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December 8, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Wednesday, December 8, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Tuesday, December 7, 1971

Next Date: Thursday, December 9, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Wednesday, December 8th. Considerable discussion in the staff meeting this morning about the OEO veto strategy. Apparently, no problem now on the veto, because we'll have a supplemental on the continuing resolution, that will provide OEO funds—even if the President vetoes the bill. The question now is to determine the strategy of vetoing, because it's imperative that we dramatize our side of the story or else the opposition will, and we've got to be sure it's on the philosophy of the bill, not just the technicality of bypassing the states.

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      DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
      Audio Cassette 16, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 11 [AC-16(B) Sel 9]
      Duration: 1 minute 36 seconds

      The big thing at the staff meeting, however, was Kissinger tirade that cut loose on India-Pakistan situation in answer to a question and he basically sort of lost control of himself and went into a real tirade. He said that the problem, we're going to have a monumental problem on this in the second term. That we're safe through the election because the results aren't going to have any effect for two to three years. And he says we're on the right side of the immediate issue, but the consequences will be dramatic later in two to three years. For instance, Thailand, Iran, and so forth would draw the obvious conclusions from our lack of support of Pakistan and they'll see our friend murdered with no help from us to save him, and therefore, conclude that they've got to go on their own. They can't rely on us. He feels it's wrong--, it was wrong not to stifle this, it was obvious it was coming. He said he'd held meeting after meeting and was sabotaged by the bureaucracy in the last several months. That we could have been tough with the Soviets, or we could have done to the Indians three weeks ago what we're doing now, that now it's too late. Any country now within the reach of Soviet power or Soviet satellite power will adjust to the facts of life. But, on the other side, it may help us marginally with the Chinese. He says three months ago we should have started screaming about Indian intervention.
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      Then he reiterated one of his standard Kissinger quotes: When you have the margin for maneuver, you don't have the evidence to back it up. By the time you have the evidence you no longer have the margin of maneuver. And he, of course, blamed this whole problem on the State Department and their bureaucracy. The whole thing startled people considerably, and was very unfortunate. Because the full staff group was there and it didn't need to be said in front of them, and it once again showed, pointed out the Kissinger-State Department problem. The President had already been very much aware of the problem with Henry as it arose yesterday, and I, so I filled him in on my meeting with Henry yesterday and his threat of resignation, also his tirade in the staff meeting this morning. The President said he had felt, even over the weekend, that there was something wrong with Henry, but he thought it was personal and went beyond the, simply the immediate substantive Pakistan problem. I think it does too and, as we talked about it, agreed that there was the personal problem involved: the President on Monday calling on Rogers at the dinner, as well as on the TV, at the midday meeting in the OEO, and the EOB office, and Henry feeling that he had been slighted there. But there was also the personal disappointment in that Henry knew that he was to blame, partially at least, in the current problem, and he didn't like that feeling. Also the President feels he's very tired physically and that's a factor in this too. In any event, the President kept coming back to it as we went along. He told me to talk to Haig about it and then later said not to. He kind of bounced back and forth on the whole question. Really trying to figure out in his own mind what the problem is and how to deal with it.

      End of December 8th.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. V, United Nations, 1969-1972

    UN Finances and Reduction of the U.S. Assessment

    Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

    South Asia Crisis, 1971

    Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972

    Announcement of Summit Through the South Asia Crisis, October 12-December 1971

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe, 1969-1972

    Romania

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972

    Cyprus

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    Narrowing the Issues, October 19, 1971-April 18, 1972

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

    • 202. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting, Washington, December 8, 1971, 3:10-3:50 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–73. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

    Vol. E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972

    U.S. Policy Towards International Production and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs

    Vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972

    Tunisia

    • 156. Intelligence Memorandum 2101/71, Washington, December 8, 1971

      Anticipating an end to President Bourguiba’s rule, this 18 page report, titled “Tunisia: The Hour of Separation Approaches” analyzed Bourguiba’s four decade rule of Tunisia and his philosophy of government, it outlined the most pronounced forces of change emerging within the power structure, and examined probable successors.

      Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 16, DI/OCI Files, Job 79-T00831A, Box 8. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. In requesting preparation of a study of current political dynamics in Tunisia, a March 18 CIA memorandum noted that, “We believe there is need for a critical and unorthodox analysis of the political situation that will re-examine current assumptions to the effect that existing institutions in Tunisia are sufficient to insure an orderly transition to a stable and moderate post-Bourguiba Government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–01229A, Box 1, AA-1, AF DIV, 1971)

    Vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

    India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971

    • 164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), Washington, December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m.

      Kissinger suggested that Pakistan invoke its mutual security treaty with the United States.

      Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6–10 Dec 1971. No classification marking.

      No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger’s reference to a mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action “as may be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that the United States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIX, page 372, footnote 6) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962, however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote 7)

    • 165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:20-5:01 p.m.

      During the course of a discussion of the crisis in South Asia, Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell weighed the possibilities of increasing pressure on India. Nixon instructed Kissinger to contact China to urge the Chinese to initiate military moves toward the Indian border, and he authorized the movement of a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 307–27. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

    • 166. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03-8:12 p.m.

      Nixon and Kissinger weighed whether to cancel the Moscow summit if the Soviet Union did not restrain India. Nixon reiterated his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–64. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Brazil

    • 142. Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, December 8, 1971, 5:15 p.m., Washington, December 8, 1971, 5:15 p.m.

      President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and members of the NSC Staff met with Médici, Gibson, and Castro. Their conversation focused on global implications of China’s admission to the United Nations, and the nature of Brazil’s place in “the global foreign policy concept of the United States.”

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 911, VIP Visits, Brazil. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Blair House. Kissinger initialed Nachmanoff’s December 10 covering memorandum that recommended the memorandum of conversation receive “no dissemination outside your office.”

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)