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20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Section 3 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	09/05/1967	Report	"The Presidency, Executive Staffing, and the Federal Bureaucracy" study by Laurin L. Henry. Section 3 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 28 pgs.
20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Section 4 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	11/11/1968	Memo	Memo from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. to RN RE: Executive Office of the President. 11 pgs.
20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Section 5 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	11/25/1968	Report	1968-1969 Presidential Transition report. 25 pages plus cover page and 4 page index. 30 pgs.

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20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Tab divider "EXHIBITS" for Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	11/25/1968	Report	Exhibit A of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 10 pgs.
20	4	10/25/1968	Report	Exhibit B of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	10/25/1968	Report	Exhibit C of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	10/25/1968	Report	Exhibit D of Section 5 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs.
20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Section 6 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	11/24/1953	Report	Summary Sheet - Federal Personnel Problem. Section 6 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 17 pgs.

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20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Section 7 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	4	N.D.	Other Document	Reprint from The American Political Review "The Selection of Federal Political Executives" by Dean E. Mann, The Brookings Institute, March 1964. Section 7 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 2 pgs.

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THE PRESIDENCY, EXECUTIVE STAFFING, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY

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Prepared for delivery at the 1967 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9. Copyright, 1967, The American Political Science Association.

ABSTRACT

Although the personnel function has been a relatively underdeveloped aspect of the Presidency, trends of recent years and the preferences of President Johnson are leading to what is probably a permanent expansion of presidential role.

In seeking executive branch responsiveness, two crucial groups are the principal presidential appointees and top career executives. Recent research on these groups demonstrates that they represent an educational elite and something of a socio-economic elite as well. Careers have tended to be department-oriented.

After years of debate and experimentation, the essential role of the political executive in directing the bureaucracy has been affirmed. Although reorganization proposals to give the President a single personnel administrator have not succeeded, President Johnson has unofficially consolidated administration of both career and political personnel in the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, retaining an active interest himself.

Simultaneous increase in presidential domination of the party and in the demands on top political executives have led to increasing emphasis on programmatic and managerial qualifications in recruiting. The last few administrations have seen a rapid trend toward centralization and rationalization of the presidential recruiting function, with the employment of a computer index the latest innovation. President Johnson seeks actively to use the appointing power to strengthen his policy control of the agencies.

The results so far seem to be a strengthening of tendencies toward educational elitism, and the appointment of increasing numbers of men who have made careers either in other political executive or civil service posts.

President Johnson displays strong interest in strengthening the higher career service through executive development schemes, and frequently reminds the service of its government-wide obligations. A new Executive Assignment Plan has some potential for increased inter-agency mobility of top career executives but probably will not tie the career men directly to the Presidency as some have wished.

Although temporary regression may occur in the next administration, a net accretion of presidential function and machinery in the personnel field seems certain. Whether this routinization of function has added permanently and significantly to presidential policy control, or merely constitutes a belated response to bureaucratic growth, is not clear.

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We academic observers of the Presidency have tended to be a little puzzled by the perennial underdevelopment of the personnel function of the office. Although aware of at least some of the reasons why, we have nevertheless regretted the apparently unsystematic way in which decisions about appointments were made and the disfunctional nature of some of the activities Presidents have permitted subordinates to carry on in their names. We have usually felt that a little more White House sophistication and attention to filling the top political and career posts would produce substantial benefits for the President both in improved management and leadership of the respective executive agencies and in overall responsiveness to presidential direction and control of the bureaucracy. For what it may be worth, I can report that we now have a President who seems to take seriously his duty as the government's chief personnel officer. Whether all of us will like the results is a different matter.

My purpose here is to examine the methods of filling the most strategic executive positions in light of newly available data from other studies and my own limited inquiry into recent and current developments that have not been fully reported. My initial suspicion--hypothesis if you will--was that changes of permanent significance for the power position and institutional apparatus of the Presidency might be occurring. My findings are that in the past two decades some developments in the political and administrative position of the Presidency have opened the way to an important expansion of presidential role in the personnel area. The current President is striving by personal effort and sponsorship of institutional innovations to take advantage of these opportunities. How far he can go, how firmly he can establish these innovations, will depend on a number of things including the duration and future political standing of the present administration. Proceeding at least partly along lines that have had expert and bipartisan support for years, the President's efforts have not become sharply controversial so far, although certain aspects of his strengthened control are producing some partisan and bureaucratic anxieties. These anxieties may increase and lead to a pause and possible retrenchment by the President's successor, whoever and whenever he may be. However, my own feeling is that any retrenchment is likely to be modest and temporary

and that much of what has happened will last. We are seeing another of those accretions of presidential role, responsibility, and apparatus with which each incumbent endows and binds his successors.

Let us look first at some of the characteristics of the executive bureaucracy and some previous efforts to define and advance the President's interest therein, and then at recent developments with respect to executive staffing.

The Federal Bureaucracy and the Presidential Interest

Our attention in this paper will be concentrated on two groups of executives that seem most crucial for the President. First, there are the principal political executives of the administration. These include the department heads, under and assistant secretaries, principal members of the White House and Executive Office staffs, heads and deputies of the leading non-cabinet agencies, chiefs of a few of the major bureaus or services within the departments, and for some purposes the members of the principal regulatory commissions. Depending on the strictness of the definition, one counts to between 150 and 250 of these principal officials before entering the zone of several hundred lesser presidential appointees such as ambassadors, federal attorneys, members of minor boards and commissions, and others who are traditionally considered more important for patronage than for policy reasons. The White House currently calculates that the President appoints 526 full time executive branch officers, 489 judicial branch officials, and almost 1700 "others" including members of 145 part time and temporary advisory bodies, for a grand total of about 2700 presidential appointees.¹ This of course excludes several thousand foreign service officers and members of uniformed corps whose presidential commissions are routine and nominal.

Second, we will give attention to the so-called "supergrades"--the 4,400 positions at levels GS-16, -17, and -18 of the classified civil service. According to Civil Service Commission tabulations, about 3/4 of the supergrades are occupied by career men appointed under full merit procedures--the elite of our permanent civil service. The remaining thousand or so are in various special schedules and exempt categories, with the incumbents ranging from people who are essentially careerists despite their formal classification to the most outright political birds of passage. (We leave aside the three or four thousand positions comparable to the supergrades in "other pay systems" outside the General Schedule such as the FBI, AEC, TVA, postal field service, VA medical service, and overseas agencies; these special categories have defied systematic study and rationalization for years, and no help for it here.)

Characteristics of Executives

In recent years several research studies have greatly enriched our understanding of the backgrounds, career lines, appointment processes, and actual jobs

that top federal executives hold. In 1957, Paul David and Ross Pollock produced an interesting analysis of alternative systems for staffing the political and career executive positions, with special attention to the tendency of the two kinds of jobs to blur into one another with respect both to functions and to status.² Marver Bernstein's study of the functions of the political executives provided valuable insights into the political-administrative milieu at upper levels of the executive branch. It emphasized the demanding nature of the jobs, the increasing requirements for substantive and managerial expertise, and the complexity of the relationships incumbents must maintain with the White House, department heads, Congressmen, "opposite numbers" in other agencies, interest representatives, and career staffs.³ John Corson and Shale Paul recently have scrutinized the functions of upper career executives and identified an interesting trichotomy of types--program managers, supporting staff managers, and professionals who are essentially practicing within the government.⁴

There is a great deal of new data about the social and educational origins of government executives. In 1963, Warner, Van Riper, Martin, and Collins published a study of over 10,000 political and career civilian executives and over 2,000 top-ranking military officers.⁵ Two years later, Brookings issued a study by Mann and Doig of the careers and processes of appointment of political executives at the assistant secretary level since the New Deal,⁶ and is about to release a more detailed analysis by David Stanley of some of the same data, widened to include regulatory commissioners and extended through the early Johnson appointees.⁷ We also have further data on top career executives in a separate study by Stanley.⁸

These studies are not precisely comparable because of differences in methods, but the results are quite consistent. Warner and associates found that although somewhat over 20% of the civilian executives were "upwardly mobile" sons of tenant farmers, laborers, and skilled workers, and about the same number were sons of white collar workers and independent farmers, over half were from business and professional families. The separation of data on political and career executives in this study is not complete, but the data seem to indicate that the political executives include a considerably greater proportion of the sons of large business owners, executives, and professional men, while the career executive group has a flatter social profile with more persons of farmer, working class, and white collar origins. Even among the civil service executives, however, sons of businessmen were over-represented by a factor of five as compared to the general population, and sons of professional men by a factor of four.⁹ These findings of relatively high occupational backgrounds of the upper bureaucrats are consistent with data on religious preferences from the Brookings study showing a disproportionately high percentage of Protestants--and especially the so-called "high status" Episcopalian and Presbyterian denominations--among political executives.¹⁰

The key to advancement--the process through which even the well-born have to qualify and the less advantaged young men have their chance to catch up--

is education. Warner et.al. reported that as of 1959, 78% of career executives and 90% of political executives had graduated from college, and 45% of the career executives and 75% of the political executives had graduate or professional degrees. The difference in advanced degrees was largely accounted for by the high proportion (39.9%) of law school graduates among the political executives.¹¹ The Brookings and the Corson and Paul data show even higher levels of education for the two groups in more recent samples.¹²

Federal political executives not only have a great many degrees, but they have them from good institutions. Considering the large number of degree-granting colleges in this country, it is remarkable that data on undergraduate colleges of political executives since 1933 show that 19% came from Yale, Harvard, or Princeton, 6% were from other Ivy League institutions, and 15% more were concentrated in a dozen other colleges including such leading private institutions as Chicago, Stanford, and Northwestern, and such major state universities as Wisconsin, Michigan, California, North Carolina, and Minnesota. The convergence at major private and state universities was even sharper among those earning graduate or professional degrees.¹³

To be sure, many poor lads manage to graduate from high-status institutions. Nevertheless, the implication in these figures of predominantly high socio-economic status origins is supported by the report that 17% of the political executives studied by Brookings received pre-college education at one of a list of eighteen select preparatory schools in the Northeast.¹⁴ A boy who goes to Groton and Harvard has a vastly greater chance of becoming an assistant secretary than his counterpart who attends the local public high school and a nearby state or private college. What accounts for the difference? No doubt it is partly a difference in character or quality of education at the elite institutions; partly a matter of acquiring motivation, outlook, and expectations for a career that may lead to high public position; and partly a matter of making the friendships and connections that will ease the way to the sort of career expected. Disentangling the elements of "merit" and "privilege" in such a career line is no easy matter.

Career executives are educated at a more diverse set of institutions than their political superiors. Leading numerically in the Warner analysis of this group were such urban universities as George Washington and City College of New York. Although such leading state universities as California and Wisconsin were among the top producers, the bulk of degrees were spread widely among the nation's state, municipal, and private institutions. Although the Ivy League was well represented, no Ivy League college ranked among the first ten.¹⁵

The pathways to the top are also fairly clearly marked, especially for the career executives. The great majority of those who reach supergrades enter the service relatively young and arrive at the supergrades in their late 40's and early 50's after a career in one or two agencies. According to Stanley's data, less than 5% had served in more than three federal agencies, and Corson and Paul pointed out¹⁶ that a high percentage of the interagency transfers occur relatively early in the careers.

The narrowness and "closed" nature of the multiplicity of career ladders comprising the federal service is further underlined by what career executives report about how they got their present jobs. They tend to be either straight promotions or movements outward and upward to higher positions as a result of prior acquaintance or service with people who are in position to hire them.¹⁷

Political executives, of course, tend to enter federal service after establishing other careers. Although there have been some variations from administration to administration, the distribution of prior occupations of political executives has been quite stable. From Franklin Roosevelt through the early Johnson appointees, 24% of the political executive appointees had primary occupations in business, 26% in law practice, 7% in education, 2% in science or engineering, and 6% in miscellaneous private pursuits. However, 36% came from primarily public service careers, including 4% from elective public service, 22% from federal appointive service, and 9% from state or local appointive service. Until recently, the main variations from these patterns have been in the administrations of President Truman, who relied unusually heavily on appointees with long government service, and of President Eisenhower, who drew less from government and more from business.¹⁸

Other breakdowns of Brookings data emphasize the tendency for political executive appointments to go to individuals who have pursued "in and out" if not continuous federal careers. Out of 1,567 appointments (some individuals receiving two or three), 29% went to persons who had held other political executive posts in the same agency, 8% had held political executive jobs in other agencies, 24% had held lower level non-career appointments in the same agency, 37% had held lower level non-career posts in other agencies, 14% had held career jobs in the same agency, 11% had held career jobs in other agencies, 6% had been in Congress, 1% on the federal bench, and 7% had held national party office. Only 15% had had no discernible previous national-level political or administrative experience.¹⁹

The Mann-Doig study sheds important light on the typical route to political executive office. It has been mainly a departmental system. Despite their formal status as presidential appointees, most assistant secretaries and the like have received their appointments as a result of prior service in the agency, personal acquaintance with other departmental officers, and other experience and connections revolving around the agency's substantive program. Despite efforts of most Presidents to put a personal stamp on their administrations in the initial staffing, the bulk of appointees, especially after the administration had been in office for some time, were program rather than President or party oriented.²⁰

Our information is perhaps least satisfactory concerning the personalities of political and career executives and the attitudes they have about their careers and their political and administrative roles. The Brookings study by Stanley indicates that the very top career executives have strong positive motivations for "getting things accomplished" in the public service and feel that although they might make more money

elsewhere their work would be less interesting professionally and lack the satisfactions of service. This study found a remarkable amount of satisfaction of top career executives with the basic outlines of the system in which they had risen to the top, and surprisingly few or specific ideas about how it might be improved--except of course by more pay. The attempts to develop psychological profiles of federal executives in the Warner book are perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of that study.²¹

In summary, the federal high bureaucracy is overwhelmingly white and male and predominantly Protestant in its composition. Although a considerable number of men of blue and white collar origins manage to qualify by educational achievement, the greater number come from upper middle and professional class families who find it relatively easier to inspire and finance their sons through a few of the nation's leading universities whose alumni dominate the service. The non-tenured political executives who are supposed to keep the career services responsible are even less socially, economically, and educationally representative of the nation as a whole than the career men. The careerists tend to rise to the top on narrow ladders of departmental or functional specialization. The political executives tend to have broader experiences, but there are increasing elements of careerism in this group as well, and the appointment process often has amounted to presidential acceptance of the man who rose to the top of the whirlpool of departmental interests.

How has the legitimacy of such a group been maintained? In large part, no doubt, it is because federal executives, although not mirroring the nation, have represented much of what the nation has admired and aspired to. Whether that is still true, in this summer of urban discontent, is not entirely clear. Although the bureaucracy is also responsible to Congress and the courts, the nation's most active agent in this respect is the popularly elected President. How does the system for choosing these men affect the President's ability to direct and lead the executive establishment?

Defining the President's Interest

A strong presidential interest in the higher appointments has always been recognized, but there have been constantly changing and frequently controversial views of how that interest should be defined and advanced. For the most part, Nineteenth Century Presidents used the appointing power to reward electoral supporters and consolidate their partisan and factional positions. The rise of the merit system removed increasing numbers of lower level appointments from the patronage area, which was generally acceptable to the President as long as scandal was avoided, a sufficient number of appointments were available for his own purposes, and the remainder were denied his enemies. Both the presidential appointments and the non-presidential but exempt positions continued to be used primarily for patronage purposes well into the New Deal period.

The Brownlow Committee, which had the gift of prophesy about a great many things, defined the President's interest largely in terms of an extension upward of the merit system and sharp curtailment in the number of presidential appointees. The Committee's staff study of personnel administration, by Floyd Reeves and Paul T. David, called for limiting the presidential appointments in each department to the secretary, under secretary, and possibly a handful of staff assistants. A sharp line was to be drawn between these political appointees and the career service, which in each department was to head up in an executive officer--the equivalent of the permanent undersecretary--supported by assistant executive officers and bureau chiefs all on a career basis.²² The political assistant secretaries apparently were to be eliminated altogether.

The Committee itself did not go quite so far. It affirmed the need for a "sufficient number of high policy-determining posts at the disposal of a newly elected President to enable him and his administration to control the service."²³ The Committee defined the policy determining posts as including the department heads and under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and the most important bureau chiefs. It also discussed the ill effects on both the President and the department head of having the President make subordinate appointments within the department. It proposed to extend the merit system upward within the departments, with exceptions to be made "only in the case of such of the highest positions as the President may find to be principally policy-determining in character." The Committee recommended further that all positions in the departments then filled by presidential appointment should be filled by the department or agency head "except under secretaries and officers who report directly to the President or whose appointment by the President is required by the Constitution."²⁴ By implication, the assistant secretaries were to be the department head's appointees. For control of the departments, the Committee apparently was willing to rely mainly on the President's hierarchical authority running to the department heads and to leave appointments below that to either the department head or the merit system. Although the Committee recommended that the staff of the central personnel agency and the personnel offices of the operating departments "should be regarded collectively as a unified career service of personnel administration",²⁵ there was little to suggest that the Committee thought of the bulk of the civil service as anything but a collection of departmental career services. Indeed, the idea of the permanent executive officer at the apex of each department implicitly strengthened the idea of the departmental career service.

Subsequent history unfolded in several ways that were unforeseen. Although the next twenty years saw a gradual reduction in the presidential appointments at lower levels, the number of top departmental officers appointed by the President did not shrink but rather expanded. Continued growth of the government and the experience of World War II and Korea led to recognition of need for more assistant secretaries, not less, and by the mid '50's the typical department had four or five where it had had one or two in the '30's.

Moreover, some long-range trends in the position of the President and the character of the bureaucracy were producing important changes in the political executive jobs. With the increasing domination of his party by the President, there was considerably less necessity and tendency to use these positions for traditional partisan and factional purposes; in fact the evolving nature of the government put a premium on substantive knowledge and managerial skills instead of old-fashioned political credentials gained by party organization and campaign service. There was a brief resurgence of interest in patronage at the advent of the Republican administration in 1953, but this soon spent its force, and by the end of the Eisenhower era it was widely recognized that traditional considerations were becoming almost irrelevant in the filling of these jobs.

The Second Hoover Commission's Personnel Task Force report and recommendations in 1955 both crystallized the implicit agreements of the previous twenty years and set many of the goals for the next twenty, although there remained much disagreement about the particular methods. The experience of the Eisenhower transition had demonstrated, and the Commission affirmed, that the continuity and neutrality of the career service could be maintained only by the insulation provided by a substantial number of political appointees who would take the heat and change with the administration. The Task Force's use of the term "political executive" and the spelling out of their functions served to legitimize the existence and need for such people. The Task Force also emphasized that political executives should be considered agents of the President, with no apparent worries about diluting the department head's authority with presidential appointees serving under him.²⁶

With reference to the career employees, the Commission stated forcefully an idea that had been creeping into the discussion for some time--the need for increased mobility among agencies and if possible the development of a corps of career executives of government-wide orientation and experience rather than narrow departmental outlook. About the methods to achieve these objectives there was and still is considerable disagreement. The Commission's wish to draw a sharp line between political and career executive positions, and to establish a Senior Civil Service of career executives who would hold rank in their persons like military or foreign service officers and leave control of their careers to a centralized assignment process designed to provide mobility and diversity of experience, proved controversial and impossible of realization.

Search for an Organizational Link

During this evolution of doctrine about the President's interest in the personnel system, efforts to establish an organizational focal point to guard that interest have taken a variety of forms--none of them long lasting.

The Brownlow Committee, enunciating a doctrine of "positive personnel management," recommended converting the three-man, bipartisan Civil Service Commission into a Civil Service Administration which would be one of the principal staff arms of the President in the new Executive Office. The agency would be headed by a single Administrator chosen under merit procedures but serving at the pleasure of the President; a seven-man Board attached to the Administration would provide advice and serve as watchdog over the merit system but would have no direct responsibility for personnel management. The function prescribed for the Administration had to do entirely with consolidation, extension, and management of the career services. Any staff work in connection with presidential appointments presumably would be left to the departments or handled by the expanded White House staff, but the Committee did not describe these arrangements.²⁷

The bipartisan Commission proved to be politically untouchable. Even when establishment of the Executive Office was finally authorized, in 1939, the Commission was excluded from the President's reorganization authority and left intact. One of FDR's six new administrative assistants was designated as Liaison Officer for Personnel Management with responsibility for linking the President and the Commission and for coordination of personnel matters not under Commission jurisdiction. This office was manned by a former civil servant and seems to have confined its attention to the career services. In Roosevelt's time, presidential appointments were managed by other White House functionaries--or the President himself.

In the Truman administration, White House staff work on political and career personnel was merged in the person of a presidential assistant, Donald Dawson, who does not seem to have dealt very strongly with either, although there were attempts toward the end of the administration to develop a set of files and procedures to put the screening of presidential appointees on a somewhat more rational basis than ever before. The First Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended more presidential involvement with the career services and a reorganization of the Civil Service Commission to place responsibility for its administration on the Chairman, who would also be designated Personnel Adviser to the President. Later in 1949 the "strong chairman" scheme was installed at the Commission by reorganization plan, but the chairman was not given additional duties as presidential adviser.

The "two-hat" arrangement was officially established early in the Eisenhower administration when Commission Chairman Philip Young was also designated as Personnel Adviser to the President. In his White House capacity Young took over the aspects of merit systems coordination that had been handled by the Dawson office. Although according to some reports he had more to do with patronage and presidential appointments than met the eye, Young's White House duties were mainly with the various career services. Meanwhile, a succession of other White House special assistants had primary responsibility for the political appointments. However, under Eisenhower doctrine which placed primary responsibility on the department and agency heads for recommending appointments in their bailiwicks, the White House office never developed into a powerful force in its own right, serving for the most part as a checkpoint for recommendations and political clearances.

The Second Hoover Commission Personnel Task Force, reporting in 1955, criticized the "two-hat" system, alleging at least potential incompatibility of the two roles. As Chairman of the Commission the incumbent had to symbolize and guard the merit system; as presidential adviser he "must consider all sorts of personnel questions which may be far afield from the career service, and he is subject to more patronage pressure than he would be as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission alone."²⁸ Perhaps in response to this criticism, a little later in the administration when Young resigned and the Chairmanship of the Commission was awarded briefly to a congressional lame duck, the two functions were split again. A former Assistant Secretary of Labor, Rocco Siciliano, served as White House special assistant for personnel matters for most of the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, dealing primarily with the career services. About 1958, when a bill sponsored by Democratic Senator Joseph Clark proposed to establish a single personnel administrator similar to the old Brownlow recommendation, the administration backed away.

President Kennedy did not keep a White House assistant for personnel in a role like the one Siciliano had played. He looked to his Civil Service Commission Chairman, John W. Macy, Jr., both for administration of the Commission and the classified service under its jurisdiction and for general advice on career systems (with some help from the Budget Bureau). Kennedy did, however, institutionalize the President's interest in the presidential appointments to a greater extent than any of his predecessors. Before inauguration, Kennedy used the frequently described Talent Scout group to help identify potential appointees for his administration. He interested himself not only in the top but in what he considered the crucial appointments at second or third levels in some departments. By inauguration day the Talent Scout group was scattered, but one of the chief scouts, Ralph Dungan, was established as a special assistant on the White House staff.²⁹ Dungan gradually built up a staff of several professional level people to assist in the screening and recruitment of presidential appointees. Personnel, however, was not Dungan's exclusive concern; he had other more or less standing areas of interest, including foreign aid and Latin American affairs. At least in the beginning, there was an attempt at functional separation between the aides who were supposed to be concentrating on identification of quality talent for the crucial policy and administrative posts, without too much regard for political considerations, and another group that was primarily concerned with keeping general files of jobs, vacancies, recommendations, and appointments to the large number of low-level or honorary and part time posts that were considered the bread and butter of White House patronage. We will look at the Kennedy staff operation in greater detail in a moment.

When Dungan left the White House after the Johnson succession and the 1964 election, arrangements were re-cast in their present form. Although he did not receive an additional commission or White House title, Chairman Macy was given special duties as the President's chief adviser on presidential appointments. Macy now supervises White House staff work on appointments at all levels, including both the "quality" and the "political acceptability" aspects.

Thus we now have, unofficially, a federal personnel administrator and adviser with wider scope of responsibility than any predecessor seen in the flesh or envisaged. Although Macy is commonly said to wear two hats, by comparison with Brownlow's Civil Service Administrator or such previous figures as Philip Young, he wears three or four. That is, he combines (1) his official role as Chairman and principal administrator of the general classified service under the Civil Service Commission, with (2) additional duties as presidential adviser on civil service problems in other merit systems, (3) identifier and preliminary recruiter of presidential appointees at all levels, and (4) staff man with responsibility for securing most of the evaluations and political clearances on prospective appointees. Macy performs these functions under the continuous scrutiny of LBJ himself, whose interest in all kinds of personnel matters, both political and career, is such that it is only slight exaggeration to say that the President himself is the government's chief personnel officer.

Staffing the Presidential Appointments

Apparently all Presidents have felt occasional impulses to bring more system and rationality into the process of decision on appointments. The nature of the problem and need has been defined in different ways at different times. Franklin Roosevelt is said to have become weary of the "same old faces" from around Washington and New York and to have yearned for the fresh talent that he was sure must be somewhere out there in Arkansas or Wyoming or Minnesota if he only had ways of finding it. To be sure, the Democratic Senators and Committeemen could always supply names, but such recommendations could not be relied on for appointments that counted for anything except patronage, and there never seemed to be time to dig out good new people in advance of the time that important vacancies arose.³⁰

President Truman, who most of the time dealt from a position of weakness in factional and public support, had to cope both with the problem of equitable distribution of patronage and with an apparently genuine shortage of well-qualified people willing to accept important posts in the military, foreign affairs, and economic mobilization agencies during the Korean period. It was about this time that the "government executive problem" first began to be cast in modern terms.³¹ The job of, say, assistant secretary of the Air Force, demanded so much substantive or managerial ability that traditional sources of political recruitment could produce no qualified candidates; but the qualified prospects who could be located by other means tended to be unmotivated for the job, often had potential conflicts of interest, and usually little or nothing in the way of political credentials--indeed, often were for one reason or another politically untouchable. It was in this period that Dawson and his assistant, Martin Friedman, made the first important attempt to build up a set of files on individuals who had been recommended or had come to their attention. According to Dean Mann, this office never became effective with respect to the hard-to-fill jobs. It served mainly as a clearinghouse for information and did little in the way of evaluation or active recruitment. "Moreover, it focused attention on meeting the demands of those whose stakes were political in nature rather than on the promotion of effective policy leadership."³²

The Eisenhower administration's efforts in this respect suffered from changing objectives and were largely abortive. In the pre-inaugural Hotel Commodore period, some of Eisenhower's associates, with the aid of a management consulting firm, attempted to identify the key jobs that would have to be filled and to locate high quality prospects--usually businessmen who combined Eisenhower support credentials and executive talent--to fill them. This operation had a good deal of success in making the first round of executive appointments. However, the key people in it did not join the White House staff, and shortly after inauguration control of appointments began to slip in two directions. On the one hand, in the interest of party harmony Eisenhower committed himself to greater attentiveness to party and congressional sources in the making of appointments, so that powerful senators and committeemen were increasingly in position to exercise vetoes and occasionally virtually to demand that certain people be taken care of. On the other hand, Eisenhower firmly believed in the administrative principle of giving subordinates control of the means to fulfill their responsibilities, so that it was increasingly left to the department heads to find and evaluate prospects, carry on the necessary political maneuvers, and make recommendations to the White House which ordinarily would be followed. The center of gravity on appointments remained in the departments, and the White House personnel office, as before, served mainly as clearinghouse with occasionally some wider latitude in filling the lesser presidential appointments that did not clearly fall within the scope of a department. The effect of all this was to accent the natural centrifugal tendencies of the system. It produced in the first Eisenhower administration a considerable number of appointees who were politically incongruous with the objectives being enunciated from the White House, and in the second administration, after partisan and patronage pressures had eased, an aggregation of appointees who were mainly department or agency oriented and inclined to look with suspicion on White House efforts at policy leadership.³³

The Kennedy Experience

The Kennedy inner circle set out with enthusiasm and a fair measure of sophistication to place what were usually referred to as "our kind of guys" in the principal positions. I have already referred to the pre-inaugural Talent Scout operation in which Robert Kennedy, Sargent Shriver, Ralph Dungan, and several other staff men extending the search for prospects beyond the usual political sources to include the best law firms, foundations, universities, non-profit organizations, and business organizations. The Talent Scouts scattered after inauguration but were replaced by a lower-keyed personnel activity at the White House under Dungan's supervision. In summer of 1961, Dan H. Fenn, Jr., a young faculty member from the Harvard Graduate School of Business, joined the staff as the principal executive recruiter. Fenn, in turn, gathered a staff that varied from two to four assistants--mostly relatively young men from the career service.³⁴

Fenn's group set its goal as the identification of "quality" prospects for the principal policy and managerial posts. The lower-level, traditional patronage posts and the usual sources of political referrals were to be left to others. Fenn intended to operate at the level where the job sought the man and to let others judge, when the right man had been found, whether he was politically acceptable.

It was recognized that, next to the President, the department head had the strongest interest in the appointment. Department heads were encouraged to make their own recruiting efforts and recommendations to the President. The President and his staff might not accept departmental recommendations and might make counter suggestions, but would not ordinarily force subordinates on the department head. Where the department head was cooperative, Fenn tried to work with him in defining the character of the job and the kind of man sought and scouting up prospects for his consideration. Where the department was not cooperative, Fenn tried to have alternatives available to give the President directly if he wanted them. It was not assumed that the eventual choice should always originate with the White House recruiters. The aim was to guard the presidential interest and keep the departments on their toes by always having well-qualified alternatives to put up against the kinds of candidates who might emerge from departmental search or be proposed by other political and interest group sources.

Prospects for consideration were identified in various ways--scrutiny of the many available lists of persons active in politics, business, education, and public affairs; personal suggestions by department and White House staff members; political referrals; and an occasional volunteer who was sufficiently impressive to be taken seriously. Also, as an aid in checking the qualifications of prospects and securing new suggestions when needed, Fenn developed a list of trusted persons all over the country who were used as contacts and references. This list, classified by geographic area and field of activity, was heavily relied on for evaluations. Dossiers on individuals who had passed at least preliminary screening went into a file of several hundred prospects which was supposed to be kept up to date. The "ready file" emphasized individuals with wide experience and general managerial talent, who might be fitted into a variety of posts but was also classified by general fields of interest. There was a special category of "bright young men" of limited experience but high motivation and adaptability who might be fitted into junior posts as needed.

Typically, when the prospects for a vacancy had been narrowed down to two or three, a more intensive check of references and credentials was made, someone in the White House (usually not of the Fenn group) was asked to determine political acceptability, and inquiries were made as to the prospects likely availability. Whenever possible these things were done quietly and indirectly, to avoid disappointing the unsuccessful, but occasionally there was no alternative to calling a man in to discuss the possibility of an appointment. When a tentative choice had been made or ratified by the President, someone on the staff would talk to the candidate to make sure he would accept the appointment if formally offered; the idea was to avoid embarrassing both the President and the man by a direct refusal of a presidential offer.

Actually, according to the staff, turndowns at the late screening stage were rare; if the staff work was done right, people who pretty clearly would not be available were spotted early and removed from consideration.

Although one cannot be certain on the basis of the limited information available, it appears that the Dungan-Fenn recruiting activity functioned with a fair degree of success through most of the Kennedy administration. The presidential interest, as conceived by the staff, was made operative in the appointment process in a stronger way than ever before. It was, of course, mid-administration and a time of relatively low turnover, but nevertheless a considerable number of promising under and assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, commissioners, and directors of special programs were seeded into the federal system. The office also proved its utility in special projects of particular interest to the President, such as attempts to get more Negroes into upper administrative levels and to re-staff the much battered foreign aid agency.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Fenn staff operated under some conditions that definitely limited its impact. For one thing, it appears that although President Kennedy understood the importance of placing his men rather than the department's, the Senate's or the interest group's men in the important jobs, his personal interest in appointments tended to be selective rather than comprehensive and sustained. He might take great pains with the choice of, say, an ambassador to Paris, but deal rather casually with a bureau chief in Interior. For another thing, Fenn did not ordinarily deal with the President directly, but usually through Dungan, who had several responsibilities in addition to personnel and, although an old and trusted Kennedy staff man, may not have had quite the access to the President enjoyed by such persons as O'Donnell and O'Brien--or Robert Kennedy. Under these circumstances, the Fenn group never established an exclusive right to the inside track with the President on appointments. The President continued to permit--or perhaps encourage--other members of his staff to dabble in recruiting on occasions, and more than once the Fenn group discovered that an important position had been committed to someone they had not realized was under consideration. Finally, the Fenn activity suffered from blurred jurisdiction with another personnel group under Dungan's supervision. Usually referred to as "the Dorothy Davies operation," this was a staff activity and set of files from which names were pulled for lesser presidential appointments, more or less honorary commissions and advisory bodies, and the presidential patronage generally. The distinction in principle between executive recruiting and political appointments proved difficult to maintain in practice and in the minds of the clientele with which the White House had to deal.

These factors may or may not have something to do with the fact that shortly before President Kennedy's death it was announced that Fenn was leaving the White House for a seat on the Federal Tariff Commission. For several months thereafter Fenn's staff carried on under Dungan's direct supervision. Late in 1964, Dungan left and it was announced that Chairman Macy of the Civil Service Commission would assist the President with the re-staffing of the administration that would be required as the

President entered the full term to which he had been elected. Although, as noted above, Macy received no White House title, he did assume direction of Dungan's personnel staff. Since then there has been a gradual change of methods and an almost complete turnover of men on that staff, with only one of the principals going back to Dungan's time.

The Johnson Approach

The Johnson-Macy recruiting effort, as developed through mid-1967, differs in some important ways from the operation under Kennedy.³⁵

The change begins with the President himself. President Johnson's personal involvement is intense, continuous, and comprehensive. There is apparently something of the old professional politician's natural interest in jobs, but also a grasp of the importance of appointments in both controlling current policy and shaping the future of the government. Johnson, it is said, feels keenly that every presidential appointee represents the President in more than just a nominal sense. This leads him to scrutinize with care not only the principal departmental appointees but also the lesser and more or less honorific appointees and those that have traditionally been left largely to the principal department concerned. (It also leads him to what some consider excessive concern that his appointees be loyal supporters of the administration across the entire range of its policies, not just in their own areas of responsibility.) LBJ's appetite for staff work is said to be insatiable: there is a constant demand for more names, new names, more information about prospects, and re-thinking of the requirements of the job being filled. No matter how thoroughly the staff has investigated a prospect, the President is likely to make a few phone calls on his own or to send the recommendation back for checking an idea that has emerged from his own memory of people and events in Washington over the last thirty years. If, as the papers say, he becomes furious at leaks or premature speculation he regards as intended to probe his intentions or force his hand, that is consistent with the remainder of the pattern.

This strong presidential interest had led to high status for the personnel man. Macy deals directly with the President on a daily basis. Furthermore, he and his staff seem to have established, if not the right to the last word, at least the expectation that they will get their word in on virtually all personnel decisions. Recommendations reaching the President from other sources are routinely sent to the Macy staff for comment and further evaluation. Having learned this, the department heads increasingly send their recommendations to the President through Macy or, better yet, work with the Macy staff in an effort to reach joint recommendations.

As before, the departments are encouraged to take thought of their own personnel needs. Such trusted department heads as McNamara, who has a reputation for competence in this as in so many areas, are given a good deal more latitude than others. But it is clear that the center of gravity on personnel decisions has shifted noticeably in the direction of the White House. This apparently is clearly the case

with ambassadorial appointments and may also be true of the federal judges.

The previous attempts at distinction between responsibility and procedures for handling the major and minor, the "quality" and the patronage presidential appointments have been given up. The same staff processes all the appointments including the investigation of both personal ability and political factors. Although this may mean more politics in some appointments, it means less in others. The custom of congressional clearance--or at least prior notification--is still followed, but the routine and mechanical clearances of all appointments through the national committee and state organizations that have been customary in some administrations are not part of the process. The President dominates the party organization and is determined to control the administration; he issues the political clearances.

In addition to Macy, who divides his time between the Commission and the White House, the present staff consists of four professionals who have more or less standing assignments to keep in touch with and recruit for particular clusters of agencies, plus a fifth man who is responsible both for overseeing the files and records and for dredging up names in large batches for various part-time and temporary advisory boards, commissions, and delegations. As before, the staff is composed of relatively young career types. It is clearly understood that no one holds these jobs too long and turnover in about two years is the norm.

The procedural core of the system is a set of files on some 30,000 people, of which about half are considered active and kept more or less up to date. The present staff considers that one of its principal accomplishments has been the consolidation into a single system of the various sets of files on prospective personnel which previously had been officially and unofficially kept around the White House. The Macy group claims now to be tied into the presidential paper flow in such a way that every White House communication that might bear on personnel gets scanned for information that may be used to start a new file or add to an existing dossier. Recommendations and evaluations are cross-filed both by recommender and recommendee. Other inputs come from scanning of newspapers, documents, and other sources in which significant information about the lives and careers of prospects might be recorded. Files on individuals who have been under active consideration are of course heavier with informal notes and evaluations.

Although insiders credit the idea to Dungan, the Johnson staff has installed the most publicized innovation in the process--a computer. The key to the files is a set of computer tapes which store basic information on each individual in the files. The computer holds mostly standard and public biographical data, with each individual coded for fields of interest by the job code used in the Census of Manufactures. The evaluative material is in the files, not the computer. Thus it is an exaggeration to suggest, as some have done, that the Johnson administration is "selecting people by computer." The personnel staff may start the canvass of possibilities for a given position by asking the computer for names of, say, midwest college presidents, or

electronics executives with Department of Defense experience. When the list is compiled, the staff then can pull the files to see which ones merit further scrutiny. But there still remain the problems of knowing what kinds of lists to ask the computer for, how to obtain and weight evaluations and judgments about the individuals whose names are spewed out, and when to shift the search into new categories of personnel.

In addition to the "talent bank" of prospects the office also has--for the first time, it is claimed--a complete and current inventory of presidentially appointed positions, and a matching list of incumbents, both on computer tape.

Recent Johnson Appointees

What effect is the Johnson system having? The exact nature of the linkage between the system for screening appointees and the qualitative character of the product is to some degree conjectural. There may be those who will argue that the kinds of appointees who emerge are determined by the President's predilections, his political situation, and the nature of the market in which he seeks to recruit, and that the personnel recruitment system has at most a marginal influence. Personally, I suspect it is more than that, but at any rate it is clear that the Johnson appointees now being produced by the system differ in some discernible ways from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and early Johnson appointees.

The Stanley-Mann Brookings data analyses the backgrounds of over 1,000 principal political executives since the New Deal, with comparisons of the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson appointees through March 30, 1965.³⁶ Using definitions and methods as nearly identical to Brookings as possible, my research assistant, Mr. Joseph Rudolph, has analyzed 100 Johnson appointees since the Brookings cut-off date--a group that includes virtually all the Johnson appointees at the indicated levels between March 1965 and June 1967.

It is commonly said in Washington that Johnson has a preference for people he regards as fellow professionals in the running of the government. This is borne out by data on the recent Johnson appointees showing a sharp rise over the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and early Johnson appointees in the proportion whose prior careers had been primarily in some form of public service. Tabulation of principal prior occupations showed "public service" for 43% of the later Johnson appointees, which is 6% higher than for his earlier appointees, 10% higher than Kennedy's, and 14% higher than Eisenhower's. Of the 43%, the great majority--38%-- were from federal appointive service. Elective political careerists at 3% and non-federal appointive careerists at 2% were fairly consistent with previous groups.

Although exceeding FDR, Eisenhower, and Kennedy in the proportion of appointees with long experience in public office, Johnson still is not relying on insiders to quite the same extent as Truman, who made 52% of his appointments from public service careerists. Johnson's recent appointees also show some important

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differences from previous groups in the distribution of occupations of those who were drawn from the private sector. Business and law practice are sharply down, while education, science and engineering are up as sources of talent.

Analysis of the kind of federal positions previously held by recent Johnson appointees showed a distribution rather similar to previous appointee groups, with perhaps a slightly greater tendency to promote political executives from both career and subordinate political posts within the same agency rather than across agency lines. The percentage of recent Johnson appointees from career to political ranks was 31%--about the same as for the Truman, Kennedy, and early Johnson groups but much higher than Eisenhower. Of those with prior federal administrative service, the median years of service was 5.0 for those whose service was in the same agency, and 5.8 years for those whose service was in a different agency. These figures, too, are not as high as those for the Truman administration but noticeably higher than others since.

The conclusion that Johnson is relying to an increasing extent on persons who are essentially Washington careerists in either political or civil service is bolstered by data on the geographic locations in which recent Johnson appointees had their principal careers prior to appointment. The South Atlantic region, which includes Washington, D.C., was up to 57%, which is an all-time high for any administration, including Truman's. Washington itself accounts for 55% of Johnson's recent appointees (as compared to 45% for Truman, 19% for Eisenhower, 31% for Kennedy, and 34% for early Johnson appointees). Of the other regions, only New England and the West South Central (and you know what state that includes) areas seem to be holding their own as sources of Johnson appointees.

The trend toward higher levels of education which has been apparent in the political executives of all recent administrations, continues through the Johnson appointees. The men who never went to college, a group that has been dwindling rapidly among political executives in recent years, are completely unrepresented in the recent Johnson appointees, 96% of whom finished college and have at least bachelor's degrees. Even more impressive is the fact that 75% of the recent group have graduate or professional degrees. Of the recent Johnson appointees, 43% were law graduates, which corresponds to the average of recent administrations. The sharp increase in advanced training comes mainly from those who have earned masters and doctorates of various kinds, including science, engineering, medicine, social science, and public administration. A full 26% of Johnson's recent appointees have earned doctorates.

It is interesting to note that tendencies toward educational elitism seem to be increasing under one of our more equalitarian presidents. As compared to other appointee groups, Johnson's recent executives show even higher concentration of undergraduate preparation at the leading colleges. The percentage from the "Big Three" (Yale, Harvard, and Princeton) was 25.5% which is similar to the early Johnson appointees and substantially higher than previous administrations, including Kennedy's. The

percentage from the whole Ivy League, including the Big Three, was up to 36.2%, higher than ever before. And the concentration at a list of 18 leading private and public institutions reached 50%. Among the leading institutions, in the most recent list of appointees Yale declined and lost first place to Harvard, but remained ahead of Princeton, which declined but still held third place. Of the other private institutions, Stanford, Columbia, and Cornell were up, while Dartmouth and Chicago were down. Among the public universities, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan held their places, several others declined or were unrepresented altogether, and only one--Texas--increased significantly. The concentration at the leading institutions for graduate and professional degrees was about the same as for previous groups, about three-quarters coming from one of the 18 leading schools. Thus, the quest for quality seems to lead inevitably to the establishment.

The Presidency and the Career Services

Now let us look briefly at the higher levels of the civil service, where some important developments have occurred in the past decade and a half and even more important ones may be in the making.

In retrospect, one of the crucial events was the creation of the supergrades--the addition of levels GS-16, 17, and 18 at the top of the civil service. Established in very limited numbers in 1949 and steadily increased to the present 4,400, these positions have provided appropriate recognition, pay, and status for obviously important jobs near the apex of the federal establishment which are not filled by presidential appointment. Without them, the promotion and salary structure of the civil service would have been so compressed that the service could not have retained personnel of the caliber it has, and the number of presidential positions would have had to be greatly enlarged. Some might argue that this would be a good thing, but that is not the course of history. Because they are by definition special, the establishment and filling of each supergrade position is subject to scrutiny and approval by the Civil Service Commission on a case by case basis. The Commission is required to make sure that appropriate procedures have been followed in every appointment to the 3/4 of the supergrade jobs that are under full merit coverage, and even for the remainder that are exempt or occupied at the pleasure of the agency head, the Commission must be satisfied that the agency's choice has reasonable credentials for a job at that level of responsibility. Thus to have an identifiable group of elite positions, large enough to justify some systematic attention but small enough to permit fairly effective central supervision. Small wonder that the Second Hoover Commission thought of creating a presidentially commissioned corps of civilian officers to occupy these positions as a solution to many of the problems of status, tenure, mobility, and policy fragmentation.

Roger Jones has given us in a recent article a good summary and commentary on the trends of the past decade.³⁸ As Jones points out, the Government Employees Training Act of 1958 was key to many subsequent developments. This Act provided the first general authorization of government sponsored and financed training throughout

the federal service. It encouraged not only specific job-related skill training at lower levels but also special training and development for higher professional and executive personnel, to be provided either in-service or in appropriate academic institutions. Under the stimulus of this Act and follow-up nagging by the Civil Service Commission, many agencies in the course of examining and justifying their needs for higher level training, began for the first time to take stock of their career executive personnel, their qualitative and quantitative needs in future years as compared to the replacements coming up the ladder, and the problems of quality recruiting, turnover, and attrition. This led not only to a great burst of new training activities but placed it in a context of serious manpower planning and efforts to institutionalize in most agencies the delicate processes of identifying, developing, promoting, and using the top career executives. Concurrently, examination of the attractiveness of the service and problems of recruiting and attrition helped clinch the argument for another landmark Act, the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962, which declared the principle that federal pay rates should be comparable to private enterprise pay for the same levels of work and actually brought that principle to realization for most of the service, although falling somewhat short at the highest career levels.

Although they lent at least nominal presidential support to these measures, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both worried, although in different ways, about the responsiveness of the career service to legitimate political control. The Republicans feared at the outset that their policies might be sabotaged for ideological reasons and established Schedule C to enlarge the number of positions at the top of the service occupied at the pleasure of the department heads. As time went by, the Eisenhower people discovered that civil servants in most cases were at least as tractable as Republican patronage appointees, and lived increasingly comfortably with the bureaucrats. Kennedy and his associates entered with little burden of ideological suspicions but became increasingly frustrated by what they regarded as plain bureaucratic immobilism in many agencies. They went along with the idea of improving the quality of the higher civil service but they remained dubious about getting effective policy leadership from this group and convinced of the necessity of a sizable and vital corps of political executives.

As compared to his predecessors, President Johnson seems to have far more faith in the careerists and hovers over the civil service with unmistakable personal interest. He has promoted large numbers of career men to presidential posts and indicated that he thinks this is a good thing to do. He presides over special recognition and awards ceremonies with obvious enjoyment. He has stepped up the pressure on the Commission and the agencies to employ more Negroes and more women. One might also interpret as evidence of presidential interest the custom begun in this administration of treating almost every civil servant being promoted to a supergrade job to a visit to the White House, interview with presidential aide Marvin Watson, and in some cases a tour of the premises and handshake with the President or Vice President if they happen to be available. Administration sources aver that these visits come only after the individual has been chosen and do not constitute any kind of political clearance; this, it is said, is positive personnel

management because it builds morale and reminds departmental officers of their tie with the President who symbolizes the government as a whole.

President Johnson also is supporting some important measures that are still pending at this moment. Two bills now before Congress would greatly increase public service training at all levels. One bill provides for a national program of graduate fellowships for public service training, in some respects analogous to the NDEA program for increasing the nation's supply of college teachers, plus an auxiliary program of grants to educational institutions for development of their resources and training programs. Another bill, which owes much to the sponsorship of Senator Muskie of Maine, would authorize sizable federal grants to state and local governments for training and other improvements in their civil services, as well as permitting intergovernmental cooperation in training and occasional detailing of personnel. If these bills do not fall victim to wartime economy impulses, they should produce important long-range benefits for the public service--not to mention a boom in academic public administration programs.

Training and executive development activities are to be stepped up within the service. In April 1967 President Johnson issued an Executive Order which put into effect most of the recommendations of a blue ribbon presidentially appointed task force on this subject.³⁹ Perhaps the most interesting provision is for a new federally operated center to provide advanced study on a full-time residential basis to selected federal executives at the highest levels. This institution, for which the Civil Service Commission is now planning actively, will climax several years of discussion of the need for what has usually been called a "federal staff college" to have a role for civilians somewhat analogous to that played for military officers by the National War College.

The last development to be noted is a new Executive Assignment System for supergrade positions which will go into effect in November after a year of Civil Service Commission preparation.⁴⁰ Although the details are complex, the essentials of the system are about as follows:

1. No involuntary assignment of personnel by a central agency; continued recognition of the right of agencies to make basic decisions, following merit procedures, about recruiting and promotion to their supergrade jobs, and of the rights of individual employees to hold tenure in their existing jobs and make their own decisions about what alternative preferred jobs they will accept.
2. Continued Civil Service Commission scrutiny of agency decisions, with a prospect of increased pressure on the agencies not to promote from within to supergrade levels without careful examination of alternatives who might be available through outside recruiting or voluntary transfer from other agencies.
3. Requirement that agencies periodically submit and review with the Commission executive staffing plans covering current and long-range needs and steps to be taken to meet them by executive development, training, outside recruiting, and promotion.

4. Staffing of a new Bureau of Executive Manpower at the Commission in sufficient depth to permit a responsible officer to work closely and continuously with each agency on preparation and implementation of its staffing plan, and on filling of its key vacancies at supergrade level.

5. Establishment of an Executive Inventory containing personnel data on all individuals holding positions at levels GS-15 through 18 (and counterparts in other pay systems), this information to be coded to permit rapid identification by computer of all individuals who might be referred to an agency for a particular vacancy as well as general analyses of the characteristics of the top-ranking federal work force.

6. Recognition, through a sub-category of Non-Career Executive Assignments, of continuing need for a small number of supergrade positions filled by special procedure and occupied at the pleasure of the agency heads--although appointees must still stand Civil Service Commission quality inspection.

According to the Commission, personally prepared questionnaires from about 21,000 of the 26,000 executives whose qualifications will eventually be in the Inventory have now been received and coded so that referrals can start any time. However, one hears in Washington a certain amount of grumbling about the length and personal nature of some parts of the questionnaire, as well as reports of foot-dragging by some well-established old hands who are not particularly interested in having their credentials handed about or being urged to change jobs. The appeal of the system is mainly to those who are young, ambitious, and don't mind another FBI full field investigation.

How much additional interagency mobility this will produce is of course conjectural. Undoubtedly it will make additional opportunities available to career men who might be interested in moving and help break up some of the more outrageously closed agency promotion systems. However, the prevailing mode of thought these days seems to be far more tolerant of the one-or-two-agency career than it used to be; the ideal of the broadly competent general executive seems harder and harder of realization. Although it is the computerized inventory that is attracting the most attention, my personal guess is that the agency staffing review and the rapport between the agency and its liaison officer at the Commission is more crucial. According to the Commission, career executive staffing at the upper levels is now an active concern of top-ranking political executives of most agencies, under consistent personal pressure from both Chairman Macy and the President. One hope that the pressure continues until the habit is formed.

The Executive Assignment Plan and related developments mark a significant shift of ground from most of the debates and reform efforts aimed at the higher civil service since World War II. The essence of it, if I read the history correctly, is that we have given up trying to reform the civil service by tinkering with formal status. Politicians, civil servants, and reformers all seem relatively unconcerned these days

about the line between political and career appointments. National affluence has dulled hunger for patronage and the wariness of bureaucrats, and department heads will take good men from wherever they find them. We have quit trying for a system that will force either civil servants or agencies to accept involuntary interagency transfers. We have given up trying to achieve greater formal tenure security for individuals, as in the rank-in-the-man senior civil service scheme proposed by the Second Hoover Commission, or somewhat less as recently proposed by the Committee for Economic Development.⁴¹ In effect, we have decided to rely for mobility on a combination of natural turnover (the Commission tells us that almost one out of every four supergrade jobs turns over each year anyway) and the working of an expanded, improved, less monopolistic, better policed free market in which agencies and potential employees can find each other. And regardless of how much interagency movement this leads to, improved training and agency executive development plans will make everyone better off and happier with what he has.

What will all of this do for the President? Mr. Johnson apparently regards these things as making an important contribution to development and better utilization of the upper career service. To the extent that they lead to more intelligent, more broadly trained, more potentially mobile civil servants with a government-wide rather than parochial view, they should strengthen the Presidency as against the centrifugal forces we know so well. But the benefits to the President will be indirect. It seems to have been decided, implicitly or explicitly, that an essentially agency-based system will suffice and that no specific organizational link to the Presidency is required except through the Civil Service Commission. Although presidential aides may dabble in career appointments from time to time, the President's own participation is best given in the form of support for general institutional improvements. If this seems less presidential control than some might wish, it may be as much as the system can politically survive.

Summary and Prospect

As we have seen, our current President participates actively in personnel matters, both political and career, and for the first time has unified personnel administration on the President's behalf under a single subordinate. Although some aspects of President Johnson's interest may be peculiar to him personally, much of this presidential involvement--especially the centralization of staff work on presidential appointments--continues a trend visible under his predecessors.

The trend of the past generation toward greater domination of his party by the President has expanded his political latitude in making top executive appointments, but at the same time the increasingly complex nature of the executive branch has narrowed the range of institutional sources from which effective subordinates can be chosen. The last two incumbents have developed and begun to mechanize ~~a more systematic canvass of the nation's areas where potentially effective appointees~~

may be found. It is not clear that these efforts are bringing much greater diversity in the body of appointees, although they are lessening somewhat the long-time dependence on lawyers. So far, they appear to have accelerated a trend toward domination of the government by an educational elite many of whose members began with distinct socio-economic advantages. They appear also to have accelerated a trend toward careerism in the holding of presidential appointments, and an increasing fusion of the top of the career system with the presidentially appointed group. Although President Johnson shows more signs than his predecessors of wishing to identify with the higher civil service and make it his personal instrument, the reforms he is sponsoring, significant as they are, amount to acceptance and improvement of the inherited basic system; the sometime dream of a government-ranging presidential corps of high career officers seems to be fading rapidly.

How firmly may one project these trends into the future? Another four years by Democratic control might etch current practice into presidential concrete. On the other hand, although members of the administration resent the suggestion, many aspects of the current situation remind one sharply of the Truman administration. If a party turnover should occur next year, it would undoubtedly bring about a resurgence of interest in patronage, concern about the neutrality of the higher career service, and installation of a more diverse set of less experienced presidential appointees in the top positions. Macy's multiple-hat role would probably be fragmented.

Yet I suspect that any successor administration, whatever its initial impulses, will soon find itself approximately where we are now. The requirements of running the executive branch become more and more stringent, and qualified executives no more plentiful. Active presidential control of political appointments, backed up by White House staff work, is a feasible and perhaps necessary means of finding talent and countering centrifugal tendencies of the system. This much, I believe, is a presidential job from now on. Whether it will give future Presidents significantly more control over the executive branch than was enjoyed by their predecessors is not clear. I doubt that many personnel officers have found that routinization of their function leads to an increase in their personal discretion and control of events.

Footnotes

1. In preparation of this paper I have had the benefit of interviews during the summer of 1967 with several members of the White House staff and other governmental officials whose anonymity probably should be preserved.
2. Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for Government (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
3. Marver H. Bernstein, The Job of the Federal Executive (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958).
4. John J. Corson and R. Shale Paul, Men Near the Top (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
5. W. Lloyd Warner, Paul P. Van Riper, Norman H. Martin, and Orvis F. Collins, The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
6. Dean E. Mann with Jameson W. Doig, The Assistant Secretaries (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965).
7. David T. Stanley with Dean E. Mann and Jameson Doig, Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967). I am indebted to friends at Brookings for access to the page proof of this imminently forthcoming book.
8. David T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964).
9. Warner, et.al., esp. pp. 12-13.
10. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 14-16.
11. Warner, et.al., pp. 107-110.
12. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 17-20.
13. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
14. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
15. Warner, et.al., pp. 131-136.
16. Corson and Paul, p. 14 and Appendix B; Stanley, pp. 31-33.

17. Stanley, pp. 56-57.
18. Stanley, Mann, and Doig, pp. 31-33.
19. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
20. Mann and Doig, pp. 64-124, esp. pp. 91-99.
21. Stanley, pp. 59-65; Warner, et.al., pp. 191-250.
22. President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report With Staff Studies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 121-122.
23. Ibid., p. 8.
24. Ibid., pp. 9.
25. Ibid., p. 10.
26. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Personnel and Civil Service, and Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).
27. President's Committee on Administrative Management, pp. 11-12.
28. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service, p. 144.
29. Laurin L. Henry, "The Transfer of Power" and "The New Administration" in Paul T. David (ed.), Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-61 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961); Mann and Doig, pp. 269-270.
30. This is the author's recollection from conversations several years ago with James H. Rowe, Jr., who worked on appointments as a Roosevelt Administrative Assistant.
31. John J. Corson, Executives for the Federal Service (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).
32. Mann and Doig, p. 269.
33. Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Transitions (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 639-686; Mann and Doig, pp. 87-123.

34. This account of the Kennedy staff operation is based on interviews with Fenn and others who participated, August 1967.

35. This account of the Johnson staff operation is based on interviews with several participants and close observers, August 1967.

36. The data on previous appointees, with which Johnson's recent appointees are compared in the immediately following paragraphs, is from Stanley, Mann, and Doig, op.cit.

37. These figures are roughly consistent with a breakdown provided by a White House staff member, who indicated that through 1966, the origins of Johnson's appointees in all categories were:

Federal Government		45%
Civil Service	21%	
Foreign Service	19%	
Legislative Branch	2%	
Military	2%	
Business		15%
Law		16%
Universities		14%
Unions		1%
State and Local Government		9%

38. Roger W. Jones, "Developments in Government Manpower: A Federal Perspective," XXVII Public Administration Review (June 1967), pp. 134-141.

39. Presidential Task Force on Career Advancement, Investment for Tomorrow (Washington: U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1967); Executive Order 11348 and accompanying Statement by the President, April 20, 1967.

40. Executive Order 11315 and accompanying Statement by the President, November 17, 1966; U.S. Civil Service Commission, "The Executive Assignment System," and "Questions and Answers on the Executive Assignment System" (mimeographed releases, November 1966). Interview, Mr. Seymour Berlin, Director, Bureau of Executive Manpower, August 8, 1967.

41. Improving Executive Management in the Federal Government, a statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1964), p. 48.

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November 11, 1968

To: Richard M. Nixon
From: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

I have conferred with Charles S. Murphy, Counselor to the President, and Mr. William J. Hopkins, Executive Assistant to the President, with regard to the appropriation for and expenditure of funds by the Executive Office of the President. Additionally, I have consulted relevant Federal statutes and Congressional appropriations to ascertain the extent of funds available to the Executive Office.

Chapter 2, Title 3 of the United States Code provides for the term of office and compensation of the President. As authorized by that statute, the Congress made certain appropriations for the Executive Office of the President for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969 in passing Treasury, Post Office and Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969 (Public Law 90 - 350; 82 Stat. 190). Title III of that Act, "Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969," contains the relevant provisions.

Compensation of the President

The compensation of the President for his services is fixed by 3 U.S.C. § 102 in the aggregate amount of \$100,000 a year, to be paid monthly, and in addition an expense allowance of \$50,000 to assist in defraying expenses relating to or resulting from the discharge of his official duties, for which expense allowance no accounting, other than for income tax purposes, shall be made by him. The statute also entitles the President to the use of the furniture and other effects belonging to the United States and kept in the Executive Mansion. The Executive

Office Appropriation Act, 1969 provides an appropriation of \$150,000 for the compensation of the President, including an expense allowance at the rate of \$50,000 per annum.

Traveling Expenses

3 U.S.C. § 103 provides that there may be expended for or on account of the traveling expenses of the President such sum appropriated by Congress not exceeding \$40,000 per annum. This sum when appropriated may be expended in the discretion of the President and accounted for on his certificate solely. \$40,000 for traveling expenses of the President was included in "The White House Office, Salaries and Expenses" budget of the Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969.

The White House Office, Salaries and Expenses

The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969, provides \$3,229,000 for expenses necessary for the White House Office, including but not to exceed \$250,000 for services of experts and consultants, at such per diem rates for individuals as the President may specify, and other personnel services without regard to the provisions of law regulating the employment and compensation of persons in the Government service. The total amount also includes newspapers, periodicals, teletype news service and travel, and official entertainment expenses of the President, to be accounted for solely on his certificate. Attached hereto as Table I is an itemized list of Salaries and Expenses of the White House Office.

Table I indicates that an estimated \$2,454,000 was expended for personnel compensation for 255 employees in fiscal 1968 and an estimated \$2,707,000 would be expended for 255 employees in fiscal 1969. The increase over 1968 is attributable to salary increases. Included in this number of employees are Special Assistants, Administrative Assistants, staff personnel, secretaries, messengers and mail room messengers. Compensation of the military aides and the staff of the National Security Council are not included in this budget.

The President is authorized by 3 U.S.C. § 105 to fix the compensation of six administrative assistants and eight secretaries or other immediate staff assistants in the White House Office at rates of basic compensation not to exceed that of Level II (\$30,000 per annum) of the Federal Executive Salary Schedule. Attached hereto as Table II is a list of eleven individuals on the White House staff currently receiving \$30,000 per year payable out of the White House Office, Salaries and Expenses. As indicated above, a maximum of \$250,000 may be expended for experts or consultants at such per diem rates for individuals as the President may specify, and other personal services without regard to the provisions of law regulating the employment and compensation of persons in the Government service. We have been informed that it is possible to include within this group over and above the fourteen Special and Administrative Assistants additional personnel at a maximum of \$30,000 per year.

3 U.S.C. § 107 provides that employees of the executive departments and independent establishments of the executive branch of the Government may be detailed from time to time to the White House Office for temporary assistance. At the present time there are a total of 185 personnel on detail in the White House, over and above the 255 personnel listed in the budget. This group is composed of assistants, secretarial personnel and lower salary staff. These persons are not included in the White House Office budget.

Special Projects

The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969 provides \$1,500,000 for expenses necessary to provide staff assistance for the President in connection with Special Projects, to be expended at his discretion and without regard to such provisions of law regarding the expenditure of Government funds or the compensation and employment of persons in the Government service as he may specify. However, no more than 20% (\$300,000) of

this appropriation may be used to reimburse the appropriation for "Salaries and expenses, The White House Office", for administrative services. No more than \$10,000 of this appropriation may be allocated in the Executive Office of the President for official representation expenses of the President. Attached hereto as Table III is the Special Projects budget. With regard to reimbursement for salaries and expenses no funds for salaries and expenses were reimbursed in 1967. It is estimated that \$50,000 will be reimbursed for both 1968 and 1969.

In general, these Special Projects funds are used to provide consultants or special assistants to the President for projects that may arise from time to time, essentially of a non-emergency nature, such as foreign intelligence activities, consumer interest programs, consultant and special assistant services.

Any funds not expended lapse at the end of the fiscal year and may not be carried over. In fiscal 1967 \$775,000 lapsed and in fiscal 1968 an estimated \$150,000 lapsed.

Operating Expenses, Executive Mansion

The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969 provides \$823,000 for the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, refurnishing, improvement, heating and lighting, including electric power and fixtures, of the Executive Mansion and traveling expenses, to be expended as the President may determine, and official entertainment expenses of the President, to be accounted for solely on his certificate. The estimate for 1969 personnel compensation is \$575,000 for 80 employees. Additional needs for personnel and expenses are met by the General Services Administration. The grounds of the White House are cared for by the National Park Service. The White House Police and the Secret Service salaries and expenses are budgeted out of the Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department Appropriation Act, 1969 (Public Law 90 - 350; 82 Stat. 190) provides a total of \$20,900,000 for ne-

cessary expenses for the operation of the United States Secret Service, including salaries, purchase and hire of passenger motor vehicles, hire of aircraft, and purchase, repair and cleaning of uniforms. Additionally, motor vehicle needs of the White House staff are provided by the Military Transportation Corps. Attached hereto is Table IV containing the Budget of Operating Expenses, Executive Mansion.

Bureau of the Budget, Salaries and Expenses

The Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969 provides \$10,000,000 for expenses necessary for the Bureau of the Budget.

Council of Economic Advisors, Salaries and Expenses

\$380,000 has been appropriated for necessary expenses of the Council.

National Security Council, Salaries and Expenses

\$664,000 has been appropriated for expenses necessary for the National Security Council, including services of experts and consultants. 3 U.S.C. § 105 provides that the President may fix the compensation of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council at a rate not to exceed Level II.

Emergency Fund for the President

\$1,000,000 has been appropriated for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad during the current fiscal year. No part of this appropriation is available to finance a function or project for which a budget estimate or appropriation was transmitted.

Expenses of Management Improvements

\$350,000 has been appropriated for expenses necessary to assist the President in improving the man-

agement of executive agencies and in obtaining greater economy and efficiency through the establishment of more efficient business methods in Government operations. The allocation is to remain available until expended. We have not been informed what portion of this fund has been expended to date. The expenditure of this fund is entirely under the management of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The President, of course, may direct the Director to conduct studies using this appropriation.

Physical Plant

The working White House staff occupies the West Wing, a three story structure including basement. The first floor accommodates twelve staff personnel plus secretaries, the second floor accommodates approximately thirteen persons plus secretaries and the basement houses five personnel plus the Army Signal Corps.

The East Wing of the White House is occupied by the staff of the First Lady and would include the Social Secretary and the Press Secretary of the First Lady. Also housed in the East Wing are Presidential advisors with whom the President is not in daily contact.

Mr. William J. Hopkins, Executive Assistant to the President has informed us that a plat of the White House Offices has been prepared and will be delivered to us by Charles S. Murphy on November 11, 1968.

TABLE I

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	1967 actual	1968 estimate	1999 estimate
Personnel compensation:			
11.1 Permanent positions.....	1,891	2,164	2,407
11.3 Positions other than permanent.....	215	200	200
11.5 Other personnel compensation.....	165	90	100
Total personnel compensation.....	2,271	2,454	2,707
12.0 Personnel benefits.....	140	137	157
Travel expenses of the President.....	40	36	40
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	22	23	25
23.0 Rent, communications, and utilities.....	103	100	110
24.0 Printing and reproduction.....	160	95	102
25.1 Other services.....	2	2	3
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	59	60	65
31.0 Equipment.....	18	13	20
99.0 Total obligations.....	2,815	2,920	3,229

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Total number of permanent positions.....	250	250	250
Full-time equivalent of other positions.....	11	5	5
Average number of all employees.....	255	255	255
Average GS grade.....	7.6	7.6	7.7
Average GS salary.....	\$8,108	\$8,108	\$8,552
Average salary of ungraded positions.....	\$4,891	\$4,891	\$5,526

PROGRAM AND FINANCING (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

Program by activities:			
10 Administration (cost-obligations).....	2,815	2,920	3,229
Financing:			
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	140	89	
40 New obligational authority.....	2,955	3,009	3,229

FINANCING AND EXPENDITURES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

Relation of obligations to expenditures:			
71 Total obligations (affecting expenditures).....	2,815	2,920	3,229
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	147	183	188
74 Obligated balance, end of year (-).....	-183	-188	-193
90 Expenditures.....	2,779	2,915	3,224
Expenditures are distributed as follows:			
01 Out of current authorizations.....	2,632	2,732	3,036
02 Out of prior authorizations.....	147	183	188

Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 152 (1968)

TABLE II

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Personnel Receiving \$30,000 Per Annum

Special Assistant to the President	Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	S. Douglas Cater, Jr. (Vacant)
Special Assistant to the President	George E. Christian
Special Assistant to the President	E. Ernest Goldstein
Deputy Press Secretary to the President	Wyatt Thomas Johnson, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	James R. Jones
Special Counsel to the President	Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President	Mike N. Manatos
Associate Special Counsel to the President	W. DeVier Pierson
Legislative Counsel to the President	Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President	Larry Eugene Temple
Executive Assistant to the President	William J. Hopkins

TABLE III

SPECIAL PROJECTS

PROGRAM AND FINANCING (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	1967 actual	1968 estimate	1969 estimate
Program by activities:			
10 Administration (cost-obligations) (object class 25.1).....	725	1,350	1,500
Financing:			
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	775	150	
40 New obligational authority.....	1,500	1,500	1,500
Relation of obligations to expenditures:			
71 Total obligations (affecting expenditures).....	725	1,350	1,500
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	48	31	31
74 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-31	-31	-31
90 Expenditures.....	742	1,350	1,500
Expenditures are distributed as follows:			
01 Out of current authorizations.....	694	1,319	1,469
02 Out of prior authorizations.....	48	31	31

Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 152 (1968)

TABLE IV

OPERATING EXPENSES, EXECUTIVE MANSION

OBLIGATIONS BY OBJECT				
	Actual 1967	Estimate 1968	Estimate 1969	Increase (+) or Decrease (-)
11.0 Personnel compensation.....	\$578,000	\$545,000	\$575,000	+\$30,000
12.0 Personnel benefits.....	32,000	35,000	37,000	+2,000
23.0 Rent, communications, and utility services.....	51,000	52,000	52,000	-----
25.1 Other services.....	41,000	55,000	98,000	+43,000
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	163,000	124,000	130,000	+6,000
31.0 Equipment.....	-----	3,000	43,000	+40,000
Total obligations.....	865,000	814,000	935,000	+121,000
PERSONNEL SUMMARY				
Total number of permanent positions.....	75	75	75	-----
Full-time equivalent of other positions.....	12	9	9	-----
Average number of all employees.....	77	76	80	-----
Average salary of ungraded positions.....	\$6,430	\$6,756	\$6,756	-----
PROGRAM AND FINANCING				
Total obligations.....	\$865,000	\$814,000	\$935,000	+\$121,000
Reimbursements from other accounts.....	-173,000	-112,000	-112,000	-----
Unobligated balance lapsing.....	-----	+6,000	-----	-6,000
Appropriation.....	692,000	708,000	823,000	+115,000

Source: Hearings on Department of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations For 1969 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 152 (1968)

WHITE HOUSE APPROPRIATION REQUESTS

The Director, Bureau of the Budget, appears before the designated Appropriations Subcommittees to defend the appropriation requested for the Bureau of the Budget itself and for the following White House accounts:

<u>Account Title</u>	<u>Type of Appropriation</u>	<u>1969 Appropriation Enacted</u>	<u>Purpose of Account</u>
Compensation of the President	Annual	\$ 150,000	Compensation of the President including an expense allowance.
White House Office Salaries and expenses	Annual	3,229,000	Provide staff assistance and administrative services for the White House Office.
White House Office Special Projects	Annual	1,500,000	Provide staff assistance for the President in connection with Special Projects. <u>Not to exceed 20 percent</u> of the appropriation can be used for White House Office salaries and expenses. \$10,000 can be made available for official reception and representation expenses of the Executive Office.
Emergency Fund for the President	Annual	1,000,000	Provide for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense. No part of this appropriation is available to finance a function or project for which a budget estimate or appropriation was transmitted.
Expenses of Management Improvement	No-year (available until expended)	350,000	Expenses necessary to assist the President in improving the management of executive agencies and in obtaining greater economy and efficiency through the establishment of more efficient business methods in Government operations.

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1968-69

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

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MEMORANDUM ON TRANSITION

October 25, 1968

I. Introduction

There are about seventy-five days between Election Day and Inauguration Day. The immediate tasks are the designation of capable and responsible leadership to the Executive Branch, the identification of the functions of that Branch, and the acquisition of information about key governmental issues.

II. The Transition

A. Pre-Election Period

Work should begin on three principal fronts:

1. Organizational and substantive studies beyond those immediately required for campaign purposes should be started as soon as possible.
2. Plans for a personnel search for prospective departmental and agency appointments should be finalized.
3. Contact with the Johnson Administration on matters related to the transition should be pursued.

In response to President Johnson's invitation, a good working arrangement has been established with Charles

Murphy, the White House designee.

There have been meetings with the Bureau of the Budget, the General Services Administration and the United States Civil Service Commission. Each is prepared to aid in the transition.

A list of Presidential appointments and current vacancies has been obtained. A statement on the expiration date of statutory Presidential Reorganization Powers and other special powers has been requested. FBI clearance procedures for Presidential appointees and others are being explored to expedite security and Presidential clearances as soon after after Election Day as possible.

B. Immediate Post-Election Period

1. Presidential Transition Act of 1963

Sponsored by Kennedy, this law vests in the Administrator of General Services the authority, upon request, to provide to the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect services and facilities, including office space, payment of salaries, travel expenses, communications services, printing and binding, and postage. An appropriation provides \$375,000 for the President-elect and \$75,000 for the Vice-President-elect for expenses incurred during the period between election and inauguration.

The Administrator has set aside 12,500 square feet of floor space in the Kennedy Federal Office Building (#7) on 17th Street, Washington, D.C. for the use of the President-elect after election without charge. It is excellent space and offers no problem as to security.

There is no government space available in New York but space can be obtained on a rental basis and therefore subject to a charge for its use.

Office furniture and fixtures will be furnished at a very nominal cost. In addition, transportation, including airplanes, will be available without charge to the newly elected President and Vice President. Telephone and telegraph will also be supplied by the Government at reduced tariff.

2. Location of President-Elect and Staff: Both Clifford and Murphy strongly recommend that Washington be established as the headquarters for the new Administration not only because of convenience and nearness to the seat of government but equally important because of the public image created thereby. This is, of course, a matter of personal preference.

3. Johnson-Nixon Meeting

The President will undoubtedly initiate contact with the President-elect. He presumably will suggest

an early meeting. If precedent is followed, an agenda will be prepared by Murphy and Lincoln after consultation with the principals. If not, you might want to give some thought to the topics to be explored at such meeting.

Such an agenda should include the following points:

a. Security Clearance - Final arrangements for expediting security clearances for appointees.

b. Current Information for the President-Elect - Arrangements to receive such Administration information as daily military, diplomatic and foreign intelligence reports, briefings and memoranda on current problems and "cable traffic."

c. Other Presidential Information - Arrangements to obtain copies of personal memoranda of Presidential meetings with foreign officials, operating information from outgoing Presidential staff, Task Force reports prepared for the President and not publicly released, reorganization studies in the Departments, Agencies or in the Bureau of the Budget, personnel information re-

lating to appointments, terms and vacancies, memorandum on technical operations of the White House Office.

d. National Security and Budget Observers - Arrangements for early and close cooperation on national security affairs and the budget process.

e. Orientation of Appointees - Arrangements for briefing of new officials by their predecessors, access to career staff and departmental information, clerical and professional assistance, and establishment of ground rules for access to policy discussions.

f. The Handling of Crises - A procedure should be established to facilitate coordination between the principals in the event a crisis occurs.

g. News Release - It may be useful for the President and President-elect to issue a joint statement after their meeting. The substance of such a statement could be along these lines:

The President and President-elect had a full, friendly and useful discussion. They and their associates will cooperate in every appropriate way in order to insure a smooth and effective transfer of responsibility on January 20. They will

continue to consult as they think desirable and are confident that such cooperation can be achieved without impairing the orderly functioning of the Executive Branch.

3. Key Items

Two items on the proposed agenda are particularly significant.

a. Clearance of New Appointees

The President-elect in cooperation with the President must make appropriate arrangements to investigate the background of new appointees in order to assure the Johnson Administration that persons to be given access to classified information have security clearance. It is also wise to establish the practice of investigating all prospective Presidential appointees regardless of their need for access to classified information.

Especially for the first category, the process must begin as early as possible. As to these, the Johnson Administration should properly examine the report, make its decision and forward the report to the President-elect. As to the second category, the present Administration should order the check and send the FBI report unopened to the President-elect.

b. The Handling of Crises.

In the event of a crisis of major proportions during the transition period, the President will undoubtedly consult with the President-elect. The Nation would normally expect this but there is no requirement by precedent or otherwise that the President must abdicate his constitutional authority and duty to decide or that the President-elect must join in or be bound by the President's decision.

C. The Administration's First Months

Pockets of resistance to the President inevitably tend to exist in the Departments, in Congress and in the Party. It goes without saying that the President-elect should assume the reins of power and leadership in his own hands, as soon as possible.

D. Task Forces

In addition to the selection of capable people, the President-elect should appoint task forces in at least two Departments: State and Defense.

President Kennedy made a mistake by having too many task forces (approximately 29 in number), in addition to numerous departmental studies conducted by McKinsey & Company.

President Johnson has directed (through Murphy) each Department and Agency to prepare a volume on organization, function, budget and personnel and a second volume on pending issues. The Bureau of the Budget likewise is to prepare a similar study on each Department and Agency. This material will be available through Murphy after election.

The Brookings Institution has in preparation a volume on important issues confronting the new Administration and has promised to deliver a galley proof by November 1, 1968. The title of the study is "Agenda for the Nation."

III. Appointments - Key Positions to be Filled

A. The White House Staff - Pre-Inaugural Period

A skeleton staff should be chosen, briefed and prepared to move into operation the day after the election or shortly thereafter. This staff must be capable of discharging a variety of duties and the following key senior positions are suggested:

1. Special Assistant (for Programs and Policy)

This is the key policy post on the staff and should in addition have primary responsibility for speeches, messages, proclamations, review of Executive Orders and similar tasks.

This position on the President's Staff was initiated during the war by President Roosevelt who appointed Judge Samuel I. Rosenman as Special Counsel to the President. President Truman abolished the position but later resurrected it by appointing Clark M. Clifford as Special Counsel. Charles S. Murphy succeeded Clifford. In addition, John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the President, aided in coordinating Federal agency programs and policies.

Under President Eisenhower this function was performed by Staff members reporting through Governor Sherman Adams and later General Persons.

President Kennedy used Theodore Sorensen as Special Counsel to focus from the beginning on the State of the Union message and to continue to advise on questions of program and policy. This role under President Johnson is now occupied by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. as Special Assistant to the President.

The Special Assistant should have a staff to assist him and access to the Administrative Assistants as they are appointed. The Special Assistant's drafting group should begin as soon as possible to collect ideas for and to prepare initial drafts of the Inaugural Address to be given on January 20, and, following that,

a State of the Union message which will present the President-elect's legislative program. These messages should be tied in closely with the Budget, and therefore it would be wise to bring into this group, on a temporary basis, an experienced man with background in the Bureau of the Budget. The President-elect may later choose to divide the responsibilities of this position among other staff personnel, but initially, the responsibilities for the described functions should be delegated to one individual.

2. Special Assistant (for National Security Affairs)

It is imperative that the President-elect have on his staff an adviser or advisers to brief him on developments involving national security. This Special Assistant serves as liaison between the President and the National Security Council and supervises the staff of the National Security Council.

Additionally, the Special Assistant brings to the President's attention issues which the President may want to explore with the Secretary of State; briefs the President on current military, diplomatic and foreign intelligence; serves as a general point of contact between the White House and the operating departments con-

cerned with National Security; and briefs the President on impending problems which have not yet reached crisis proportions.

The duties of this position were performed under President Roosevelt by Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant; Admiral Leahy, Chief-of-Staff to the Commander-in-Chief; and Judge Rosenman. W. Averill Harriman assumed this role under President Truman, serving in the specially created position of Director for Mutual Security. Under President Eisenhower, Adams and later General Goodpaster handled these duties. President Kennedy named McGeorge Bundy to the National Security Adviser's job and President Johnson appointed Walt W. Rostow upon Bundy's departure.

It is suggested that the implementation of the positions for Special Assistants for Programs and Policy and for National Security should not be permitted to develop into chief of staff functions. These positions should not block access to the President.

The following are additional staff positions which should be filled as soon after election as possible. Some may be only temporary but most will later become the official White House Staff.

3. Personnel Adviser

The President-elect should have an assistant to coordinate the recruiting and screening of top personnel.

Attached hereto is a list of high priority positions to be filled prepared from a computer tabulation listing provided by the Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission.

4. Appointments Secretary

This individual keeps the President's calendar, coordinates his time, assists in determining priority of visits, supervises the making of travel arrangements, ceremonies and official functions. The position requires an assistant and a secretary.

5. Press Secretary

A vital job requiring the talents and diplomacy of a highly skilled individual to serve as the President's spokesman to and liaison with the press. He will need one deputy who can speak in his name, and preferably two, and an appropriate staff. He should be one of your advisers on public relations.

6. Correspondence Secretary

He has responsibility for the President's correspondence, refers inquiries to Departments for answer, and functions in cooperation with the Staff Secretary and

Executive Clerk in handling volume mail. He will need some staff personnel.

The Staff of the White House is the President's personal staff and should conform in size and function to his needs. It is suggested that initially the President-elect's staff be kept small and versatile. The staff can be expanded later. Back-up resources in the Bureau of the Budget and in the Council of Economic Advisers are available.

Each Administration has, in addition to the regular White House staff assistants, acquired by assignment from Departments and Agencies, a large pool of back-up personnel.

For example, the Johnson White House Office is served by 2500 persons. We are seeking to obtain more detail on their functions.

7. Chief of Staff

President Eisenhower found the Chief of Staff organization well suited to his method of operation. Others have rejected it as inadequate. It is suggested that a system that permits all senior persons on the staff access to the President and provides for regular meetings with staff encourages much desired intra-staff communication. Staff should share in the government-wide perspective of the President.

The President's staff should include the following senior positions in addition to those enumerated above:

8. Staff Secretary

"Monitor" of White House staff work, keeping track of documents requiring action, of assignments requiring execution, of decisions reached in Cabinet meetings, legislative leaders' meetings, and elsewhere. Coordinates and synchronizes the work of the staff. The staff secretary works closely with the White House Executive Clerk (normally a non-political position), who handles and records all formal papers and documents for President's action or attention.

9. Cabinet Secretary

Handles general liaison with Cabinet officers and other agency heads, investigating grievances and adjusting minor differences not requiring Presidential intervention. Attends Cabinet meetings and keeps minutes of proceedings.

10. Administrative Assistants to the President

The White House staff should have at least six Administrative Assistants. Several should be capable writers, to assist in speech writing and to be available for direct assignment by the President to other jobs. The other Assistants should have roving assignments as

directed by the President. One Administrative Assistant could be permanently assigned to the recruitment and processing of top level appointees to significant policy positions, after the groundwork has been done initially by the Personnel Adviser.

11. Armed Forces Aide to the President

This post should be held by a regular military officer and is useful for ceremonial and housekeeping functions, travel and similar responsibilities.

12. Congressional Liaison

Assists in formulating Administration strategy for achieving a legislative program and advises on Administration policy-making on what Congress is or is not likely to do. He also serves as a conduit for legislators to the President.

13. Scientific Adviser

Assists President and his advisers in analyzing and understanding complex technical questions on the weapons, space, disarmament, drug, mining, agricultural, and related fields.

In addition to the above White House staff positions, the President requires other personnel such as the household staff, the Secret Service, communications room, switchboard, files, the mail room, personnel office, and related services, all of which will carry over in their

present form and with much the same personnel. Also required are the social secretary and such other staff as the President's wife may require who will have to be brought in.

Attached to this memorandum are lists of the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson White House office staffs for purposes of comparison.

B. The Executive Office - Pre-Inaugural Period

1. Bureau of the Budget

As indicated above, contact has already been initiated with the Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. There is a critical need for the President-elect, as his first appointment, to designate an individual or individuals to serve a liaison function with the Bureau. President Eisenhower's designation of Joseph W. Dodge within ten days after the election in 1952 to work with the outgoing Budget officials did much to increase the effectiveness of the new Administration during its early months.

The Bureau has indicated that consideration of the most important budget matters relating to the departments and agencies will be taken up between Election Day and Thanksgiving.

The Budget liaison man may be a new Presidential staff member on loan or the President-elect's ultimate choice for the Director's position.

The Bureau is preparing 21 Department and Agency Highlight Summaries, which identify main aspects of program and policy, budget legislation, and organization and management of which incoming management should be informed at an early date, 75 Issue or Topical Papers and a series of Basic Reference and Descriptive Papers covering the various functions of the Bureau. These papers will be made available through Murphy the day after election.

2. Council of Economic Advisers.

The President-elect should promptly designate an individual to act as liaison with the present Council of Economic Advisers and with the Bureau of the Budget on economic matters. Access should be given to the Treasury Department. This individual could be the new Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

3. National Security Council

The National Security Council is composed of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director

of the Office of Emergency Planning. As indicated above, the President-elect should at his meeting with the President make arrangements to permit a representative of the President-elect to observe National Security Council meetings and to facilitate close cooperation between the President's White House advisers in this area and their designated counterparts.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency is under the direction of the National Security Council. The Director of the CIA is probably the most important man in the intelligence establishment. The President-elect might consider retaining the current Director, a career man, for several months at least and then replace him if he was found unsatisfactory. If so, this should be announced before inauguration.

C. Executive Office

The key positions are:

1. Budget Director

The Budget Director is a direct arm of the Executive (not even Senate confirmation for his appointment is required). Under his direction, the Bureau of the Budget is a source of sophisticated

economic analysis and a potential participant in positive policy making. In addition, the Bureau can serve as the most effective way of controlling the departments and shaping of Presidential policy. A strong Director is essential.

2. Chairman and Members of the Council of Economic Advisers

The Council serves a valuable function to keep the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve from overpowering the President, and to estimate and define the differences between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.

The following agencies constitute the remaining bodies located within the Executive Office of the President. They need no priority attention from the President-elect at this time.

3. Executive Secretary of National Aeronautic and Space Council

4. Director of Office of Economic Opportunity

5. Director of Office of Emergency Planning

6. Director of Office of Science and Technology

7. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

8. Executive Secretary of National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development

9. Executive Secretary and Chairman of Consumer Advisory Council

Attached hereto is a list of the key appointive positions making up the Executive Office.

D. Executive Departments, Commission, Agencies and Boards

1. Appointments in General

a. Retaining career officials. Some of the posts to which the President-elect may make appointments are now held by very capable people, some of whom served under the Eisenhower Administration and who will not find it difficult to serve loyally under a new Republican Administration.

b. The Appointments Process. The President-elect will normally fill Cabinet positions from his intimate advisers and other major political figures.

As to the others, the President-elect should utilize the skills of an individual or individuals with wide acquaintanceship in the fields of government, law, business, education, and foundations to conduct a talent hunt for the several hundred sub-cabinet posts that must be filled.

One danger to avoid is that encountered by Kennedy, that of filling too many departments from the bottom up. Generally, the Secretary should be named first, so that he can be consulted on lower jobs in his department.

c. Personnel Policy. Various general personnel

problems, such as pay raises, leave payments, and reclassifications inevitably greet the President-elect. The United States Civil Service Commission, under John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, is best equipped to function on these problems. These problems should not be handled by individuals occupied with selecting and screening top appointments.

2. Cabinet Appointments

In selecting the heads of the twelve Executive Departments and the Ambassador to the United Nations, the new President establishes a public image of the character of his Administration. Bi-partisan appointments might be considered. There is a good public relations impact in making early appointments.

Priority should be given to the following positions:

- a. Secretary of State and two Under-Secretaries.
- b. Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary.
- c. Secretary of the Treasury.
- d. Attorney General.
- e. United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

E. Relations with the Military

1. Replacement of Incumbent Joint Chiefs of Staff

Although the President naturally desires to have his own men around him, it probably is good judgment to retain for the time being the present Joint Chiefs and other senior military men. General Wheeler, the Chairman, serves at the pleasure of the President; the term of General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, expires in 1972; the term of Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, expires in 1971; and the term of General McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, expires in 1971.

Under former Secretary McNamara the status of the Joint Chiefs was reduced to that of technicians. It would be advisable to restore the earlier prestige and usefulness of the Joint Chiefs by a meeting with the President-elect before January. It would be welcomed by the Chiefs and helpful to the President-elect.

2. Presidential Military Adviser

This is a delicate choice as evidenced by the antagonism aroused in the military establishment by Kennedy's personal relationship with Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin. Certainly a personal military adviser to the President can be found who would not

arouse such antagonism at the Pentagon.

IV. Relations with Congress

The President-elect will be in a position to develop a strong continuing relationship with the Congress and he must take the initiative immediately after election to do so.

A. Organization of Congress

The President-elect should give attention to the organization of both Houses.

B. Program

The President-elect should plan strategy for his legislative program with the Congressional leaders. Many points of his program have, of course, been outlined by the President-elect in his public statements. As soon as Congress meets, steps should be taken to effectuate these proposals. The State of the Union message to the Congress will itemize his legislative objective.

An analysis of the Bills in the 90th Congress on which full hearings were conducted should be made and a determination made as to those Bills which the President-elect might decide to support.

The President-elect has the alternative of urging their immediate passage or incorporating them into a

broad program as presented to the Congress in his State of the Union message.

C. Future Relationship with Congress

The President-elect might wish to set forth immediately his ideas on regular meetings and channels of communications between him and Congressional leaders. Personal weekly conferences with the Big Four accompanied by ad hoc contacts with committee chairmen and important Congressmen might be the best approach at least initially. As already noted it is essential for the President-elect to establish a position within his own staff to supervise congressional liaison.

D. Patronage

The Congress, of course, is a constant source of requests for appointments to government positions. Lest this create unwanted friction explicit procedures should be established.

V. Control of the Republican Party

The President-elect will have control of the National Committee and the support of the leaders of most of the organizations within the Republican Party. If not, this should be acquired shortly after election.

A. National Chairman and Staff

The President-elect should work with the National Chairman to encourage communication be-

tween the Party leaders and the President-elect, to assist with patronage with members of Congress and party leaders, and to coordinate the fund raising for mid-term elections.

B. Patronage

Between election and the inauguration, requests for patronage and recommendations of appointments to Executive Branch positions, particularly below the level of Assistant Secretaries and policy heads, will be quite heavy. Perhaps the President-elect could use the National Committee to divert pressure from the White House.

Field positions, such as attorneys and postmasters are politically important but should be made thoughtfully as a persuader in obtaining passage of programs through Congress.

Conclusion:

This memorandum is purposely brief. It is primarily an interim report and check list and seeks to reflect the best thoughts of a host of others who have worked on the problems of transition.

Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A

ROOSEVELT WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - March 10, 1945

Secretary to the President	Stephen Early
Secretary to the President.....	William D. Hassett
Secretary to the President.....	Jonathan Daniels
Military Aide to the President.....	Col. Richard Park, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President.....	Samuel I. Rosenman
Personal Representative of the President.....	Donald M. Nelson
Administrative Assistant.....	William H. McReynolds
Administrative Assistant.....	Lauchlin Currie
Administrative Assistant.....	David K. Niles
Administrative Assistant.....	James M. Barnes
Special Assistant to the President.....	Harry L. Hopkins
Special Executive Assistant.....	Eugene Casey
Personal Secretary.....	Grace G. Tully
Executive Clerk in charge of White House Executive Offices.....	Maurice C. Latta

TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE - September 20, 1945

Secretary to the President	Matthew J. Connelly
Secretary to the President	Charles G. Ross
Secretary to the President	William D. Hassett
Special Counsel to the President.....	Samuel I. Rosenman
Executive Clerk in charge of the White House Executive Offices.....	Maurice C. Latta
Executive Clerk.....	William J. Hopkins
Administrative Assistant in the President's Office.....	Rose A. Conway
Social Secretary.....	Reathel M. Odum
Chief Usher.....	Howell G. Crim
Special Executive Assistant to the President.....	George J. Schoeneman
Administrative Assistant to the President.....	David K. Niles
Administrative Assistant to the President.....	Raymond R. Zimmerman
Military Aide to the President.....	Brig.Gen. Harry H. Vaughan
Naval Aide to the President.....	Commo. James K. Vardaman, Jr.

TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - July 1, 1952

Secretary to the President	Matthew J. Connelly
Secretary to the President	William D. Hassett
Secretary to the President	Joseph Short
The Assistant to the President.....	John R. Steelman
Special Counsel to the President.....	Charles S. Murphy
Administrative Assistant to the President	Donald S. Dawson
Administrative Assistant to the President	David H. Stowe
Administrative Assistant to the President	David E. Bell
Administrative Assistant to the President	David D. Lloyd
Administrative Assistant to the President	Clayton Fritchley
Administrative Assistant in the President's Office	Rose A. Conway
Social Secretary	Mrs. Edith B. Helm
Secretary to the Wife of the President	Reathel M. Odum
Military Aide to the President	Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, USA
Naval Aide to the President.....	Rear Adm. Rober L. Dennison, USN.
Air Force Aide to the President	Maj. Gen. Robert B. Land USAF
Physician to the President	Maj. Gen. Wallace H. Graham, USAF
Executive Clerk.....	William J. Hopkins
Chief Usher	Howell G. Crim

EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - July 1, 1953

The Assistant to the President.....	Sherman Adams
Assistant to The Assistant to the President.....	Maxwell M. Rabb
Special Assistant to The Assistant to the President	Roger Steffan
Special Assistant to The Assistant to the President	Charles F. Willis, Jr.
Special Assistant in the White House Office	James M. Lambie, Jr.
Secretary to the President.....	Thomas E. Stephens
Press Secretary to the President.....	James C. Hagerty
Assistant Press Secretary	Murray Snyder
Special Counsel to the President	Bernard M. Shanley
Special Assistant to the President	Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.).
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Gerald D. Morgan
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Bryce N. Harlow
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Homer H. Gruenther
Special Assistant to the President	C. D. Jackson
Special Assistant to the President	Lewis L. Strauss
Administrative Assistant to the President	Robert Cutler
Administrative Assistant to the President	Gabriel Hauge
Administrative Assistant to the President	Emmet J. Hughes
Economic Adviser to the President	Arthur F. Burns
Physician to the President	Maj. Gen. Howard Snyder, USA
Acting Staff Secretary	Col. Paul T. Carroll, USA
Assistant Staff Secretary	L. Arthur Minnich, Jr.
Executive Clerk	William J. Hopkins
Military Aide to the President	Lt. Col. Robert L. Schulz, USA.
Naval Aide to the President.....	Comdr. Edward L. Beach, USN
Air Force Aide to the President.....	Maj. William G. Draper USAF
Personal Secretary to the President.....	Ann C. Whitman
Secretary to the Wife of the President.....	Mary Jane McCaffree, Actin
Chief Usher.....	Howell G. Crim

EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1960

The Assistant to the President	Wilton B. Persons
The Deputy Assistant to the President	Gerald D. Morgan
Secretary to the President	Thomas E. Stephens
Press Secretary to the President	James C. Hagerty
Associate Press Secretary	Mrs. Anne W. Wheaton
Special Counsel to the President	David W. Kendall
Associate Special Counsel to the President	Henry Roemer McPhee
Assistant Special Counsel to the President	Phillip E. Areeda
Deputy Assistant to the President for Inter- departmental Affairs	Robert E. Merriam
Deputy Assistant to the President for Congress- ional Affairs	Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President	Homer H. Gruenther
Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President	Earle D. Chesney
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs	Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President	Kevin McCann
Special Assistant to the President	Maj. Gen. John S. Bragdon, USA (Ret.).
Special Assistant to the President	Meyer Kestnbaum
Special Assistant to the President	Clarence B. Randall
Special Assistant to the President, and Food- for-Peace Coordinator	Karl G. Harr, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	Don Paarlberg
Special Assistant to the President	W. Allen Wallis
Special Assistant to the President	George B. Kistiakowsky
Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management	Eugene J. Lyons
Deputy Special Assistant to the President	Amos J. Peaslee
Special Consultant to the President	Clarence Francis
Special Consultant to the President	Arthur Larson
Administrative Assistant to the President	Jack Z. Anderson
Administrative Assistant to the President	Malcolm C. Moos
Administrative Assistant to the President	Edward A. McCabe
Staff Assistant to the President	Clyde A. Wheeler, Jr.
Physician to the President	Maj. Gen. Howard McC. Snyder, MC, USA.
Staff Secretary to the President	Brig. Gen. A.J. Goodpaster, USA.
Assistant Staff Secretary	L. Arthur Minnich, Jr.
Assistant Staff Secretary	Lt. Col. John S.D. Eisenhower
Executive Clerk	William J. Hopkins
Administrative Officer (Special Projects)	E. Frederic Morrow

EISENHOWER WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1960

Assistant to the Staff Secretary	Christopher H. Russell
Secretary to the Cabinet	Robert K. Gray
Assistant to the Secretary to the Cabinet	Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
Military Aide to the President	Col. Robert L. Schulz, USA.
Naval Aide to the President	Capt. E. P. Aurand, USN.
Air Force Aide to the President	Col. William G. Draper, USAF
Special Assistant in the White House Office	James M. Lambie, Jr.
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Frederic E. Fox
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Robert E. Hampton
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Douglas R. Price
Special Assistant in the White House Office	Stephen H. Hess
Personal Secretary to the President	Mrs. Ann C. Whitman
Personal and Social Secretary to Mrs. Eisenhower	Mrs. Mary Jane McCaffree
Chief Usher	J. Bernard West

KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1961

Special Counsel to the President..... Theodore C. Sorensen
Deputy Special Counsel to the President..... Myer Feldman
Assistant Special Counsel to the President.. Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the President.. Lee C. White
Press Secretary to the President..... Pierre E.G. Salinger
Associate Press Secretary to the President.. Andrew T. Hatcher
Special Assistant to the President..... McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President..... Lawrence F. O'Brien
Special Assistant to the President..... P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President..... Jerome B. Wiesner
Special Assistant to the President..... Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President..... Frederick G. Dutton
Special Assistant to the President..... James M. Landis
Special Assistant to the President..... Frank D. Reeves
Special Assistant to the President..... Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President..... Harris L. Wofford, Jr.
Deputy Special Assistant to the President..... Walt Whitman Rostow
Administrative Assistant to the President..... Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President..... Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President..... Mike N. Manatos
Special Assistant to the President--Director,
Food for Peace..... George McGovern
Physician to the President..... Dr. Janet Travell
Military Aide to the President..... Brig. Gen. Chester V.
Clifton, USA
Naval Aide to the President..... Comdr. Tazewell T.
Shepard, Jr., USN
Air Force Aide to the President..... Col. Godfrey T.
McHugh, USAF
Executive Clerk..... William J. Hopkins
Personal Secretary to the President..... Mrs. Evelyn N. Lincoln
Social Secretary..... Letitia Baldrige
Chief Usher..... J. Bernard West

KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1963

Special Counsel to the President	Theodore C. Sorensen
Deputy Special Counsel to the President	Myer Feldman
Assistant Special Counsel to the President	Lee C. White
Press Secretary to the President	Pierre E. G. Salinger
Associate Press Secretary to the President	Andrew T. Hatcher
Special Assistant to the President	McGeorge Bundy
Deputy Special Assistant to the President	Carl Kaysen
Special Assistant to the President	Lawrence F. O'Brien
Administrative Assistant to the President	Mike N. Manatos
Administrative Assistant to the President	Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President	Jerome B. Wiesner
Special Assistant to the President—Director, Food for Peace	
Special Assistant to the President	Richard W. Reuter
Special Assistant to the President	Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President	Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	Brooks Hays
Special Assistant to the President	Stafford L. Warren, M.D.
Special Assistant to the President	David L. Lawrence
Advisor for National Capital Affairs	Charles A. Horsky
Physician to the President	Rear Adm. George G. Burkley (MC), USN.
Military Aide to the President	Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifton USA.
Naval Aide to the President	Capt. Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., USN.
Air Force Aide to the President	Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh USAF.
Executive Clerk	William J. Hopkins
Personal Secretary to the President	Mrs. Evelyn N. Lincoln
Social Secretary	Nancy L. Tuckerman
Chief Usher	J. Bernard West

JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - JUNE 1, 1964

Counsel to the President	Myer Feldman
Associate Counsel to the President	Lee C. White
Associate Counsel to the President	Hobart Taylor, Jr.
Press Secretary to the President	George E. Reedy
Assistant Press Secretary	Malcolm M. Kilduff
Special Assistant to the President	McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President	Lawrence F. O'Brien
Administrative Assistant to the President	Mike N. Manatos
Administrative Assistant to the President	Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President—Director, Food for Peace	
Special Assistant to the President	Richard W. Reuter
Special Assistant to the President	Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President	Stafford L. Warren, M.D.
Special Assistant to the President	David L. Lawrence
Special Assistant to the President	Walter Jenkins
Special Assistant to the President	Bill D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President	Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President	Horace Busby, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	S. Douglass Cater, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President on the Arts	Roger L. Stevens
Special Consultant to the President	Jack J. Valenti
Advisor for National Capital Affairs	Charles A. Horsky
Physician to the President	Rear Adm. George G. Burkley (MC), USN.
	Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifton USA.
Military Aide to the President	
	William J. Hopkins
Executive Clerk	Mrs. Juanita Duggan Roberts
Personal Secretary to the President	
Press Secretary and Staff Director for the First Lady	Mrs. Elizabeth S. Carpenter
Social Secretary	Mrs. Bess Abel
Chief Usher	J. Bernard West

JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE OFFICE - OCTOBER 14, 1968

Special Assistant to the President	Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President	George E. Christian
Special Assistant to the President	E. Ernest Goldstein
Special Assistant to the President	Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President	James R. Jones
Special Assistant to the President	Walt Whitman Rostow
Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs	Miss Betty Furness
Special Consultant to the President	Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Ret.
Special Consultant to the President	George E. Reedy
Special Consultant for Physical Fitness	James A. Lovell, Lt. Cmdr.
Special Counsel to the President	Harry C. McPherson, Jr.
Special Counsel to the President	Larry Eugene Temple
Legislative Counsel to the President	Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr.
Counselor to the President	Charles S. Murphy
Deputy Special Counsel to the President	Lawrence E. Levinson
Associate Special Counsel to the President	W. DeVier Pierson
Assistant Press Secretary to the President	Wyatt Thomas Johnson, Jr.
Administrative Assistant to the President	Mike N. Manatos
Physician to the President	Vice Adm. George G. Burkley (MC), USN
Armed Forces Aide to the President	Brig. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh USAF
Personal Secretary to the President	Mrs. Juanita Duncan Roberts
Press Secretary and Staff Director for the First Lady	Mrs. Elizabeth S. Carpenter
Social Secretary	Mrs. Bess Abell
Executive Assistant	William J. Hopkins
Chief Usher	J. Bernard West

EXHIBIT B

JOHNSON EXECUTIVE OFFICE- October 14, 1968

Bureau of Budget Director	Zwick, Charles J.
Deputy Director of Bureau of Budget	Hughes, Phillip S.
Council of Economic Advisers, Chairman	Okun, Arthur
Council of Economic Advisers	Smith, Warren L.
Council of Economic Advisers	Peck, Merton J.
Executive Secretary of National Security Council	Smith, Bromley K.
Director of Central Intelligence Agency	Helms, Richard
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency	Taylor, Rufus L., Vice Adm.
Executive Secretary of National Aeronautic and Space Council	Welch, Edward C.
Special Assistant to President	Rostow, Walt W.
Director of Office of Economic Opportunity	Harding, Bertrand
Deputy Director of Office of Economic Opportunity	Perrin, Charles R.
Office of Emergency Planning Director	Daniel, Price
Deputy Director of Office of Emergency Planning	Merker, Mordecai M.
Civil Defense Advisory Board Chairman	Goebel, Margaret
Office of Science and Technology Director	Hornig, Dr. Donald F.
Deputy Director of Science and Technology	Bennett, Dr. Ivan L.
Office of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations	Roth, William M.
Deputy Special Representative	Rehm, John B.
National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development Chairman	Humphrey, H. H.
Executive Secretary of National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development Executive Secretary	Wenk, Edward Jr.
Consumer Advisory Council Executive Secretary	Furness, Betty
Consumer Advisory Council Chairman	LaFollette, Bronson

EXHIBIT C

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS - October 14, 1968

Secretary of State	Rusk, Dean
Under Secretary of State	Katzenbach, Nicholas
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs	Rostow, Eugene V.
United States Representative to United Nations	Wiggins, James R.
Administrator for AID	Gaud, William S.
Director of Peace Corps	Vaughn, Jack Hood
Secretary of Treasury	Fowler, Henry H.
Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs	Deming, Frederick L.
Under Secretary of Treasury	Barr, Joseph W.
Secretary of Defense	Clifford, Clark M.
Deputy Secretary of Defense	Nitze, Paul H.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Wheeler, Earle G.
Secretary of the Army	Resor, Stanley
Under Secretary of the Army	McGiffert, David E.
Secretary of the Navy	Ignatius, Paul R.
Under Secretary of the Navy	Baird, Charles F.
Secretary of the Air Force	Brown, Harold
Under Secretary of the Air Force	Hoopes, Townsend
Attorney General	Clark, Ramsey
Attorney General Deputy	Christopher, Warren
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director	Hoover, J. Edgar
Solicitor General of United States	Griswold, Edwin N.
Postmaster General	Watson, W. Marvin
Deputy Postmaster General	Belen, Fred C.
Secretary of Interior	Udall, Stewart Lee
Under Secretary of Interior	Black, David S.
Secretary of Agriculture	Freeman, Orville L.
Under Secretary of Agriculture	Schnittker, John A.
Secretary of Commerce	Smith, C. R.
Under Secretary of Commerce	Bartlett, Joseph W.
Secretary of Labor	Wirtz, Willard W.
Under Secretary of Labor	Reynolds, James, Jr.
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare	Cohen, Wilbur J.
Under Secretary of Health, Educa- tion and Welfare	McCrocklin, James
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development	Weaver, Robert
Under Secretary of Housing and Urban Development	Wood, Robert
Secretary of Transportation	Boyd, Alan
Under Secretary of Transportation	Robson, John E.
Administrator of Federal Aviation	Vacant - McKee

EXHIBIT D

CHAIRMEN OF PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT AGENCIES - October 14, 1968

Administrative Conference of the United States, Chairman	Williams, Jerre S.
American Battle Monuments Commission, Chairman	Devers, Jacob L.
Appalachian Regional Commission, Federal Cochairman	Fleming, Joe W., II
Atomic Energy Commission, Chairman	Seaborg, Glenn T.
General Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy	Hafstad, Lawrence R.
Canal Zone Government, Governor	Leber, Walter, Maj. Gen.
Civil Aeronautics Board, Chairman	Crooker, John H., Jr.
Commission of Fine Arts, Chairman	Walton, William
Delaware River Basin Commission, Federal Member	Udall, Stewart L.
Delaware River Basin, U. S. Commissioner	Northrop, Vernon D.
District of Columbia Commissioner	Washington, E. Walter
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chairman	Alexander, Clifford L., Jr.
Export-Import Bank of the United States, President and Chairman	Vacant (Linder, Harold F.)
Federal Farm Credit Board, Governor	Tootell, Robert B.
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review, Chairman	McElroy, Dennis L.
Federal Communications Commission, Chairman	Hyde, H. Rosel
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chairman	Randall, Kenneth A.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Chairman	Horne, John E.
Federal Maritime Commission, Chairman	Harllee, John
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Director	Simkin, William E.
Federal Power Commission, Chairman	White, Lee C.
Federal Reserve System, Chairman, Board of Governors	Martin, William McC., Jr.
Federal Trade Commission, Chairman	Dixon, Paul Rand
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, Chairman	Sutton, Leonard V. B.
General Services Administration, Administrator	Knott, Lawson B., Jr.
Indian Claims Commission, Chairman	Vance, John T.
Interstate Commerce Commission, Chairman	Tierney, Paul J.
National Aeronautic and Space Administration, Administrator	Webb, James E. (Vacant)
National Aeronautic and Space Administrator, Deputy Administrator	Paine, Thomas O.
National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities, Chairman	Stevens, Roger L.
National Labor Relations Board, Chairman	McCulloch, Frank W.
National Mediation Board, Chairman	Ganser, Howard G.
National Science Foundation, Director	Haworth, Leland J.
New England Regional Commission, EDA Federal Cochairman	Linnchan, John J.

CHAIRMEN OF PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT AGENCIES - October 14, 1968 (cont'd)

Ozarks Regional Commission, Federal Co-
chairman
Panama Canal Company, President
Railroad Retirement Board, Chairman
Renegotiation Board, Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission,
Chairman
Selective Service System Director
Small Business Administration,
Administrator
Subversive Activities Control Board,
Chairman
Tax Court of the United States, Chief
Judge
Tennessee Valley Authority, Chairman
United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Director
United States Civil Service Commission,
Chairman
United States Information Agency,
Director
United States Tariff Commission,
Chairman
Veterans Administration, Administrator

McCandless, William M.
Leber, W. P., Maj. Gen.
Habermeyer, Howard W.
Hartwig, Lawrence E.

Cohen, Manuel F.
Hershey, Lewis B., Lt. Gen.

Samuels, Howard J.

Manhan, John W.

Drennen, William M.
Wagner, Aubrey J.

Foster, William C.

Macy, John W., Jr.

Marks, Leonard H.

Metzger, Stanley D.
Driver, William J.

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November 24, 1953

SUMMARY SHEET

FEDERAL PERSONNEL PROBLEM

Purpose

The attached material is based on information received by various Republican senatorial offices. Its purpose is to bring to the attention of the Administration a pattern of operation within the personnel branches of the executive agencies and departments which we believe is highly detrimental to the programs of the Administration. Due to limitations of time and personnel the scope of this material has been confined to the presentation of selected examples which we believe are sufficient to indicate the pattern of operation.

In brief, the evidence would indicate that the following objectionable practices exist:

Personnel and organization and management directors who are closely allied with the previous Administration are ignoring qualified people who are recommended for positions with the federal government.

Available positions in the federal government are being filled by personnel who are not in sympathy with the present Administration and its policies and it is believed that personnel directors as well as organization and management directors in the departments and agencies are instrumental in obtaining such appointments.

Certain recently reorganized agencies and departments would appear to have failed to take advantage of reorganization powers granted them by Congress with respect to the hiring of personnel.

The Civil Service Commission has recently revoked its previous order which would have permitted the reorganization of bureaus within agencies and departments without the transfer of personnel.

There is a well defined pattern of transfers between agencies involving personnel directors and organization and management directors which indicates an interlocking scheme of protection and organization designed in part to protect incumbents in government positions and to thwart the appointment of qualified individuals who are sympathetic to the new administration.

Recommendations

The following changes are suggested:

A broader interpretation of the executive order which establishes Schedule C positions to include all policy making positions in the executive branch of the government.

Personnel and organization and management directors should be made Schedule C positions (see attached list of personnel directors with dates of appointment; personal histories of personnel directors may be found in agency files.)

To relieve the immediate situation the position of special assistant for personnel should be created in each agency and department.

RECOMMENDATION FOR PERSONNEL DIRECTORS JOBS BEING
PLACED IN SCHEDULE "C"

Patronage bottlenecks are caused by existing agency resistance through government operations control. Democrats in policy making key positions have this year and will continue, unless constructive steps are taken to adopt a new pattern, to embarrass the Republican senators, congressmen and the Republican National Committee. Everyone tells the same story - Republican people are sent to the agencies and they rarely ever get hired - why? Is it really because of the Republican budget cuts?

During the last twenty years the Democrats built up a new organization and they covered up in their reorganization two very important and crucially key positions. Seventy-two laws were passed during this time which directly or indirectly consolidated these positions through Civil Service Commission authority until today there is in control of government an operating group small in number but protected by these laws authorizing the Civil Service Commission to give these jobs and men the protection anticipated by Democrats and now needed by them.

In every agency the Administrator or Secretary knows what he wants to do policywise but must have the willing cooperation of two men: the Personnel Director and the Organization and Procedures Director. Presently, these jobs and men are placed under the protection of the Civil Service Commission and can't be touched because they are declared to be non-policy making positions.

In government there is what is known as a job description covering the duties of the individual. This job description is approved by CSC and a man having the qualifications to fit the job must be selected to fill the job and he must be approved by the CSC. Where private

industry would keep changing the job descriptions to truly reflect the true duties of the personnel director - government does not. The result is a piece of paper legally correct but out of date when the true and factual duties of the incumbent are known. At present, personnel directors are today not performing in accordance with the job description listed with CSC but are determining which people are hired and which are not by using the gimmicks of the CSC and controlling subordinates to the advantage of the Democrats and keeping the qualified Republicans out.

Our present CSC is not rendering a favorable climate for Republican appointments and unless the jobs of Personnel Directors and Directors of Organization and Management are placed in Schedule C and the CSC gives a clear cut two to one majority for the Republicans, the unfavorable situation will continue.

The Personnel Director is a key man in that he is recommending changes and keeping his administrators advised. Especially since many top level Republican appointees are new to government and they tend to feel helpless and rely upon the advice of the incumbents as they would in business. This makes the Personnel Director and the Organization and Management Director even more of a policy maker.

In government the employees are very party conscious and tend to be loyal to those who appointed them, not those who keep them in the jobs. There are many who feel they belong to the club and as long as they do they are in and when their club is out of power they expect anything to happen but they drag their feet meanwhile. This applies to the grade 9 jobs and above, quite across the board and in some cases certain lower positions.

The difference between the function of personnel directors in private industry and government is that personnel directors along with the other officials of a private firm are all members of the same team, whereas in the government they are appointed by one or the other political party. Regardless of the fact that they claim to be career people their sympathies remain with the political party responsible for their appointment.

It is our belief the key to the whole thing, the situation of appointments in government, are with the directors of personnel and the directors of organization and management. (See attached list of personnel directors with dates of appointment.)

On May 29, 1953, the Civil Service Commission issued an order "Which would enable an agency to abolish a bureau, lay off all its employees, transfer their functions to another bureau and staff the new bureau with completely new employees." This would have given personnel directors an opportunity to ride the agency of old new deal Democrats who were not cooperating with the Administration and to replace them with capable Republicans in accordance with Civil Service Commission authorization. If there had been personnel directors appointed by Republicans they would no doubt have taken advantage of this opportunity. This order was later rescinded, just prior to the reorganization at Department of Agriculture. It is alleged that personnel people at Agriculture complimented the Commission on this action. They stated that by rescinding this order the Secretary of Agriculture was prevented from doing some things he wanted to. This is disloyalty.

To our knowledge, only one department has replaced the Director of Personnel with a Republican appointee. The argument has been offered

that the position of Director of Personnel is not on a policy making level. It is pointed out that a reference to the Civil Service job description of this position and of actual duties and influence will indicate it to be of a high policy level. As the situation is today, the personnel directors are able to work together to the point of giving reductions in force in one agency and arranging with directors of personnel in another agency to rehire good Democrats released from the first agency. For example, in a position at Foreign Operations Administration, a position as Chief of Recruitment was authorized by Organization and Management and while the record indicates there was a Republican qualified under Civil Service standards for the position within the agency, it is alleged a man was brought over from the State Department - "Walter Curtis" and placed in this job at a GS-14. We are told Curtis worked for an insurance company prior to 1947 when he went into the State Department as an employee. In 1947, he was earning \$4200 per year. He has been brought along as fast, if not faster, than Civil Service promotional regulations would permit and through the cooperation of his "friends" qualified for \$9600. Curtis was endorsed by George Elison, Arch K. Jean and Judson H. Lightsey from the State Department. Lightsey was originally connected, or worked under, Henry A. Wallace in the Board of Economic Warfare and has been a long term new dealer, as are Elison and Jean. Lightsey has since been transferred to U.S.I.A. and on at least one occasion a Senator's office was told that he was the man that must be contacted on personnel matters. This is another case of transfers in order to control the personnel situation.

PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE

In connection with reduction in force notices at Foreign Operations

Administration, the following are some of the individuals who received their notices: Jay Wescott, Everett Bellows, Robert Whitett, Harry Clement. Interviews were arranged for them under cloudy circumstances with recruiting representatives of UNKRA here in Washington. These men were interviewed according to a pre-arranged plan and offered positions with UNKRA in Korea. All of the above named it is alleged are well known extreme new dealers with political philosophies of the extreme left. It might be pointed out that as far as can be determined, none of the Republicans receiving reduction in force notices at that time were allowed the benefit of such interviews. This would indicate that the Director of Personnel at Foreign Operations Administration, or at least some of his assistants, are most certainly working in close contact with the personnel people at UNKRA. We might remind the reader at this point that Tyler C. Wood, a Democrat of long years of government service, is heading the Foreign Operations Administration mission in Korea and has as his assistant Bill Coleman, another alleged new dealer.

JOB CREATION

In the case of an individual at Foreign Operations Administration reduced in force, an administrative position was "created" in the International Branch of the U. S. Office of Education to take care of this individual. Yet we are told there are no vacancies if we call there. This individual had been a personnel director in a private concern and was brought into the government by a Republican in a high office. The people making the offer to create the job in the Office of Education did not know of this man's affiliation with the Republican party at that time. This again would indicate a close working

relationship between personnel people in Foreign Operations Administration and those in the Office of Education, which is indicative of the same kind of thing going on in other agencies. We are informed that where pressure is too great to keep a Democrat in a position, the plan is to get a so-called Republican with government service, and one with whom the old crowd is acquainted and attempt to have him fill the position.

TECHNIQUE

In connection with the filling of vacancies in agencies, these vacancies are held in suspended action and are not officially listed for recruitment until it is convenient to do so by the personnel director and/or the operating official or officials. This gives them an opportunity to determine the "qualifications" of the candidate wanted for each job and many times enables the selection of an individual on a hand picked basis from within the agency or another agency or from recommendations given by those friendly to these people. At the time candidates are referred by letter from the offices of congressmen, senators and the Republican National Committee, these applicants are called in and given interviews and passed from the Personnel Department to operating officials, or vice versa, who are appraised in advance of where these individuals come from and as a result a cursory interview takes place. The applicants leave with the knowledge that the position has not been officially cleared by the budget or the job description has not come out of Classification or the complete program in connection with that project has not been worked out. After the hand picked candidates have been selected, this whole project is dropped officially into place and any other candidates referred by congressmen, senators or the

Republican National Committee, or any candidate previously referred by these groups will be told that the job has already been filled and that no further openings exist. Thus, it is almost impossible to gain acceptance of Republicans under the present personnel set up. Where extreme pressure forces placement of a Republican for the record, an occasional one is taken in and given a job but remains "sealed off" where he can do no harm in terms of policy or otherwise.

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

In Washington, there are today three professional societies to which many government personnel people, as well as Organization and Management people and some other categories, belong for the purpose of research and extending their influence as well as exchange of information. (1) The Society of Personnel Administrators in which many people below GS-12 belong. This Society is influenced a good deal by top Democrats in government agencies through their people who belong. (2) The Society for the Advancement of Management, Washington Chapter, is composed largely of the technical people usually at GS-13 and above, whose people belong to Navy, Air Force, Army, and technical agencies. (3) The Civil Service Assembly which has chapters throughout the United States. People who belong to this Society are usually old line civil servants, and many of the top career people belong to and support this organization. These people know one another and often hold memberships in all three organizations. Information is exchanged and people are recommended by and recruited through these societies. It is alleged there is a close working relationship between the personnel directors and these organizations.

To again indicate the policy making level and influence of the

personnel directors' positions, consider for example, the recruitment of personnel for overseas service. Prior to January 20, 1953, candidates were recruited and various processes were carried on concurrently, viz: interviews, reference checks, physical examination, security check, passport application, shots, which enabled the accepted applicant to be in the field in a relatively short time. An example exists where a candidate was picked up on the West Coast and was in Taipei within six or seven weeks (T. O. Ryhesbarger, a Geographer-FOA). This involved the cooperation of Personnel as well as Operations. Since January 20, 1953, applicants are required in the program at FOA to be recruited on the basis of consecutive rather than concurrent steps in the processing, such as first the interview, then references must be carefully checked and evaluated, following that security must be completed, followed by a physical examination and the answer received either favorable or unfavorable. The applicant's biography then must be cabled to the mission in which vacancies exist, a cabled reply received before passport application is made, shots cannot be given until the passport application has been made. All of this taking from three to six months. Upon inquiry one would be told that there is a clause in that order which indicates that any applicant considered priority can be recruited on a priority basis. However, in a program such/^{as}FOA, operating on a temporary basis all overseas jobs are generally required as on priority basis. It is pointed out that personnel directors in all government agencies could, in this same way, slow down the program of the Administration.

STATE DEPARTMENT

In the case of six or eight jobs that were up for consideration

on a Schedule C basis after a Republican appointee had taken over as personnel director, within a week members of the Personnel Management Staff had influenced the newly appointed personnel director against authorizing the placement of these six or eight jobs in Schedule C. The individual that related this incident laughed about it indicating that it was rather unusual. Under the Democrats, this would not have happened. This was a Democrat in personnel of another agency indicating that the story had gotten around other agencies that the Democrats in the State Department could wield some immediate influence.

EXAMPLES OF INFLUENCE IN PLACEMENT

In order to give a few specific examples to demonstrate how personnel directors are cooperating with one another to prevent placement of Republicans we submit below some cases brought to our attention.

Post Office Department. Charles Hook, Jr., reports to Mr. Summerfield, Postmaster General. The Post Office Department is considering a project whereby the United States will be divided into sixteen areas, or regions. An administrative officer for each region, a special assistant, personnel officer, an employment officer, a classification officer and whatever clerks and other personnel are needed will be appointed to administer the regional affairs. The first personnel officer to be appointed was a long time Democrat by the name of Arthur McLean, who was formerly at Federal Security Agency as Personnel Director. He was brought over to FOA by Everett Bellows, noted left winger. His inefficiency was soon apparent and he was told that if he didn't resign charges would be preferred. He chose to resign and he has recently been appointed Personnel Officer in the Cincinnati, Ohio, region and is scheduled to be out there within the next few days. (See

attached Jerry Kluttz story from Washington Post. This column printed a long time after this report came to us.)

"Q. Who is responsible for the appointment?

A. A Gus Hertz. He is a young consultant, probably about 32, but the point is age doesn't make much difference, job experience in the consultant field is what is important. He has been authorized by Mr. Hook to do the organization and management work in setting up these regions as well as the interviewing of all applicants for the job.

"Q. What is his background?

A. A long time Democrat. I haven't any idea where he is from. I know Hertz got out of the job he had by reduction in force. He came over to our office and the fellow he was formerly working with - Leonard Johnson, who is an officer of the Civil Service Assembly to which Hertz belongs, talked immediately to Mel Spector, Acting Personnel Director, about him. I think Johnson is Treasurer of that Society. When he found we didn't have a job he was told about creating a job in FOA. At that time they had Helen Elliot, who was there and they couldn't give this job to this fellow, so they got her to leave and they would have let that man get into this job. However, about that time Hertz received an appointment at the Post Office Department."

COMMISSION CONTACTS

"One individual who is tied into this and he is with Civil Service Commission - Clyde Hall. If any members of the Societies want to know where these jobs are and who to see, you call Clyde Hall.

"Q. What is his job?

A. I don't know what title he has, but his office is supposed to be the office to help people get jobs.

"Q. Is he in charge of recruiting of permanent Civil Service?

A. No, Ed Holland is in charge of placement of displaced career personnel. Mr. Holland is a former O.P.S. Inspector - GS-13, and is alleged to be a well known good Democrat."

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

Another specific example of how personnel people in one agency are working with those in another, is the situation at the Veterans Administration. A man by the name of Longfellow, who is supposed to be a Republican, was appointed the Assistant Administrator under the Republican Administrator - Haegley. A vacancy occurred in the position of personnel director. Fred Zapollo was appointed. Fred Zapollo was originally in charge of the WPA program for a while in Harrisburg for

the State of Pennsylvania and was brought into Federal government by Oscar Ewing as personnel director at the Veterans Administration. He left that job - being recruited for the position of Chief of Employment shortly after ECA was formed on the bi-partisan basis under Paul Hoffman. Recently, he was moved from there upon the recommendation of the CSC and some others to the position of Personnel Consultant to General Kerr at the Veterans Administration, who had been appointed Assistant Administrator for Personnel Purchasing, etc. General Kerr, when he retired, was succeeded by Mr. Longfellow and Mr. Zapollo was made Acting Personnel Director. Here was an instance of a vacancy on a high level position being filled by a Democrat in spite of the fact that the Administrator was a Republican appointee. Several apparently qualified candidates were endorsed by senators, the Republican National Committee and by the personnel people at the White House. Here is another instance of where personnel people now classified under Civil Service are transferred from one agency to another in order to assure the Democrats of keeping a firm hand on the personnel situation.

"Q. You mentioned that Donald Dawson was still very active. How was this possible? What is he doing?

A. He has an office here in town as a consultant.

"Q. What kind of a consultant?

A. He doesn't say what kind of a consultant he is. Dawson was directing this Federal Personnel Council and had his thumb right on top of it. For a long time they didn't know what to do or how he could be most effective working from his house. After the new Administration took over, he decided the Republicans weren't going to clean out personnel people so he opened an office and is listed as just consultant. The word is to see Donald because he still has people under his thumb.

"Q. In view of his prior activities, do you have any knowledge or information whether he is hired as a consultant to obtain jobs with the Government?

A. No, just from what I hear from the boys.

"Q. You mentioned before that right after January the personnel people

all expected to be moved?

A. Yes. Not only the personnel top people but the management group. Any people that the Democrats felt that were policy making people and they were making temporary plans to leave Washington. As far as they were concerned the group behind Dawson is A.D.A. and Bob Nathan - he is working with them."

PUBLIC HEALTH

"In Public Health, there is another example, Carl Nasi. I don't know what his background is. He is a public health civil engineer. He came from Public Health to the number two spot in MSA/PHS. Now he is acting due to Dr. Hedley's death. Carl just moved up. Not appointment. They have a fellow in mind - I don't know what his name is - a long time Democrat, however."

In this agency we have another instance of a vacancy in the position of personnel director. A Democrat was appointed.

INTERNAL REVENUE

In the Internal Revenue Department many examples are evident.

Harold Vance, head of Management at OPS, after election moved over to the Internal Revenue Department in a high management position and took his secretary with him.

Philip Charles applied to FOA for a grade 15 Deputy Personnel Director. FOA was told by CSC that unless Charles was hired they would not approve anyone else. Since Mel Spector, acting Personnel Director, wanted Edward MacMinamsn, who was with him in Paris in this job, arrangements were made on the inside with Edward Montague, Director of Personnel at Internal Revenue, for Charles to be employed over there; thus, opening the job at FOA for Mac Minamen.

Edward Montague, former Director of Personnel for the State Department, was transferred to the Internal Revenue Department as Personnel Director. Winston McNamara, Assistant Chief of Recruitment at FOA was transferred to the Internal Revenue Department six weeks ago.

It appears that the Democratic personnel people are concentrating on

"loading" the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Evelyn Robison in the position of assistant to Jane Ganeshan, brought into FOA by Spector, Acting Personnel Director. She was formerly Administrative Officer at OPS. She was moved into this position at OPS never having had a day of experience in personnel work, but is a well known Democrat. Miss Robison was first hired at FOA on the basis of 90 days but since has been moved into this position, apparently to stay.

OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

The following are selected cases which illustrate the fact that overseas employment affords a convenient foxhole for politically active Democrats. Other cases could be cited but unfortunately, there is no central depository of the personnel records of persons employed by the United States Government in its overseas establishments. It is extremely difficult to get personnel information in regard to overseas employment because such information is scattered throughout the Executive establishment and by that method, is well hidden.

(1) Eugene H. Merrill, Chief, INFRA Construction Section NATO, Paris, France.

Merrill's present position pays \$14,300 per annum (Grade FSR-1), exclusive of allowances, etc. This appointment was made subsequent to January 20, 1953.

Merrill is the close personal friend and political protege of former Congressman Walter K. Granger, Democrat of the State of Utah.

In May 1952, Granger put Merrill's name forward for appointment to the Board of Directors of TVA. This recommendation culminated a long series of New Deal-Fair Deal positions held by Merrill dating from November 1941 - ORM, WPB, State, Military Govt.-Germany, NPA and DPA.

In the heat of the 1952 Presidential campaign, President Truman appointed Merrill a member of the FCC. This appointment was announced by President Truman in the course of a campaign speech at Provo, Utah, Merrill's home state. Following the November election, President Eisenhower withdrew the Merrill appointment. Thereafter, Merrill was appointed to the \$14,000 job which he now holds.

The report of contributions filed by the Democratic National Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives shows that in October 1952 Merrill contributed \$100 to the Democratic Campaign Fund. This is but one item in a long record of financial contributions and support for the Democratic Party and individual Democratic candidates. In 1950, Merrill contributed \$100 to Democratic Congresswoman Reva Beck Bosone and \$150 to Democratic Congressman Walter K. Granger. Inasmuch as Merrill was then on the Federal payroll, the propriety of these contributions was questioned and made the subject of national publicity. The contributions seem to transgress the provisions of the Act of June 25, 1948 to make it a criminal offense for government employees to donate monies to members of Congress.

(2) Guy J. Swope, Special Assistant to the High Commissioner (Germany)

Swope's position pays \$14,000 per annum (Grade FSR-1), exclusive of allowances, etc. This appointment was made prior to January 20, 1953.

Swope is an ardent and active Democrat. He served one term in the Congress of the United States (1937-39) as a Democratic member of Congress from the State of Pennsylvania. Thereafter he was appointed Auditor and then later Governor of Puerto Rico; then Director of the Division of Territories in the Department of the Interior--these were outright patronage appointments requiring the clearance of the Democratic

National Committee.

During the war, Swope was a commissioned officer in the United States Navy. Thereafter, he held several important jobs in the U. S. Military Government, first in Japan, and now in Germany.

The official Democratic National Committee report of contributions for 1952 shows that in October 1952 Swope contributed \$300 to the Democratic Campaign Fund. No effort has been made to search out his contributions in prior years but it can be reasonably assumed that such contributions were made.

(3) William E. Warne, Director of Operations, U. S. Mission to Iran.

Warne holds a position paying \$13,200 per annum (Grade TCA-1), exclusive of allowances, etc.

Warne's appointment to his present position was effected prior to January 20, 1953. He has a long record of New Deal-Fair Deal employment and enjoyed very special trust and confidence of New Deal-Fair Deal officials in the U. S. Department of the Interior. Warne has an open and well-known record of active Democratic partisanship. He is a former publicity man who rose to become Assistant Secretary of the Interior under former Secretary Oscar Chapman. He stepped down from his position as Assistant Secretary to become Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation and it was from this position that he was appointed to his present position in Iran. This personnel action was taken in November 1951.

No attempt has been made to search out Warne's record of contributions to Democratic campaign funds.

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Free

THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL POLITICAL EXECUTIVES*

DEAN E. MANN
The Brookings Institution

Central to the problem of obtaining intelligent and effective management and policy direction in the federal government are the sources and procedures used in the selection of federal political executives. These executives, occupying positions usually subject to presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation, constitute the "key group in making representative government work within the executive branch."¹ Through them the President directs and controls his administration, creates political support, and establishes lines of defense for his political program. Increasing attention has been paid to the selection process in recent years because of frequent reports of extreme difficulty in recruiting able people, inability to retain their services, and allegations that those who have served have proven less than adequate. The problem as broadly stated by the (Jackson) subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations is: "how to make the quality of appointments of private citizens to national services keep pace with the spiraling complexity and difficulty of foreign policy and defense problems."²

The information available on the backgrounds of men who have served as political executives, the duration of their terms, the procedures used in their selection and their reactions to the prospect of government service—in short, the information to substantiate these charges—has hitherto been highly impressionistic, based on inadequate data, out of date, or tinged with ideological preferences. To cite but a few examples, C. Wright Mills characterized the second team of the political directorate in his *Power Elite*³ on the basis of a rela-

tively brief period at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, alleging that they were the product of big businessmen fathers, Ivy League colleges, large corporations or big law firms, and country clubs, all of which made them "representative of the corporate rich." In their landmark study of *Federal Administrators*,⁴ now 25 years old, Macmahon and Millett said that "appointments to assistant secretaryships have been political in most connotations of that word, with little regard for qualifications or the needs of the posts. Few of the occupants of these positions have been conspicuous individuals." One imaginative commentator asserted that the difference between a Roosevelt New Dealer and a Truman Fair Dealer was about 30 pounds; the difference between an Eisenhower and a Kennedy executive was about 30 years and a shift from "gentlemen 'C' boys" to Phi Beta Kappas.⁵

For the present study, several approaches were taken in obtaining information on the process of selecting political executives. First, we secured biographical information on all political executives who had served in the federal government between 1933 and 1961.⁶ Using standard biographical sources and information supplied by the federal agencies, we assembled profiles of these executives, including information on place of birth, education, occupation, residence, party affiliation, age at the time of appointment, and length and kind of previous public service. Second, using a modified random sampling procedure we chose 108 cases of appointments during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations for an intensive investigation to learn the procedures followed in the recruitment and selection of political executives. Interviews were

* This paper is taken from a book to be published in 1964 by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., by Dean E. Mann with the collaboration of Jameson W. Doig. An earlier version was presented at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, May 1963.

¹ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on *Personnel and Civil Service*, February 1955, p. 39.

² "The Private Citizen and the National Service," *Organizing for National Security*, Hearings, vol. 3, 1961, p. 63.

³ New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 233.

⁴ New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 302.

⁵ William V. Shannon, "The Kennedy Administration: The Early Months," *The American Scholar*, fall 1961, pp. 484-85.

⁶ As defined in this study political executives are limited to under secretaries and assistant secretaries in major departments and deputies in several other agencies: Bureau of the Budget, Veterans Administration, General Services Administration, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, United States Information Agency, International Cooperation Administration and predecessors.

Notes



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