls the enemy agencies: HEW, HUD, etcetera. He wants to modify the antitrust laws to let the United States compete abroad. He says we're dropping the ball regarding the President's actions where the press is not there. We don't get things out, such as Girl's Nation, the Business Consumer Council, and so on.

      His main regret on the speech is that he didn't have more convincing points in it, because he didn't have enough time to work on it, especially in the conclusion. It came out the way a writer would write it, instead of the way the President would speak it. His real interest is whether we gave the people an emotional lift. As it turned out, I think he did. As the day went on, the stock market figures kept coming in. It got more and more fascinating as it became clear that we had set an all-time record, both in volume and in size of the gain, so that made it quite exciting. He decided to call a Congressional leadership meeting tomorrow, after he talked to Wilbur Mills, who was strongly for the whole program and said he would support it. So we're setting up a bipartisan meeting tomorrow morning. He wants to be sure we give Wilbur equal credit on the Japanese thing, and wants Peterson to fill him in on the whole deal. This comes out of the first Aspen discussion...

      -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 12, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 9 [AC-12 (B), Sel 6]
      Duration: 9 seconds

      …where it was agreed we'd use the emergency thing for working on the Japanese. He wants to be sure we don't make the announcement in a belligerent way. We've already slapped the Japs hard enough...
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      ...but he wants to tell Wilbur that we now have a way to work it out. He thought about dropping by the Stock Market tomorrow on his way into New York, but decided not to. He wants to be sure that we tell Milton Friedman that there was a political problem here. That we had a situation where Congress was going to act on wage and price controls on a permanent basis, and the President had to beat them to the punch with a temporary move such as the freeze. Otherwise they would have introduced this on September 8, and we would really have been up a tree.

      He decided at the last minute to shoot over to the State Department and open the sub-Cabinet briefing that Ehrlichman had set up. So he did that, then came back to the EOB, changed his clothes and went out to Burning Tree to play golf with Bill Rogers. He had me ride out with him to Burning Tree.

      On the textile thing, he said to tell the industry that we have a plan, but we cannot come out with it for a couple months. That the US cannot come out and impose quotas at this time, but something else has opened up and we have an answer for them. We had a ridiculous motorcade going out there with a huge police escort and everything which was really horrible, and they drove right into the Burning Tree club grounds and up in front of the caddie house, which was very embarrassing. And then it was topped off by Helen Thomas getting out of the car and standing there watching him, when the press car wasn't even supposed to come in and no women are allowed at Burning Tree
      .
      He had me call Arthur this evening to try to get him off the desire to see the President regarding Federal Reserve appointments. I had a good chat with Arthur. He said he'd been busy reassuring the foreign people, especially the Japanese and Canada, that this part is very important, because it could eventually hurt us domestically. That--, and then he said that Shultz had told him the President had made a decision on the Fed appointment, and he has a candidate, told me all about him. It’s a guy named Thompson at Texas Instruments. And I told him the President agreed that if he and Connally agreed on a candidate that would be satisfactory with the President. The President called me later in the evening at home and said, Well, it's been quite a day, and I don't really care what Meany says, Hubert's in a tough spot. And that was about it.

      I talked to Connally also this evening. He had had good reports from all over on the whole operation.

      End of August 16th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972

    • 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, Washington, August 16, 1971, 0245Z

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files—Europe, Box 685, Germany, Volume IX 4-8/71. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Identical cables with this message from President Nixon to certain other heads of government were also sent on the evening of August 15. (Ibid.) The originals of the typed messages sent to the Department of State for transmission are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US. Circular telegram 149446 to all diplomatic and consular posts, August 16, transmitted a summary of Under Secretary Volcker’s briefing of the Washington diplomatic corps at 10 p.m. on August 15. (Ibid.) The full transcript of Volcker’s briefing was sent to all posts in telegram 156086, August 25. (Ibid.)

    • 170. Memorandum of Conversation, London, August 16, 1971, 4 p.m.

      Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 15, France. Confidential. Drafted on August 23 by Cross and approved by Volcker. The meeting was held at Wychwood House.

    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    The Consequences of Operation Lan Som 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8-October 6, 1971

    • 245. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 16, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy. Kissinger forwarded a slightly different version to Rogers under a covering memorandum, August 17, on which there is a note indicating that Rogers read and returned it that day. (Ibid., Box 861, Camp David Memos, July–Dec 1971)

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    Between Beijing and Moscow: Summit Announcement, July 19-October 12, 1971

    • 316. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, August 16, 1971, 9:05-10:45 a.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s Files, China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Embassy. Drafted by Lord on August 19. In a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Lord noted: “The President has already read your memorandum summarizing this session.” Kissinger approved the memorandum of conversation “for the files” on August 28. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 17. An August 16 memorandum from Kissinger to the President describing his meeting with Huang Chen is printed ibid., volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 155.

    Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972

    China,January-September 1971

    Vol. XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

    April-October 1971: Change and Reassessment

    • 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, August 16, 1971, 0108Z

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Johnson and approved by Johnson and Eliot. In telegram 8278 from Tokyo, August 24, Meyer summarized the effects of Nixon’s new economic program on Japan. He asserted: “Recent US actions, particularly new economic program, have had constructive effect in Japan, forcing Japan to face realities of 70’s.” (Ibid.) In response to Nixon’s new economic program, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced on August 27 that it would let the yen float against the dollar.

    Vol. XXI, Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    Vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

    Vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972

    Vol. XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

    Discovering the Possible, May 1971-September 1971

    • 12. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, August 16, 1971, 11:30 a.m.-4:05 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 866, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—Vietnam Negotiations, C.D. 1971 Dr. Kissinger (1 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the North Vietnamese Residence at 11 Rue Darthé.

      Once Kissinger realized that he would face only Xuan Thuy at this meeting, as Le Duc Tho was in Hanoi, he knew that the meeting “was essentially a holding action.” And in the face of President Nixon’s growing reluctance to continue the secret talks, Kissinger, in his report on the meeting, argued for their continuance, at least for one more time, on the following grounds:

      “• We are improving our already good negotiating record. We had to give them an opportunity to consider our new version [a reference to the American eight-point plan he presented at the meeting].

      “• We have a channel if they want to settle, and which forces them continually to review and modify their position.

      “• We may keep them from escalation, during the electoral campaign.

      “• We gave a good justification should we retaliate if they do escalate.

      “• I must come to Paris anyway to work out the details of my interim visit to Peking and the announcement of your visit.

      “• We have nothing to lose, except my 36 hours of inconvenience, and we achieve nothing by breaking off now (they are not keeping us from anything we want to do).” (Memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, August 16, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 245)

      According to Kissinger, Nixon reluctantly acquiesced to one more of what seemed to be “increasingly sterile contacts.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1036)

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    Afghanistan, 1969-1972

    • 344. Telegram 5041 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, Kabul, August 16, 1971, 1002Z

      Afghanistan requested a moratorium on the repayment of debt owed to the United States.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Tehran, Tokyo, and the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels. Also repeated to the US Asian Development Bank representative in Manila.

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Guatemala

    • 355. Memorandum For the Record, Washington, August 16, 1971., Washington, August 16, 1971

      During a weekly meeting with the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that President Arana had directly participated in drawing up death lists.

      Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Latin America General, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive.

    Vol. E-13, Documents on China, 1969-1972

    • 17. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, August 16, 1971, 9:05-10:45 a.m., Paris, August 16, 1971, 9:05-10:45 a.m.

      President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Chinese Ambassador to France Huang Chen that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon conclude an agreement that would lessen the dangers of accidental nuclear war between the superpowers, predicted that the Soviets would propose that President Nixon visit the Soviet Union, and assured Huang that Nixon would visit China before visiting the Soviet Union.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, July 1971-Oct 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted by Lord on August 19. All brackets in the source text. The meeting was held at the Chinese Embassy.

    • 18. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chinese Ambassador to Canada (Huang Hua), Paris, August 16, 1971, Paris, August 16, 1971

      Kissinger welcomed Huang Hua to his new post in Ottawa and provided his White House telephone number as well as the home telephone number of NSC staff member Lord.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, July 1971-Oct 20, 1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “8/16/71-handed by HAK to Amb. Huang Chen in Paris for transmittal to Huang Hua.” Published from a copy that indicates Kissinger initialed the original.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)