1. Home
  2. Research
  3. Almanac

January 30, 1973

Introduction

This almanac page for Tuesday, January 30, 1973, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Monday, January 29, 1973

Next Date: Wednesday, January 31, 1973

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at The White House - Washington, D. C.

  • The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents made available transcripts of the President's news conferences; messages to Congress; public speeches, remarks, and statements; and other Presidential materials released by the White House.

    Digitized versions can be found at HathiTrust.

  • Each Public Papers of the Presidents volume contains the papers and speeches of the President of the United States that were issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary during the time period specified by the volume. The material is presented in chronological order, and the dates shown in the headings are the dates of the documents or events. In instances when the release date differs from the date of the document itself, that fact is shown in the text note.

    To ensure accuracy, remarks have been checked against audio recordings (when available) and signed documents have been checked against the original, unless otherwise noted. Editors have provided text notes and cross references for purposes of identification or clarity.

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

  • The Congressional Record is the official daily record of the debates and proceedings of the U.S. Congress.

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Tuesday, January 30.

      A number of meetings during the day today, while he was supposedly getting prepared for his press conference, all basically on Vietnam. He had read the news summary and felt the most significant thing is our problem regarding Kissinger, as evidenced by the Schecter piece in Time. We have a necessity to develop a real plan regarding the handling of the war, the themes, and so on, and who gets them across. What do we want to have come out of this? The positive points, the attack points, or the personal points? He had written this out over the weekend and handed me his handwritten sheet which he had originally intended to dictate. He had me make a Xerox, which is in the file. He feels that there's a bad line of Kissinger's on the motives of others, his answer to the bombing question. Kissinger must use the phrase "peace with honor", that we should look at how the media rewrote the '70 elections and see that they're doing the same thing here. We can't leave it to the good judgment of the people. Kissinger should hit the bombing question straight out -- “I recommended it, supported it, and it worked”. We need a plan of what goals to get across, then how to do it. Collect a list for those to see. For instance, we should do Crosby Noyes instead of Craslow, or Smith Hempstone instead of Craslow. Ziegler should make a list of all the good press people on Vietnam; Crosby Noyes, Smith Hempstone, Roscoe Drummond, and so on. What is the media objective and how do we change it? His concern is that we've leashed our people so tightly that we're not getting any of the things out. Where are the good editorials and columns? Is there any indication of success of our plan? We should activate Haig, Scali, Klein on a crash basis and get them doing background pieces. We're still in a campaign, but we may have battle fatigue. Henry's got to avoid nit-picking the agreement, rolling his eyes about the motives of North Vietnam. Look at the Schecter piece about Henry trying to keep his feet in both camps. The press realizes that he's doing this. I should tell Kissinger that I just reread his messages and scare him on that. We should say no on Kalb, because all Henry does is build himself up by knocking down the President. He then changed his mind and said we should go ahead and have him do Kalb, but he's concerned that Henry won't take it on, except in the presence of a superior who agrees with him, like the President, so we've got to convince him to approach this on how the President did it, not Henry’s books and articles for background, but the President’s.

      We need to give Henry six points that are musts on one piece of paper. Here's the checklist. Forget the process. CBS is after the process plus Kissinger's role in downgrading the President, so you have to prove otherwise. Remember that you're talking to average people and not to Marvin Kalb. You have an obligation at this point. At the present time it looks like you're building yourself at the expense of the President. For instance, your answer on the bombing, which should have been a simple answer. The theme of the left has to be: one, that it's all going to fail or, two, that Nixon didn't do it, Kissinger did. For once, we should get away from self-glorification of Henry. He doesn't mean it that way, but that's how it comes out. You've got to choose. You can't be a friend of everybody; the time has come to take sides. He wants Colson to gin up some letters to Kissinger of outrage on the point that he should be supporting the President, not taking all the credit himself. Your briefing was brilliant, but you lacked any mention of the President who made all this possible. The President's courage was the indispensable element. Also, Henry's got to use the word "Communist". He never will do that.

      The President then pointed out that we really had three options: one, we could continue to fight, escalating the war, which would have been hopeless; two, we could have bugged out and turned over Southeast Asia to Communism; or three, we could do what we did, which was find a way for peace with honor.

      He also wanted me to [unclear] -- the President wanted me have a heart to heart talk with Haig and have him sit in on how to handle the Kissinger problem. That we have to establish an absolute rule that Kissinger has no press on the trip and that it's not to even be raised. That's his Hanoi trip. Thinks we ought to get an article on the shocking attitude of the press, that they were yelling for peace all this time. Now they refuse to concede that maybe the President showed some character in bringing it. The question of where the British editorials are, and can we get those mailed out? The question of strategy in dealing with the press and whether it does any good to have social contact with them. He feels it's better to have reasonable question and answer contact, plus an occasional special interview, but nothing from the social standpoint because it just doesn't do any good.

      He got me over again late this evening and then back to the whole Kissinger problem. By then, I'd had a meeting with Henry and had spent a lot of time working out the basic notes of the six goals he ought to cover, the analysis of the problem, and so forth. Those notes are in the file, but he makes the point that we should tell Henry that the President's going to listen to the TV and see what he does. The points I made in my notes to Henry were that, first of all, the problems we face now are: one, that Kissinger is divided from the President -- they're making it appear that the President pulled Kissinger back from peace, that Kissinger opposed the bombings, that Kissinger was compromised by the President, and that he's being forced to conduct three-way negotiations between Hanoi, Saigon and Nixon; second, that the agreement won't work; third, that it wasn't worth the cost; four, that the President didn't do it; five, the appearance that Kissinger is building himself at the expense of the President. The media is trying to build the Kissinger role and downgrade the President's role. For example, Schecter's analysis of the bombing answer, and the point that the agreement was done by Kissinger over the President's dead body; and six, the appearance that Kissinger is keeping a foot in both camps. He's got to change that, take sides. You can't be a friend of everybody. I made the point that we have four broad goals. First, to establish the President's role in bringing peace. Kissinger's negotiations may have been essential, but without the President's courage, they would have been useless. Also, the President's long-range concept going way back on Vietnamization, which he was discussing in the '68 campaign, long before Laird raised it. Also the China opening, which he wrote about in 1967, long before he'd ever met Henry Kissinger. And third, the Soviets' role, which he had been discussing for three or four years before he was elected. The second major goal is to establish the validity of the tough decisions: November 3rd, Cambodia, Laos, May 8 and December. That Henry's got to give a simple answer on the bombing. I recommended it, supported it and it was right. Third, we have to confirm without question that we have "peace with honor". And fourth, we have to destroy the liberal establishment, kill the critics, because they said it couldn't work. Build our credibility because it did work and build our equity for the future. Given those goals, I argued that Henry's approach on TV should be to forget the process and the details. Talk to the average person, not Kalb. Watch the nuances, evasions, eyes rolling, and so forth. Be formal, not chummy. Call him Mr. Kalb. Don't worry about defending the agreement. It'll either work or not. What is said at this time won’t matter. There's no need to explain the agreement any more. The need now is to solidify support of the President. So, he should establish and sell six solid points: One, we have achieved peace with honor. We preserved the credibility of the United States in the world with our allies, our enemies, and the neutrals. It's essential to our role as a force for peace, and we have a peace that no one thought was possible. Two, the courage of the President was the essential element. In spite of unprecedented opposition, pressure, hostility, vilification, in spite of Congress, and media attempts to undercut him. His courage, calmness, wisdom, guts to hang in prevailed. Third, the tough key decisions made the difference: November 3, Cambodia, Laos, May 8 and December -- all unpopular and all attacked by the media. Four, the bloodbath consequences of a bugout. We would have gotten the United States out, but we would have doomed Southeast Asia first, to a bloodbath and second, to a Communist takeover. Five, the December bombing worked and was right and it worked. It broke the deadlock, there was no division between the President and Kissinger, it was not terror bombing, we struck only military targets. And six, the liberal establishment critics were wrong. The establishment is now badly damaged, their credibility tarnished, performance in question, failed to stand firm in adversity. All their predictions failed to come true. The President's peace with honor was despite little support from within the government, active opposition from the Senate and some in the House, overwhelming opposition from opinion leaders, press, religious, education and business. Their approach would have left the war going for 50 million people, left South Vietnam for a Communist takeover, destroyed respect for the United States among our allies, encouraged our enemies and dismayed the neutrals.

      I discussed this whole thing with Henry and convinced him of some of it, but it's clear that his main concern is his own position and he is afraid of that. He thinks that he's lost the President's confidence and doesn't like the tenor of the atmosphere around the White House now. He's still convinced that some of us launched the effort to do him in and/or separate him from the President, and he's trying to figure that all out.

      The President talked with him after my meeting and felt he was very serious and somber and wondered what I had done to him, so maybe I did shake him up a little. Ziegler hit him the same way, and he's agreed to do the Kalb interview on Thursday night, but we'll see how it comes out.

      End of January 30.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. X, Vietnam, January 1973-July 1975

    Neither War nor Peace, January 27-June 15, 1973

    • 3. Memorandum for the President’s Files by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 30, 1973, 9:30-10 a.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 104, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam, GVN Memcons, November 1972–April 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original. For an audio recording of this conversation, see ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 844-03.

    • 4. National Security Study Memorandum 167, Washington, January 30, 1973

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–195, NSSM Files, NSSM 167. Secret; Sensitive. According to the attached correspondence transmittal sheet, the Vice President, Scowcroft, Odeen, Kennedy, Holdridge, and Negroponte also received copies.

    Vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976

    National Security Policy

    • 2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, Washington, January 30, 1973

      Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Gardiner Tucker. Secret. Tucker sent this “status report” to Richardson under a covering memorandum of January 30. On the covering memorandum, Richardson wrote on February 11, “This impresses me as an absolutely first-rate paper. Would like to discuss with you ASAP.” Tucker later sent the memorandum to Secretary of Defense-designate Schlesinger under a covering memorandum of May 17. A stamp on a June 1 OSD covering memorandum indicates that Schlesinger saw it. (Ibid.) Under a covering memorandum, February 3, Tucker sent Richardson and Clements another lengthy paper, this one an overview of current defense strategies and missions. (Ibid.)

    Vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974

    March 16, 1972-March 6, 1973

    Vol. E-15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976

    East Europe Regional

    • 1. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon, Washington, January 30, 1973., Washington, January 30, 1973

      Johnson submitted the Committee’s evaluation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) system for controlling exports to communist countries.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-241, NSSM 222 [2 of 2]. Confidential. The full report was not attached. The COCOM study was in response to NSDM 159 of March 29, 1972. NSDM 159, which governed the sales of integrated circuit technology to communist nations, is printed as Document 380 in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)