

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
White House Special Files Collection  
Folder List

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33	13	06/09/1968	Memo	From: Ellsworth. Re: Notes on Strategy and Tactics through November 5. 23 pages.
33	13	07/24/1968	Memo	From: Bob Ellsworth. Re: Thanks.
33	13	n.d.	Memo	To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention and Pre-Election Impact. 3 pages.
33	13	06/24/1968	Memo	To: Buchanan. Re: Further Thoughts On Wallace. 3 pages.
33	13	07/13/1968	Memo	To: RN. From: Buchanan. Re: Breakdown of the Gallup Poll. 11 pages.
33	13	07/10/1968	Newspaper	Ex-Vice President Lagging 35 to 40%. Unknown author for unknown newspaper. Not scanned.

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33	13	07/13/1968	Memo	From: Bell. Re: The Gallup Poll.. 9 pages.
33	13	n.d.	Other Document	Subjects on but not limited to: Campaigning, General Approach, and Agenda. 14 pages.
33	13	07/08/1968	Memo	To: Mitchell & Haldeman.From: DC. Re: Citizens, Counterattack, Humphrey Attack Strategy, Family Schedule, Speakers, and Background Material. 5 pages.
33	13	07/07/1968	Memo	To: DC. From: Rose Mary Woods. Re: Edwin Emrich Suggestion.
33	13	07/18/1968	Newspaper	Ohio, Mich. Polls Deal Rocky Blow. Author unknown from The Washington Post. Not scanned.
33	13	n.d.	Memo	To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Billy Graham. 3 pages. Duplicates not scanned.
33	13	n.d.	Memo	To: Nixon. From: Senator John Conlan. Re: Project Hoover. 2 pages. Duplicates not scanned.

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33	13	n.d.	Other Document	Handwritten notes. 2 pages.

*Haldeman*

June 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC  
Mitchell  
Stans  
Haldeman  
Flanigan  
Kleindienst  
Garment

FROM: Ellsworth

RE: Notes on Strategy and Tactics through November 5.

Summary: The campaign in 1968 has become a national campaign in a more complete sense than ever before. The old politics of regional geographical campaigns, and the old politics of ideological and class campaigns, have to a substantial extent given way to the new politics of media campaigning (as suggested in the Haldeman memorandum of 1967) with tactics based on demographic analysis.

One of the deep running currents in American politics today is the demand for a change in leadership: the opening theme of the Nixon campaign, the Johnson abdication, the Kennedy and McCarthy campaigns (netting some 75% of the vote in recent Democratic primaries), and the Wallace campaign -- all give evidence of this current. One effect of the RFK killing and TV coverage is to heighten the sense that the "ins" have failed to govern effectively and to intensify the pressure for changes in policies and leadership.

Assuming that Nixon and Humphrey\* are the nominees of the two major parties, Wallace would be the main competitor against Nixon for the votes of those who desire substantial change. In addition, Wallace will tap a substantial regional popularity in the South, plus the residual racism of the South, plus whatever white backlash may have been generated in recent years in the rest of the country.

Given the nationwide character of the "new politics" campaign that is indicated this year, it remains that the President has to be elected (according to the Constitution) by the electoral college. This means that local and regional factors must be taken into account, that the demography of the principal states has to be read and accounted for, and that the Wallace candidacy has a double potential for mischief: in that Wallace may win a substantial number (35 or more) of electoral votes, and in that he might drain off enough "we want a change", anti-Humphrey and white backlash votes in several states to deprive Nixon of electoral votes by throwing those states to Humphrey.

In thinking about campaign tactics, it is also necessary to keep in mind that we will have 25 candidates for Senate seats (including incumbents running for reelection) who appear to have a reasonable chance of winning. All of those votes in the Senate will be important to Nixon as President.

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\* A source close to Secretary Fowler says LBJ will now accept a draft at the Convention.

The foregoing points: 1.) the national quality of the election campaign, 2.) the electoral college effect, and 3.) the Senate candidates effect -- are analyzed in some detail on the following pages, and at the end the campaign efforts -- budget, non-candidate efforts, the Vice Presidential candidate's effort and the Presidential candidate's effort -- are assessed in light of the entire analysis.

I. The campaign in 1968 has become a national campaign in a more complete sense than ever before. The old politics of regional geographical campaigns and the old politics of ideological and class campaigns, have to a substantial extent given way to the new politics of media campaigning with tactics based on demographic analysis.

Politicians tend to think in terms of states or geographical regions, and while it is necessary to take account of regions and states later, it is better to start with a look at the national electorate. It may be a truism that the American people have become homogenized, but it is certainly true that television and other national media, together with the great mobility of large numbers of the working class (not to mention the sales, business and professional classes) -- all accelerated and strengthened by mass college education -- have made Presidential politics genuinely national.

In fact, Presidential politics today are to a large extent non-partisan. When George Gallup talks about the Republican Party being a third party (43% Democrats, 30% Independents, and 27% Republicans) he is talking about the self-identification of his interviewees -- not about how people vote. The fact is, both parties are minority

parties in terms of Presidential politics in the United States -- and have been since World War II. In the last 5 Presidential elections, the Democrats have received a majority of the popular vote only once -- in 1964. Moreover, when all the votes cast for President in the last 5 elections are added up, the Democrats come out with 49.6%, the Republicans with 49.1% and others with 1.3%.

These effects are underscored for Presidential campaign purposes this year because of the general and pervasive nature of the political issues. For example, the Gallup Poll Survey of Issues in May 1968 showed 42% of the American people thought Vietnam was the most important problem facing this country today. An ORC poll conducted for the Nixon organization in February 1968 showed that in California, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, Vietnam was regarded by over 70% of all voters as the one single problem the President should concentrate on solving. Similarly, race relations, crime and lawlessness and the high cost of living/taxes, generally in that order, rated with nearly equal intensity all across the nation.

Thus: modern mass media permit -- even require -- a truly national Presidential campaign. On historical form

the two major Presidential candidates can expect to have an equal chance at winning, regardless of their party identification, and the politically potent issues appear to be genuinely nationwide.

That being the case, what are some of the nationwide demographic groupings in which the Nixon candidacy may be expected to have strength, and where may problem areas expect to be encountered? How large are these different groups in terms of votes? Answers to these questions are important so that the campaign can be designed to emphasize the appeal to and build up the vote turn-out in the strong groups, largely through organizational efforts -- and at the same time design appeals to the problem areas for the purpose of minimizing antagonisms and emphasizing possible positive appeals. No accurate study has been made in this area; one is needed.

In a rough and preliminary way, we have developed a highly speculative analysis, based on conversions of recent Gallup polls designed to show relative strength and weakness with basic groups of people as used by Gallup. I want to emphasize that the following figures are included in this memorandum only to indicate the utility and importance of a professional demographic analysis being developed quickly

for use in this campaign. The figures that follow are so extrapolated, converted and estimated that they cannot be taken as anything other than indicative.

CATEGORY	EXPECTED NUMBER OF 1968 VOTERS	NIXON STRENGTH (+) OR WEAKNESS (-) VIS-A-VIS HUMPHREY
I. <u>Sex</u>		
Men	36,200,000	even
Women	38,100,000	+1,500,000
II. <u>Education level</u>		
Completed college	18,000,000	+1,400,000
Completed high school	38,800,000	even
Completed grade school	17,800,000	-1,800,000
III. <u>Occupation</u>		
Professional & business	15,900,000	+1,600,000
White collar	10,700,000	-2,100,000
Farmers	3,700,000	+1,500,000
Manual	41,700,000	-4,200,000
IV. <u>Religion</u>		
Protestant	27,200,000	+3,300,000
Catholic	18,600,000	-5,200,000
V. <u>Geography</u>		
East	20,500,000	-2,400,000
Midwest	22,700,000	even
South	17,400,000	+ 700,000
West	13,400,000	+1,600,000
VI. <u>Income</u>		
over \$7,000/year	30,800,000	+1,200,000
\$5,000-\$7,000	21,700,000	-2,100,000
\$3,000-\$5,000	13,800,000	- 800,000
below \$3,000	10,800,000	even
VII. <u>Size of Community</u>		
over 500,000	12,700,000	-1,500,000
50,000-500,000	16,000,000	-1,900,000
2,500-50,000	13,800,000	+1,700,000
under 2,500	10,800,000	+3,600,000

The immediate political uses of such figures are perhaps self-evident. For example, one should emphasize getting out the vote of high income, highly educated residents in communities of over 50,000. Nixon has great appeal to these income and educational groups, and we need to minimize and cut down anticipated losses in the large communities. For example, it is interesting to note that in the "Geography" section, the strengths in the South and West very nearly balance the weakness in the East. This is not to say that one should ignore the East -- only that one should not focus one's campaign on the East at the risk of diminishing the enthusiasm in the Midwest, South and West. Other examples could be given -- the point is, a demographic/political analysis, professional and accurately done, is needed. It will be useful.

On a national basis, the Wallace candidacy holds dangers. The Gallup and Harris polls in May 1968 show the following figures:

	NIXON	HUMPHREY	WALLACE	UNDECIDED
Gallup	39	36	14	11
Harris	36	38	13	13

Until we can get more precise research, it is difficult to know what the full effect of the Wallace

candidacy will be. One presumes his percentages are very high in the South and quite low in the rest of the country, and that the 13% or 14% showing in the national polls is an average. This presumption is borne out to some extent by a February 1968 poll in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution showing Wallace with 28% versus a Nebraska poll conducted in mid-April showing Wallace with 4%. A 4% vote for Wallace in Nebraska would probably not affect the disposition of Nebraska's electoral votes; a 4% vote for Wallace in Pennsylvania would: it might throw Pennsylvania's electoral votes to Humphrey. However, a study of Wallace's relative positions in Harris polls over the spring gives some hint that, when Humphrey is a candidate, Wallace support tends to come from Humphrey or from undecideds, rather than from Nixon. A professional study of the Wallace effect in key states outside the South needs to be made.

In general: it has been said that, as election day approaches, Wallace's appeal will fade and his percentage of the vote will be greatly lower than his percentage in various polls. This is good campaigning but not an inevitable development. The hope might be based on the historical experiences of 1948, when Thurmond and Henry Wallace are supposed to have run less well in the election than they did in the polls, and on the experience of 1965 when William Buckley ran less well in the New York City mayor election

than he had been running in the polls. However, careful research shows that while it did happen to Henry Wallace and Buckley, this did not happen to Thurmond. Instead, he got a higher percentage of votes than the polls showed he might. A Crossley poll, taken shortly before the election of 1948, showed Thurmond with about 1.6% of the vote. Gallup showed Thurmond getting about 2%. On election day, Thurmond got over 2% of the total national vote, performing better than might have been predicted on the basis of the polls.

Thus it can be seen that, although Henry Wallace did get only about half the vote that had been expected for him, Thurmond actually got a little more than what he had been polling, on a national basis.

Truman ignored Thurmond on the right, correctly assessing his appeal as intense but limited to a small number of voters. Instead, Truman came out hard for federal medical care and active government generally, berating and ridiculing the "Republicans" for a do-nothing record. Thus he occupied Wallace's ground by promising federal action for the masses and drove Wallace to an untenable Communistic left position.

A detailed and thorough analysis of the Wallace effect, made on a state by state basis, is clearly indicated: it seems probable that Wallace would win the electoral votes of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina against Humphrey and Nixon, with Georgia being a battle ground. No effort should be made to capture the electoral votes of these states because of the risk (having in mind the instantaneous nationwide quality of mass communications) of losing votes from the center to Humphrey in other states.

Instead, the Nixon campaign should continue to occupy the center as it has done so far, and should undercut Wallace by stressing that Nixon represents a substantial change from present leadership policies while Humphrey does not, both in terms of domestic policies (government and private capital to draw blacks fully into American life, bloc grants for decentralization of power, judicial balance and crime control for law and order) and foreign policies (peace, no more Vietnams, use of economic and diplomatic power with military balance vis-a-vis the USSR to insure stability in the world). Nixon cannot compete with Wallace on regional appeal or racism, but he certainly can on the change of leadership issue.

Wallace's great weakness, even in the South, is his lack of experience in Washington and the doubt that he could manage the federal government. Nixon could.

II. Given the nationwide character of the "new politics" campaign that is indicated this year, it remains that the President has to be elected (according to the Constitution) by the electoral college.

At the present time, I count 28 states solid for Nixon with 251 electoral votes -- 6 states (including D. C.) solid for Humphrey with 81 electoral votes -- 4 states solid for Wallace with 35 electoral votes -- and 13 states uncertain with 171 electoral votes.

The breakdown is as follows:

NIXON				HUMPHREY	
Illinois	26	Oregon	6	✓New York	43
Ohio	26	✓Nebraska	5	✓Massachusetts	14
Texas	25	✓Arizona	5	✓Minnesota	10
Florida	14	✓Idaho	4	✓West Virginia	7
✓Indiana	13	✓Maine	4	✓Rhode Island	4
North Carolina	13	✓Montana	4	✓Dist. of Col.	3
Virginia	12	✓New Hampshire	4		
Missouri	12	✓Utah	4	TOTAL	81
Tennessee	11	Alaska	3		
✓Iowa	9	Delaware	3		
Kentucky	9	Nevada	3		
Washington	9	✓Vermont	3		
✓Oklahoma	8	✓Wyoming	3		
✓Kansas	7				
Colorado	6	TOTAL	<u>251</u>		

WALLACE		UNCERTAIN	
✓Alabama	10	California	40
✓Louisiana	10	Pennsylvania	29
? — South Carolina	8	Michigan	21
✓Mississippi	7	New Jersey	17
TOTAL	<u>35</u>	Wisconsin	12
		Georgia	12
		Maryland	10
		Connecticut	8
		Arkansas	6
		Hawaii	4
		North Dakota	4
		New Mexico	4
		South Dakota	4
		TOTAL	<u>171</u>

A rough, preliminary demographic analysis of the several states (similar to the rough national demographic analysis explained above) is attached as Appendix A. This should be refined and used for political analysis.

Taking the top four states among the undecided -- California, Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey -- which, when added to the sure Nixon states, brings Nixon to within 12 electoral votes of winning the Presidency -- the demographic data are of great political significance.

For example: The business and professional class, in which Nixon is very strong, runs at about the national average or a little above. Farmers with whom Nixon is

stronger than with any other occupational group in the country, runs substantially below the national average. Manual workers, with whom Nixon is not strong, run at or slightly above the national average. The implication is clear for these key states: strong get-out-the-vote efforts should be organized among the business and professional classes; Nixon should campaign to manual workers on themes (such as law and order) that appeal to them and stay away from economic themes that alienate them, and he should avoid talking about farm problems.

In the same states (except for California), relatively small percentages of the population live in rural areas and as has already been seen by the minuscule percentages of people engaged in farming, most of these are probably suburbanites or exurbanites. In any case, Nixon has great strength among people who live in communities of under 2500 and substantial strength among people who live in communities between 2500 and 50,000. The opposition has great strength among people who live in communities of over 50,000. What is indicated is a strong get-out-the-vote drive among the suburbs.

In general, more effort should go into the Uncertain states than into the Nixon states, and the least effort should go into the Humphrey and Wallace states.

III. In thinking about campaign tactics, it is necessary to keep in mind that we will have 25 candidates for Senate seats who appear to have a reasonable chance of winning.

They are as follows:

STATE	SENATE CANDIDATE	STATUS	ELECTORAL VOTES
Oregon	Packwood	Nixon state	6
California	Rafferty	Uncertain	40
Nevada	Fike	N	3
Idaho	Hansen	N	4
Utah	Bennett	N	4
Arizona	Goldwater	N	5
Colorado	Dominick	N	6
No. Dakota	Young	Un	4
So. Dakota	Gubbrud	Un	4
Kansas	Dole	N	7
Oklahoma	Bellmon	N	8
Missouri	Curtis	N	12
Iowa	Ray or Johnson	N	9
Wisconsin	Leonard	Un	12
Indiana	Ruckelshouse	N	13
Kentucky	Cook	N	9
Florida	Gurney	N	14
Ohio	Saxbe	N	26
Maryland	Mathias	Un	10
Penn.	Schweiker	Un	29
New York	Javits	Humphrey state	43
Conn.	May or Sibal	Un	8
New Hamp.	Cotton	N	4
Vermont	Aiken	N	3
Alaska	Rasmussen	Un	3

At least for the first few months of a Nixon Presidency, it would be beneficial to the White House to have personally helped in the campaign of every one of these men -- even the old-timers.

IV. The various campaign efforts must be assessed and assigned to priorities so as to produce the maximum effect, within the limits of the time, money and personnel that will be available for the campaign.

(1) Budget Priorities.

In the broadest terms, budget priorities should be assigned as follows, from lowest priority to highest:

(a) Lowest priority: those states regarded as solid for Humphrey or Wallace.

(b) Next priority: those states regarded as solid for Nixon.

(c) Highest priority: those states regarded as uncertain.

As a general rule, the Candidate's effort, being the most important, should be expected to consume the most money.

The Vice Presidential candidate's effort may be considered in the same category, but of course would not consume as much money as the Presidential candidate.

The non-candidate efforts would absorb the rest of the money: the Nixon-oriented get-out-the-vote campaigns in various metropolitan areas, a high level speakers group (Surrogate Candidates), and the distribution of campaign materials.

(2) Non-candidate Efforts.

These efforts, which would not involve either the Presidential or the Vice Presidential candidate, should consist of two principal activities: a high level speakers group (Surrogate Candidates) and a combination telephone and door-to-door effort modeled on the highly successful Oregon operation, for use in metropolitan areas throughout the country.

Citizens groups, Party organization efforts, and local campaigns can supplement this phase of the effort, but -- particularly if the Presidential candidate is going to severely limit his mass public appearances -- the Surrogate Candidates and the neighbor-to-neighbor telephone and visitation program will assume great significance in this campaign.

The Surrogate Candidates may be used appropriately both in speaking to live audiences and in appearing on local and regional media. These men would be articulate, experienced politicians and public speakers whose thinking parallels that of the Candidate and who would be amenable to delivering the Nixon line in some detail. I am thinking of the following men: National Committeemen Bud Wilkinson and Bo Calloway, Senators Baker, Percy and Thurmond, Governors Agnew and Hickel, and Congressmen Brock, Bush, Morse, Rumsfeld and MacGregor.

The telephone-personal visit operation used so successfully in Oregon involves the limited but active involvement of thousands of men and women, for the most part within metropolitan areas. Briefly: paid professionals telephone and recruit volunteers to hand-carry packets of campaign material to 5 neighbors. The original successful calls of course are followed up with direct mail and with a further follow-up telephone call. This has worked well not only in Oregon but in a number of other cities in the West. It can be modified in various ways. The principal advantage of such an operation is that it actively involves tens of thousands of individuals directly in the campaign and thus is very much in line with the new so-called "participatory politics".

(3) The Vice Presidential Effort.

The Vice Presidential candidate, acting as an alternate Presidential candidate, should design his campaign, his media presentations and his personal appearances so as to appeal, on a national basis, to those elements of the electorate with which the Presidential candidate may not have the greatest strength. For example, if there are age groups or occupation groups or even ethnic groups -- in the national electorate and more particularly the undecided

states -- where the demographic analyses show the Vice Presidential candidate to have substantially more potential, his campaign should focus upon those elements in those areas.

The Vice Presidential candidate cannot substitute for the Presidential candidate, however, in the Senatorial candidate area.

(4) The Presidential Candidate's Effort.

(a) Time. Fifty-eight calendar days lie between Labor Day, the traditional start of Presidential campaigns, and election day. Assuming that the Candidate can sustain a high intensity effort 5 days out of every 7, that means 41 days are available for high intensity campaigning.

Assuming the Candidate can do with 6 hours' sleep each day, that provides 738 hours. Assuming that no more than one-third of those hours (i.e., 6 hours a day) can be given to public appearances (including backgrounders, conferences with political leaders, time actually spent with staff) -- that leaves 246 hours for public appearances by the Candidate during the general election campaign.

In attempting to arrive at a theoretical basis for utilization of the Candidate's time (total 246 hours), it is my feeling that at least 10% should be set aside for personal visits with the leading figures of the national

press, radio and TV. I do not know that this exact percentage has been used, but undoubtedly the time that has been devoted to this purpose during the last several months has been time well spent. That leaves approximately 225 hours.

Although I assume most of the television advertising production will be out of the way by Labor Day, it is quite possible that some issue may come up requiring the production of new advertising material by the Candidate during the campaign itself. Ten percent of the Candidate's time should be reserved for this eventuality. That leaves approximately 200 hours. These hours should be apportioned so as to put the greatest effort in those places where the greatest effort is needed and where it has the best chance of paying off.

Analysing the political situation in the several states, eliminating those states solid for Humphrey or Wallace, assigning to each Nixon state its own electoral vote, assigning to each Uncertain state double its own electoral vote, then adding to each Senate Candidate state that state's electoral vote -- and then dividing the 200 public appearance hours among the states on the basis of the relative weights thus assigned to them, the Candidate's public appearance time should be spent in various states approximately as follows:

STATE	CANDIDATE'S TIME (hours)
Alabama	0
Alaska	1½
Arizona	2½
Arkansas	3
California	30
Colorado	3
Connecticut	6
Delaware	¾
District of Columbia	0
Florida	7
Georgia	6
Hawaii	2
Idaho	2
Illinois	13
Indiana	6½
Iowa	4½
Kansas	3½
Kentucky	4½
Louisiana	0
Maine	1
Maryland	7½
Massachusetts	0
Michigan	10½
Minnesota	0
Mississippi	0
Missouri	6
Montana	1
Nebraska	1
Nevada	1½
New Hampshire	2
New Jersey	8½
New Mexico	2
New York	0
North Carolina	3
North Dakota	3
Ohio	13
Oklahoma	4
Oregon	3
Pennsylvania	22
Rhode Island	0
South Carolina	0
South Dakota	3
Tennessee	3
Texas	8
Utah	2
Vermont	1½
Virginia	3
Washington	2
West Virginia	0
Wisconsin	9
Wyoming	1

NB: It should be recognized that New York, because of its preeminence in the communications world and because of the nationwide implications of anything that is done or not done in New York, represents a special case.

NB: South Carolina also represents a special case. If Senator Thurmond campaigns for the Republican ticket in the manner and to the extent he has indicated, and if he or Harry Dent desires the Candidate in South Carolina, the Candidate must give serious consideration to going.

NB: It is essential that the "unity" theme which has been stressed so successfully and so effectively so far in 1968 -- effectively in terms of primary results, effectively in terms of favorable standings in national polls and effectively in terms of reactions of commentators such as Wicker and Broder -- be given tangible, concrete form in the conduct of the general election campaign. In detail, this means campaigning, and thus appearing to be concerned with, all of the major geographical sections of the country. This will be relatively easy as there are in fact either undecided states or states with Senate candidates in every section of the country.

It also means campaigning to the two groups that are most alienated from the rest of the country and that are

causing the most trouble: the blacks and the young people. I do not suggest that the Candidate modify his positions on the issues or his views on either domestic matters or foreign policies -- only that he campaign to these groups, thus reassuring the rest of the country that, as President, he would pursue a policy of national unification rather than continued drift or further division.

"Probably every generation sees itself as charged with remaking the world. Mine, however, knows that it will not remake the world. But its task is perhaps even greater, for it consists in keeping the world from destroying itself."

Albert Camus, on receiving  
the Nobel Prize for Literature,  
1957.

*For your information*

**From Bob Ellsworth**

July 24, 1968

Bob -

Thanks for the loan of your copy.

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

This is a memo prepared by an amazing political creature in Fino's office who wants to work for RN--and who has enormous depth and breadth of knowledge of the American electorate and voting patterns. He has told me he would be willing to be quizzed by our four top people on his ~~own~~ ability. Attached is a copy of a memo prepared by him at Len's request in ten minutes.

Buchanan

*① RN agrees —*  
*② Halderman + Lett*  
*hire this guy*  

---

*RN*

Considerations in Assessing the Probable Pre-Convention  
and Pre-Election Impact of the High Poll Showing and  
Predicted November Strength of George C. Wallace

As the November campaign shapes up as one focusing the issues of law and order, George C. Wallace, the candidate whose public pronouncements cater to the hearts - if not the minds - of a large segment of the population, is rising in the polls.

There are reasons - see below - why Wallace's vote is liable to emerge as far less significant in November than now predicted, and this should be born in mind as far as pre-convention strategizing.

Point One: Wallace's poll strength is being falsely measured. The question posed in the polls asks voters whom they would like to see elected president - not whom they intend to vote for. Historically, voters have shrunk from third-party candidates in the general election, even though they prefer them, because such votes are wasted votes. Even if the question were modified to "whom do you now intend to vote for", it would still overstate Wallace's election day strength, but to ask who you like to see elected is to court a high Wallace vote by eliciting responses from conservatives who prefer Wallace's position (especially while Mr. Nixon is as yet somewhat inchoate) but who will not waste a vote on him. THE POLLS GROSSLY OVERSTATE WALLACE STRENGTH AND UNDERSTATE NIXON STRENGTH (TO BE PICKED UP FROM WALLACE).

Point Two: Much of the vote Wallace receives in the end is liable to come from disgruntled Democrats, while GOP voters hold ranks. One can analogize here to Wm F. Buckley's race in New York City, for while he took votes from both Beame and Lindsay, the last minute dropoff in Buckley support (confirmed by comparing Assembly District polls with actual votes) came in Republican districts and represented conservative Republicans edging back to Lindsay because of party ties. In the end, Wallace's vote is liable to be more Democratic than observers predict, and this trend (see following commentary) does not militate for Rockefeller but for Nixon because 1) a more conservative Republican will bring GOP voters back to the fold and 2) the Wallace split-off should be useful in marginal states like Michigan and Illinois (coming as it will from Democrats in bulk).

Thus, from the preconvention viewpoint, Nixon should not overreact to Wallace in either of two ways: 1) he should not move left and re-orient himself to a left-trending city appeal; and 2) he should not write off the South because Wallace will, in the end, not win much of it. These two refusals must be congruent - they are inter-dependent.

What Mr. Nixon should do is this: refrain from courting Wallace or affirming any Southern strategy because Rockefeller can make delegates edgy by raising the Goldwater spectre and simultaneously suggesting that Mr. Nixon is Goldwater's heir. But at the same time, the Nixon strategy should not embrace the Rockefeller style assertion that the campaign will be won or lost by a liberal pitch or the lack of it in the big cities. The Nixon strategy should take a middle of the road straddling position as follows to retain strength now and flexibility for the campaign.

Suggested Nixon strategy: 1) Accept thesis that big city states and urban voting is crucial to victory but do not accept thesis that liberal social programming is necessary; 2) Accept thesis that George Wallace's bloc should not be courted but minimize Wallace strength by citing historical analysis of third-party Southern behavior and explaining poll proclivity to overstate his strength; 3) Counterattack by showing how Nixon will overcome Wallace - use trend data again - in the modern Outer South (while Rockefeller would lose all South) and by showing gross weakness of Nelson Rockefeller in big cities, see enclosure, and showing real Nixon urban strength(see enclosure).

By this approach, no liberal positions will be taken which will offend Wallace poll backers who must be held - and will be - on election day, but at the same time, it will undercut Rockefeller's theme that urban votes are necessary and that 1) a liberal approach is necessary to get them, and that 2) Rockefeller must be nominated.

The enclosed short statements detail the following arguments  
1) Nixon will be in good shape down South in November because the Wallace third-party phenomenon will not hold up; 2) Nixon can do well in the cities because of conservative and Catholic trend, explaining that much of his 1960 weakness was not linked to "Urban" behavior, but to Catholic voting (For JFK) which will not be a problem in 1968; and lastly 3) how Nelson Rockefeller, contrary to his propaganda, is not a good vote-getter in the cities (citing his great decay in urban New York).

See enclosed

Then, after Mr. Nixon is nominated, he should pursue a moderate conservative course sufficient to clearly differentiate himself from Hubert HphmOrhey on 1) social policies and 2) the war in Vietnam(ideal position is quasi-isolationist). This will strike the right balance between moderation and appeal to independents, and the needed "realm of plausibility" differentiation by which the Wallace vote will fall back in line for Mr. Nixon. Such an approach ought to reduce the Wallace vote to 3-5% nationally, with the electoral vote impact confined to 27 (Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana and much of the minimal Northern vote won from urban Demcrats (Lake County, Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark et al).

Mr. Nixon should... 5-8 of the two...

24 June 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN

SUBJ: Further Thoughts on Wallace

*D.H. W. - thinks this is [unclear]  
very pertinent  
+ Haldeman as to [unclear]  
① discuss with [unclear]  
② Media program*

*Expectant  
ominous*

I think it is important in assessing the Wallace threat to keep our perspective. I would estimate that between 5 and 8% of his support is hard-line racists. There isn't a damn thing we could do to get these people, and of course we couldn't afford to try if we wished. However, Rocky is full of shit when he says a Republican candidate wouldn't want their support. Hell, you take every vote you can get from whomever will give it. The point is we can't get these people and we should forget them.

Further, we don't need Wallace. What is, Calloway made a mistake when he said Wallace should join with the Republicans against the Administration. Wallace doesn't give a damn about anything except satisfying his urge to run for President. His populism is best reflected in his frequent assaults upon the private foundations of this country -- Rockefeller, Ford, and Mellon. The inclusion of the latter amazes me; it suggests he doesn't really <sup>know</sup> much about the private sector, nor does he care. In this respect, the guy is dangerous as hell. Knocking him out of the ball game as a serious political figure would be a major service to the nation.

*Let D.H. W. handle  
the South*

What we need to do is go after those people who indicate at this time that they're for Wallace but who are not really racists. These people -- particularly Southerners -- are simply fed up with being run over by the Planners. They're fed up with crime and civil disorder, with being told that all the problems in this country are ~~their~~ their fault because they're white and prosperous. Southerners particularly feel that they been abused long enough -- they are all racists, they starve children, they bomb churches, etc. It is a visceral reaction on their part to support Wallace since he speaks for "Southern Power" -- that is, he is willing to tell the Establishment to get off the South's back. This is emotionally satisfying to many Southerners -- moderates as well as conservatives. I know because my North Carolina wife is one of them. She's a Republican and wouldn't vote for Wallace, but she can't help finding some pleasure from watching Wallace "tell 'em off".

What does this mean for RM in the course of the campaign? I think it is this: we have to go after the Independent and Democrat who is sick of the permissiveness which permeates our society, but who wants to do something about it, i.e., wants his vote to count, to really make a difference, to effectuate a change. Wallace does extraordinarily well among these people in the current polls, but I doubt if he can hold these people if they have a reasonable and electable alternative. RM doesn't have to appeal to a covert racism to get them, but he does have to stake out a distinct position on the gut issues and pound it home. And he has to convince these people that a vote for him is a solid vote for

*Myself*

the type of change which they want to see take place in this country. I don't think this requires any marked change in what the Boss is presently saying. What I do think it requires is a little more passion on the Boss's part, a determination to keep hitting on these gut issues in phrases which stick in the mind of the average voter (Wallace's "not a dime's worth of difference" is one hell of an effective phrase), and a decision to gear our media advertising to this type of appeal to the disenchanted Independent and Democrat.

One thing which I found of interest when I was studying the voter trends in North Carolina over the last 8 years is the marked similarity in the percentage of votes cast in 1960 and 1964 for the Republican gubernatorial candidate and the presidential candidate. It suggested to me that there wasn't much switch voting. This may mean that it would be to our advantage to tie our national campaign in these states to the state-wide races, particularly where in North Carolina, for example, we have a damn attractive gubernatorial candidate. I don't know if any consideration has been given to this sort of state by state analysis of campaign strategy, but I think someone ought to look into it.

*agreed*

We don't have much choice but to write off Alabama and Mississippi to Wallace, but I think it would be a mistake to grant him any of the other "Deep South" states. We can't afford to do so, for I don't want to take my chances with a brokered election. Knowing Wallace, I would bet 100 to 1 he would make a deal with Humphrey before he would with us. And Humphrey could get away with it -- not a word of protest from the New York Times.

I am rather concerned about the use of media in the campaign, since I don't see much in the way of coordination between what they are planning and what we are discussing in terms of issue exploitation. I think this is a matter that might deserve further consideration.

*think*

One immediate requirement in terms of fighting Wallace is for us to attempt to come up with some catch phrases which are responsible but which appeal to those concerned about the gut issues. The Boss needs to hammer away day in and day out on a couple of issues. Water pollution may be one hell of a national problem, but I doubt if it will win us many votes.

*we need a word*

As a matter of necessity, we have got to keep the Calloways and ~~and~~ Martins and Thurmonds from stirring up a lot of controversy, but on the other hand, we need them stumping the South hard as hell on RM's behalf. We need the South to win, and I think we can develop a so-called Southern strategy which is effective and yet consistent with the Boss's oft-stated position on matters of civil rights. In other words, I am not advocating nor do I think we need engage in any campaign to out-Wallace Wallace on racial matters.

One final word about the Negro vote. I have watched the polls carefully and the best I have seen Rocky do among the Negroes is 26%, which is a maximum of 2.6 million votes. The Boss is credited by Harris with getting 19% of the Negro vote against Humphrey unless Teddy is on the ticket when it goes down to 7%. The greatest myth of contemporary politics is the idea that the Negroes are a "swing" vote. They're Democratic votes, or at least the vast majority of them are. From all indications of Negro voter patterns thus far this year, Negro voting may be ~~as great as~~ <sup>less than</sup> 50% as great among registered voters in November as white voting. What we need to do is avoid giving the Negro any reason to vote. What means we don't want to antagonize him by a Coldwater-type campaign, but our greatest asset potentially is the possible feeling on the Negro's part that Humphrey doesn't represent such a hot item that it is necessary to troop to the polls. I think this will be particularly true if he selects Connally as a running mate.

Disjointed as these thoughts are, I think they suggest some matters for further consideration. With Wallace getting as much as 14% of the vote in some Northern states and matching LN's vote in the South, we can't afford to ignore his challenge... However, we must attempt to put it perspective. He could be our major threat in some areas of the country, and we need to figure out how to cope with him without alienating other voters whose support we also need.

July 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN  
FROM: BUCHANAN

*Copy to Mitchell  
Frank  
Holden*  
*This makes sense +  
its essential to  
see in detail in  
photocopy*

Lying unnoticed before our eyes in the breakdown of the Gallup Poll is the answer to our riddle; RN's landslide victory is sitting right there in front of us. I have already documented the quintessential importance of RN winning the Wallace Protestants -- the other wing of RN's victory lies in the Humphrey Catholics.

Everyone is squealing about RN's 7 per cent of the black vote and RN's 4 per cent of the Jewish vote. The crisis and the opportunity both lie in RN's 27 per cent of the Catholic vote against HHH.

(Against McCarthy, a Catholic, RN gets 30 per cent of the Catholics) RN -- note the following statistics.

UNITED STATES POPULATION

<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Catholics</u>
5,800,000	22,000,000	46,000,000
	(Eligible to vote)	
3,500,000	11,000,000	26,000,000

(In allocating the "eligible to vote" I gave the Jews the highest percentage of eligible because they tend to smaller families and so an older average population ...)

the Catholic came second and the Negro third, as the latter has the youngest population. Statistically, it is said that half the American Negroes are under 21.)

(Probable Voters)

<u>Jews</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Catholics</u>
2,400,000	5, 500,000	17,000,000

(Again, the allocation was made that about 70 per cent of the eligible Jews will go to the polls in November, that about 65 per cent of the Catholics (national average) and about 50 per cent of the Negroes (historically true.)

Against HHH, RN is currently getting about 4 per cent of the Jewish vote which amounts to a paltry 100,000 votes nationally. He is getting seven per cent of the Negro vote nationally which is not quite 400,000 votes.

RN nationally today is getting fewer than 500,000 Negroes and Jews in these United States.

These statistics are telling us something that we can ignore only at the cost of victory this coming November.

First, let's take the Jewish vote. If we multiplied our present Jewish vote by five, we would be adding fewer than 400,000 new voters. In other words to go from 4 per cent of the Jewish vote to 20 per cent of the Jewish vote

would add to RN's total about 386,000 new supporters.

On the other hand, if RN increased his support among Catholics from 27 per cent which he has against HHH to 30 per cent (which RN already has against McC,) RN would be adding 510,000 new supporters to his cause.

That 3 percentage point increase that RN can easily pick up among Catholics also amounts to more than all the Jews and Negroes combined that RN has right now -- which as I pointed out from the current Gallup Poll is under 500,000.

Now let's look at the Catholic vote.

RN is currently running at 27 per cent of those 17,000,000 votes, which means RN is reaping about 4,600,000 Catholic votes, or just a shade under that figure. In other words, RN has 46 Catholics backing him for every Jew supporting him, and 10 Catholics for every Negro supporting. RN's Catholic support is nine times RN's Jewish and Negro support combined in terms of total votes.

These statistics are in themselves astounding. But more important is where we get the votes to win this election.

If we look at it cold-bloodedly, in terms of votes -- we should be putting seven times as much time and money

and media and writing in special interest appeals to Catholics as to Jews -- because they have seven times as many votes.

But even seven times the effort would not be sufficient if we argue from reason and logic -- because the Catholic is one hell of a lot easier voter to win over from Hubert than is the Jew or the Negro. The latter two are the most committed of Democrats. (JFK did better with Jews than he did with Catholics; and since 1964 the Negroes are lost to the Republicans for a generation.)

There is no reason on God's earth why in this day and age HHH, the liberal Protestant Druggist, should be getting twice as many Catholic votes as RN.

Let's put it this way.

Suppose RN has in mind making a speech like Black Capitalism, which is directed to our black friends, or perhaps writing a piece for the Zionist magazine which is directed to our Jewish friends. If RN's purpose is to raise his percentage among these groups he will find that:

An increase of 1 per cent among Jewish voters adds 24,000 new supporters to RN's ranks.

An increase of 1 per cent among Negro voters adds

55,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.

An increase of 1 per cent among Catholic voters adds 170,000 more supporters to RN's ranks.

My contention is further that it is easier for RN to pick up that 1 per cent among Catholics, than it is among the traditionally hostile Negro and Jewish communities. The logic seems to me to be undeniable; if we are going to make special group interest, minority interest appeals -- let's make them to the Catholics.

It is easier for RN to gain ground here; it is less risky in terms of backlash to make specific appeals to RCs as opposed to Jews and Negroes; and it is a thousand times more promising.

Let's remember too that Cardinal Cushing and Jack Kennedy won't be in this ball game; and Catholics in 1968 are one hell of a lot more conservative and receptive to an RN positions approach, than are the Negroes and the Jews.

In terms of votes, 50 per cent of the Catholic vote would mean more to a candidate than to get every Negro and Jewish vote in the United States.

If RN can raise his percentage of the Catholic vote 13 points -- from 27 per cent against HHH to 40 per cent

against HHH -- the votes he would add would be equivalent to raising himself from 7 per cent of the Negro vote to 37 per cent and from 4 per cent of the Jewish vote to 28 per cent.

It is utterly impossible for RN to get 37 per cent of the Negro vote; it is next to impossible for RN to get 28 per cent of the Jews -- but to jump from 27 per cent of the Catholics to 40 per cent is not impossible; and if we did it, we would have broken up the historic Democratic coalition and won a national landslide.

Hubert's Catholics have half of our victory and the Protestants of George Wallace have the other half. If we get one of these halves back, we win; if we get them both, we can win a landslide -- and the two objectives are not mutually exclusive:

It is time to ask ourselves -- what is the best we can do among Jews and Negroes. I would say 20 per cent of the Negroes and 20 per cent of the Jewish vote, given our current situation and only four months to go. If we made a Herculean, Jewish-Negro pitch and reached that percentage among both (it would cost us votes to Wallace) we would be adding some 1, 100,000 Negro and Jewish votes. We can get the same number of new votes -- 1,100,000 -- by

raising our Catholic total from 27 to 34 -- at little or no loss to Wallace. This seems incredible but the statistics are there.

What do we conclude from this memo?

1) Hubert Humphrey will be looking for a Catholic, if he is thinking, to put on that ticket with him -- and the case for Teddy Kennedy becomes even more convincing.

2) If RN intends any future special interest appeals -- for God's sake, let us give the Catholics some consideration.

3) RN's research staff should find out what is the gut 'Catholice' issue which unites them -- and I would think it is the question of parochial schools and some of tax relief for what they feel is an excessive burden of supporting both their own and their neighbors school. If we go with the tax credit idea -- let's make sure we put the Catholics and Lutheran Schools up high in the copy.

4) Let's stop looking around so hard for what the Negroes want to hear, and what the Jews want RN to say on the Middle East -- and let's start taking some polls of Catholic voters' interests and concerns.

5) As for the Middle East and Israel -- it now becomes clear that there is no mileage whatsoever in a hard-line pro-Israel posture by RN. As noted, if RN's Jewish vote goes from 4 per cent to 20 per cent, he picks up fewer than 400,000 votes. It's a waste of time and effort.

6) RN should reconsider, if he has already decided, whether we ought not definitely to take the Conservative Party endorsement, and let Javits and his friends squeal their heads off.

7) It would be seven times as valuable for RN to show up at a visibly Catholic event as it would be a Jewish event.

8) It might be in RN's interest to begin to say what intelligent men are already saying -- that when it comes to the Middle East or anywhere else -- that an American statesman's first duty is to place America first, and not any other country, no matter how strong our times or our commitments.

(I am not arguing for RN to come off anti-Jew and score points that way at all. I just say that quite frankly, slobbering over the Israeli lobby is not going to get us anything, and so we ought to stand tall on the issue. It would appear the same is true of the Negroes.)

9) This offers new thoughts on the Vice Presidential thing -- which Buchanan did not mention in his memo on Reagan.

10) Ethnic groups which tend to be Catholic should be given first priority consideration in media, and time and RN statements and considerations. Among minority groups religion becomes now a factor in our considerations.

11) Positive efforts should be made to have RN and family and kids in specifically Catholic settings -- such settings should take priority over Negro and Jewish settings.

FINAL NOTE: To RN/ From Buchanan

We have come up here in the last two weeks with the Wallace in-depth analysis which no one has to date refuted; and here is a Catholic analysis which would seem to me to be self-evident to any of our people who are supposed to be analyzing the polls. But our poll people, to my knowledge, have never even mentioned either -- and our media people have not yet acted on the first -- the Wallace threat.

If this kind of analysis -- of both Wallace and the Catholic thing -- as opposed to the Negro- Jewish approach has not been brought to RN's attention by his poll analysts -- then perhaps they are reading our polls through rose-colored liberal glasses -- and they ought to be replaced.

My suggestion is that some of us in research be given access to the polls that we are taking -- so that we can do some of our own analysis; that Alan Greenspan be instructed to analyze the results of our polls as well as the "media" people; that further, strategy people be asked either to refute the analysis we have come up with -- or

start guiding the campaign and the advertising by them.

What I am contending in these recent memos and what I have yet to see refuted is that all this endless talk we have been getting about RN losing unless he gets the Negro and Jewish vote is a pile of crap. We have let ourselves be sold a bill of goods. The Eastern liberal Establishment which goes down the line for the Democrats has made the Republican Party dance to its own tune; it has told us that we cannot win without Negroes and Jews -- and it continues to feed us this nonsense every day.

The power of the Negro and the Jew to damage RN in this election lies in this: The Negro loud-mouths are given access to the public communications media by a guilt-ridden establishment -- and the Jews control that communications media.

We don't want to antagonize or alienate these people -- they can damage us. But they're not our voters; and if we go after them, we'll go down to defeat chasing a receding rainbow. The Irish, Italian, Polish Catholics of the big cities -- these are our electoral majority -- they, and the white Protestants of the South and Midwest and rural America. That way lies victory.

11

RN -- By dropping to 4 per cent of the Jewish vote and 7 per cent of the black vote -- we have been given a tremendous flexibility; man, we can't get any lower -- and so RN is now free of trying to placate these people, of trying to acquiesce their views -- and he can tell it like it is to the whole damn country. Let's face it. We are right now at 35 per cent of the vote nationally -- six points under Barry Goldwater. The way I see it we are just about at bedrock -- the guys we have will be hard to lose in any event; they are damn near all Republicans; it is time for RN to start swinging and telling it precisely like it is.

Buchanan

Price  
Garment -  
Buckham -  
Lipshutz -

*all should read this*

July 13, 1968

*Handwritten signatures and initials: "H. H. Ellsworth", "Moore", "no to"*

MEMO FROM BELLI

*Direction of page 5*

*Handwritten note: "Giffelman read pages 8 & 9"*

In 1948, Thomas E. Dewey proved that an Out party can't win an election by playing it safe.

Even when the Out party has most of the issues--including a massive split in the In party--going its way.

The last three Gallups have been remarkably stable in the spread between Humphrey and RN: between 40 and 42 for Humphrey, between 35 and 37 for RN. An RN deficit of 5 or 6 every time. The chief variable has been significant gains by George Wallace--to the point where RN is now running third in the 13-state area of the South.

Clearly, nothing catastrophic has occurred. No significant errors have been made by RN or his campaign--as everyone, including the press, has acknowledged.

Equally, though, it is clear that a campaign which doesn't make mistakes is not enough. The RN campaign has been run on a strategy of not taking chances--and it has failed to catch fire.

On those occasions when a controversial issue has been seized, the initial flurry of protests from the liberal press has often caused it to be modified--if not dropped. Examples: Columbia, the Supreme Court, crime itself.

It is my feeling that we will win this election, if we do, by a strong appeal to the heart of the middle class: Americans who make \$6000 to \$15,000 a year. The "group" that Richard Seamon has called the "unblack, the unyoung, and unpoor."

This is what Democrats call the Gut vote; it is a group which Hubert Humphrey has so far held remarkably well.

Unfortunately, Gallup has not been breaking his polls down according to income. But there are ways of guessing.

Among clerical and sales people, Humphrey leads, 43 to 37.

Among people between the ages of 30 and 49, Humphrey leads, 45 to 35.

Among Catholics, he leads, 53 to 27.

Among those who have finished high school but not college, he leads 43 to 35.

All of these represent bigger Humphrey leads than he enjoys nationwide.

Wallace is averaging about 12 per cent among these groups.

The Gut vote, then, is leaning toward Humphrey. But this group is not happy. It is concerned, in particular, about the following things:

1. Crime. They are worried about the safety of their families. They are sick of permissiveness in the courts, the city halls, and the Administration.

2. Riots. They do not subscribe to the theory that stealing and killing become more tolerable when carried out by large numbers of people. They also reject the idea that their own racism, real or not, is the primary reason for crimes committed by groups with which they are seldom in contact.

3. The decline of U.S. prestige abroad. They are upset that third-rate military powers can keep the most powerful nation in history in a stalemate. They react particularly strongly

anything else, the War on Poverty and the constant and visible scandals that have accompanied it from its inception have turned these voters against Johnson's reform coalition. It just doesn't take much sophistication to see that subsidizing gangs is not going to help the ghettos.

It is intolerable to the RN campaign that Hubert Humphrey-- the chief enthusiast and publicist of every one of the most extreme Great Society programs, and a man who, it develops, falls considerably short of Johnson's resoluteness in foreign affairs--should be in possession of this gut vote. It is intolerable that he should now be running first not only in the South but in the Midwest--the two areas which voted most strongly against the Great Society in 1966.

I think a number of shifts in emphasis are required.

1. Less emphasis on lofty, general "think" speeches.

I don't think that the staunchest admirers of the "New Coalition" and "New Democracy" speeches would argue that these did us the slightest good with the Gut vote. I do not think this would have changed significantly had these two speeches been broadcast in full on TV network prime time. The main argument for them is that they keep Establishment commentators off our back. That is true. But I would argue that the solons lay off primarily because they realize we are not hitting the chords of the electorate--"If Nixon keeps up with this kind of thing, we don't have to worry."

2. More specificity. The obverse of the above is that

Have Bill  
get R.N. 10 or 15  
good examples in  
con. use in  
speeches

the more specific we get, the more the solons hit us. When Clayton Fritchey takes us to task for our "flying Pueblo" statement, we may be sure we have drawn blood. The only criterion of a Clayton Fritchey is what will hurt Richard Nixon in November. If we are delivering speeches that do us little or no good, the Clayton Fritchey will lay off in the hope that we stick to bland generalities. The moment that we throw out something on a real issue which the Gut Voters can understand and respond to--such as the "flying Pueblo" or Columbia statements--that is when they pounce on us in the hope that we will drop it. Because to the Gut vote, what is important and understandable is that which is specific: this American ship held by North Korea, that poverty grant that subsidized a gang, this college being disrupted by the sons and daughters of their bosses, that trade agreement which helped Poland to make the ball bearings which kill our men in Vietnam, that American embassy that was burned. A candidate can be very specific about events and issues without getting into personalities. A speech or a statement is demagogic not because it is appealing, but because it is wrong or distorted. Liberal commentators will accuse us of demagogy whenever we do something that is appealing. I think we must steel ourselves to that fact.

In addition, specificity demands that we nail down Humphrey on his own rhetoric. When he calls for new ties with the Chinese Government, we must ask him what Chinese government he is talking about--the Maoists or the rebels. When

Just get our attack group to follow up -

he says that the United States should no longer contain communism, we must first remind him of Rusk's statement late last year that the United States is legally committed to come to the defense of more than 40 nations, and then ask him which of those nations he is still willing to help, and which he proposes to abandon. When he endorses a Marshall Plan for the cities and the Urban Coalition's multi-billion-dollar job plan--programs that even Johnson opposes--we must ask him where he is going to get the money, and how much larger than \$25 billion the Humphrey budget deficit is going to be.

4. More chance-taking. I realize that should, for instance, the Pueblo be made a major campaign issue, there is always the danger that Pyongyang will release it in order to embarrass RN (some have argued that this kind of thing has already been done by the Russians to RN, in two instances that come fairly readily to mind). Despite the seeming intransigence of the Kim Il-Sung regime, I believe this is a real possibility. However, I would be inclined to accept that risk. An issue which so fulfills the Gut-vote criterion of specificity, and which, as I have said, so typifies the lack of will of this Administration, more than makes up for the negative possibilities. I would even argue that an emphasis on this issue might help us on balance, even assuming the ship is released. (This, of course, would depend on the circumstances in which the ship is released. If the Administration is forced into a humiliating apology or indemnity, as seems likely, the issue would be more alive than ever). The Pueblo issue could be made even more graphic by reciting the exact circumstances in which the ship was captured-- why no resistance

was authorized, why no air support was nearby, etc.

In any event, to draw blood we must take chances. If we take chances, we are going to make more "mistakes", and the hostile press will show us no mercy when we do. But in my view the biggest mistake of all would be to run a campaign whose central goal is to avoid all mistakes.

5. More personal appearances. The primaries showed that RN is probably the most effective campaigner on the American political scene at this moment. Aside from the remarkable returns, the most striking proof of this is that RN is generally regarded as leading Humphrey in every state in which he has campaigned extensively. Even Humphrey's strategists ("As Humphrey Backers Size Up Election Now," U.S. News) give us all five of the RN primary states--New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Indiana, Nebraska, Oregon--among a grudging total of eleven states that they give us altogether. If these visits are accompanied by the kind of newspaper and media advertising characteristic of a primary, we can move ahead in selected states with a two- or three-day semi-saturation effort.

6. The New Candor. This, I think, is the central criterion. At the Hudson Institute briefing Thursday, Kahn said that what the majority of voters are looking for is someone who tells them the truth, even if the truth is unpleasant. He said that the candidate who begins to do this is going to win the election in a landslide because the people have had four years of lying, they know it, and want a change. If large handouts to the Negroes are

not only not possible, but may worsen the problem if they were possible, they want to know about it. That is what RN told them in the Black Capitalism speech--the one moment so far in which the RN campaign caught fire. The New Candor of that speech should be the model for the rest of the campaign. That, above all else, is what the Gut voters crave.

In Vietnam, this involves saying, in a time of national pessimism, that the United States has a commitment to the South Vietnamese government that cannot be renounced, except at the cost of a worldwide decline in American credibility and prestige. We support an honorable settlement, if that is possible. But we must ask Humphrey what he plans to do if Hanoi rejects the "political settlement" that he describes as the "only way" to end the war. It is not enough for a great nation to keep its easy commitments. If we default whenever the going gets rough, all our commitments will be called into question.

If Hanoi does not accept reasonable settlement, then there is no alternative to the continuation of the war. But RN cannot just promise the Gut vote what Kahn calls "more of the same"--that would be fatal. This time, should the talks collapse, we must do what the Democrats have never done: proclaim a comprehensive war plan that promises victory over aggression without escalation, whether or not the enemy's morale is broken. The surest way to keep an enemy's morale alive is to proclaim, as your only objective, the breaking

of that morale. This time, we must institute a police program that will bring security to every hamlet. The only sure way to end violence in South Vietnam is to separate the VC from their victims, and this may be a painstaking process. We must admit it. But for the first time, there would be a war plan that is realistic, checkable, and credible--not only to the enemy but to the electorate that will have to support it.

Rockefeller claims to be the only candidate with a viable peace plan. RN must become the only candidate with a viable war plan. In addition, he must assert still another hard truth: that a viable peace plan depends on a viable war plan. That Hanoi is not the sort of adversary that agrees to reasonable terms unless it faces, as its only alternative, a grinding process of attrition that will lead to defeat. This is a hard course for RN to take. On the other hand--given his own position and his future credibility--it is also the only position he can take. I believe it is the kind of honest, hard talk that will be greeted with visible relief on the part of the Gut voter--a voter who doesn't want this country to lose its national honor any more than he wants to be lied to.

To summarize: the Gut vote--Americans in families making between \$6000 and \$15,000 a year--make up a majority of the voters. Humphrey is doing better with this group than with

the electorate as a whole, and far better than he has a right to be doing. New approaches are needed to win interest and commitment among these voters. These include: more specificity, more visibility, more controversy, more chance-taking, and above all a New Candor that--in the words of Robert Kennedy-- "tells it like it is," the hard answers as well as the easy ones, the bad with the good. To do this, to use Buchanan's phrase, we may have to "cut the umbilical cord" between us and an establishment which wishes us ill in any event, and subject ourselves to a significantly higher level of printed and broadcast abuse. I think it is worth it. I think that by going after the Gut voter with honesty and realism, we can not only break out of the Gallup Poll rut but win this election going away.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### CAMPAIGNING

The time has come for political campaigning - its techniques and strategies - to move out of the dark ages and into the brave new world of the omnipresent "eye."

A candidate for any city-wide, state-wide or national office can't afford the old "tried and true" methods of campaigning: six speeches a day, plus several handshaking receptions, a few hours at factory gates and a soul-crushing travel schedule. Just because it has always been this way doesn't mean it always has to be.

Let's look at the whole thing from the viewpoint of just basic logic. If a national candidate actually does six speeches a day, six days a week, for the full eight-week campaign period, he'll make 288 speeches. If he has a spectacular crowd-gathering ability (or staff), he might average 5,000 per speech (but no one ever has). So he will have spoken in the flesh to a total of 1,440,000 people. A reasonable estimate is that at least 75% of those people are his loyal adherents. So he's had the opportunity to convert only 380,000. True, most elections, except national, are won by less than that. But then, will he really convert this 25% - and is it really 25%? Probably more likely 10%.

What happens to the candidate in this process? He becomes punchy, mauled by his admirers, jeered and deflated by his

opponent's supporters (and paid troublemakers), misled by the super-stimulation of one frenzied rally after another. He has no time to think, to study his opponent's strategy and statements, to develop his own strategy and statements. No wonder the almost inevitable campaign dialogue borders so near the idiot level.

Yes, but think of the great value it has in "firing up the troops." Baloney! Analyze carefully the actual number of troops that count in a campaign, and you'll find they are very few, can be fired up much more effectively and efficiently by small "private" sessions on an informal basis with the candidate, and are themselves being worn to a frazzle and constantly diverted from important activity (precinct work and telephoning) to crank up a crowd for the next rally or airport arrival.

True, maybe, but the real importance is the effect on news media and thus indirectly on their vast audiences. That's the worst argument of all. How many stories per day will any newspaper or radio or television station carry about a single candidate? Answer: one - if he's really lucky, important or controversial. So what's the use of roaring around making six, eight or ten stories every day?

Obviously it's to get localized coverage in each area of the constituency. But isn't the wire story, the commentator or the syndicated columnist what really counts? It sure is!

So what do you do - quit campaign travels and sit on the front porch? Not at all. You plan a campaign that is designed

to cover the important localities, provide excitement and stimulation for your supporters, generate major news every day, generate intensive coverage in depth by commentators and columnists, develop a meaningful dialogue (even if one-sided), and still offer a reasonable chance of the candidate's survival.

## II. GENERAL APPROACH

How, then, does a candidate plan his campaign schedule (and build his campaign organization) to accomplish these objectives?

First - the whole approach and the basis for all planning and structuring must be directed to the same concept: that the candidate's time, energy and thinking will be programmed for maximum possible benefit. And maximum benefit is defined as reaching the most people most effectively. And this does not necessarily mean in the flesh.

He has to take maximum advantage of the media of mass communications, with emphasis on that or those which reach the most people and present him most favorably and believably. Television will undoubtedly be pre-eminent - but radio, newspapers and magazines should not be overlooked.

### One news lead per day

The first consideration is development of one major news lead per day. (Herb Klein argues strongly for two leads per day - one timed for AM newspapers and another for PM's and TV/radio news. This should be carefully analyzed, because he's probably right. On the other hand, one per day is obviously more desirable from our point of view, and in a presidential campaign the AM's and PM's both have to cover a candidate's news, so there may be a way to work satisfactorily with just one lead per day - I hope so.) This can result from a speech made at a rally, a statement at a formal news conference, a remark made apparently offhandedly

at an airport or on the sidewalk, a television or radio address, a "confidential" interview with a columnist, a reaction to a planted position or question by a prominent supporter, an answer to the opponent's attack or position, release of a white paper, a statement by a prominent supporter expert in some field, reaction to a major external news break, or just a formal news release.

Over the period of the campaign, all of these and other devices should be used on a carefully planned but apparently random basis. No regular pattern should be established, and the element of surprise should be skilfully utilized.

Not a single day should pass without such a news lead, planned in advance as to content and method of release and coordinated with the total campaign effort. The whole approach should be one of initiation and attack, rather than reaction and counterattack. The timing and approach should not be dictated by the opposition.

Obviously, it will be necessary at times to react and to counterattack - and to revise strategy to fit the developing situation and the opponent's strategy. But this in no way precludes the necessity for a complete, preconceived plan, even though it be revised daily.

#### Overall schedule

After an overall skeleton is developed on the basis of the daily news lead, the candidate's schedule can be filled in, using

his time for a balanced program of corollary supporting activities. Major needs will include at least one major public appearance almost every working day, one or two offbeat "color" activities, many short and a few long personal or small group meetings, ample staff time, frequent studio time (TV and radio) and, by a wide margin most important, lots of free time for thinking, rest, recreation, reading and unplanned activity. Also maximum use of programmed phone calls.

#### Major public appearances

The daily public appearance(s) may, or may not be the base for the news lead as mentioned above. When it is, it should be carefully staged - and when it's not, the speech should be standard so we retain control of what the lead will be. These appearances should not all be rallies. Some should be motorcades, staged visits to plants, hospitals, etc., large worker meetings, headquarters drop-bys. Some should be at night, some in the daytime. All should be designed for maximum coverage - and should not be restricted to the stereotyped kinds of political appearances. They should be dictated by the overall strategy, not by the pressures of local organizations or leaders.

#### Offbeat activity

The offbeat "color" activity should be planned for particular effects, generally in the "image-building" area. In many cases these would appear to be unscheduled and spontaneous. They would always be an integral part of the overall plan. These

would include frequent use of "drop-bys" at group meetings, human interest individual contacts at all levels (the shoeshine boy, Billy Graham, a kid who has collected campaign funds, spectator or participant sports, etc.). Some leeway for completely opportunistic activity, with staff always on the alert for possibilities.

#### Meetings

The personal or small group meetings would not be publicized and are used to make points primarily with people who will in turn reach large numbers of other people. Concentration is on TV and radio commentators, columnists, syndicate feature writers, publishers, station owners, major civic leaders, party leaders, specific issue spokesmen.

It will be argued that this approach simply does not cover enough cities - there is inadequate geographic spread. The answer is that the important thing is not the one city where the candidate is, but the coverage of his activities that goes into all cities. Only a minute fraction of the people in a city where the candidate appears actually see him in the flesh. The vast majority just watch on TV or read about it in the newspapers. To these people, what difference does it make if he's in their city, the neighboring one, or one clear across the country?

The geographic pattern should be developed to provide balanced regional coverage, with proper representation of large and small cities, urban and rural, etc. But an appearance in a small farm town in Iowa can be just as effective in its impact on

an Oregon small farm town resident as it is on the Iowans. In other words, people identify with other similar people - so get coverage of whatever group you're with and you'll affect all the similar groups who see the coverage.

#### Programmed phone calls

Use phone calls to keep troops fired up. During allotted time, two staff men work on placing calls. Get one lined up ahead so candidate sits at one phone - pushes buttons to utilize two lines alternatively - talks for 2 minutes on each call. Can do about 25 calls in an hour. On some can go even faster. Staff have calls programmed ahead with background card on each for candidate's quick briefing.

Use phone calls to maintain ties with key commentators and columnists. Call them two or three times a week for their reactions to campaign. Don't tell them anything - ask for their analysis and ideas. Pick some favorites and work them hard. Build the list as fast as possible and keep adding to it.

Use a phone car for all long drives, and use time for phone calls as per above - or else program car and other travel time for one of specific purposes - i.e., staff, personal meetings, work, rest, etc.

#### Radio network

Use network radio to keep troops fired up - by buying 5 minutes on national network every day through entire campaign - at 6:30 pm local time. Have a daily report from the candidate

and marching orders from campaign manager. A supply of fill-ins could be pretaped for emergency use, but normally candidate would tape current message each day. This could be delivered to local outlet for network feed - or fed by phone. One staff man would be producer and program would be tied to overall plan.

Mail

Use mail to fire up troops. Draft and start typing a standard but personalized letter to each local chairman. Mail them all two weeks before election day. Just thanks and encouragement. Signed by candidate.

### III. ADDENDA

#### AVERAGE DAY'S CONTENTS

Start at 9:00 AM - finished by 10:00 PM

Work 6 days a week. Use the Sunday for complete break - rest and reading and planning.

Spend 2 hours on public events

2 hours on private meetings

2 hours for rest and writing and staff

2 hours for meals

2 hours for travel plus some of above time

1 hour for phone calls

1/2 hour briefing for traveling press - every day

1 1/2 hour TV taping.

#### SOME BASIC RULES

Don't go to cities that don't have adequate facilities

- good hotel with right room arrangements
- airport proximity and reasonable weather conditions
- good local organization for rally work, meeting, etc.
- major communications facilities - TV, radio, phone

Don't plan schedule on any basis except what we want.

Don't do any public fund raising during campaign -

use phone calls, private meetings and letters for this.

Use airport arrivals for offbeat color - suburban rallies, etc.,

but don't cut in to main public event.

Use a few motorcades where they'll really work - and go all out.

For all other travel, use unpublicized routes, but look  
for offbeat possibilities.

SAMPLE DAY 1

9:00 leave hotel for  
9:15 Publisher meeting - 1/2 hour - at the paper  
9:45 leave for TV studio  
10:00 makeup and preparation for TV taping  
10:30-11:00 tape major statement for today  
11:15 leave studio for luncheon at hotel  
11:30 pre-reception with small group of civic leaders  
12:00 group into luncheon - candidate to room to eat - 1 hour  
1:00 candidate to luncheon - standard speech - 1/2 hour  
15 minutes handshaking, etc.  
Drop by convention luncheon on way out or in  
2:00 return to room for phone calls - 1 hour  
staff work - 1 hour  
4:00 private meetings in suite - individuals - 15 minutes each -  
3 per hour - 6 meetings  
5:00 leave for airport - fly to next city - dinner and staff work  
on plane  
10:00 arrive at hotel

SAMPLE DAY 2

9:00 leave hotel for airport  
9:45 take off for next city  
2 hours travel - staff work on plane  
11:45 arrive new airport -  
SUBURBAN WELCOME RALLY  
standard speech  
12:30 drive into town  
1:00 arrive at convention luncheon in progress for drop-by  
1:30 to suite -  
1/2 hour lunch - staff  
1 hour phone calls  
3:00 to TV studio for panel program  
3:15 at studio - makeup and preparation  
3:45-4:15 tape show  
4:30 leave for veterans' hospital visit - offbeat  
4:45-5:30 at hospital  
6:00 arrive at hotel - to suite - rest  
6:30-7:00 cocktails - 6 key civic leaders  
7:00 prepare for evening meeting - eat dinner  
8:15 leave for major coliseum rally  
8:30 speak at rally  
9:30 return to hotel - overnight

PHONE CALL PROCEDURE

1. Maintain roto card file - 4 x 6 cards alpha by name.  
Front side - name, phone numbers, basic data - political, personal, etc.  
Reverse - complete record of contacts - phone, mail, personal
2. Staff pulls cards for today's calls - figure ratio of number to time - stack in order of priority.
3. Note with each card suggested points for candidate to make.
4. Staff places calls - while candidate is on preceding one.  
Chat if time available - get reading and make notes.
5. Hand card and notes to candidate before he takes call - for quick pre-briefing.
6. Staff listen in on call - record any needed follow-up. Post info on card - refile - toss out notes except follow-up.
7. Two staff men needed to do this - one on current call, one on next one.

NOTE: Use conference calls - i.e., all local chairmen set up by regional man.

Street Map  
Laguna  
file.

July 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Mitchell/ Bob Haldeman  
FROM: DC

This is a general memorandum covering several points I have already mentioned and a few others that I may not have touched on. I am including all of these thoughts in this memorandum because this is perhaps the last time I shall have a chance to appraise our campaign activities and to make suggestions that may prove useful.

✓ 1. Citizens

I know that by the time you read this you will have met with Huston and I hope to the extent his ideas are relevant you will try to get them adopted. I feel that Tom Evans' effort in this field needs to be substantially strengthened and that someone with a hard nosed attitude of a Huston must be seeded into the group at the earliest possible time.

With regard to our general approach. It should be altogether different than in 1960. Then, our primary effort was to set up parallel volunteer organizations at the national and state level with state chairmen and a whole hierarchy down the line. This year - except where it may be useful to have a state chairman in order to implement our other objectives in a particular state - we should not go forward on that line. Our concentration should be primarily on developing special interest groups in the swing states. Of course, in other states as well for insurance purposes we should let these groups operate -- but what is vitally necessary is to put 90% of our effort into the major swing states.

One purpose, of course, is to obtain news stories out of such committees but an even more important effort must be to get law enforcement officials, etc. operating in our behalf cutting across party lines, etc. Humphrey knows how to do this because he has campaigned at a state level in exactly the same way that I have. One area that particularly needs emphasis is the nationality group. The National Committee's operation here is pretty sad. The emphasis here should not be on the traditional line of "captive nations" which will be what the National Committee's group will

RN -  
done  
Rhyme  
cancelled

Citizens

suggest. This is the doctrinaire approach of the past. The emphasis should be appealing to these groups on law and order and other issues on which they may be very sensitive. Of course, the captive nations theme can be a sub-line where it seems to be appropriate.

I again suggest that Hiram Fong could provide some useful in-put on this kind of organization. It didn't work out too well in California but on a national basis I am inclined to think that the way he moved on into the less elite groups -- like beauticians, barbers, etc., was most effective. It is a great compliment to such people to be asked to participate in the campaign. It is of vital importance, incidentally, for us to recognize that we are not going to make much headway with the Negroes and we must make a much greater effort, for that reason, with the other nationality groups.

In this connection, a massive effort among Mexican-Americans must be undertaken at once in Texas and California.

## 2. Counter Attack

There must be ready to go into action immediately after our convention a counter-attack group with a procedure set up to defend RN when he is attacked by someone RN may not want to answer. Here, the Surrogate Candidates can play a role and in our own organization Klein and Ellsworth can be used to hang statements on if we want them to be that close to us.

I cannot emphasize more the importance of getting this set up on a proper basis. You will find that there was an "Answer Desk" set up in 1960 which was run from Washington and it was a fairly effective operation in defending the Administration. It was not too effective in defending RN.

Typical of a case in which such an operation would be used was on the Calloway matter. I know that a majority of our staff felt that I should respond to Rockefeller on the Calloway attack. It would have been better to have a strong statement made by someone else so that RN could have referred to that as being the answer and not touched on it himself.

3. Humphrey Attack Strategy

*Hillings*  
I understand that Earl Mazo is going to do some work in this field. As I pointed out in an earlier memorandum, the report that Agnes made up was a fair start but only scratched the surface as far as possibilities are concerned. We need chapter and verse - going back through his entire Senate career - on the statements and positions that Humphrey would like to forget today. It is going to be essential for us to nail him as a way-out liberal.

On the subject of spending, for example, Agnes has come up with the figure of 100 billion dollars which would have been the cost of Humphrey proposals had they been enacted into law. I notice that Jack Knight in his column Sunday pointed out that Humphrey's major liability was that he was a big spender. I would like this study to be pursued in more detail so that our speakers would be able to say, in effect, "Had Hubert Humphrey had his way, the annual budget would be \_\_\_\_\_ billion dollars more. Had Humphrey had his way, the following programs, costing so much each, would have been enacted into law."

In this connection, we also need a good library of Humphrey on tape - both radio and TV as far as statements he would like to forget. We may not decide to use this material but we should have it ready for counter-attack in the event that our opponents start taking us on. This is a vitally important assignment and should be supervised at the highest level. This is one area, of course, where the National Committee should have the work already done for us but I doubt if you will find much in their files.

I also imagine that Goldwater could have done something on this score in 1964. In any event, it needs a follow up.

4. Hand-Holding

With Ruwe and Hillings on deck, a good start will have been made on this project. Not only do I visualize an operation in which we respond to calls that are made to us but also one where calls are initiated to political, financial, editorial and personal types who either might expect a call or who would react very positively if they received one. Not only should such calls be made by Ruwe and Hillings but I would hope that others would undertake this kind of assignment to the extent their schedules will permit.

RmW could make calls of this type - Eddie Nixon and, of course, the top political men, including Mitchell, Kleindienst et al.

I think one way we can avoid having people say that the candidate is "fenced off" is to beat them to the punch and constantly to have a dialogue with them.

#### 5. Family Schedule

I think the family scheduling should be upgraded and possibly Ruwe would be a good answer here. We have an excellent added stroke which should be used quite precisely not only in states where I may not be able to campaign but particularly in major states in cities which I would not be able to visit. For example, I think the family should be very heavily scheduled in California, Pennsylvania, Texas, Ohio, et al.

Here we ought to get in touch with our State Chairmen and tell them what the potential is and see what kind of events they can arrange.

One item which was not handled adequately in Chicago by the Advance Man is with regard to interviews that Tricia, Julie and David have with the press. It must be clearly understood that such interviews are not to cover their views on political subjects. If reporters - either television or news - do not want to interview them under those circumstances - so be it. I think it is too much to ask them to be prepared on all the subjects which a political reporter would ask. They ran into some pretty tough antagonistic questioning from a reporter from the Sun Times and one from the Mutual Broadcasting System, when they were in Chicago. I don't want them submitted to this - but beyond that this can be risky when they get beyond their depth.

This, again, takes a fairly sophisticated advance man or at least one who is instructed as to how to handle the situation. Perhaps it will be necessary when they do go out on these trips to have a press man go with them since it appears that such interviews are the rule rather than the exception. They, of course, can be extremely helpful from a local publicity standpoint but the cost would be too great if we get them involved in freewheeling political press conferences. Haldeman should check this out immediately so that the future schedules are handled as indicated.

#### 6. Speakers

Just as soon as possible the Speakers Bureau must be upgraded and put under a Congressman or Senator or perhaps a joint operation with two in charge. Brock would be excellent at the Congressional

level and perhaps Baker at the Senatorial level. Charlie McWhorter would be a good man to help out on this at the staff level. He submitted an analysis to me a few weeks ago pointing up the number of Governors and Senators who are not up for re-election and who should be available to campaign nationwide. Also there are several Congressmen who have safe districts who are in this category. Using this group effectively could be a major assist to us in the campaign but the decisions on it should be made at a strategy level and not simply on the basis of rushing around to find a speaker when we have an engagement to fill.

7. Background Material

One area I would like for you to shore up is with regard to this background material. In two respects: (1) the color material where we now have in mind using Gavin and a couple of others. (2) The necessity of taking these long memoranda that Charlie McWhorter prepares and boiling them down. Ellsworth prepared the background on a number of occasions - he has the knack of it. I will not always have time to read a couple of pages of material but will need just the bare essentials.

#####

*File*

*Into Calif file or Laguna?*

July 7, 1968

*that mtg*

*Dwight*

*fyi*

*2-8*

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC  
FROM: Rose Mary Woods

Another suggestion Edwin Emrich made was that somehow or other you try to telephone each delegate.

He said he had had Nelson Gross do that in their county and that is how he won.

One thought -- since you will have covered a lot of them how about trying to call the ones you are not going to be meeting personally?

*Bob - This would be part of the Calif. Program - do you want to consult you Kleinfeld - or do we hold?*

*Kleinfeld - How about it? (To shore up our N. N. delegates - no anti-governor)*

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: PROJECT BILLY GRAHAM  
TO: Richard Nixon  
FROM: State Senator John Conlan

The Goal: To utilize and develop in the most positive manner an indorsement of Richard Nixon by Billy Graham, the Christian statesman.

A Recommended Solution -- in Four Stages (short summary)

- Stage One - Have Billy Graham give the invocation at the Republican National Convention.
- Stage Two - Phase A - Nixon appears at the Pittsburg Crusade (Aug 30-Sep. 8th)  
Phase B - Nixon stops by Graham home in Montreat, N.C. in course of a campaign swing thru Carolinas.
- Stage Three - DECISION Magazine (circ. over 6 Million) carries cover or lead story "Personal Interview with Richard Nixon"...this must be September issue)
- Stage Four - Phase A - Billy Graham publicly endorses Nixon on nation-wide 30-minute T-V program.  
Phase B - Billy writes personal letter to each on his mailing list telling them reasons for his endorsement and asking them to work in Nixon's behalf if God so leads them to join Billy in this matter.
- 

Stage One - By Billy appearing at Republican Convention, this opens the door to preparing his followers and the public for his later indorsement action. However, this question arises: Will the DEMocrats then ask Billy to appear at THEIR convention and give the invocation? Does he decline? Is he so tied up with the Pittsburg crusade starting three days later that he can't make it to Chicago? Does he fly into Chicago for the Demo convention for the real purpose of appearing bi-partisan still, but yet braodening his image and his PUNCH when he later comes out for Nixon two-three weeks thereafter? This writer is presently inclined to think his appearance at both conventions, if invited, would add strength to his "well-thought out" endorsement of Nixon...having "attended" both conventions in a truly "bi-partisan" sense.... On the other hand, why give a blessing to the Demos!

Stage Two- Phase A - Billy's Pittsburg Crusade will be filmed for T-V showing later. A Nixon appearance there will have great wire-service value in preparing Graham's CHristian supporters for Billy's later indorsement. Nixon, in scheduling which evening he appears in Pittsburg, should keep in mind that both the mammoth (50-60,000 attendance) Sunday, September 8th rally as well as a mid-week Youth Night rally will be taped by Grahams crew. Decision to make then: Does Nixon prefer the "Youth" night appearance, image-wise, or does he prefer the Sunday or other appearance...

(Billy's T-V telecast should be given between Sept. 15-October 1st, for maximum effect in activating his following).

Phase B - A Montreat, N.C. (Asheville area) appearance by Nixon would be good...would help the REpublican gubernatorial, senatorial and congressional cause in N. Carolina, etc. However, wouldn't this have to be done before the Pittsburg meeting?? i.e., before the DEMO convention, to which Billy may or may not be invited?

Stage Three - Nixon needs to be written up in a personal "exclusive" interview in Billy Graham's DECISION Magazine (over 6,000,000 circulation...perhaps 20 Million readership) for the September issue! This requires a directive immediately from Billy to SHerwood Wirt, editor of DECISION and a splendid writer (politically on conservative side), to fly to Nixon and interview him (and his family, if possible, photograph the family) in time to write the lead article before the September issue goes to press in early August!

\*\*\*

Similar stories could be planted in other Christian publications like Christian Life, Collegiate Challenge, Young Life, etc. if staff assistance is given Nixon on this.

Stage Four - Phase A - Billy Graham's public indorsement of Nixon should not be at a press conference or other press release situation. It definitely should be a 30 minute nation-wide T-V telecast...prime time! Billy should announce at a press conference the day before he is scheduled to go on T-V (on time previously bought under Nixon's name to keep private the timing of the announcement and thus heighten the suspense) that he WILL go on nation-wide T-V "tomorrow night" to "discuss American affairs". Just buying T-V page ads is not enough. The listening audience must be "built" by a 24 hour prior press release.. (longer advance notice will only give critics time to carp).

The telecast should be well-prepared, using documentary film, photos, etc. of Dr. Graham's travels around the world, of his meetings with kings and queens, premiers, parliaments and presidents, abroad and at home. Narrated by Billy, this can establish during the first 15 minutes of the telecast his "credentials" as a World Statesman himself in addition to being an evangelist. A skillfully put together, well-documented/visually attractive background of action will "establish" Billy in the eyes of the non-evangelical listening audience of millions; thus when he uses the remaining 10-12 minutes to tell why he's for Nixon, why the country is in crisis, etc. THEY, the audience, will find him most credible. A presentation of the type I have in mind will so convey the real depth and knowledge of Billy Graham to millions of Americans, that if the Liberal clergy or the other politicians try to cut Billy up, they will fail because the public would have seen and heard his depth with their very own eyes.

Phase B

A one or two page, single sheet letter should be sent to every one on Billy Graham's mailing list. A personal letter using his Montreat or Minneapolis address will protect him from losing his own supporters who will tend to think of his political indorsement as a radical departure. A personal letter should set forth his reasons for indorsing Nixon and possibly urging them to do everything they can possibly do to elect a God-fearing man to the Presidency.

This letter, to the 6,000,000-plus, timed to arrive at their home shortly after the telecast, will serve the dual function of activating most of his supporters in Nixon's behalf and simultaneously assuaging some possible dissenters because they received a personal letter from Billy setting forth his sound Christian reasons for taking a stand in this Hour of Cosmic Decision.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: PROJECT HOOVER  
TO: Richard Nixon  
FROM: State Senator John Conlan

THE GOAL: To secure the indorsement of Richard Nixon by J. Edgar Hoover - one of America's truly great living heros -- about whom generally everyone, except the criminal and the leftist, have the highest admiration.

THE FACTS: There is little doubt in most minds that the next President of the U.S. will select the successor to Hoover. Either Mr. Hoover's health or age will cause his removal from the scene during the next presidency, or the new ultra-liberal Democrat president will, upon assuming office in January, "thank" Hoover publicly for his almost 50 years of public service -- and thus send him into retirement by replacing him with a new "younger" man. In other words, the handwriting on the wall indicates that Hoover will be "graciously" (or ungraciously, if necessary) be booted out by an ultra liberal Democrat administration.

Mr. Hoover's options, it would appear are  
(a) to stay quiet thru the inauguration and "hope" he has a Republican president; or,  
(b) fight a probable losing battle with a new DEMocrat administration loaded with leftists; or,  
(c) use all the personal prestige he has to elect Richard Nixon to the presidency and thus have a man with whom he can cordially work out the succession at the F.B.I.

POSSIBLE STRATEGY

Since Billy Graham is willing to lay his "all" on the line for America, why not have Richard Nixon ask Billy Graham to go to Hoover, privately, on a man-to-man basis. Hoover is a pretty keen Christian and reputed admirer of Billy. Billy should ask Hoover to join Billy in going "all out" for Nixon....

(With this combination a voter would have to be an "Atheist or a communist" to vote against their endorsement,,.this is humorously written).

Option One - Hoover could resign one day, announce he was going on a 30-minute nation-wide telecast (ala Graham) two days later, then give a tremendous, well-documented rational for why he was indorsing Nixon after all these almost 50 years of being a non-partisan civil servant. "I resigned in order to speak out for America"...etc. ...a very moving presentation could be written."

Option Two - Hoover would not resign, if he preferred, but would speak out anyway...pointing out that he was concerned about his successor as F.B.I. head...that he did not want to see it prostituted to a position for political patronage or special interest...Therefore, he urges his fellow Americans to elect Nixon because Hoover is confident Richard Nixon will allow Hoover to select his own successor, etc. when Hoover retires in the very near future.

CONCLUSION : With Hoover and Graham both for Nixon, it would be an overwhelming one-two punch to the Democrats...and, moreover, it would cut millions of votes out from under George Wallace (and turn them to Nixon in spite of Wallace):

1:00  
5u

= time comment - for reasons -

use 1/2 hr TV - like a documentary -

①

clips of G in other places w/ would talk  
build-up ahead - what's he going to do.

---

Need National Front Coalition

have McCarthy on left - Wallace on right

②

G could get J Edgar

---

Hoover - do TV - annnc. he'll resign if pass.

1/2 hour - Sat nite -

use G for contact

---

③

problem in Repub. ranks - defection to Wallace  
John Connally as V. P.

RN spring him as surprise - for coalition

like Churchill - crisis of our times

provides way to bridge gap after election  
in Congress

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article for Decision magazine - Sept. issue  
personal ltr - meeting G to G mill.

④ - re TV - use of visual aids  
film clips in bkgrd -  
maps - stills - etc - charts  
animation

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