

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
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32	34	10/11/1968	Other Document	Handwritten notes on Presidential transition, 4 pgs.

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NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
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NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
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*You have copy
of this already.
What was your
action? To
Hruszpan*

MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.

Date: September 12, 1968

From: Glenn Olds

Subj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration

After review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., discussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State Farm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordination) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting their recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work on this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out an agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The agenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional arrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)

In the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to tap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the area. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate your interest in their results. They propose the following which I believe is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but useful.

"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indicated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-started' with the hope that advance work will help him and his advisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administration."

Your reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in using their help.

cc: Messrs. Haldeman
Garment
Mitchell
Keogh

file *To*
H

TO: John Mitchell
FROM: Bryce Harlow
DATE: September 21, 1968
RE: Suggested Program Development Plan
for Nixon Administration

1. Retain Dr. Milton Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman.
2. Retain Dr. Paul McCracken as Operational Chairman.
3. Employ Roger Jones (Special Assistant to Director, Bureau of the Budget) as Executive Director to direct entire effort under McCracken's policy guidance.
4. If Jones declines, Drs. Eisenhower and Arthur Burns and McCracken should promptly agree on a suitable Executive Director.
5. Until an Executive Director is employed, no additional task forces will be activated, but those already in motion will continue:
 - (a) Two now functioning -- Budget and Tax.
 - (b) Five in formation -- State-Federal Relations, Financial Institutions, International Economic Policy, Governmental Reorganization, Government-Business Relations.
 - (c) Eleven other planned (stopped until Executive Director is named).
 - (d) Five Advisory Groups in operation -- Economics, Defense, Law Enforcement, Agriculture, Foreign Policy.
6. If RN should desire it, Jones could handle transition, as well as program development. In any case, RN should meet with McCracken and Jones, to assure that objectives are clearly defined and to make Jones know he is RN's specific choice for this work.

7. Olds and Boothe will supply Jones, as requested, suggested names for task forces from academic community; Greenspan, et al will furnish names of others, as requested. Neither Olds nor Research will be otherwise involved in this effort.

8. Task force members will be kept entirely confidential; only fact that the total effort is in progress can be publicized.

9. Jones will function in Washington, Michigan or New York City, as agreed between McCracken and Jones. He would doubtless be needed at least to the end of November and possibly until new Administration takes office. RN might wish to retain him permanently in a White House administrative role. Suspect his pay would have to be at roughly a \$30,000 a year rate for this interim period, plus secretarial, etc. backup.

10. I consider this effort a highly important one for RN; if elected, and if this task is done well, ~~hh~~ will save six months to a year in getting his new Administration in gear. Eisenhower lost a year (1953) for the lack of this.

BH/lac

Memorandum

LP
M

L
2

9/12/68
Indianapolis

*M has memo from Harlow
w/ give me cc*

To: DC

*Roger Jones - exec. dir. -
BH who his 70% sold.*

From: Anderson

Re: President Johnson's request for representatives
on the problems of transition.

must get someone on full-time basis.

President Johnson has invited each of the three major candidates to send representatives to the White House to work with his representative, Charles Murphy, on the problems of transition.

*use Jones
as liaison
man.*

RN said ok.

It would seem that the two men who could handle this most effectively are Bryce Harlow and Maury Stans.

I have run this idea by Buchanan, Keogh, Greenspan and Allen. They agree that Harlow and Stans would bring to this difficult and delicate task an unmatched combination of seasoned judgment, broad government experience and an intimate knowledge of the key people in Washington.

*Henry Loomis
(McCracken) task force
Arthur Burns - Tom Evans
Frank Lincoln*

EXPERIENCES SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND WELL THE RISKS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN HAVING THEIR G-2 IN ANY WAY SUBSERVIENT TO--- OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO---THE PLANNING PROCESS. IN SUCH A SITUATION, INTELLIGENCE---WHCCH IS IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS NOT EASILY PERCEPTIVE OF THE WHOLE "REAL WORLD"---TENDS TO BECOME CONTAMINATED.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE A SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY PART OF THE PLANNING OR DECISION MAKING PROCESS. HE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT (AND HIS STAFF) WITH THE "FACTS" IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE KNOWN BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS DIFFERENT "ANSWERS" AS FREQUENTLY OCCURS, HE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TOADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST ON THE GIVEN POINT OF ISSUE.

IT IS COMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PERFORMS THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT IN FACT HE NEVER HAS--- MAINLY BECAUSE HE IS A BUSY ADMINISTRATOR INHIS ON RIGHT; AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS THE NATURE OF PRSSIDENTIAL STAFFS (ALL STAFFS) TO PROCEED ALONG WITH THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT IN SERVICING THEIR BOSS' REQUIREMENTS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF IS APT TOMOVE A GOOD DISTANCE ALONG IN THE FORULATION OF POLICY WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE BEST INTELLIGENCE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DCI IS NOT A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL STAFF. AN INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST, WHO KNOWS THE TRADE AND THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, VESTED INTERESTS, ETC., WOULD GREATLY IMPRIOVE THE ~~HOUSE~~ INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT BEING UTILIZED BY THE

MR. ROSTOW ABLE SCHOLAR AND PERCEPTIVE STRATEGIST THAT HE IS, WAS NOT SUCH AN "INDEPENDENT AGENT." FROM THIS LACK OF INDEPENDENCE FLOWED MANY OF THE LAST ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM MISTAKES, VACILLATIONS, PROCRASTINATION AND "CREDIBILIT

①

Piro 10/11/68

Please Call Soc
tonight.

Transition.

2,500 key people.

C.S. - Can be transferred.
- Problem of information.

- Put together small org.

1. Top Bus for Scanned talent.

What do you ask for? Man that
could run company some day.

- Start top down.

1. Interview then check around.

Must learn how to interview.

Train those involved in Campaign
Kendell, O'Donnell.

Transition

3 levels of priority.

- 1 Top: Cabinet Committee heads. ~~Fig 2.5~~ ^{2.5}
- 2 Top insiders - key people for the administration. ^{key post.}
- 3 Top manpower pool.

1.

What types of people. -
Defense Dept. - Young Officers.

Pools

Service.

Business - Door to Door.


Orientation

What & Where we are going.

Use advancement for recruiting
Young Presidents Org.

Recruiting

YPO - Bus.
Academic Pool



Computers.

Service has list of outstanding officers they would like to
keep. Hot young guys.

★ What are the assistants to Andersen Category.
are they Civil Service or?

Piro - will put together a plan.

White house Staff.

3 levels. - 1. top insiders.

2. Top. people.

3. Top pool.

★ Salary levels in White house

E - Problem of the "Greenbook"

Ambassador's Plans to fair degree.

M - re: Possible financial arrangement
for Campaign.
Foundation.

Scale for Piro