1. Home
  2. Research
  3. Almanac

March 8, 1969

Introduction

This almanac page for Saturday, March 8, 1969, pulls together various records created by the federal government and links to additional resources which can provide context about the events of the day.

Previous Date: Friday, March 7, 1969

Next Date: Sunday, March 9, 1969

Schedule and Public Documents

  • The Daily Diary files represent a consolidated record of the President's activities. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    The President's day began at Key Biscayne, Florida

  • The Federal Register is the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other Presidential documents.

Archival Holdings

Any selection of archival documents will necessarily be partial. You should use the documents and folders identified below as a starting place, but consult the linked collection finding aids and folder title lists and the collections themselves for context. Many documents to be found this way do not lend themselves to association with specific dates, but are essential to a complete understanding of the material.

  • Selective document listing

    President's Office Files

    The President's Office Files consists of materials drawn together by the Special Files Unit from several administrative subdivisions within the White House Office. It is the handwriting and sensitive papers sent to the Staff Secretary that now comprise much of the President's Office Files. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Annotated News Summaries, Box 28, News Summaries - March 1969 [During this period, the Staff Secretary only removed pages from the News Summaries which contained President Nixon's handwriting, often leaving the document with no date. Although there are no specific documents with this date, you should also consult the full folder for the month.]

  • The H. R. Haldeman Diaries consists of seven handwritten diaries, 36 dictated diaries recorded as sound recordings, and two handwritten audio cassette tape subject logs. The diaries and logs reflect H. R. Haldeman’s candid personal record and reflections on events, issues, and people encountered during his service in the Nixon White House. As administrative assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Haldeman attended and participated in public events and private meetings covering the entire scope of issues in which the Nixon White House engaged in during the years 1969-1973. Visit the finding aid to learn more.

    • Transcript of diary entry (PDF)
      Saturday, March 8.

      At Key Biscayne - very uneventful day. Cloudy, some rain. Chapin and I spent day talking - mainly regarding personnel, etc. Had a long talk with Larry by phone on same general subject. A few cables and phone calls from Kissinger - some action because of Lodge talks (private) with North Vietnam - and Rogers meeting with Dobrynin. President called about 5:00 for Ehrlichman and me to come over, but John out driving with Jeanne, so postponed till tomorrow.
    • Handwritten diary entry (JPG)

  • The National Archives Catalog is the online portal to the records held at the National Archives, and information about those records. It is the main way of describing our holdings and also provides access to electronic records and digitized versions of our holdings. 

    The Catalog searches across multiple National Archives resources at once, including archival descriptions, digitized and electronic records, authority records, and web pages from Archives.gov and the Presidential Libraries. The Catalog also allows users to contribute to digitized historical records through tagging and transcription.

    Nixon Library Holdings

    All National Archives Units

National Security Documents

  • The President's Daily Brief is the primary vehicle for summarizing the day-to-day sensitive intelligence and analysis, as well as late-breaking reports, for the White House on current and future national security issues. Read "The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford" to learn more.

    • No President's Daily Brief delivered on this date

  • The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. Visit the State Department website for more information.

    Vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970

    Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970

    Vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970

    Initial Contacts, January-April 22, 1969

    • 24. Memorandum of Conversation , Washington, March 8, 1969, 10 a.m.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, E 5405, Records of Joseph Sisco (Lot Files 74 D 131 and 76 D 251), Box 27. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Toon. The memorandum is part I of IV. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

    Vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972

    The Rogers Plan

    Vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972

    Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; Seabed Arms Control Treaty

    • 69. Issues Papers Prepared by the National Security Council Staff , Washington, March 8, 1969

      The three issues papers on the U.S. positions for the ENDC were forwarded to NSC members prior to the March 15 NSC meeting. These papers addressed the three key issues on the agenda of the ENDC, the comprehensive test ban, the cutoff of fissionable material production, and the seabed arms control. The papers fully detail the problems, issues, and summaries of each item.

      Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, NSC Meeting 1/29–4/9/69, ENDC–3/15/69 Meeting. Top Secret. Jeanne Davis forwarded the papers to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and George Lincoln under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which she stated that the papers would be discussed at an NSC meeting on March 12. The NSC meeting was held on March 15.

    Vol. E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972

    Nigerian Civil War

    • 50. Telegram 36410 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, March 8, 1969, 1954Z

      The Department reported on Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmerʼs meeting with Nigerian Information Commissioner Anthony Enahoro. They discussed U.S. humanitarian policy, bombing of civilians and relief aircraft, assistance to Relief Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, protection of Ibos, Soviet influence in Nigeria, and delays in Nigerian visa issuances.

      Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to London, Geneva, Paris, and Cotonou. Drafted by R.J. Wach (AF/W), cleared by Palmer, and approved by Melbourne.

  • The Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts consist of approximately 20,000 pages of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969-1974) and Secretary of State (1973-1974) during the administration of President Richard Nixon. Visit the finding aid for more information.

    Chronological File, Box 1, Folder March 3-13, 1969 [1 of 2]

    • 9:30, Secretary Packard
      Secretary Packard
      3/8/69 9:30

      P said that he would support it if HAK wanted to call the President. If we do nothing, it looks as if we are afraid of escalation. P said we ought to be quiet and then give them a little bang.

      HAK said when you have a weak poker hand, you shouldn't be too causious. We shouldn't be afraid that they will walk out in Paris. We shouldn't set here and do nothing. the CIA report might not be as pin-pointed as it could be. The impact on the Soviets would be the same.

      HAK said he thought maybe some of our colleagues would start a vendetta. P wasn't worried about that. He thought the President should tell Rogers what he plans to do and that he had considered the alternatives.

      HAK wanted to know if we should do it in the same week as the ABM. P thought that the ABM could be postponed for a week.

      HAK wanted to know if Colorado Springs had been put in. P thought that this was incidental and unimportant at this point. C.S is very well protected but there might be some problem of putting in communications.
    • 10:10 AM, Mr. Haldeman (in Key Biscayne); Mr. Kissinger
      Mr. Haldeman (in Key Biscayne)
      Mr. Kissinger
      3/8/69 10: 10 a. m. Saturday

      Haldeman mentioned possibility they'll come back tomorrow.

      HAK told Haldeman he cancelled yesterday evening "that thing we discussed in Belgium," and that Packard went thru the roof, calling again this morning saying he wanted to call the President, but HAK said no, that was his job, and that if the Pres. wants to talk about it further to Packard he will do so. Packard feels very strongly that we are making Laird the fall-guy; that we are looking terribly weak; that it is not such a big thing to do; that after the next attack on us it will be too little. He is very very strong about it. Haldeman asked if HAK wanted to talk to the Pres. about it, and HAK said the Pres has heard all the arguments, but when the Acting Secy feels as strongly as he does about the matter, the Pres should know about it.

      Haldeman asked , what action are we aiming towards? HAK said it can't be done tomorrow; it would have to be Monday. We could slip the matter of ABM a few days.

      HAK: He feels the way to handle the other end of town is to say this is the decision, and he expects full support. I don't think you negotiate with a Cabinet officer after you have given him a chance to make his case.

      Haldeman: You still have that risk problem.

      HAK: That risk problem will not be diminished. I didn't urge the President not to cancel it. As of now, it is cancelled by my orders based on full discussion with the Pres.

      HAK: Lodge is meeting today with Hanoi--let's see what he gets out of that. In the meantime, why don't you tell the President what Packard thinks. Tell him I am not yet prepared to make a recommendation, but I will call you after I know what Paris reports, and I will then see whether he wants to talk to me. Just tell him Packard feels very strongly (which he can easily verify by calling Packard) and I didn't want him to be bothered as long as there is no clear operational decision, and I didn't want him to be in a position where he had to overrule Packard.

      Haldeman: Does the President know how sides are drawn? In other words, the only opposition is Rogers -- the rest of you are in agreement to go ahead?

      HAK: I can see some merit in Rogers' argument. A basic strategic argument is involved. It's a question of stance. I can see Roger's argument, but my view is that what will determine the President's position in public opinion will be whether the war is wound up 15 months from now. If it isn't , having received a favorable editorial now will do him no good; if it is, having been clobbered by the NYTimes this week won't harm him. My feeling is we ought to consider where we will be a year from now rather than next week. In terms of immediate reaction, there's no question but what Rogers's right. But we can slip it a week.
    • 10:45 AM, The President (in Key Biscayne); Mr. Kissinger
      The President (in Key Biscayne)
      Mr. Kissinger
      3/8/69 10:45 a.m.

      Pres: I talked to Haldeman. My general feeling is, as you know, strongly along the lines of Packard's. The problem is not one of Rogers' veto, which has nothing to do with it. But you know the little State boys will start squealing and then having Rogers not going along on a major decision. It occurred to me that it could be useful if you would get Rogers and Packard together. Packard is a strong man and I'd like to see Packard work Rogers over a little on this. I am glad that he is willing to step up to a tough one. I am certainly willing to do it --and in fact I'm leaning toward it -- and we may have to tell them. What is the latest on shelling?

      HAK: Nothing has happened.

      P: But Packard's point is if we allow them to shell and not respond..he feels it's a bad pposture to sort of sit there...then it may be too eager a response if we do it.

      HAK: I am gradually coming to the point of view that our original idea with respect to it--which was really to think of doing it as quite independent from...we started thinking of this well before the offensive. It's really the right thing.

      P: Your whole point is you want to influence the Soviets...

      HAK: My feeling is we lean over backward not to hit the North. If we hit the North only to influence the Soviets....I feel that this one is one we really shouldn't do so much as retaliatory.....but as retaliation to the whole offensive, not to a specific act. After we have done this I would keep taking things for a long time and then do something very drastic.

      P: If they continue to go along we'll crack the North and crack it good. We may have t

      HAK: Haiphong is the only target worth doing it to.

      P: The ships have moved?

      HAK: The ships have moved and reconnaissance started today. We have another problem: if private talks start within the next two weeks and all shelling is really a prelude to them, then if you do it you are going to be accused of screwing up the talks.

      P: Basically, the Rogers/ State Dept line is that these - - first, they don't think it is an important target; they're buying the view of CIA. CIA is all over the lot on this; that doesn't really bother me too much. We're getting an area and that indicates it is spilling over a bit. What is your view?

      HAK: We ought to see what comes back from Lodge today.

      P: I hope we do not go through that thing again. I must talk to Rogers and tell him I feel it is a great mistake to ever beg for a meeting. We don't do that. I don't like Lodge going hat in hand and going back. If they break the appointment, they break the appointment.

      HAK: My own inclination would have been...I think you made the right decision, faced with the problems we had, which is to defer. But on balance, I think it might be useful just before we go into the private talks, to do it, and then be very forbearing for a while.

      P: Now on the ABM decision, there is no reason to be concerned about that; we'll make that when we are ready -- perhaps at the end of the week. I would be willing to defer the ABM for a week. After all, it's a strong move, too. In other words, I wouldn't mind doing two strong things basically at once. It poses no problem with me.

      HAK: My overall judgment is: if the war is settled in a year, it doesn't make any difference if you get attacked now. So the really key question is, how can one bring it to a conclusion more quickly?

      P: State, I guess, is traditionally opposed--they don't think it would have any effect to hit them.

      HAK: State believes it's a negotiation game. I think that may work but it's also a very time-consuming strategy and time is not on our side. The one thing going for us now is that the Chinese/Soviet feud must be worrying the North Vietnamese.

      P: That dispute seems to be quite lively.

      HAK: The Soviets have published pictures of mutilated Soviet soldiers and a mob in Moscow smashed windoes in the Chinese Embassy.

      P; And that doesn't happen by accident.

      HAK: So Hanoi must feel the heat, too; they are completely dependent on  international environment in which Communist support is assured, to the extent that attention of the world is deflected. Now my recommendation would be that I talk to Bill after he has talked to Dobrynin and to see what exactly he said, and to wait for what Lodge gets.

      P: Let's stop being knocked off balance by what Dobrynin says -- Bill has to take a very hard line with Dobrynin. Don't let this personal thing go too far. You and I know that where these fellows are concerned, this personal stuff has no meaning at all.

      HAK: I think the Walsh line is not going to be working. Habib is coming in to see me. Would it help if I brought him up to see you for a few minutes?

      P: I want him to stick his chin up and level.

      HAK: I'm going to communicate with him; I think he's one of the few tough fellows over there.

      P: He seems to be.

      HAK: I saw him in action in Saigon under tough circumstances; he has a lot of guts.

      P; We don't have to convince them of our sincerity. I just know sincerity has nothing to do with this. Face-saving is fine, but sincerity is not what this is about. They know we want out of this thing; the question is, do they? Do you think, if Packard feels that strongly, that he will stand up to Bill? I was thinking if you and Packard and Bill could talk. As this thing goes along, I don't think we can fail to react to it. Can Laird back-channel to us as to what he really thinks? Let's get what he really thinks.

      HAK: Packard and I are planning to come on Monday.

      P: I may come back Sunday night. Basically, Rogers has to go along on this. I think Packard ought to work him over a little.

      HAK: If you order it, you have a right to expect loyalty in execution.

      P: I think the question is degree of enthusiasm. We even got loyalty from Smith

      HAK: Packard and I both think that if we do it, and if silence about it doesn't help, we have to step up and say what we did.

      P: I don't want to be in a position --we remain silent and let heat build up -- it's say no, yes, no, yes, or maybe. And then say Yes, I ordered the attack on the border for those reasons and we'll do it.

      HAK: The primary responsibility is to the security of our forces.

      P: The attacks originated from that area; it was a thinly populated area; we had to hit them from both sides, so we did. I wouldn't fudge it at all.

      HAK: Packard agrees. Everyone agrees that the target is important.

      P: Helms says he is not so sure they are all there; that it's only a captain. That doesn't bother me too much there. So we'll hit something.

      You talk to Bill, who can talk to Packard, and Packard and Bill can get together: and tell Packard to be strong and firm.

      HAK: I'm going to get Laird to back-channel us his full assessment.

      P: This is not the time to hit the North; I think we've got to threaten it by physically having a movement. But if we hit the North we have to hit something worthwhile.

      HAK: Then as a seeming retaliation hit something way off in another direction -- it's not clear that that doesn't look weak. But we can wait a few days; it can't be done over the weekend.

      P: Do you think we can wait? I understand Packard would like to do it Monday. I would like to do it tomorrow, for that matter. I think the pressure for hitting the North -- this is the alternative. I don't want to hit the North, but I'm going to do something. Where Bill's argument falls: why do you have to do something? It's not our fault that the fighting is going on. They mounted this offensive; they have been mounting it for months.

      HAK: I'm having an analysis made of the number of engagements initiated by the other side, in order to see just what there is in that argument. But they've been mounting the infiltration for months.

      P: State' argument is because we've been killing them. State Dept people never see these things with any realism.

      HAK: They do have a tendency to see the other side. Up to now they have had to pay heavy casualties in order to keep us off the back of the infrastructure. And for the first time we can start pounding away at the infrastructure. And in view of some of the other things we are planning. We are losing the leverage.

      P: Continue for a couple of months -but then Defense has got to change its character for a support action on the police side and they've got to give the South Vietnamese the stuff they need.

      P: We are going to lean so hard..

      HAK: The police they must do immediately.

      P: But in terms of providing more support for the South Vietnamese forces they've got to start doing that now.. On July 1st we start playing it the other way.

      HAK: If you do it from a dormant situation the other action will look like the inevitable result and you will be driven to it.

      HAK: I will get Packard and Rogers together; maybe I'll get Packard to take the initiative.

      P: See how the two come out. I don't mind making a decision, but if we can bring Rogers along, it would be infinitely better.

      HAK: I thought it was the right thing to act as you did. But I thought you had to know Packard's strong views.

      P: On ABM we aren't tied down to doing it any particular time. Also, I might decide that I'm getting some more evidence and thinking it over. The disadvantage is that people who are against it will squeal that much louder. My own view is that the case we make here is awfully strong. You have immensely important arguments. It is a guarantee against the Chinese attack; a guarantee against an accidental shot. Beyond that it creates an area of--it tends to balance the power.

      HAK: I can see the argument that reducing casualties from 80 to 40 million isn't attractive.

      P: With regard to the Soviets, too, in terms of Soviet intention. The credibility of the power that we have and they have in international diplomacy that credibility is substantially lessened in my view unless we go forward. It is substantially increased if we do. Let's face it. It's just that much more. Anything that adds to the equation on one side changes the game.

      HAK: I wouldn't recommend that for the public. What is absolutely true can be said to the public; if the Soviet has defensive intentions this deployment doesn't affect their capability at all. If the Soviet has offensive intentions then it affects their capability. So it is buying insurance against a reckless Soviet weapons policy.

      P: To use Jackson's term, it's the protection of the deterrent.

      HAK: This is the minimum condition. This gives us a few options we don't talk about.

      P: It does strengthen our bargaining position. It's like the NATO - Warsaw Pact forces. Even if I felt we could get along with one division , and then get them to give up something too.

      HAK: To say if they lob one in the US and have to kill 80 million people is very amateurish and naive.

      P: The main thing is that Packard carry the ball with Bill. The thing with Bill is that I really believe there must be a response because of the bargaining table situation, and on that score we can't give the impression that we're just sitting here. The main thing is Packared must hold up the spectre of pressures
      for hitting the North.

      HAK said he would report to the President later.
    • 11:20 AM, Secretary Packard
      Secretary Packard
      3/8/69 11:20 a. m.

      Packard was going over the ABM situation again to make sure we were doing the right thing. He was a little worried about the congressional problem but thought we were going in the right direction.

      HAK said the President might return Sunday night since the weather was so bad.

      HAK said he would like to get together tomorrow with Rogers, Packard and himself at the President's request and try to get Rogers on our side. All the reports should be in from Paris by morning so that they can go over all the material at one time.

      HAK said the President was willing to put off the ABM.

      (In a second conversation HAK added the following)

      HAK wanted Package. to get from Laird, through back channels the South Vietnamese mental attitude toward attacks and what Laird and Bunker thought jointly about the other target. HAK reiterated the back channel again.

      A meeting was set up for 4:30 in HAK's office with Sec. Packard and then they will go on to Sec. Rogers office at 5:00.
    • 11:45, Secretary Rogers
      Secretary Rogers
      3/8/69 11:45

      HAK said he had talked to the President and the President wanted Packard, Rogers and AK to meet together to discuss the matter they talked about Thursday. HAK thought Packard should present his case to Rogers. Rogers agreed.

      HAK asked about his meeting with Dobrynin. Rogers said it went fine and that he (Rogers) and D were off on a very good personal basis. He said D was relaxed. Rogers gave him the information and it wsa agreed to start discussions here maybe next week. D thought meetings should be held in Moscow but Rogers felt it should be started here and it could possibly change at a later date.
    • 12:15, Max Fisher
      Max Fisher
      3/8/69 12:15

      Fisher is speaking at a couple of groups Sunday and Monday and wanted to get a couple things clear.

      HAK said on the Middle East thing that we had a very complicated situation. We are trying to set up so that in an international forum we won't be in a 3-1 position with the U.S. alone defending the Israelis. This forces us not to be in an advocates position. It has become obvious because of our French visit that the have shifted their position and Israel knows that. (HAK mentioned that this was extremely privileged information for Fisher only). HAK mentioned that Eban was coming to Washington next week and would be completely informed of our position. HAK specified two things (a) no imposition and (b) physical, tangible guarantees.

      Fisher mentioned a story that had leaked from some gongressional briefing. these were ividently from Jewish constituencies. Their reports were vague but HAK said Fisher was given the whole story.

      Fisher said there were to be some meetings in which Javits and Simington would be speaking. Fisher said he didn't think people from State should be talking on thins that might be tenuous at this time. HAK agreed.

      They discussed having dinner next week some time. Fisher is going to call to set up appointment. HAK agreed to this either next week or the next.

    Chronological File, Box 1, Folder March 3-13, 1969 [2 of 2]

    • 6:25 - 7:10 PM, The President and H. A. Kissinger
      March 8, 1969 -- 6:25 - 7:10 p. m.
      The President and H. A. Kissinger

      K-- after today's meeting among myself, Packard and Rogers, Packard very disturbed about Rogers I action of today -- it was handled like a corporation case.

      Pres -- When Laird returns, Laird, Rogers, Packard, Kissinger and I must meet to see what the strategy will be. We cannot have this thing running in every direction!

      K -- The first cables of instruction were unbelievable. We got them changed, yet Lodge is apparently operating close to original instructions. It is hard to tell what goes on on the phone. Suggest you instruct Habib.

      Pres -- I definitely want to sit with Habib and find out what is going on. Let's hope the strategy is right.

      K -- Question of judgment. I don't believe we are not making progress because the other side doubts our sincerity.

      Pres -- I made that clear over there.

      K -- And, secondly, I don't think their feelings are hurt by us.

      Pres -- Who is putting out that "feelings are hurt"?

      K -- Harriman and Vance feel passionately that they are and have all along. Rogers reported this passionately today. It is the Thompson view toward Russia. I feel it gets us back into the Kennedy position vis -a-vis Russia. It was only after the missile crisis that the Soviets started talking peace to Kennedy.

      Pres -- We ought to get the ABM out fairly soon next week under the circumstances.

      K -- We should prepare very carefully with the Senate. I do not believe you should go on TV.

      Pres -- I should make a written statement with no large press conference.

      K -- That would be my recommendation and Bill agrees. Believe Packard should give a news conference. All of us should work on the Senators.

      Pres - - And on the press with backgrounders.

      K -- Your problem is not with the public. Most of the questions would be so technical. I am sending a book to you tonight containing possible questions and answers on the ABM.

      Pres -- I will look it over and see what I need to do. We might have to go on later to answer some of the foolish things. But I think we should move on it and make a good strong statement.

      K -- There should be a written statement issued to the press with possibly a morning press conference on it -- not a national, evening press conference.

      Pres -- I don't intend to use prime time. The only purpose for a press conference is to answer questions. I could stay out of the technical stuff and make a statement and let it go at that.

      K -- It won't fly without your strong support. A written statement may not be strong enough. It may have to be a regular press conference -- opened by this subject, and then open the floor to any other questions, half of which would be on this.

      Pres - - Back to the private talks

      K -- I don't think you could issue an order from Key Biscayne without an enormous bureaucratic blow-up. Laird gets back Wednesday. If they attack Saigon again, respond. If they don't, we will be in private talks by the end of the week. We are now committed to it. If you hit Cambodia after the private talks start, it can break them, and you will be accused of insincerity.

      Pres -- Once we are in private talks, we are virtually dead as far as strong action is concerned. If done, it has to be before.

      K -- Hit them and then ask for private talks.

      Pres -- Packard sees this as the best way to proceed diplomatically?

      K -- Yes, but doesn't feel that confident about it. Rogers feels it would be bad for negotiations.

      Pres - - When Habib gets here, I want to talk. They are not going to give away the game there. We could lose the whole South Vietnam position.

      K. -- Saigon will collapse on us.

      Pres -- Did Lodge and Walsh recommend opening the talks to political as well as military matters? Why did Bill volunteer? Did Dobrynan ask or did he volunteer?

      K -- It doesn't say in this cable what Dobrynon said to Bill. I don't know whether he volunteered or answered a question.

      Pres -- Seems to me that it is a simple thing -- tying political to military was such a major shift in position.

      K -- That is what Dobrynon says. Bill said he didn't know why Dobrynon said it was a shift.

      Pres -- It was in the briefing paper!

      K -- We weren't saying we didn't want to discuss political questions. I think, myself, we have now wound up, in this first testing period, in a weak posture in a tough sequence of events. My concern is they will now feel free to press us along in these private talks. Pres -- We can't be boxed in where we are at the mercy of the fact that we can't hit the north and we can't have private talks. We will have no bargaining position.

      K -- For the first 4 weeks, they have been pressing publicly for political and military talks. Now they have achieved this, they can go into the private talks and string them out.

      Pres -- You can cut that down by making clear to the Soviets, and I will say so in the press conference, there will be no compromise on this coalition government.

      K -- I don't believe it will be easy for you to attack Cambodia while the private talks are going on and not much being done in South Vietnam.

      Pres -- My point is if, while the private talks are going on and they are kicking us, we are going to do something.

      K -- The Communist objective will be to push you to the left. They will be much less cautious when this is achieved.

      Pres -- Get Habib in and we will see what's going on and have him throw in some other arguments.

      K -- Can't do much now unless they have another rocket attack laid on before the cables to Hanoi and Moscow.

      Pres -- I want to see those cables next time myself -- any cables of instruction on these talks. I have strong feelings and I will personally dictate them on any instructions. Who prepared the first instructions?

      K -- My information was they came from Bill. (In response to query from the President) Bill Bundy is the Assistant Secretary in that area of responsibility.

      Pres -- Is he taking the Harriman line now?

      K -- He was tough formerly, but he was shell-shocked by the last Administration.

      Pres -- And he is tired.

      K -- I will show you the original instructions when you return. What Lodge did was bad primarily in tone but still it got us much of the way to private talks. The Dobrynon conversation we will have to
      live with.

      Pres -- I agree. I can't believe he agreed to go politically.

      K -- On the Middle East, he went ahead and told them bi-lateral. My concern is this is our one chance to be precise and concrete.

      K -- The more reasonable we sound, the worst off we are. We should have the option open that we might go back to the Dulles position. Once the private talks start on Friday, we can't go with the Cambodian thing.

      Pres -- The major thing is tying together the political and military.

      K -- If we keep pushing to speed up negotiations, we might crack them. We have a massive problem if we want to play this way. They should be given authority to do it. If not, we need a high command to monitor negotiations or they will fly apart.

      Pres: From now on, I want to see the instructions. That was the understanding. I have to see them! I know more than Bill or Walsh will every learn.

      On the ABM, again:

      Pres -- There are two ways to put out the ABM:

      (1) Written Statement
      (2) Then make a statement in the press conference on Thursday.

      K -- We could release the 7-page statement and have you speak from a shorter one.

      The President agreed -- thought Thursday was definitely the time to do it. Speak orally for 2-3 minutes, "this is what I have decided," and ask for questions.

      K -- Some people think we may lose this one in Congress.

      Pres -- I don't think so; I think it will carry. Assuming we lose in Congress, I think it is more important that I am for it; that this fact gets across to the Soviets.

      Pres -- (Back on the Dobrynon matter) We shouldn't build this Dobrynon thing up -- I didn't give him an inch in my conversation. Bill has to learn this is the way to treat them.

      K -- We still have a chance -- 6 months to get them moving in a qualitative direction.

      Pres -- The re is not going to be any de-escalation. State has nothing to do with that. We are just going to keep giving word to Wheeler to knock hell out of them.

      K - It was also bad agreeing to private talk with NLF in the same room.

      Pres -- Did he check that with Lodge? Will that wash with Ky?

      K -- I think Saigon will be horrified when they hear of this.

      Pres -- We will back off. Lodge hasn't said this yet.

      K -- It's being sent to Lodge; that's how I got it. I think we can get Lodge under control through Habib.

      Pres -- Do that Monday. I will start looking at the instructions myself and dictate my own reactions. That will bring them around fast. I should get some memo out on the private talks. Lodge has to know this -- say to Bill, one thing is very important. Lodge and the President talked to Ky -- we have to be sure we have told Ky to have private talks with the NLF. We have to be sure Ky agrees. This is very important. Tell Bill to send a cable.

      K -- They will interpret that as authority to beat away at Ky to agree.

      Pres -- You can't order him to do it. The best thing is to wait until you can tell Hanoi what you think.

      K -- Lodge doesn't technically have authority for private talks. Why don't we leave it that you reserve the right to give authority.

      Pres -- It will be interesting to see what happens on the other side.

      K -- If they hit us, we must refuse to have private talks for another week.

      Pres -- We cannot stand back and not hit them. Let us suppose between now and next Wednesday, they shell us again and we have not yet hit Kaswan (?).

      K -- There is also the 7th NVN division 10 miles away from Kaswan (?) if they shell us again.

      Pres -- We cannot tolerate one more of these without hitting back. We have already warned them. Presumably they have stopped. If they hit us again, we will hit them with no warning. That is the way we are going to do it. I can't tolerate argument from Rogers on this. You only warn once. However, if they don't hit us, we are screwed.

      K -- We could wait at least through next week for private talks to see how they behave.

      Pres -- In the future, we will keep in more close control. I think Bill did net realize the tremendous significance of tying political with military matters. We have to start talking about Viet Nam outside of the NSC -- just among the President, Kissinger, Rogers and Laird -- to bring up such things as this political matter to educate people. If Bill had been to Vietnam, he would not have done this.

Context (External Sources)