Breadcrumb

April 26, 1971

Introduction

This almanac page for Monday, April 26, 1971, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Sunday, April 25, 1971

Next Date: Tuesday, April 27, 1971

Schedule and Public Documents

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Annotated News Summaries, Box 30, News Summaries - April 1971 [During this period, the Staff Secretary only removed pages from the News Summaries which contained President Nixon's handwriting, often leaving the document with no date. Although there are no specific documents with this date, you should also consult the full folder for the month.]

    President's Personal File

    The President's Personal File is essentially a President's secretary's file, kept by Rose Mary Woods, personal secretary to the President, for two purposes: (1) preserving for posterity a collection of documents particularly close to the President, whether because he dictated or annotated them, or because of the importance of the correspondent or the event concerned and (2) giving appropriate attention–letters of gratitude, invitations to White House social events, and the like–to members and important friends and supporters of the Nixon administration. This generalization does not describe all the varied materials of a file group which is essentially a miscellany, but it does identify the reason for the existence of the file group's core. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Monday, April 26.

      Staff meeting this morning. Got into the whole question of our position re: the demonstrators, following up on our PR staff meeting yesterday afternoon. The general feeling was that the President should say something to show that he's not frightened, but also not insensitive to the demonstrators, feels that the absence of a statement is evidence of-- or no that the absence-- his absence from Washington is evidence of the fear of being here and his insensitivity to the problem. They generally felt that it got through that the demonstration is now respectable, and that we need to keep that in under consideration. I discussed this later with the President, and we got into quite a discussion as to what the statement should be. The President's first inclination was to say-- to recite all the bad things that they did, after saying that he was pleased the demonstrations were peaceful on the whole, but that it's too bad they tore down the US flags at the monument, burned the benches, stopped traffic in New Jersey, threw bottles at the police, etcetera. After Ron came in, we went back over that ground and decided rather to make the point that the message of the demonstrators is that they want to end the war, and there's no argument with that, the President does too. The question is ending one war and preventing others. The President's building a structure of peace so that the teenagers who are there demonstrating won't have to fight in a war. This takes long-range planning and hard decisions, and the track record of those who have shouted "Peace Now" in years past is not one that speaks very well for their leadership. He then wants to make the point of his speech at the Woodrow Wilson dedication, where he gave his philosophy on foreign policy generally and made the point that he feels that the demonstrators were saying-- that what the demonstrators were saying is that they're against this war. The President's view is that he's against all wars, and that he must end this one in a way to avoid others. The general feeling was that last week's press coverage of activities is bound to have an effect, but our people are over reactive; they feel that we have to do something fast, and this is the problem that LBJ became obsessed with. The important thing for us is to maintain serenity and calm. The President made the point that anyone who had been through the Hiss case wouldn't get excited about all these other things. The question now is just to see it through. You'll either win or lose, and you can't let it be personal.

      We got into quite a discussion of press conference timing, the concern that we're looking worried if we run a press conference this week. He decided that wasn't the case and that we should go ahead and do it. So we will on Thursday evening. We got into quite a question on Hill activity today. The demonstrators went up and disrupted the Senate and some of the offices, and this got everybody stirred up, but didn't get very much media coverage, unfortunately. The result at the White House was that we called a PR staff meeting to discuss the whole process of how to handle the upcoming demonstrations and didn't get a lot covered, although in general we agreed that we should not take any action before the fact of the demonstrators' action. In other words, we should let them move first.

      We discussed various possibilities of preparedness for breaking up the blocking of the roads, which is going to be the important problem next week. The feeling is that the District police are going to be able to handle it themselves, unless the numbers become really massive, in which case the National Guard will have to help. It turns out that we can use the National Guard without declaring a state of martial law, and this, of course, is something we wanted to avoid at any cost. As a result of all this, the President called tonight, saying that he had decided not to stay in California, but rather to come back on Monday. So as of now, that's the plan.

      We got onto the Cabinet officer problem again and to the question, particularly, of how to remove Hardin. The decision now is to have Harlow talk with Hardin if he will, and see if he can ease him into taking the Purdue job as a way out. The President met with Senator Long this afternoon; and he was very pleased with the Senator's strong praise of the President for standing firm in the face of the demonstrators and also saying that they were really a bad bunch of people, and he was clearly not pleased with them.

      The President talked with Henry about the problem of the effect of the demonstrations on Hanoi. Henry's all concerned that they may misinterpret the thing and weaken our position, which of course, to some degree they will, but there's no point in worrying about it. The President made the point to me that we're going to have to play the propaganda role more skillfully, and that he's only going to let Henry go to Paris once, or at the very most twice, and then we'll give up on the negotiations. He feels that if we wait more than a couple more months, we twice, and then we'll give up on the negotiations. He feels that if we wait more than a couple more months, we won't have anything left to negotiate anyway, except the residual force and the bombing versus the release of POW's. The problem is that we need one more stab at negotiations, so we can't set a time certain yet. After we've taken that stab, if it doesn't work, we'll just go ahead and set the time certain, and that's it.

      Going back to Long, when the President was commenting on him, he was really impressed and said he's clearly the ablest man in the Senate, and that it's a real pleasure to talk to a guy with that kind of brilliance once in a while. He was regretting that we didn't have anyone of the same caliber. He also made the point in a phone call that sometimes we really dodge a bullet, and that he was sure glad this morning he didn't make a statement praising the peaceful protests, because it would have ridden right with the reports of today's activities and would have really looked bad for us.

      End of April 26.
    • Original audio recording (MP3)
  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings.

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

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National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972

    The NSC System

    Vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972

    The Consequences of Operation Lan Som 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8-October 6, 1971

    Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971

    "One of Two Routes": Soviet-American Relations and Kissinger's Secret Trip to China, April 23-July 18, 1971

    • 191. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 26, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 489–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 11:52 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

    • 192. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 26, 1971, noon

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 27. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and an undated memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to the President. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it on April 28. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 12:14 and lasted until 1:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

    • 193. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 26, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 489–17. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 3:56 to 4:12 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files).

    • 194. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 26, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject File, USSR US Ships in the Black Sea (Silver Fox). Secret. Sent for information. According to a notation and attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memorandum on May 5.

    Vol. XXI, Chile, 1969-1973

    Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970-December 31, 1972

    • 223. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 26, 1971

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 778, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. I, Korry File. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for action. This memorandum was prepared by Nachmanoff and sent to Kissinger for approval under cover of an April 22 memorandum that reads, “Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memo to the President forwarding a personal letter from Ambassador Korry. Your memo contains my suggestions for handling this situation. I believe this is one case where human compassion, and perhaps justice, coincides with self-interest. Taking these actions will not guarantee that Korry will not at some future time do damage to the President’s and others’ interests, or to our foreign relations; but human nature being what it is, failure to do something for him will inevitably lead him to seek vengeance and self-justification.” (Ibid.) At the bottom, Kissinger wrote, “Also do a very warm backchannel from me to Korry saying letter has been placed before President.” No record of this backchannel message has been found.

    Vol. XXIX, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972

    Turkey

    Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972

    From Stalemate to Breakthrough, August 24, 1970-May 20, 1971

    Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972

    The Defense Budget and U.S. National Security Policy

    • 184. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting, Washington, April 26, 1971, 2:15-3:51 p.m.

      Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, DPRC Minutes, Originals, ‘69–’73 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets except those that indicate omitted material are in the original. In an April 23 memorandum, Wayne Smith informed Kissinger that the meeting’s purpose was to review Defense Department fiscal and strategic guidance and the economic outlook for FY 1973 and beyond. Smith advised Kissinger that his goal “should be to ensure that our strategic plans are not changed by Secretary Laird without any Presidential consideration of the issues involved and that the President is presented with a full range of alternative DOD budgets for his consideration” later that year. (Ibid., Box H–102, DPRC Meeting, Strategic and Fiscal Planning, 4/26/71)

    Vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972

    Peru

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Digitized versions can be found in the National Archives Catalog.

Audiovisual Holdings

Context (External Sources)