

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
35	11	09/10/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Housing arrangements for weekend in California and Florida trip. 1 pg.
35	11	09/10/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Media monitoring assignment for Chotiner's delegation. 2 pg.
35	11	09/09/1968	Memo	From Maurice Stans to Nixon Re: Owen Cheatham stock certificate contribution. 1 pg.
35	11	09/07/1968	Memo	From Fred LaRue to Nixon, Mitchell & Peter Flanigan Re: General characteristics of Wallace supporters. 4 pg.
35	11	09/06/1968	Memo	From Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman Re: Forwarding memo. Also, memo from Haldeman Re: New points of emphasis on campaign. 4 pg.
35	11	09/06/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman & Whitaker Re: Shifting focus of Westchester appearance. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
35	11	09/06/1968	Letter	From Haldeman Re: Motocade in major Eastern city. 1 pg.
35	11	09/04/1968	Memo	From Tom Evans to Haldeman Re: List of Celebrities for Nixon. 3 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Request for summary of big ORC Poll. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Using Nixon's Polish and Hungarian work. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to John Tower & Keogh Re: First meeting of Key Issues Group. Also, memo from Senator Tower to Nixon & Mitchell Re: Summary of Key Issues Committee meeting. 4 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to John Mitchell Re: Necessity of independent fundraising. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Hubert and Chicago demonstrations. 1 pg.

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35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Avoiding public criticism of Chicago Police. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Letter for Chairmen of dinner fundraiser. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Missed phone call about Italian contribution. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Policy on heckling Humphrey. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Setting up procedure for responding to Humphrey attacks. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Use of Mazo. 1 pg.
35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Research on Humphrey contradictions. 1 pg.

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35	11	09/02/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Company for California weekend - Helene Brown, Bebe, and Manuel. 1 pg.

file

Phone Cole to
confirm.

3 with 3 at Villa

All ring with in Cott

2 pl at Baber Smathers

MEMORANDUM

September 10, 1968

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: RN

I spoke to Mrs. Nixon about the weekend in California and all that is needed now is for Whitaker to send out a schedule indicating she will stay with Helene Drown and, of course, call her so that she is aware of this arrangement that I mentioned orally.

Done

I want you to have Manuel fly out to Santa Barbara and take care of the arrangements for the day and a half that I am in the house there. I know that the house probably has servants, but I would prefer to have him there without the servants around since the time is so short it will save me having to get acquainted with them and having to waste time.

On the same line, I want Manuel to go to Florida and set up the arrangements for my stay there. Arrangements should be made for me to stay at the Smathers' house if it is available. Rebozo will know how to make the arrangements. If I can't stay at the Smathers' house I will stay at the hotel, but I would much prefer not to because that will knock out most of the time travelling to and from the hotel and the beach and Rebozo's side.

Babe

L
Ldl

Ev 27 →
30

Smathers house will
be avail.

Chot

MEMORANDUM

September 10, 1968

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: RN
RE: Contents to be discussed with Murray Chotiner

The more I think about it, the more I think Chotiner's major assignment for the next few weeks should be to set up this counter-attack group on an effective basis. This means not only getting people who are ready to say something, but most important it means having somebody with intelligence reading the papers, listening to the television, and preparing the material, the statements for the counter-attack group to use. We can't put that much of a burden on Buchanan and Safire to do all of this. There should be enough people in the New York office who are intelligent and hard-hitting who could come up with some answers. Why not use people like Mazo and deToledano and Frank Kluckhohn -- all of whom are available, I understand, for this kind of activity.

Relating to the responses to Hubert -- counter-attacks on him -- the monitoring of TV and radio -- and, at a much lower level of priority the checking of newspaper and magazine comments and getting letters to the editor, etc., off, I am still very concerned that this is not being adequately done, neither at the national level or the local level. If Chotiner would take over this assignment and ride herd on it we might get a real program under way that would be effective.

The end of this week when I arrive in California, I would like to have a chapter and verse report on both of these projects -- the counter-attack on Humphrey and the monitoring of radio, TV and newspapers.

Of course, Chotiner should put a major burden in this respect on Herb Klein and his outfit, but he will have to ride herd on them if we are going to get any production.

What I have in mind here is not for Chotiner to prepare the material, or to do the work, but for him to kick hell out of everybody concerned -- Hillings, Klein, et al, and to some way see that enough in put comes in from both the New York and Washington staffs as well as from the campaign plane so that there is a definite follow-through.

I don't think you can stand by and figure that Ellsworth will get this done. Ellsworth is excellent in terms of calling individual Congressmen or Senators or Surrogate Candidates to get them to say something, but when it comes to the content, however, he simply does not have the time or the knack to think up the phrase which might be appropriate.

I can't emphasize too strongly the necessity of instantaneous reaction. Many times you will find that if the reaction does come instantly it will be in the same story. Follow it up, of course, the next day with another reaction so that we get a double effect.

In addition, there should be a constant stream of attacks on Humphrey on his own record so that we keep him on the defensive rather than having us in the position of constantly responding to his attacks.

If Chotiner can take this assignment on and carry it out, this could be the most significant exercise of the campaign except for speeches and other appearances that I personally make. Speeches, of course, get greater visibility and for that reason are of a higher priority.

Tom Dewey tells me that the New York Times Station QXR (or some signal like that) gives us hell every hour on the hour all day long in the New York area and is widely listened to. I think that one or two people on a volunteer basis should undertake calling this station and bitching to them all day long. This might have a salutary effect. This is only an example of what should be done on a nationwide basis with similar radio and television stations of this type.

Bill

September 9, 1968

~~Handwritten scribble~~

Done.

TO: Richard M. Nixon
FROM: Maurice H. Stans

I am doing my best not to trouble you on any financial matters during the campaign so that you can devote your time to winning big. However, once in a while an unusual situation develops in which I need counsel.

Owen Cheatham has sent \$75,000 in stock certificates as a contribution, in addition to his early gift of \$25,000 before the convention.

I understand there is some uncertainty about whether this contribution should be accepted. Considering our great need for funds at this time, I would appreciate it if you would suggest the guideline in this case. Could I make it clear to him that acceptance is without any obligation?

M.H.S.

ac

yes _____
No _____ ✓

Per instructions to Stans from Cliff Folger this gift of \$75,000 must be returned to Cheatham. Cliff talked directly to Stans on this. Suggest memo as attached.

OK? H

N

NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400

Handwritten initials

Handwritten notes:
L. Call
RN
seen.
Done
9/8

September 7, 1968

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Richard Nixon
John Mitchell
Peter Flanigan

FROM: Fred LaRue

RE: Wallace Strategy

Our research indicates the following general characteristics of the "Southern" supporters of George C. Wallace:

The Wallace support, in terms of socio-economic class, is predominantly low and lower-middle. His support increases as you proceed downward on the educational achievement scale.

Wallace supporters are "Democrats" in the Southern interpretation of the term. They are intensely alienated from the National Democratic Party and feel that they have no effective voice in or influence upon national affairs and decisions.

They are highly "traditional" in their attitudes, having very strong convictions centered on the "Puritan Ethic" -- everybody ought to "work hard and save." A high percentage are home-owners. They are concerned about debt, spending, high taxes, and soundness of the dollar.

They are simplistic in rationalizing issues, anti-intellectual and markedly less concerned about the educational needs of the nation and, especially, of the "disadvantaged."

They feel threatened and insecure --

-- Fear "change" which is seen as threatening

their already inferior socio-economic "status."

- Desire "firm, tough, fair" (traditional father image) President, while fearing concentration of power at Washington.
- Oppose "social programs" designed to improve the lot of the disadvantaged, fearing economic competition and relative loss of "status" advantage over those less fortunate.

Everything learned about Wallace supporters indicates they are "clannish" in both regional and class terms; thus, if presented with an attack on Wallace by anyone outside their place or peer group, they may tend to unify in rejection of the "outsider" and, even irrationally, harden their support for Wallace.

CONCLUSION: TO ATTACK WALLACE RISKS SOLIDIFYING FOR HIM MARGINAL SUPPORT WHICH, BY OTHER MEANS, MIGHT BE CONVERTED TO NIXON VOTES BY NOVEMBER.

This very important conclusion, which is the basis for recommended campaign policy, is supported by analyses of our polls and surveys --

Other than a minority of hard core, deeply committed Wallace supporters, which we are unlikely to influence to any degree, only a very small percentage of those "favoring" and "leaning toward" Wallace believe he really has a chance to win the Presidency.

Wallace support outside the hard core is extremely vulnerable: 64% of those "favoring" him and 79% of those "leaning toward" Wallace say they "may change their minds."

Other than the hard core, three out of four Wallace supporters say they are willing to vote for "at least some" GOP candidates. A large number of those "leaning toward" Wallace acknowledge theirs to be a "protest" motivation.

Even when the hard core is included, 61% of all Wallace supporters see "some" to a "great deal" of difference between Nixon and Humphrey. Wallace's "there's not a dime's worth of difference..." definitely is not selling.

CONCLUSION: MANY OF THE VOTERS NOW "FAVORING" AND "LEANING TOWARD" WALLACE CAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE NIXON COLUMN BY AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL PROPAGANDA EFFORT WHICH ACHIEVES SUBSTITUTION OF NIXON FOR WALLACE AS THE BENEFICIARY OF THE PROTEST VOTE.

The national mood is "throw the rascals out" -- our national campaign theme is "only we are not bound to the errors and mistaken policies of the past" -- So it will not be inconsistent in the special regional campaign to present Nixon as a more effective instrument of protest than Wallace can possibly be.

SPEAKERS AND WRITERS SHOULD NOT ATTACK WALLACE, AND SHOULD "SELL" NIXON RATHER THAN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

While it can be offensive to Wallace supporters to say "You will throw away (waste) your vote if you cast it for George Wallace" (many feel they are voting for their principles and convictions, not just a man), you can get our message across without overt recognition of Wallace or offense to his sympathizers if you say instead --

- "Only a Nixon victory can bring about the changes in the nation's government which you, and most Americans, want so strongly."
- "Your only effective protest is a vote for Richard Nixon."
- "Make every vote count for a change in Washington. Give your vote and support to the national candidate who can win, and go on to unify our whole country."

The special, supplementary regional campaign envisions utilizing -- in selected areas from Delaware

Wallace Strategy
September 7, 1968
Page 4

to Texas -- weekly and small daily newspapers and local radio and TV stations to disseminate a positive, pro-Nixon appeal for the "protest" and "alienated" former-Democrat vote.

The anti-Wallace message will be indirect -- "between the lines" and in regional "code words."

One example of the propaganda innovations to be employed is a special ballad-type song in the current "country and western" music style by which nationally famous artists will "sing" the message via radio and TV. The multi-stanza ballad will allow issues to be included or excluded as the local situation indicates. The song's technical aspects will be such that "local talent" as well as a variety of "stars" can render it effectively.

Large-space ads in small-town weekly newspapers will let the "little people" (who indicate such a high feeling of alienation from the national scene) know that Nixon cares about them, at the same time that the ad communicates the national campaign's key message re-phrased in the regional idiom.

A "spot" TV campaign will be waged using recognized conservatives (Thurmond, Reagan, etc.) to emphasize the importance of "making your vote count" and to present Nixon as the most effective instrument of protest.

I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED ON THIS BASIS UNTIL OUR POLLING INDICATES WE SHOULD REASSES OUR OVERALL STRATEGY.

FL/lf

9/6/68



BOB HALDEMAN

The attached memorandum from you was sent to the following:

John Mitchell

Peter Flanigan

Murray Chotiner

Herbert Klein

Leonard Garment

Patrick Hillings

Senator Thruston Morton

Congressman Mel Laird

Lt. Gov. Bob Finch

Bob Ellsworth

Dick Moore

Shakespeare

James Keogh

Bryce Harlow

Patrick Buchanan

Ray Price

Bill Safire

Charlie McWhorter

Pat Hitt

Charles Rhyne

Tom Evans

(rmw)

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RTP HHS, Date 4/1/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM: Bob Haldeman

RN asked that I summarize some of his thoughts regarding the campaign -- and transmit them to you in this form with the request that you make every effort to implement them within your areas of contact or responsibility -- as quickly and as thoroughly as you can.

As we begin the first week of the campaign, it is essential that we maintain the initiative. This will be primarily the role of the candidate but now is the time for everybody in our organization -- including Surrogates -- other speakers and top staff who talk to press as well as politicians who talk to State and County Chairmen across the country - to have the line and put it out as effectively as possible. Among the points that should be made are the following:

1. The Come-Back Theme: This has an immense appeal and RN does not believe it has adequately been covered in columns or the press. Find ways to get it out - pointing up the obvious, that RN accomplished this despite the overwhelming opposition of the financial establishment and the press establishment and without huge financial resources, PR gimmicks, etc.

2. The Calibre of the Nixon Team: This gives us the opportunity to point up the superb RN pre-Convention organization, that it has high intellectual quality, great morale and great loyalty. It will be recalled that one of Johnson's weaknesses is that very few people on his staff are really loyal to him, due to his personal abuse of them. Apparently HHH has real staff problems, too.

3. The Youth of the RN Organization: Because we have such an outstanding group of young staff members in very key positions - this story should be easily and effectively promoted. Perhaps by emphasizing average age of Nixon staff, or the number of key men under 30, under 40 -- or whatever such statistics might be most telling. Also individual or group features on the young stars of the team, i. e., Buchanan, Price, Anderson, Bell, Gavin, Hart, etc., in R & W; Chapin, Ziegler, Higby, Allan Woods,

etc., in tour operations; the young crew working with Mitchell, Flanigan, et al; and all the young people in the Citizens Operation.

4. The Immense Effect of the RN Acceptance Speech:

It probably had a greater effect in shifting votes than any acceptance speech in the last 25 years. Several have suggested that the story that RN prepared the speech on his own, and did not "try it out" or reveal any of the content to anybody except his secretary, simply hasn't gotten across. This is a very impressive story to the average person who suspects that all politicians are simply parroting the lines their ghosts have written for them. This story should be gotten out broadly. Perhaps one way to bring this off is that when we reprint copies of the Acceptance Speech to distribute to people, a brief paragraph at the outset point out how it was prepared and also the immense effect that it had. Although many will say that we shouldn't build on events of the past, let us not forget that Kennedy made mountains of yardage during the first two years of his Presidency by referring to his Inaugural Address and having the press do likewise. Our people have not yet done an adequate job in this respect as far as this speech is concerned.

5. RN as Party Unifier: Even several of the less favorable press men pointed out that the week when we were at Mission Bay plus the swing to the major states was probably one of the major political stories of our time and would have been covered as such had the Czech Revolution not occurred in the same period. This story should be repeated over and over again -- properly embellished -- pointing out that RN fights hard but then is able to unify and bring the best men into the final organization. This will also give a good impression as to how RN will handle the Presidency once the battle is over.

6. RN, "the man for the times.": Perhaps most important of all - there should be emphasis on RN, "the man for the times." The Churchill analogy is probably appropriate. Churchill was "in the wilderness" as he put it during the '30s but was called back to lead his country in a period of crisis. What we must do is to knock down the idea that , by manipulation and because of political debts that were due RN, he was able to get the nomination. We've got to point out that he won the nomination because of his own strength and not just because of the weakness and confusion of his opponents.

In summary, one weakness of our campaign in the past has been the tendency of our entire staff, and most of our supporters, simply to rely on RN's speeches and activities for our campaign success. We are doing better this time than we have previously, but we can take a leaf out of the Kennedy book and recognize that at least 50% of the credit for his win in 1960 and also for his immensely good press after the 1960 election was due to the fact that his staff and friends were constantly running their own campaigns in his behalf, and not just waiting for him to carry the ball. This must be done at all levels -- on the campaign plane, from the Citizens group in Washington and from the Campaign Headquarters in New York -- as well as by all of our state and local leaders.

Of vital importance is the point that we must play the confident line from now until November, regardless of what developments occur. We are on the offensive and we must stay on the offensive. The Democrats are demoralized, and we must keep them demoralized. We should exude confidence, not cockiness, indicating that we're going to run an all-out campaign and pour it on, but that we do so knowing that we are ahead and that we plan to stay ahead and extend our lead so that we can elect a Republican House and a lot of Republican Senators as well. It is important that all of our major speakers take this line, and particularly important, that those who are on the plane and talking with the press, and the local politicians exude it. It is also important that those who have contact with RN take this line and not come in with long faces any time something goes wrong.

September 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman ✓
John Whitaker

FROM: RN

RE: Westchester

I think it is vitally important that we balloon Westchester. Pour in the dough and make it big. Forget the TV -- remember because of the crowds in the West and Midwest if we come into Westchester and go into a highschool auditorium and have 1500 people - no matter how enthusiastic they are -- it will be terribly downgraded.

Westchester should be oriented more to the size of the crowd and enthusiasm rather than to thinking how RN looks on TV.

September 6, 1968

BOB HALDEMAN

RN said he would probably cover this with you verbally but dictated the following as well:

Bill Scranton was elated about the receptions in Chicago and San Francisco and strongly urged that at a later time we motorcade a large, major city in the East - particularly one that is difficult.

The only one that occurs to me at the moment might be Boston which would give me an opportunity to call on Cardinal Cushing, which I think is very much in order.

The other possibility would be Philadelphia.

If we do a major Eastern city, I would also think that you might consider that this would be the time to follow up with Atlanta.

W
A
OK out
Phila

W



UNITED CITIZENS FOR NIXON-AGNEW

CHARLES S. RHYNE
National Chairman

THOMAS W. EVANS
National Director

HEADQUARTERS • WILLARD HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 • PHONE (202) 783-1560

September 4, 1968

filed RN?

To: Bob Haldeman

From: Tom Evans

TWE

Per RN's request as relayed to my office through Larry Higbee yesterday, attached is a current list of Celebrities for Nixon. I have asked Cy Laughter who directs this division of our campaign to send you an updated list at least once a week.

TWE:cph

LES BROWN
Honorary Chairman

CY LAUGHTER
Executive Director



September 5, 1968

CELEBRITIES FOR NIXON

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| * Agar, John | Fontaine, Frank |
| Albanese, Licia | Foster, Preston |
| Allen, Rex | * Francis, Connie |
| Arlen, Richard | Fuller, Robert |
| * Austin, Pamela | |
| | * Garber, Kathy |
| * Baer, Max Jr. | Garnett, Tay |
| Bargl, Miss H. Ilonka | Gentry, Gene |
| Beban, Bob | Glaser, Charles |
| Begley, Ed | Glaser, James |
| Beradino, John | Glaŝer, Thomas |
| Bergen, Edgar | Grant, Johnny |
| Blackburn, Norman | Gray, Coleen |
| Blaine, Vivian | |
| Bolger, Ray | Hampton, Lionel |
| Bondi, John | Hawkins, Lucia |
| * Boone, Pat | Hayward, Susan |
| Bowman, Lee | * Hickman, Dwayne |
| * Brewer, Teresa | Hildegarde |
| Brown, Les | * Hunter, Jeffrey |
| Buck, William | |
| Bulger, William | Jones, Allan |
| Burk, A. | Jordan, Ted |
| | Jory, Victor |
| Calhoun, Rory | Joyce, Elaine |
| Carmichael, Hoagy | |
| Charisse, Cyd | Kaye, Sammy |
| Colby, Anita | * Kersh, Kathy |
| Conner, Nadine | Knapp, David |
| Corey, Wendall | * Langard, Janet |
| Cory, Alon | * Lee, Ruta |
| Costello, Don | LiBianca, Ginetta |
| Crosby, Bob | Lindstrom, Jane |
| * Crosby, Phil | Linkletter, Art |
| Curry, Tom | Lombardo, Guy |
| | * Lowell, Linda |
| DeFore, Don | Lundigan, Bill |
| Devine, Andy | |
| | * Maina, Jill |
| Eastman, Peter | Male, Colin |
| Ekberg, Anita | Martin, Tony |
| Epton, Lou | Massey, Raymond |
| | McCrea, Joel |
| | * McCrea, Jody |

DIVISION OF UNITED CITIZENS FOR NIXON

McMurray, Fred
Milland, Ray
* Minor, Mike
Monroe, Vaughn
Morgan, Dennis

Ness, Eddie
Nolan, Lloyd

Pickford, Mary
Prinz, LeRoy

Ritter, Tex
Roberts, Roy
Robertson, Dale
Robinson, Chris
Rogers, Ginger
Rogers, Buddy
Romero, Cesar

* Sissle, Cynthia
Sissle, Noble
Smith, Dean
Spina, John
Mr. & Mrs. Robert Stack
Stewart, Don
Stossel, Ludwig

Teal, Ray

Vallee, Rudy
* Van, Mrs. Bobby

* Ward, Bert

* Younger Leading Artists

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

Would you get from Dirge or from Garment, or from whoever else can make this analysis for me, a two-page summary of our big ORC Poll, setting forth what the poll tells us with regard to the issues we should hit, lay off of, etc. I am not interested in the trial heats, only in what the poll may indicate with regard to positions I should take. Also, if the poll has information with regard to attitudes toward the candidates, which might be useful for me to have, pass it on and include it in the memorandum very briefly.

#

Check Assayer
Flanigan
Can this be done & available for 10/11
by Mrs. Hill to 9/11?
will be ready Monday Mon.
H

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN (to pass on to Klein and others who may be
dealing with the Eastern European group.)
FROM: RN

I don't think we have received enough mileage out
of RN's Reception in Poland in 1959 and his work with the
Hungarian refugees in 1956. Here are two areas where we
could get great support because of a residue of memories
among those who met me, or heard about me, in those episodes.

..

#

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN TOWER cc: Keogh
FROM: RN

~~Call Tower~~
get me the copy
of this report
quickly from R.
Ray Kilgallon

The report of the first meeting of the Key Issues Group was excellent in every respect.

Bob Haldeman will be in touch with you with regard to the use of your local poll results, on a national basis.

I agree with the judgement of the Committee with regard to hitting the Administration more decisively on the mismanagement of the economy and also on the thought of projecting the cost of living into the future.

My view is that we ought to label Humphrey as the most expensive potential President this country's ever had, and then prove it by pointing out that the bills he had introduced which were not passed would have added \$100 billion to the Budget and that his Platform and his program would add _____ billion dollars to the Budget and result in (and then project this out in terms of the individual farmer, laborer etc.)

I completely agree, too, with your thought that Agnew's statement on Civil Rights to the Baltimore Negroes be broadly distributed. He should not be on the defensive on this issue and should take the offensive on it. I would hope that you

LH- RAW needs dis. for file so
here is another copy.

Copy given
to Rich Allen
for research
people

✓

Rich

NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
1726 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 783-4201

MEMORANDUM

TO: Richard Nixon
FROM: Senator Tower
CC: John Mitchell

August 24, 1968

The first regular meeting of the expanded Key Issues Committee was held on Wednesday, August 21, 1968, in New York. A list of those attending is attached.

After you left, subcommittees were set up in accordance with your request. They are: (1) Foreign Policy and National Security, (2) Urban Problems (which include law and order, crime, riots, the root causes thereof, housing, and job opportunities and training), (3) Economic Policy, (4) Agriculture and Natural Resources, (5) Human Resources (to include education, health, welfare, labor). Subcommittee assignments are presently being made and you will be advised as soon as they have been determined.

The members were then briefed on the recently completed issues poll and considerable discussion followed. Additional information was requested by a number of members and is currently being followed up by our staff with Dr. Derge.

A memorandum is also being prepared to be sent to all state chairmen requesting that local poll results relative to presidential personalities and issues be made available. Such information would be secured by the Key Issues Committee, evaluated and coordinated with other individuals in your organization for maximum benefit.

The primary discussion then centered upon the three major position papers you submitted to the Platform Committee on Vietnam, Crime, and Economic Policy.

Vietnam: It was the consensus that the current Nixon position is a good one. Stressing that there are no pat solutions as we cannot have solutions which presuppose the cooperation of Hanoi and we cannot telegraph our punch to Hanoi by presenting detailed plans and solutions. A change in people is necessary for a change in policy. In broad terms, keep it general and don't identify with the Administration.



Economic Policy: General agreement with the following exceptions:

A. Exception was taken with the statement that the Administration has been guilty of "neglect." The Committee felt it was not neglect but deliberate mismanagement--politically motivated policies.

B. Although it was understood what the purpose of the paper was, it was still felt that the approach should be more "sexy." People do not care about economic matters stated in bland, fiscal terms, but do care about the rise in cost of living, the loss of U.S. gold, workers losing jobs and the loss of confidence in the American dollar.

In each area, there should be an early thrust with emphasis on the way a problem affects the citizen and then go on to detailed explanations later in the paper, if necessary.

It was suggested that possibly extrapolating the cost of living into the future, i.e., project percentages increases over the next four years for a loaf of bread and then add that the farmer still is laboring along on the same basis, getting no more compensation, but he, too, having to pay higher prices.

Crime: Again there was good acceptance and agreement with the following exceptions:

A. Issue was taken with the phrase that "we must return to a single standard of justice . . ." There are many ethnic groups, the poor and others, that believe there has not been a single standard of justice. Therefore, our thrust should be that we will establish a single standard of justice for all.

B. Following the above point, it was agreed that there should be emphasis on law enforcement for the Negro citizen aiming at protection of him from violence of Negro against Negro.

C. Organized crime should be hit with stress on the vast amount of money that it is taking out of the pockets of the poor--much more than the poverty program could ever put in.

D. Law enforcement should be emphasized with justice. Possibly using the phrase from the platform, "we will not overlook the necessity for justice and we will not tolerate violence."

Discussion followed regarding Mr. Agnew's problem with his stand on Civil Rights and Negro relations. The text of his Baltimore remarks to the group of Negro leaders should be distributed widely. Other materials should be distributed, i.e., favorable editorials on his record. However, it was strongly believed that he must not remain on the defensive on this or any other issue.

Among areas in which there was agreement that Committee action should be taken were:

1. Decentralization of the federal government and federal, state, and local relations.
2. The pursuit of research and development in peaceful applications.
3. Education-positive programs for the vocation, secondary and higher education systems.
4. Programs for government employees.
5. Agriculture and the rural problem.

The question was then raised as to what position, if any, you should take regarding the Fortas nomination. The consensus of the Committee is that you and Agnew should stay aloof from the entire question. An appropriate response to the question is that is the President's prerogative to make such an appointment and the Senate's responsibility to give advice and consent.

The staff is pulling together material and setting up the mechanics to provide assistance to the V.I.P. and surrogate candidates. This would also include liaison between candidates on issues and problems, which currently does not exist within the organization, research support, fast-reaction answers and speech preparation.

The next regular meeting of the full Committee will be at 2:00 p.m. Wednesday, September 11, 1968, in Washington.

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN MITCHELL

FROM: RN

I cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity to set up independent committees for citizens fund-raising and fund-raising for our television programs. You can get people like Max Fisher and Henry Salvatori to do far more if they are listed as Chairman of a committee in their own right -- and they will do it if they asked to serve on a committee under Maury Stans. I wish you would follow up on this at the earliest possible moment.

#

*Max Fisher - separate operation -
not under Stans - helping McClure on dinner*

After dinner he goes separate

Asa Callan same

Henry Salvatori special comm

M
M

~~*I want to follow
up on this
you*~~

September 2, 1968



MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

RE: Further memo to the Research and Counterattack Group

It is quite obvious that Hubert is going to try to make an asset out of the Chicago demonstrations by putting himself in the position of a man who is threatened by assassination and who is the all-out exponent of law and order. I think it is very important that none of our people, as I have said in a previous memorandum, get into the business of kicking the Chicago police. Our line should be to take on the Convention, the Convention's managers and to point up that the demonstrations were the result of the Administration's failures over the years and the too tightly controlled Convention. Buchanan has some good stuff on this which probably should be circulated among our speakers and opinion feeders.

#

Dr. 0

File

September 2, 1968

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

With further reference on your guidance for RN team during the next two weeks, I think I would avoid criticism of the Chicago Police. The difficulty here is that inevitably, even though I will not have said anything on this point, I will be asked to approve or disapprove of statements made by others close to me.

I would have them all put out the line that the RN Campaign will be attacking problems, not personalities, that it will be people-oriented rather than boss-oriented, just as was our Primary Campaign.

#

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

I think a letter should go to each Chairman of the \$1,000 a plate dinner along these lines...

I was delighted to learn from Maury Stans that you had agreed to serve as Chairman of our Finance Dinner in Cleveland (or (city)). I am convinced that this is our year and I appreciate more than I can say your helping to provide the financial support for what I believe will be a great victory in November.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

(Then try a similar letter to those who put on the \$100 dinners, if you feel it would be appropriate to do so.)

9/5
Kelebas
Will you please handle.
Went out Today 9/5

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

~~See of Elmer Bobst~~

Flanigan
Can you handle?
Lill
Done 9/4

Will you have someone at a high level, perhaps Pete Flanigan, call Elmer Bobst and chat with him on the phone telling him that I tried unsuccessfully to reach him by phone when I was in New York Saturday. It is possible, incidentally, that he is in Spring Lake, but the number Dwight left on my pad was his New York apartment. Perhaps the best one to call him is Maury Stans, in view of the fact that he asks about this contribution from the Italian and how to handle it. Keep him on my phone list and I will try to call him when I return to New York. Be sure he knows that I have seen his letter and have greatly appreciated it, and that I tried to reach him.

#

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: RN

Handwritten notes:
Mitchell
Can we get this level out to our state & local chairman?
Mailed to all state chairman
Cde. Litija

In view of the fact that Humphrey is being heckled in various places, it is vitally important that all of our local chairmen be informed that our policy is not to have Nixon signs or any heckling signs, which can be attributed to us, at Humphrey airport arrivals or meetings. At this time, leave this to the opposition. If they begin to get rough on us, we will then begin to re-examine our policy.

Handwritten note: Said let "local know"

#

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

file

*Christina
Understand you
are implementing
Per our disc.
today 9/3
11*

I would like for you to discuss with Buchanan the conversation I had with him on the law and order statement and on Humphrey's Vietnam statement in which he asked me to join him in a joint statement.

Fundamental here is the need to set up a procedure whereby a Hillings-Klein operation, Ellsworth and Surrogate operation and Agnew as well as Rhyne and our political types on their own seize the opportunity to respond to Humphrey's attacks, but even more important, take him on for his inconsistencies and demagoguery. I cannot assume the responsibility for thinking up these points and I want our whole campaign organization to begin to do some thinking along these lines.

In that respect, while Safire and Buchanan and Harlow will have as their major responsibility preparing material for RN, they are all good gut fighters and possibly they could have a meeting every morning and feed stuff out to this group. We should get going on a procedure immediately and I would like for you to push them along.

#

September 2, 1968

File

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: RN

Is Mazo being used, and, if so, would he be helpful to the Chotiner-Klein operation?

#

*Yes he would
& is
also Irving Furman
and Sy Friedman as
H/H man*

September 2, 1968

[Handwritten signature]

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN (This perhaps goes to Keogh, Agnes et al. --
you determine it.)

FROM: RN

Our Research group has got to get together material
with regard to Humphrey contradicting himself. Get this
material out to all columnists, speakers etc.

..

#

[Faint handwritten notes]

September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: RN



I would like Bebe and Manuel to be present in California on that short weekend -- two weeks from today. Have Manuel fly out there and be there and open up the house and have it ready for occupancy when we arrive Saturday night. Have Bebe join us on the way out if he wants, or he can fly out and meet us there and stay on a couple of days after that.

Also, you can inform Helene Drown of these plans so that she can join Pat when we are out there. It might be well to let Helene join us ^{for} a couple of days prior to arriving there or for a couple of days immediately after being there.

#