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Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	3	10/25/1968	Other Document	Report binder cover for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	10/25/1968	Report	Table of Contents for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	10/25/1968	Other Document	Section 1 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	06/17/1968	Report	Cover page for "The Development of the White House Office, 1939-1967" by Alex B. Lacy, Jr. Section 1 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	06/17/1968	Report	Abstract for "The Development of the White House Office, 1939-1967" by Alex B. Lacy, Jr. Section 1 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	06/17/1968	Report	"The Development of the White House Office, 1939-1967" by Alex B. Lacy, Jr. Section 1 of "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. Pages 1-33 plus 5 pages of footnotes. 38 pgs.

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20	3	10/25/1968	Other Document	Section 2 tab divider for "1968-1969 Presidential Transaction" by Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. 1 pg.
20	3	08/15/1968	Letter	Letter from Franklin Lincoln to RN RE: Post-election transition. 3 pgs.
20	3	08/15/1968	Memo	Memo from Franklin Lincoln to RN RE: "Preparing for the Post-Election Transition" Pages 1-30. 31 pgs.

1968-69

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. Oct. 25, 1968

1. The Development of the White House Office,
1939-1967 - study by Alex B. Lacy, Jr. - 1967
2. Lincoln memo to RN of August 18, 1968 -
Preparing for the post-election transition
3. The Presidency, Executive Staffing and the
Federal Bureaucracy - study by Laurin L. Henry,
1967
4. Lincoln memo of November 11, 1968 to RN
re transition
5. 1968-1969 Presidential Transition
6. Summary Sheet - Federal Personnel Problem
November 24, 1953
7. Reprint from The American Political Science Review
"The Selection of Federal Political Executives by
Dean E. Mann, The Brookings Institution
March, 1964
8. Study of the Presidency - Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
May, 1968
9. A Suggested Patronage Program for the Incoming
Republican Administration by Fred Telford
January 12, 1953

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, 1853-1967

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✓ Prepared for delivery at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Pick-Congress
Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9. Copyright, 1967, The
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Abstract: "The Development of the White House Office, 1939-1967"

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Prepared for delivery at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9. Copyright, 1967, The American Political Science Association.

In the first section of the paper the development of White House activities prior to 1939 is summarized briefly. The Reorganization Act of 1939 and organization Plan NO. 1 of that year are discussed as the legal foundation of establishment of the Executive Office of the President including the creation of the White House Office in that year. The debate over the merits of the centralization of the Presidency is reviewed and the nature of the study of White House activities in this part is described.

In the second section of the paper data for a biographical profile of the White House Office staff of each of the five Presidents since 1939 is presented. The typical staff member during this period has been in his mid-forties, white (only three Negroes served), male, from the Eastern half of the United States, with prior experience in the federal government, and holder of at least one Ivy League degree.

The third section of the paper is a discussion of the organization of the White House Office under Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Attention is given to such topics as the relationship of the staff to the President, work habits, the evolution of major staff positions, and staff schedules.

Finally, the impact of expanded staff facilities in the White House Office on the Presidency is evaluated.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, 1939-1967
by Alex B. Lacy, Jr. *

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Prepared for delivery at the 1967 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association; Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9.
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When Thomas Jefferson entered the White House in 1801, his professional staff was composed of a messenger and an occasional secretary. He paid the messenger out of his own pocket. However, the secretary, William Short, was paid out of Washington, and, for the most part, Jefferson handled his own correspondence. More than a century later Woodrow Wilson conducted a world war and a major international diplomatic effort with only seven personal aides. In the years separating the experiences of these two eminent political theorists, other Presidents had struggled along with little staff assistance. Grant had only two professional staff members and McKinley had the painful experience of having an offer to Mr. J. A. Porter to become his Secretary refused because of "the low recognition value of the job." 1

When Franklin Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933 in a time of grave emergency, he quickly found that the President had very little assistance outside of the Bureau of the Budget, still primarily a center for the correlation of budget estimates from the departments, and the line departments and agencies. Roosevelt operated throughout his first term with three formal, professional staff members - the three secretaries - and a small clerical staff. In order to get the job done, he borrowed staff from the line departments and agencies - sometimes moving them physically to the White House, usually leaving them in their old offices and calling on them when needed. In addition, he relied on old friends like Judge Samuel Rosenman to give him assistance when a special task had to be completed.

When the emergency was over and the President had time to give attention to the structure of the executive branch in 1936, he called on three political scientists, Charles E. Merriam, Luther Gulick, and Louis Brownlow, to give him advice on the subject. This team under the leadership of Brownlow formed the President's Committee on Administrative Management and their report in 1937 led to a major reorganization and expansion of the President's staff facilities. 2

Since the work of the Brownlow committee and the events which followed the report are well known, only a very brief summary of the report and the following events will be given here.³ The Committee's basic thesis was that the organization of the executive should be designed to increase the effectiveness of the President as administrative manager of the executive branch. They found the President bogged down with an impossible workload:

Where, for example, can there be found an executive in any way comparable upon whom so much petty work is thrown? Or who is forced to see so many persons on unrelated matters and to make so many decisions on the basis of what may be, because of the very press of work, incomplete information? How is it humanly possible to know fully the affairs and problems of over 100 separate major agencies, to say nothing of being responsible for their general direction and coordination.⁴

The report emphasized that priority of attention should be given to presidential staff and its first recommendation was that the White House Staff be expanded.⁵

The Committee then went on to recommend the other ingredients of the Executive Office of the President. When President Roosevelt transmitted the report to Congress in 1937 he firmly supported its conclusion:

. . . that the President cannot adequately handle his responsibilities; that he is overworked; that it is humanly impossible, under the system which we have, for him fully to carry out his constitutional duty as Chief Executive, because he is overwhelmed with minor details and needless contacts arising directly from the bad organization and equipment of the Government. I can testify to this. With my predecessors who have said the same thing over and over again, I plead guilty.⁶

One major result of the Brownlow Committee study was the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1939 which formed the legal basis for Reorganization Plan No. 1 and Executive Order 8248 of September 8, 1939 which established the Executive Office of the President with an expanded White House Office as one of its ingredients.

Since 1939, the Executive Office of the President has grown at a rapid pace. Since it is our purpose here to deal only with the White House Office, it is enough to say that the White House Office expansion is illustrative of what was happening in the entire Executive Office. The Executive Office has now overflowed the old State, War and Navy building which a few years earlier had housed three major departments.

President Grant operated the White House Office on a budget of \$13,800 and a total of six employees. McKinley had a budget of \$44,340 and a total staff of twenty-seven. Coolidge's White House had forty-six employees operating on a

budget of \$93,520.⁷ When the Brownlow Committee made its report in 1937, Roosevelt had thirty-seven employees in the White House Office and a budget of about \$200,000. By 1967 the budget had increased to nearly three million dollars. The total White House staff for 1966 has been estimated to be 2,845.⁸

Table I

White House Office Budget, 1937-1967

Fiscal year	Total Personnel	Total Obligations Incurred
1937	109,222	200,000 E*
1938	128,759	211,380
1939	126,066	213,160
1940	145,842	222,900
1941	172,005	222,800
1942	164,448	224,860
1943	180,782	226,210
1944	225,789	302,190
1945	235,643	339,131
1946	250,996	342,588
1947	772,122	848,507
1948	1,067,200	1,194,502
1949	1,023,060	1,123,843
1950	1,185,660	1,304,735
1951	1,367,294	1,495,699
1952	1,446,264	1,609,398
1953	1,525,290	1,732,324
1954	1,435,479	1,640,452
1955	1,640,038	1,854,770
1956	1,649,934	1,877,952
1957	1,672,258	1,846,946
1958	1,748,437	2,051,970
1959	1,878,940	2,222,000
1960	1,906,000	2,221,000
1961	2,097,000	2,478,000
1962	2,003,000	2,449,000
1963	2,045,000	2,534,000
1964	2,156,000	2,717,000
1965	2,248,000	2,841,000
1966	2,435,000 E*	2,940,000 E*
1967	2,450,000 E*	2,955,000 E*

*Estimate

The budgetary story of the expansion in the White House Office can be seen in Table I. The first big jump in budget after 1939 occurred in 1947 when President Truman insisted that all borrowing of personnel from the agencies and departments had to cease. The 1947 budget then was the first "honest" one for the White House Office. President Truman's staff was not that much larger than Roosevelt's. The increase in budget since 1947 has been steady, although on several occasions it has been cut slightly from one year to the next. The trend has been steadily upward.

Although the professional staff in the White House Office has not increased as rapidly as these budgeting figures might suggest, Roosevelt after 1939 operated with an average of eight professional staff members while Eisenhower began his Presidency in 1953 with twenty-one and Kennedy began his Presidency in 1961 with that same number.

It cannot be denied that the Reorganization Act of 1939 and Reorganization Plan No. 1 rank among the most important events in the development of the American Presidency. Moreover, few political scientists today would argue that the "institution" of the Presidency, the Executive Office of the President in general and the White House Office in particular, is not important. As Clinton Rossiter has put it, "We can never again talk about it [the Presidency] sensibly without accounting for 'the men around the President.'" ⁹

The term "institutionalization" is a difficult one to define as applied to the Presidency. It is generally operationalized as synonymous with the expansion of the Executive Office of the President. It certainly has meaning in much broader terms than this, however. It involves, at the very least, formal constitutional developments relative to the office, informal, political developments relative to the office including especially recent developments in presidential-congressional relations, and the evolving national and international public image of the office as well as the development of staff. ¹⁰

However, the merits of this "institutionalization" (in the narrow sense) of the American Presidency have been the subject of heated debate. The debate is a familiar one and it is not necessary for us to consider it in detail here. Professors Rossiter and Corwin, both writing in the mid-1950's under the immediate influence of the Eisenhower White House, are able spokesmen for the opposing sides of the argument. Rossiter viewed Executive Order 8248 as the salvation of the Presidency and the Constitution:

I have already pointed out, with the help of Professor White, the momentous administrative significance of this development in the modern Presidency. Its constitutional significance, it seems to me, is even more momentous. It converts the Presidency into an instrument of twentieth-century government; it gives the incumbent a sporting chance to stand the strain and fulfill his constitutional mandate as a one-man branch of our three-part government; it de-

... as even the most forceful arguments, which are still raised

occasionally, for a plural executive; it assures us that the Presidency will survive the advent of the positive state. Executive Order 8248 may yet be judged to have saved the Presidency from paralysis and the Constitution from radical amendment.¹¹

Corwin, on the other hand, a critic of the Brownlow Committee from the very beginning,¹² viewed the institutionalization of the American Presidency with alarm. As he saw it, most of the dangers of institutionalization had been fulfilled in the Eisenhower administration. The tendency toward "bureaucratization" had been fulfilled and Eisenhower was "reigning rather than ruling" to an extent that, when he became ill in midterm and was incapacitated for a lengthy period of time, "the 'administration' went on notwithstanding the disaster with scarcely a tremor."¹³ However, even Corwin concluded that "the office remains highly personal."¹⁴ Corwin's answer, of course, was a new type of Cabinet which would stabilize the relationship between the President and Congress.

Now, nearly three decades after Executive Order 8248 and more than a decade and two administrations after Professors Rossiter and Corwin wrote, precisely what has been the impact of expanded staff facilities on the American Presidency? What have been the most salient characteristics of the "institutionalization" of the office? Is the President, in fact, still free "both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can"?¹⁵

In order to begin to try to answer these questions, the present study is an effort to analyze the role of one aspect of the expanded presidential staff, the professional staff in the White House Office, since 1939. How have the five presidents in the period organized their staffs? What have been the work patterns of the staff members? What kind of men have served in the White House Office and how did they view their work? What role has the professional staff of the White House Office played in presidential decision-making?

Political scientists have conducted very little research on these questions and most of the studies that are available were completed in the 1950's. Edward H. Hobbs covers the White House Office in his pacemaking studies of presidential staffing and its impact on administrative management. Richard Neustadt, a member of the Truman staff and close to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has written on the subject in several excellent articles and certainly has to be counted as the leading authority on our subject. Louis W. Koenig has written poignant biographical accounts of three staff members in our period, Thomas G. Corcoran, Harry Hopkins, and Sherman Adams. Rexford G. Tugwell has some interesting observations on the role of presidential staff in his volume, The Enlargement of the Presidency. Finally, J. C. Heinlein has contributed an excellent monograph on presidential staff and national security policy.¹⁶

One reason that so little research has been conducted on the White House Office is simply that data on the subject are very difficult to obtain. There are very few personal memoirs of staff members, and those that have been written

frequently are not helpful. The oral history projects of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy libraries working with the National Archives are promising, but little of their work is available for use and much of it will not be available until all persons involved in the record are deceased. Journalistic accounts of the White House Office are not available in quantity until the Eisenhower period and they are frequently not revealing.

With so little written material available, most of the data for this study was collected through interviews with men who have served in the White House Office since 1939. Since early 1966 I have conducted interviews with nearly twenty per cent of the men who held professional staff positions in this period. The interviews covered staff members of all five administrations and lasted an average of about ninety minutes. The interview schedule was flexible and questions were open-ended. The respondents were generally questioned about staff organization and work patterns, their perceptions of their role in the White House Office, and their relationship to the decision-making processes in the White House. In addition, they were asked to give their account of the process by which they were recruited to the White House Office and, in some cases, their reasons for leaving the job were solicited. In a number of instances the respondents discussed alternative patterns of staff organization and work habits and gave assessments of the potentiality and limitations of the White House Office of the future. Some respondents were also questioned about specific decision-making crises in the White House which will be discussed in a later paper. All of the respondents were assured that they would not be quoted and that observations would not be attributed to them directly.

In this paper I will deal first with some of the data for a biographical profile of the White House Office professional staff for each of the five Presidents since 1939. The major part of the paper will then be devoted to a discussion of the organization and work habits of each of the staffs. Each of these subjects will be discussed in more detail and the role of the staff in presidential decision-making will be treated in a book length manuscript which is now in preparation.

A Biographical Profile of the White House Professional Staff, 1939-1967

Since the reorganization of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, 169 men have served at the professional staff level in the White House Office.¹⁷ The typical staff member during this twenty-eight year period since the reorganization was in his mid-forties, white (only three Negroes served), male (no women held professional positions during this period although several personal secretaries were quite influential), from the Eastern half of the United States, with prior experience in the federal government service, and holder of at least one Ivy League degree.

Age

The typical appointee to the White House Office staff since 1939 has tended to be several years younger than other executives in top positions in the federal government,¹⁸ and slightly older than business executives on their first senior appointment in the business world.¹⁹

As the data in Table II indicate, the Roosevelt staff was five years older on the average than the youngest staff, the Truman staff, while the average age of the Kennedy staff was only several months older than the Truman staff and the average age of the Eisenhower and Johnson staffs was exactly one year older than the Truman staff.

Table II

Age Distribution and Average Age at Date of Appointment, White House Office Professional Staff, 1939-1967

Age	FDR ¹	HST ²	DDE ³	JFK ⁴	LBJ ⁵
20-29	0	1	4	0	1
30-39	2	6	27	10	4
40-49	4	7	25	12	18
50-59	7	4	22	1	4
60-69	1	1	7	5	2
Over 69	0	0	1	0	0
Average Age	49.6	44.6	45.6	44.9	45.6

¹ Data available for 14 of 16 staff members

² Data available for 19 or 22 staff members

³ Data available for 86 or 86 staff members

⁴ Data available for 28 or 28 staff members

⁵ Data available for 29 of 33 staff members

The White House Office clearly has not been a place for the very young or the very old since 1939. Only six men under the age of thirty have served during the period: the youngest were Stephen Hess and Stephen Benedict, who were appointed at the age of twenty-six in the Eisenhower Administration. Only one staff member, former Senator Walter George, who held a brief special assignment for Eisenhower, was over seventy years of age at the time of his appointment. The high pressure and long hours of employment in the White House make it a position for the middle-aged man.

Geographical Origins

In an effort to give a realistic answer to the question "Where are they from?", the data in Table III take into account the region of primary experience of each staff member as well as his birthplace. Like other federal executives and business leaders, White House staff members generally had their principal occupational experience in a region other than their birthplace.²⁰ Their mobility tended to be from farms and small towns to cities, especially Washington.

Thirteen of fourteen staff members for whom data is available in the Roosevelt Administration after 1939 and fifteen of twenty Truman staff members were born in rural areas. However, nearly all of them had their principal experience before appointment to the White House Office staff in Washington or the Middle Atlantic cities. On the other hand, a majority of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson staff members were born in urban areas. Those who were born in rural areas had their principal experiences in the cities of the East and there was even a tendency for those born in urban areas to migrate to Washington for their major occupational experience prior to appointment to the White House Office. Only two of the fifty-seven staff members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for whom data is available had their principal experience prior to their White House assignment in rural areas.

Naturally, Presidents tend to find a primary recruiting ground in their own native regions. Thus Truman relied more than the other Presidents on the West North Central states. Similarly, Kennedy relied on New England and Johnson has relied on his native Texas. Eisenhower, long removed from his midwestern origin, tended to favor the business world of the Middle Atlantic states as his primary recruiting ground. Roosevelt's staff members were not concentrated in any particular region of birth, but half of them had had their primary experience in Washington.

The East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions were noticeably underrepresented on the White House Staff, both as regions of birth and principal experience, compared with the total population of the region. The South Atlantic region, almost entirely because of the location of Washington in the region, was overrepresented as an area of principal experience. The Middle Atlantic region was overrepresented as a region of birth and, to a large extent, as a principal region. Significantly, ten of the staff members in this period were

Table III

Geographical Origins, White House Office Professional Staff, 1939-1967

Census ¹ Region	% of pop. 1950 cen.	FDR ²		HST ³		DDE ⁴		JFK ⁵		LBJ ⁶	
		Prin. Birth	Prin. loc.								
New Eng- land	6%	0	2	3	1	11	8	5	8	4	5
Middle Atlantic	20%	0	2	5	3	25	33	3	3	8	6
South Atlantic	14%	3	7	3	14	8	25	1	12	1	14
East South Central	8%	2	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	0
West South Central	10%	1	0	1	0	4	1	1	1	6	2
East North Central	20%	3	3	1	0	11	10	2	0	4	1
West North Central	9%	3	0	5	2	9	2	4	1	1	0
Mountain	3%	0	0	0	0	5	3	4	0	3	0
Pacific	10%	0	0	1	0	4	4	1	3	0	1
Foreign		2	0	0	0	6	0	2	0	0	0
Rural*		13	3	15	0	36	12	12	2	12	0
Urban		1	11	5	20	50	74	16	26	17	29

* Includes Small Towns

¹New England: Ma., Vt., N.H., Mass., Conn., R.I.

Middle Atlantic: N.Y., Penn., N.J.

South Atlantic: Del., Md., D.C., W.Va., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.

East South Central: Ky., Tenn., Miss., Ala.

West South Central: La., Ark., Tex., Okla.

East North Central: Ohio, Ind., Mich., Ill., Wisc.

West North Central: Minn., Iowa, Mo., Kan., Neb., S.D., N.D.

Mountain: Mont., Idaho, Wyo., Nev., Utah, Col., Ariz., N. Mex.

Pacific: Wash., Ore., Calif., Alas., Hawaii

²Data available for 14 of 16 staff members ³Data available for 20 of 22 staff members

⁴Data available for 86 of 86 staff members ⁵Data available for 28 of 28 members

⁶Data available for 29 of 33 staff members

foreign-born.²¹

Education

The White House Office staff members have been extremely well educated since 1939. Their educational level was generally comparable to that of other federal executives²² and somewhat higher than that of business executives.²³

The educational level has generally improved since the Roosevelt Administration when nearly half of the staff did not have a college degree. Although there was a slight decline in percentage of college degrees in the Eisenhower Administration, it is rather difficult to compare percentage figures for the Eisenhower staff members to those of the other Presidents because of the significantly larger number of respondents for the Eisenhower staff. For the entire period, about three out of four staff members had a college degree.

Table IV

Education, White House Office Professional Staff, 1939-1967

Educational Level	FDR ¹	HST ²	DDE ³	JFK ⁴	LBJ ⁵
No college degree*	6(42.9%)	2(10%)	14(16.3%)	2(7.1%)	2(6.9%)
Bachelor's degree*	7(50%)	16(80%)	63(83.3%)	25(89.3%)	25(86.2%)
Advanced degrees	5(35.7%)	13(65%)	47(54.6%)	18(64.3%)	17(58.6%)
- Masters	1(7.1%)	5(25%)	18(21%)	5(17.9%)	4(13.8%)
- LL.B	3(21.4%)	8(40%)	25(29.1%)	12(42.6%)	10(34.5%)
- Ph.D.	1(7.1%)	1(5%)	9(10.5%)	4(14.2%)	2(6.9%)
- other	1(7.1%)	2(10%)	5(5.8%)	2(7.1%)	2(6.9%)

*The total of the "No College Degree" and "Bachelor's Degree" columns may not add up to 100% because some staff members took advanced degrees in lieu of a Bachelor's Degree.

¹ Data available for 14 of 16 staff members.

² Data available for 20 of 22 staff members.

³ Data available for 86 of 86 staff members.

⁴ Data available for 28 of 28 staff members.

⁵ Data available for 29 of 33 staff members.

More than half had advanced degrees with the majority of these being in the LL.B. category. The Kennedy staff, according to the data in Table IV, was the best educated staff of the period under study. Nine out of ten Kennedy staffers had bachelor's degrees, two-thirds of them had advanced degrees, and one out of

The Ivy League schools did not dominate the list of institutions granting degrees to members of the Roosevelt and Truman staffs. However, for the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson staffs the trend definitely is toward the Ivy League for both bachelor's and advanced degrees. Ivy League schools awarded 21.7% of the bachelor's degrees and 33% of the advanced degrees awarded to Roosevelt and Truman staff members. They have awarded 38.1% of the bachelor's degrees and 61.8% of the advanced degrees awarded to Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson staff members. Harvard has awarded the most degrees to White House staff members in each of the major categories, B.A., LL.B., M.A., and Ph.D. Princeton is a strong second in the B.A. category. The Washington area schools, Georgetown and George Washington are relatively high in the LL.B. and M.A. categories.

Occupation Prior to White House Appointment

The five presidents who have served during the period of this study have differed a good deal in the occupations from which they have recruited their staff members. Roosevelt recruited primarily from government and news reporters - getting about one-fourth of his staff members from each category. Truman recruited about half of his men from the ranks of government employees. Eisenhower looked primarily to the business world for his staff, recruiting about one-third of them from that category. Kennedy recruited two-thirds of his staff members from government ranks, most of them having had experience on the staff side of government, and the academic world. Johnson has relied primarily on government service, again mostly staff men, and the business world for his staff members.

Although a good many members of the staff in each administration have held law degrees, relatively few of them have been engaged primarily in the private practice of law before their appointment to the White House. None of the Roosevelt and Truman staff members had received their primary occupational experience in the academic world, but that category has become rather prominent for the three most recent Presidents. Eisenhower naturally showed some preference for men who had had backgrounds in the military - several of them had served on his military staff. Five of Eisenhower's appointees came directly from student status on the campus to the White House without significant employment along the way. Only one staff member in the period, Roosevelt's Daniel J. Tobin, has been recruited from the ranks of organized labor, and he remained on the staff only a few months.

Political experience does not appear to have been a particularly important qualification for White House Office staff service. Only fifteen of the 169 staff members since 1939 have had their primary experience as politicians, and most of them have served for short terms on special assignments - half of them in the Eisenhower administration. As one of the respondents put in in an interview, "There is only room in the White House for one politician." However, this is not to say that political know-how is of little value to White House staff members. A good many of the men in the "government service - staff" category in Table V were involved primarily in politics.

Table V

Primary Occupations Before Appointment, White House Office
Professional Staff, 1939-1967

Occupation	FDR ¹	HST ²	DDE ³	JFK ⁴	LBJ ⁵
Government, non political - (Staff)	4(26.6%) (2)(13.3%)	11(55%) (2)(10%)	11(12.8%) (5)(5.8%)	11(39.3%) (10)(35.7%)	13(40.6%) (10)(31.3%)
Politics	3(20%)	0	8(9.3%)	3(10.7%)	1(3.1%)
Business	2(13.3%)	1(5%)	26(30%)	1(3.6%)	7(21.9%)
News Reporting	4(26.6%)	3(15%)	6(7%)	1(3.6%)	3(9.4%)
Law, private practice	0	3(15%)	12(14%)	4(14.2%)	4(12.5%)
Academic	0	0	11(12.8%)	7(25%)	4(12.5%)
Military	1(6.6%)	2(10%)	7(8.1%)	1(3.1%)	0
Labor	1(6.6%)	0	0	0	0
Student	0	0	5(5.8%)	0	0

¹ Data available for 15 of 16 staff members.

² Data available for 20 of 22 staff members.

³ Data available for 86 of 86 staff members.

⁴ Data available for 28 of 28 staff members.

⁵ Data available for 32 of 33 staff members.

The Road to the White House

There is no typical road to the White House for the aspiring staffer. Although a good many staff members, especially the key ones, had had previous experience with the President and were well-known by him, a majority of the White House staff members had not had a significant relationship with the President prior to their appointment - this was particularly true during the Eisenhower period.

In response to the questions, "Could you tell me how the initial contact was made with you about the possibility of a White House job?" and "What was your previous relationship to the President?", most of the White House staff members interviewed in this study emphasized "chance, circumstance, and a good bit of luck" as the key factors in their appointment. For instance, one Eisenhower staff member (a recently retired Democratic precinct chairman) was looking for a research post in Washington, and thinking primarily about the CIA, when he bumped into an old army friend of World War II days who happened to be on the Eisenhower staff. The momentary friend was quickly added as an assistant

Another Eisenhower staff member was picked up from a relatively minor government post after he gave testimony before a government committee which impressed Sherman Adams. Another Eisenhower staff member was appointed after a Harvard dean had been asked to recommend a Republican lawyer with political experience under the age of thirty. This man emphasizes that he got the second offer for the position. One Roosevelt staff member was appointed primarily because Ed Flynn and Henry Wallace thought the President was losing interest in politics and needed someone around to stimulate his interest. One Truman staff member was appointed because Truman remembered a bill he had written for him when he first entered the Senate.

Few White House staff members have been appointed because of their special expertise in a particular subject matter of interest to the President - with the major exception of press relations. Moreover, few White House staff members have been obvious choices, indispensable members of the President's team before he reached the White House - men like Sorensen, O'Brien, Moyers, Jenkins, Adams, Persons, and Howe are exceptions to this rule.

Usually, the staff appointee simply happened to know the right people - frequently another staff member, a Corcoran, Murphy, Adams, Sorenson, or Moyers - and be available at the right moment.

One reason for the lack of prior relationship to the President for most staff members at the time of their appointment is that most of the presidents have come to the office from positions where they maintained relatively small staffs. This was particularly true for Truman and Johnson - both of whom had been operating with modest staffs in the Vice-Presidential office.

For the two Presidents who have come to the office fresh from critical electoral victories since 1939, the presidential campaign staff has been a major source of White House Office staff material. About two-thirds of Eisenhower's initial staff members had been active, usually full time, in some phase of the 1952 campaign. About one-half of the initial Kennedy staff members had earned their stars as full time members of the 1960 campaign staff and others like McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. had been advising from the sidelines.

Turnover

Exact data is not available for dates of appointment and dates of departure for some members of the Roosevelt and Truman staffs. However, membership on both staffs was relatively stable. World War II necessitated some changes in the Roosevelt staff which involved short-term appointments. President Truman had some difficulty in getting the men he wanted in the White House for a few months; but, after 1947, his staff was remarkably stable.

It is difficult to compare the Eisenhower staff to the others during this period on the question of turnover because of its unique organization involving various

short-term, special assignment positions. The Eisenhower men stayed in office for an average of thirty-eight months with six of them remaining for the entire 96 months of his two terms in office.²⁴ There was no noticeable turnover problem in the Eisenhower administration.

The Kennedy staff had a remarkable turnover record. The only front-line Kennedy men to leave the White House before the assassination, Richard N. Goodwin, Walt W. Rostow, Frederick G. Dutton, and Harry L. Wofford, Jr., left to accept other positions in the State Department and the Peace Corps.

If comparable statistics could be obtained for each of the administrations under study, the highest turnover rate would probably be that for the Johnson staff. One of the major reasons for this, of course, involves the emergency conditions under which President Johnson took office. Several of the Kennedy staff members resigned within six months after the assassination. However, twelve of them stayed for more than a year. Only five Kennedy men (counting Rostow, who has returned from the Department of State) are still serving on the Johnson staff. However, the loss of the Kennedy staff members tells only part of the turnover story for the Johnson White House staff. Only three of President Johnson's eleven early staff appointees in 1963 and 1964 are still on the staff. Moreover, the turnover on the Johnson staff has involved key men like Bill Moyers, Walter Jenkins, Jake Jacobsen, Jack Valenti, and Horace Busby.

Salaries

President Roosevelt's Administrative Assistants and Secretaries to the President earned \$10,000 per year after the reorganization was effected. In 1948 the Truman Administrative Assistants and Secretaries to the President were still earning \$10,000 although John R. Steelman, as The Assistant to the President, had a salary of \$15,000 and Clark M. Clifford, as Special Counsel to the President, had a salary of \$12,500. Salaries crept near the \$20,000 mark under Eisenhower and the Kennedy staff men received \$21,000. President Johnson's top staff aides now receive \$30,000 annually with the second line professional staff members receiving \$27,500.

For most White House Office Professional staff members since 1939, appointment to the presidential staff has meant an increase in pay. Some, primarily the businessmen of the Eisenhower Administration, have taken salary cuts. However, it has not been customary for staff members to dispose of investments while in the White House and thus few of them suffered losses as a result of conflict of interest practices as cabinet appointees frequently do.

However, after leaving the White House most of the staff members have taken positions which represent a substantial improvement on their White House salaries - several of them earning more than \$100,000 annually.

The Organization of the White House Office, 1939-1967

The Roosevelt White House Office, 1939-1945

The most impressive characteristic of the Roosevelt White House Office is the extent to which Roosevelt himself dominated its every activity. The staff was in a very personal sense an extension of the President. If the staff appeared at times to be on the brink of chaos and assignments to be without reason or purpose, no one questioned his motivations and his direction. Roosevelt initiated the assignments - frequently giving instructions in great detail. He personally checked to be sure that every assignment was carried out (staff members testify that he never forgot an assignment) and the final reports were made directly to him. The Roosevelt professional staff was larger than his predecessors had enjoyed, but not so large that he could not personally be available to all staff members whenever they needed his attention. There was never anything resembling a hierarchy on the FDR staff.

As Richard Neustadt has perceptively observed, Roosevelt's pattern of relations with his staff were motivated by "a concern for his position as the man in the White House."²⁵ He was also an action oriented President with "a strong feeling for a cardinal fact in government: that presidents . . . act in the concrete as they meet deadlines set by due dates."²⁶ The Roosevelt staff members had to be jacks-of-all-trades, prepared to tackle any domestic or foreign assignment. There was no spot on the Roosevelt staff for anyone because he was a specialist on some subject of interest to the President, and no staff members developed special areas in which they had pre-emptive influence.

Roosevelt felt a special need, perhaps in part because of his own physical limitations and the restrictions those limitations placed on his activity outside of the White House, to have differing points of view available to him before he made decisions. He frequently gave two or more staff members the same assignment and delighted at their rivalry. In so far as I can tell, this disconcerting practice did not produce any permanent hard feelings among the staff members, although it did contribute to occasional "jockeying for position."

The implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 1 in 1939 did not radically change the Roosevelt White House Office. Three Administrative Assistants (six had been authorized) were added immediately and a fourth was added the following year. Roosevelt continued his practice of borrowing staff from executive agencies and departments and was reluctant to put them on his own payroll, even after that became politically feasible in 1939. One of the borrowed staff members noted that he worked in the White House for four years before being placed on the White House Office payroll in 1944.

The big changes in the White House Office under Roosevelt had taken place in 1933-34. This was when the borrowing process was started and the expansion which actually took place in presidential staff at that time was a more significant one than

the addition of the three Administrative Assistants in 1939. As one Roosevelt staff member said, FDR had to have additional staff in 1933 "because the people began to look to the President as they never had before - writing to him, calling him. A big change in the Presidency brought about change in the staff. The President was doing more. He had to have more help."

Even after the reorganization provided for the six Administrative Assistants "with a passion for anonymity," White House Office activity continued to center around the three Secretaries. Although none of the Roosevelt men had absolutely fixed assignments, there were certain recurrent presidential obligations that had to be met day after day and the three Secretaries' responsibilities were oriented around the most persistent of these obligations. Stephen Early (followed by Jonathan Daniels) was in charge of relations with the press; and, although he sometimes handled other assignments, most of his time was spent on this job. Marvin H. McIntyre handled appointments and made overall arrangements for FDR's trips, public appearances, and meetings (the military aides handled the details). Brig. Gen. Edwin M. "Pa" Watson was special legman, confidant, and, in some respects, the successor to Louis Howe. He later took over the appointments job when McIntyre succumbed to tuberculosis; and, when Watson died at sea abroad the Quincy returning from Yalta, Early inherited the appointments job.²⁷

The first three Administrative Assistants, James H. Rowe, Jr., William A. McReynolds, and Lauchlin Currie were jacks-of-all-trades and handled whatever tasks were at hand. However, each did develop an area of special interest. McReynolds developed special skills in personnel matters and was an especially valuable coordinator of civil service matters. Rowe developed into a political trouble shooter with a special interest in patronage, Currie continued to keep a close watch on economic matters. The other six men²⁸ who were appointed as Administrative Assistants from 1940 to 1945 also developed some areas of special interest - for instance, David K. Niles became a skilful student of racial and minority group matters. But the great task of the Administrative Assistants was to serve as eyes and ears for the President and to be available for any task that Roosevelt might throw their way.

During the war years the organization of the White House Office changed considerably. Judge Samuel I. Rosenman became Special Counsel to the President, a title especially designed for him in recognition of his years of service to the President as his primary speech writer and adviser without pay. Rosenman continued to have primary responsibility for drafting speeches and messages to Congress and also was responsible for reviewing all bills and Executive Orders from both a legal and policy perspective. Although McIntyre, Watson, and Marguerite "Missy" LeHand, the President's able and influential personal secretary, died during the war years, leaving major gaps in the staff, Rosenman was in no sense a chief of staff even though many crucial staff services centered in his office.²⁹

Earlier in the war period Harry L. Hopkins had moved into the White House with the title of Special Assistant to the President. Hopkins' role in World War II is well-known and does not need to be treated in detail here.³⁰ Hopkins was a very special assistant who was involved in almost every aspect of White House Office activity

during the war years. His position was made firm by his special relationship with FDR and this, in turn, was enhanced by the fact that he actually lived in the President's personal quarters on the second floor of the White House. Numerous stories are available about Hopkins' clashes with other staff members on policy and procedural matters - Hopkins usually won. However, although Hopkins' position was a very special one in the war years, he too was never a chief of staff. Roosevelt might tell a staff member to "talk to Harry" about some problem rather than listen to the details himself, but Hopkins was not a Sherman Adams as some writers have suggested.

A third special appointment during the war years was that of Eugene B. Casey as Special Executive Assistant to the President. After the 1940 election, a number of leaders in the Democratic party organization became concerned that Roosevelt was losing interest in politics. It was becoming more and more difficult for them to make contact with the President. At the same time, Henry Wallace and other leaders interested in agriculture were concerned that Roosevelt's interest in the war would lead to the total neglect of their interests. Casey, with the encouragement of Ed Flynn and Wallace, became a special coordinator for the President on party and agriculture matters.

A fourth special wartime position was that of "Chief-of-Staff to the Commander-in-Chief" held by Adm. William D. Leahy. He presided over the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was FDR's main contact with the military. He gave the President a daily briefing on the military and intelligence situation.

A more important change during the war years occurred when Roosevelt himself gradually became less involved in staff work on domestic matters. The staff men, especially the Administrative Assistants, worked with less direction and with fewer conflicting assignments after 1942.

The image of lack of organization in the Roosevelt White House was reinforced by the comings and goings of borrowed staff members who had no office in the White House, but frequently spent more than half of their time there. Among the more important men in this category were Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran (who usually occupied the table in the Cabinet Room as a base of operation). Cohen and Corcoran were as important as most of FDR's official staff members for several years before Corcoran fell out of grace.³¹ There were occasional conflicts between the official staff members and the "outside" staff. Corcoran, for instance, was frequently at odds with McIntyre about appointments and Hopkins about political matters.

The schedule of the White House Office staff was designed to complement the President's schedule. The White House Office day usually began with a brief conference while Roosevelt had his breakfast. Although Roosevelt never held staff meetings, several staff members would show up at breakfast and the day's work would be discussed. Watson, Early, McIntyre, William O. Hassett, Rosenman, and Hopkins were frequently in attendance in varying combinations. The only other time when the staff members regularly met with the President in groups of three or more was in the hour preceding his press conferences when briefings were completed and strategy on possible questions discussed. After the breakfast conference, the staff members were

In the situation, he quickly cleared out these early job seekers and not one of them received an appointment to the White House Office staff. Truman then requested several Roosevelt staff men, including Rosenman, Hassett, and Niles, to stay on the job and they did so.

In less than one year Truman had decisively reorganized the White House Office to suit his own needs. Although several individual members of the Roosevelt staff became very helpful aides for Truman, the new President could not have operated with Roosevelt's staff organization and work habits. The Truman staff men continued to be generalists. Most of them did not come to the job as specialists on a particular subject. However, they did tend to fall into fixed areas of assignment much more readily than the Roosevelt men. There was none of Roosevelt's lack of organization in the Truman office.

Throughout his Presidency Truman did follow Roosevelt's example by using the three Secretaries to handle the most recurrent duties of the White House office. Charles G. Ross served as Press Secretary until his death in December, 1950. He was replaced by Joseph Short who also died in office near the end of Truman's term. Matthew Connelly, an old confidant, served as Appointments Secretary and primary political troubleshooter. Hassett continued to serve as Corresponding Secretary.

Staff work on matters of policy tended to center around two offices, the office of "The Assistant to the President" and the office of the Special Counsel to the President.

John R. Steelman served as "The Assistant to the President." Steelman had served with distinction on the United States Conciliation Service for ten years under Roosevelt and was an industrial consultant in New York when Truman came into office. He was highly recommended as a specialist on labor affairs by Francis Perkins and Truman's Secretary of Labor, Lewis B. Schwollenbach. Truman had some difficulty in persuading Steelman to return to government service from his high paying position in New York, and came up with the new title as a special incentive to keep him in the White House. The title came out of the experience of James F. Byrnes in the Office of Defense Mobilization where Byrnes had had unusual powers delegated to him by Congress and the President, and was frequently referred to as "The Assistant President." It was the same title that Eisenhower was to give to Sherman Adams.

Steelman was a mediator in the White House. He handled labor matters, but he was even more important to Truman as a coordinator of the executive departments and agencies. He handled the family fights in the executive branch and in performing this task he worked very closely with the Bureau of the Budget. It was during the Truman Administration that the Bureau became something more than a budget agency, although Harold Smith had started it on the way under Roosevelt. In some respects, the Bureau was an extension of the White House Office, furnishing the Office with valuable assistance and providing a primary recruiting ground for its staff members. David Stowe, David Bell, Richard Neustadt, David Lloyd, and Frederick Lawton all moved from the Bureau to the White House Office and several of them later returned to the Bureau.

Rosenman stayed with Truman as Special Counsel until late 1945. After his departure, the office remained vacant for about six months, although Truman's naval aide, Clark Clifford, who had worked with Rosenman on several speeches, began to do much of Rosenman's work. Clifford was appointed Special Counsel in June, 1946, and remained in that office for four years. The duties of the office remained much as they had been under Rosenman. Clifford was responsible for writing speeches and checking bills and Executive Orders from both a legal and policy point of view. Under Clifford and his successor, Charles Murphy, it was the key position on the staff for policy formulation.

Many of Truman's speeches were major policy formulation events and the White House Office staff worked very closely with the Cabinet members and the departments in their formulation. Truman relied on his Cabinet and the departments much more than Roosevelt had, and this, plus his use of the Bureau of the Budget, is one reason that he was able to keep his White House staff so small. He seldom had more than eleven men reporting directly to him from the White House Office. The major speeches went through seven to ten drafts and throughout this process there was constant interchange with the appropriate departments and agencies.

Clifford took on one new chore that was beginning to be a recurrent one in the White House and that was the task of coordination of national security matters. This, of course, was Hopkins bailiwick during the war, and Roosevelt himself had been constantly involved with the war effort after Pearl Harbor. After the war, there was even more need for coordination of defense matters as the defense establishment itself underwent an extensive reorganization. Most of Clifford's efforts involved the defense and post-war recovery agencies. A major part of his effort was devoted to coordination of policy and practices between these agencies and the State Department. Murphy, as Special Counsel, was not as actively involved in national security matters as Clifford had been.

In addition to the Steelman and Clifford operations, Truman found that he had to formalize congressional liaison work much more than Roosevelt had done. When Roosevelt had a special task involving Congress, he called on Corcoran or Rowe or someone else to do that particular job. Truman, facing a Congress controlled by the opposition party soon after he took office, began to look to Charles Murphy to coordinate the executive's relations with Congress. Murphy did not develop any elaborate machinery in the White House for congressional liaison. However, he did gather around him a group of bright young assistants - Bell, Neustadt and Lloyd among them. In addition to these duties, Murphy also had special responsibility for drafting messages to Congress and assisted Clifford on speeches. Murphy's position as Administrative Assistant then was another important office highly involved in policy and political matters. After he replaced Clifford as Special Counsel in 1950, Murphy continued to carry on the congressional liaison work from that office. The new duties apparently blended quite well with his old ones.

Another Administrative Assistant who had a special area of responsibility was Donald S. Dawson. Dawson was staff coordinator on matters of personnel and patronage. George I. Schoeneman and Raymond R. Zimmerman had handled these matters

before Dawson's appointment in August, 1947. Dawson handled liaison with the departments and agencies on management problems on a rather elaborate scale. He kept in close touch with politicians in and out of Congress on patronage matters and apparently maintained good relations with the Civil Service Commission at the same time. The patronage tasks were among the most difficult ones in Truman's Presidency and they tied very directly into the work of Steelman (with the departments) and Murphy (with Congress). Dawson's work then was pivotal and he developed some very firm procedures in his office. He kept a detailed file on potential candidates for office and most of Truman's appointments outside of the customs positions and federal courts came from the Dawson file. After 1948, Dawson also handled arrangements for Truman's trips and political appearances.

With the exception of Murphy and Dawson the Administrative Assistants tended not to be front-line men in the Truman Administration. In fact, they served primarily as assistants to Murphy, Clifford and Steelman. The development of an able cadre of supporting staff for key staff members was an important aspect of the Truman White House Office. In my interviews with the Truman men, I soon discovered that they liked to talk about span of control and most of them felt that the President should not have more than a dozen staff men reporting to him. When asked, "Were the professional staff services adequate to meet the demands on the President?" and "For instance, did you need more men on the staff?", the ten Truman respondents unanimously replied in the negative.

Although Truman did not use borrowed staff in the White House Office, he did make maximum use of his military aides, Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, Adm. William D. Leahy, and Adm. Robert L. Dennison. Leahy had been Chief of Staff to the President under Roosevelt and continued as a trusted aide to Truman for the immediate post-war period. Vaughan was an old friend who had been with Truman longer than anyone else except Connelly. Both he and Dennison were among the President's favorite poker companions. Vaughan tended to handle specific military problems and developed a special interest in the F. B. I. Dennison was held in especially high regard by his fellow staff members. He was responsible for maritime matters and had charge of the White House processing of military and intelligence communications.

Like Roosevelt, Truman found that the pressures of war necessitated special services from his White House staff. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Truman appointed W. Averill Harriman as a Special Assistant to the President with the special responsibility of keeping the President informed about the war situation. Harriman sat with the National Security Council and gave special attention to the coordination of State and Defense efforts.³⁶ Harriman quickly assembled a huge staff which was larger than the rest of the White House Office staff combined. He never really functioned as a White House Office staff member, and in 1951 he and his staff were installed in a new office, the Director for Mutual Security, in the Executive Office.

The daily schedule of the Truman staff members was designed to complement the President's schedule. The day began with a formal conference attended by most of

hour was gradually moved up to 9:00 or 9:30 A. M. The staff meetings were so regular that everyone sat in the same position relative to the President's desk at each conference. Truman presided at the conferences and began by discussing previous reports and handing out new assignments. Then Truman went around the circle, permitting each staff member to be heard - beginning with Leahy when he was in the White House.

The Truman staff members felt that these meetings were especially important. As one respondent evaluated them, "Every staff man could hear what his colleagues were doing - be informed, know what was going on." There can be little doubt that the daily staff conferences were important as a means of coordination. When minor disputes would arise among staff members, Truman would iron them out here. It permitted the staff members to get to know each other and apparently gave them something akin to a sense of teamwork. One staff member estimated that Truman initiated about three-fourths of the staff assignments, but the give and take of the conferences permitted the staff members to make a case for the need for a particular chore.

Immediately after the staff conference, Dennison gave the President a briefing on the morning's intelligence communications. Unless a press conference was to be held that day and special briefings were in order, the President was generally not available to the staff again until 3:00 P. M. The hours from 3:00-5:00 P. M. were set aside exclusively for staff and Cabinet members, and it was during these hours that basic policy matters were discussed. These were invaluable hours for Clifford and Murphy.

After the afternoon conference, Truman would depart for his living quarters with a huge leather desk folder under his arm with cabinet matters in a pocket on one side and staff matters on the other. The evenings were devoted to reading and study for the President and his staff and the staff was constantly amazed at Truman's capacity for evening reading.

Truman's staff was made up of very able men who came to be especially devoted to their chief. Although they did not have an intellectual background comparable to the Kennedy staff, Truman probably could not have gotten maximum mileage out of a group of intellectuals. He did get maximum mileage out of the men he had. In the words of one of the staff members, "He [Truman] had a good concept of staff work. He could delegate. Once he got confidence in a man, he used him to his advantage."

The Eisenhower White House Office, 1953-1961

Unlike his immediate predecessors in the office, Eisenhower entered the Presidency with some very definite ideas about staff work. The key aspects of his theory involved organization, efficiency, and keeping as many burdens as possible off the President's shoulders. Eisenhower, of course, had had extensive experience with military staff and he brought this experience into the White House with him. The President was convinced that his staff operation was never understood by its critics--the politicians, political scientists, and reporters. In response to some writers who felt that the state of the Roosevelt staff might be better for the

Presidency than the precision of the Eisenhower staff organization, he noted: "I have been astonished to read some contentions which seem to suggest that smooth organization guarantees that nothing is happening, whereas ferment and disorder indicate progress."

Organization was the key to the Eisenhower staff operation and Sherman Adams was the key to the organization. As one respondent mentioned at the end of my interview with him, as if to reinforce and summarize what he had said, "You will have to give key attention to Adams in your study. He was the key to the whole thing and he managed everything with a firm hand." Adams inherited Steelman's title, The Assistant to the President, but his job was entirely unlike Steelman's. Adams was, in every sense of the term, a Chief of Staff. He was at the top of the clearly structured hierarchy of the Eisenhower White House Office staff and this was the way Eisenhower wanted it. According to Adams, Eisenhower "never specifically defined my responsibilities or outlined their limits . . . except when I was acting on an explicit directive from the President, my duties and responsibilities were implied rather than stated." Eisenhower and Adams were both sensitive to the charge that Adams made decisions for the President, but, even the dust jacket to Adams' own book describes him as "the man who probably exercised more power as a President's confidential adviser and co-ordinator than any other individual in modern times."

Adams presided over a highly structured staff. Each man had a special job which took all or most of his time: appointments, patronage, press, minority group matters, economic policy, legislative liaison, speech writing, cabinet secretary, checking bills and Executive Orders for legality, and many more. A complex set of new titles were developed and generally indicated where one stood in the chain of command. Old titles were discredited. For instance, the Rosenman-Clifford-Murphy post of Special Counsel was stripped of most of its duties - only the routine legal work was left. The Eisenhower staff men rarely received an assignment outside of their speciality and they all reported directly to Adams and received their instructions from him. When they had particularly difficult problems, they took them to Adams and he made the decisions. It must be added that he also took the responsibility for them.

It would be impossible to begin to go into detail within the limits of this paper on the work patterns of the main body of the White House staff. Their basic job was to reduce the President's load. An important motto was that nothing should go to the President's desk if it could be handled elsewhere, and, if it had to go to the President, it should be condensed to a one page memo. Adams developed a reputation among other staff members as an expert draftsman of these one page memos. Memos were not supposed to go to the President's desk until the "O.K., S.A." was affixed. Moreover, the memo should include recommendations. One staff member recalled that he once went to Adams with a problem which was potentially explosive for the White House. "Adams listened and said, 'Well, what do you want me to do about it?' You were wasting his time unless you had a recommendation."

Most of the respondents in this study believed that Adams' reputation as a "hard boss" and "a difficult man to get along with" was well earned. Their relations

with him were formal and cool - strictly business. Nevertheless, they had a profound respect for him and they marvelled at his ability to get work done and make decisions. In retrospect, they felt that his work habits were justified. As one of his closest assistants said, "He could get the most out of a man. Ike could not have anticipated that Adams would have such talent for chief of staff work, but he was excellent. He knew how to work people."³⁹

Although it is impossible to discuss the complex Eisenhower staff organization in detail, four aspects of it do deserve special attention. One of the innovations of the Eisenhower years was the development of a special office to manage the clerical staff, handle correspondence, and, most important, handle national security and intelligence communications. The first two aspects of the work of this office had been handled by a career man, William Hopkins, under the title of Executive Clerk since the days of Roosevelt. Hopkins continued to work in the office but he was under the direction of the Staff Secretary. Although Adams supervised the work of this office in a general fashion, it was largely the province of the Staff Secretary, a position held by two very able Army men, Col. Paul T. Carroll and Gen. A. J. Goodpaster. In particular, Adams was not involved in the military and intelligence communications coordination of this office which went directly from the Staff Secretary to Eisenhower. The Staff Secretary also handled arrangements for conferences between the Joint Chiefs and other military personnel and the President.

A second aspect of the White House Office organization that must be discussed involves White House efforts to coordinate national security matters. Eisenhower formalized the work that had been handled by Clark Clifford for Truman. He had two assistants who were primarily responsible for coordination of national security policy matters in addition to the Staff Secretary who handled communications. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs served as an adviser for the National Security Council and its various machinery and a Special Assistant to the President served as the President's representative on the Operations Coordinating Board.⁴⁰ The first position was held by a senior staff member,⁴¹ and the latter was held by a more junior member of the staff.

The work of these two assistants was not within the sphere of influence of Sherman Adams. They reported directly to Eisenhower and received their assignments directly from him. They worked closely with the Staff Secretary and these three staff members usually saw the President daily. The following description by one of the national security staff members of his relationship to Adams would be an accurate one for all of the men who held these positions: "I seldom saw Adams except in the White House Mess at lunchtime. He may have been 'Assistant President' for domestic affairs, but he had no influence over national security matters."

The task of coordinating national security and foreign affairs matters was a very important one and Eisenhower apparently made a clear decision early in his Presidency that the coordination had to come from the White House. Eisenhower used the National Security Council "regularly and seriously." It was an important apparatus of coordination. He developed and announced all of his national security and foreign

decisions in its meetings so that each department and agency involved knew "how, who made the decision, why, and what the rationale was." Eisenhower, working closely with Dulles for whom he had great respect, ⁴² exerted his greatest influence as President in the national security and foreign policy areas.

Unfortunately, Eisenhower had much less interest in domestic politics and this made the congressional liaison unit within the White House Office a very important one. The relatively modest operation of Murphy and his team in the Truman Administration gave way to a very elaborate system under the direction of General Wilton G. Persons in the Eisenhower Administration. Persons was assisted by a number of very able men including Gerald Morgan and Bryce Harlow. Morgan took over direction of the work when Persons replaced Adams in 1958.

All of the respondents in this study who had worked in legislative liaison for Eisenhower agreed that, especially in the early years, it "was like pulling eye teeth" to get the Republicans in Congress to support the President's program. Eisenhower was asking the Republicans to support programs that they had been opposing and many of them, including Senator Robert Taft, found this very difficult to take. It was in the difficult early months of his Administration that the elaborate legislative liaison machinery was developed.

The "Tuesday Morning Breakfast Conference" (in the first few months, it was held on Mondays), which had been used steadily by Roosevelt and Truman, became the central structure in Eisenhower's legislative liaison apparatus. Each Saturday morning a member of the Persons staff, usually Morgan, would preside over a meeting of all the legislative liaison men in the departments as a part of a careful effort to coordinate all legislative liaison activities in the executive branch from the White House Office. Using the matters discussed in this conference as a base, the Persons-Morgan staff prepared a detailed agenda for the Tuesday morning meeting between the President and Congressional leaders. The agenda was cleared with Adams and the President and then distributed in advance to the Congressional leaders. Then on Tuesday morning the legislative leaders and the President met in the White House. The President generally followed the agenda rather rigidly and at the end of the meeting the legislative leaders could bring up additional matters for discussion. Morgan and Persons were usually in attendance at these meetings and appropriate officers from the Departments were frequently invited to attend.

The work of the legislative liaison team was greatly complicated by Eisenhower's reversion to party politics. He was not appreciative of the bargaining which was at the heart of normal, healthy Presidential - Congressional relations. One Republican congressman, when asked about patronage under the new Republican Administration, complained that not only had he not gotten additional jobs but that he had lost one that he had under Truman. This story is illustrative of the nature of the problem facing the legislative liaison team and the elaborate machinery in the White House Office helped to make up for the deficiency.

The same predispositions which led President Eisenhower to develop the kind of staff operation he developed led him to make more use of the Cabinet than his immediate predecessors. In an effort to get the Cabinet to support his policies, Eisenhower

Cabinet, he created the post of "Cabinet Operations Officer," later changed to "Secretary to the Cabinet." The two men who held this position were both previously Adams' immediate aides and they continued to work directly under his supervision in their new post. They had some responsibility for coordination of affairs in the executive branch, but the really tough problems of coordination were handled directly by Adams.

The White House Office experienced three periods of major strain during the Eisenhower Presidency - the President's two lengthy illnesses and the departure of Sherman Adams from the staff. The staff continued to function very smoothly during the three periods of serious illness of the President. When Eisenhower was hospitalized in Denver, the routine was disrupted to some extent because Adams and several other staff members had to spend much of their time in Denver. However, for the most part the staff functioned amazingly well during the illnesses. Most of the Eisenhower respondents agreed that this was the case and attributed this to the efficiency of the staff organization and the genius of Adams.⁴³ Eisenhower's critics were not so generous and concluded that the "business as usual" attitude in the White House was a sign that it was Adams and not Eisenhower who had been running the Presidency for the most part all along.

The departure of Adams from the staff in 1958 after the Goldfine case had exploded led to a more serious disruption in White House Office routine.⁴⁴ Most of the respondents were shocked when Adams announced his resignation. After the congressional hearings, most of them thought the case was settled - that Adams had been indiscreet but had done nothing wrong. Several of them thought that the whole thing had been "masterminded" from Sam Rayburn's office for political reasons. They knew that pressure was being put on Eisenhower for Adams' resignation by Congressional Republicans who had to face elections in November. However, they had no idea that he would yield to the pressure. They would all agree with Louis Koenig's assessment that "the resignation of Sherman Adams gained the Republican party little and cost the President much."⁴⁵

The general tone of the interviews was that the "staff felt low" when Adams departed. He was replaced as "The Assistant to the President" by Persons and the nature of the White House Office was changed considerably. Persons was an easy going man compared to Adams. He was much more willing to give staff members freedom in their work. He still coordinated all staff activities, but he did not run the tight ship that Adams had run for eight years. As one respondent who served under both men for six years said, "Persons was a different kind of man, more easy going - willing to let the staff go its own way. He asked, 'What do you think ought to be done?'" Moreover, President Eisenhower became more involved in staff activities under Persons. He began to take more initiative in the White House when the strong hand of Adams was no longer present.

The daily schedule of the White House Office before Adams departure centered around Adams' schedule in sharp contrast to the Roosevelt and Truman years when the schedule of the Office centered around the schedule of the President. The typical staff day kept them in the White House from 7:00 A. M. to 7:00 P. M. during the week

Adams always wanted the staff in the office when he was there, and he was an "early to bed, early to rise" advocate, much to the dismay of his staff. The staff adapted to the schedule because they knew that "he didn't like to call your desk and not be able to get you." They were gratified that Adams liked to play golf on Saturday afternoons.

In 1953 Adams held staff meetings every morning. After 1953, he usually held three a week. Eisenhower rarely attended these meetings. In these meetings Adams gave assignments and outlined the day's work. The meetings were usually brief and Adams did most of the talking. The respondents who attended them felt that they were very important. They were a source of information for a highly specialized staff about what was happening in other aspects of White House work. Persons held very few staff meetings after he replaced Adams.

The Kennedy White House Office, 1961-1963

When President Kennedy came into office, he had been the recipient of more advice about the organization of the White House Office than any of his predecessors. Clark Clifford, Richard Neustadt, and the Brookings Institution had each prepared elaborate background papers for him before the election in order to help him through the transition. Each of these advisers had given detailed attention to the White House Office and had discussed alternative plans of organization.

In reading the memoranda of those advisers, Kennedy immediately decided that he could not operate his staff on the Eisenhower pattern. This decision was confirmed by the transition contacts between the Kennedy men and the Eisenhower staff members.⁴⁶ The Kennedy staff organization represented a return to the basic characteristics of the Roosevelt-Truman examples. The men who served on his staff were mostly generalists although they had more fixed areas of assignment than the Roosevelt or Truman men. However, Kennedy could not have made his White House Office a replica of either the Roosevelt or Truman organization because government in the 1960's was vastly different from that experienced by these two Democratic predecessors. Nor could Kennedy ignore everything in the Eisenhower organization precedent. Some of the Eisenhower arrangements were useful for Kennedy and he kept them.

In addition to the advance planning, Kennedy had another advantage over his predecessors when he took office. He had already been operating for many months with a very elaborate staff organization in his campaigns for the nomination and for the office itself. The campaigns had been a valuable testing ground for staff and most of the appointees to the White House Office staff had survived the test of the campaigns. They had already developed work patterns as assistants to Kennedy. He knew what to expect from them and they knew his abilities, expectations, and needs.

President Kennedy was his own chief of staff. He carefully supervised the work of his staff in the White House Office. He initiated assignments, personally, received all reports from his top aides, and, as Sorenson has written, "decided what it is he need not decide."⁴⁷ He carefully guarded his own options. Again, in

Sorenson's words, Kennedy's staff organization "imposed upon him heavy burdens of overseeing everything we were doing, but he much preferred those burdens to the handicaps of being merely a clerk in his own office, caught up in the routines and recommendations of others." ⁴⁸ There was no hierarchy in the Kennedy White House Office.

The workload of the Kennedy White House Office centered around several key offices. Kennedy restored the office of Special Counsel to the status it had enjoyed under Rosenman, Clifford, and Murphy and, in fact, greatly expanded its scope of activity. Theodore Sorenson, one of his most trusted aides, was named to fill the office and he was assisted by three very able men - Myer Feldman, Richard N. Goodwin, and Lee C. White. ⁴⁹ Sorenson was the primary staff adviser on domestic policy matters and speech-writer par excellence. His handiwork can be seen in almost every message that Kennedy sent to Congress. However, he was much more than a speech writer. Although he did not make decisions for the President, his opinion was respected and frequently persuasive.

Since Sorenson's time was taken up with domestic policy matters, his assistants were needed to handle the more traditional duties of the Special Counsel. Feldman was viewed by his fellow staff members as an exceptionally able lawyer and he was responsible for regulatory agency matters and most other matters relating to business--including tariffs and trade. He also supervised the drafting of Presidential proclamations and Executive Orders. ⁵⁰ White handled civil rights matters in close coordination with Robert Kennedy and received special assignments in matters of public housing and power. White also handled presidential pardons and pleas for clemency. Goodwin was primarily involved in speech-writing and quickly developed a special interest in Latin American affairs.

Sorenson's counterpart on foreign policy and national security matters was McGeorge Bundy. Although Kennedy was not enamoured with the complex national security coordination efforts by the White House under Eisenhower, he did find it necessary to have a strong foreign policy-national security operation in the White House. However, where Eisenhower's national security advisers in the White House were primarily concerned with organization and the coordination of the vast and complex activities of Defense, State, and a dozen other departments and agencies, the Bundy team was primarily concerned with advising the President on policy matters. The President was his own coordinator when coordination was called for. Bundy's own training and personality suited him for this kind of role. He would not have been as well suited for the kind of role which Gordon Gray performed so ably for Eisenhower.

Bundy was assisted by a group of very able men - an average of ten - in his operation in the basement of the White House which Kennedy used to call his "Little State Department." As a matter of fact, the organization of Bundy's office in some respects resembled the State Department. For example, he had a specialist for European affairs (Dr. Carl Kaysen, who also handled disarmament matters), a specialist for Far Eastern Affairs (Michael Forrestal), and a specialist for Near Eastern affairs (Robert Komer).

Bundy held the only meetings that even resembled staff conferences in the Kennedy White House. Each morning he briefed key White House Office staff members on significant foreign policy and national security developments during the past twenty-four hours. This briefing was all that took place at the meetings, but they were an important mechanism for coordination of foreign and domestic policy in the White House. None of Kennedy's advisers were ever out of touch with foreign policy matters and could shift from domestic assignments to assist in a foreign policy crisis with relative ease.

A third office which was of central importance in the Kennedy White House was that of the Appointments Secretary, Kenneth O'Donnell. O'Donnell occupied the same office that McIntyre had occupied a quarter of century earlier, but his responsibilities were much broader than McIntyre's had been. In addition to handling appointments, O'Donnell was a primary political troubleshooter (comparable to Matt Connelly in this respect), handled liaison with the Secret Service and F. B. I., and made arrangements for the President's trips. Pierre Salinger in his memoirs has ranked O'Donnell as the most important member of the Kennedy staff. He certainly was the key man, outside of the President himself, for the internal operation of the White House Office. Since Kennedy dropped the Eisenhower position of Staff Secretary, O'Donnell also kept watch over the general operation of the White House Office services. He worked closely with his Massachusetts colleague, Lawrence O'Brien on all matters relating to politics.

O'Brien was in charge of Kennedy's legislative liaison operations. Although his White House Office liaison operation was not organized as elaborately as the Persons-Morgan operation, his organization was much more elaborate than Murphy's had been for Truman. Like Persons and Morgan, O'Brien viewed the office as a center of coordination for legislative liaison officers throughout the executive branch and the Tuesday Morning Breakfast Conference continued to be a central part of his equipment. During Kennedy's first Congress, O'Brien demonstrated that he was a first-rate political strategist and, although his tactics were often described as high pressure efforts, earning him the title of leader of the Irish Mafia in the White House, he was usually effective. Like Sorenson, O'Brien had a talented group of assistants led by Mike Manatos and Henry Hall Wilson, Jr.

In addition to the O'Brien and O'Donnell offices a third position in the Kennedy White House which was concerned primarily with politics was held by Ralph Dungan. Dungan had worked with the Shriver group in the great "talent hunt" that had taken place during the transition months and he continued to be concerned with personnel. He was the key patronage man in the White House and was also a valuable assistant on labor politics.

The position of Press Secretary was by now one of the oldest presidential staff positions. Press relations were particularly crucial for Kennedy after the narrow victory of 1960, and this position was held by another veteran of the campaign wars, Pierre Salinger. He was assisted by one of the few Negroes to hold a Presidential staff position, Andrew Hatcher. In addition to the regular duties of Press Secretary, Salinger held frequent briefings for public information officers from the department.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., held a unique White House staff position. He was the White House's liaison with intellectuals in general and with Adlai Stevenson in particular. Kennedy did not know Stevenson well, but Schlesinger had assisted in Stevenson's campaigns and was a natural choice for this job. Schlesinger was not actively involved in the day by day work of the White House, although he did get special assignments from time to time. He was the idea man⁵² in the White House and kept a steady stream of memoranda on the President's desk.

Although he dropped the title of Cabinet Secretary, Kennedy kept the function and assigned the job to Timothy J. Reardon. He was responsible for preparing agenda for Cabinet meetings and his duties also included some coordination of Presidential relations with the executive departments and agencies. However, he was by no means the exclusive staff member for the latter duty.

President Kennedy reacted strongly against the abundance of titles used for staff members in the Eisenhower Administration. Titles were meaningless in the Kennedy Administration. Most of the staff members were simply "Special Assistant to the President" and Kennedy once remarked that he wished that all the staff members had had that title.⁵³

The old title of Administrative Assistant was rarely used by Kennedy. In fact, it was given only to Reardon and to O'Brien's assistants, Manatos and Wilson. Paradoxically, the "passion for anonymity" attributed to the original Brownlow Committee creation was also not a particularly strong characteristic of the Kennedy staff. It was inevitable that the position of staff assistant to the President of the United States should be glamourized eventually, and this occurred as the youthful, active President Kennedy attracted unprecedented public attention to the White House. Most of the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower respondents in this study indicated that offers of speaking engagements or other public appearances were rejected as a rule of thumb. When I asked one Truman man if he had given interviews to reporters, he immediately told me that this would have been "unheard of behavior" for a staff member. Most of the respondents from the earlier administrations vowed that they would never write memoirs about their White House years unless asked to do so by the President— because "it would not be proper to do so."

In sharp contrast to most of their predecessors the Kennedy men were constantly in the news. They did make speeches and public appearances. The mass circulation magazines carried detailed and frequently romantic stories about them. Already, three of them have written memoirs.⁵⁴ They gave interviews to reporters rather freely. However, most of the Kennedy men did try to insulate themselves as much as possible from the great pressures for publicity. Too much publicity would have made them their own man and by definition useless to the President. As one of them put it, "While few of us had a 'passion for anonymity,' most of us had a preference in that direction."⁵⁵

The Johnson White House Office, 1963-1967

Although President Johnson is now in his fourth year in the White House, to write about his staff organization and his approach to staffing is to write about something

which is still evolving. President Johnson was not really free to develop his own "staff system" until after the election of 1964. For many reasons he felt that it was desirable to keep as many of the Kennedy staff members as possible until after the election. In the "let us continue" spirit, the presence of the Kennedy staff was an important part of the continuity which characterized the very smooth transition - standing in sharp contrast to the Roosevelt-Truman transition. Moreover, President Johnson did not have an extensive staff of his own and he did not have time to develop one before the election. He made a decidedly wise decision in asking the Kennedy men to stay with him. However, this decision did make it more difficult for him to put his own stamp on the staff.

The departure of Walter Jenkins from the staff during the campaign made it even more difficult for Johnson to develop his own staff organization. Jenkins had been his primary assistant for two decades. During his months in the White House, he apparently demonstrated his great ability. He knew Johnson well, had the complete trust of the President, and undoubtedly would have been his key staff member if he had not collapsed in 1964. The vacancy he left on the staff would be a very difficult one to fill and led to a considerable reshuffling of duties among staff members.

Then, after the election, two more key assistants, Jack Valenti and Bill Moyers, departed within a few months of each other. Both left to accept high salaried and prestigious jobs outside of government. Thus, during his first three years in the Presidency, Johnson lost three of his most important staff members. During the same period, most of the Kennedy men were also leaving the staff. The result has been that the President has not been able to develop a definitive approach of his own to staff work.

However, some preliminary observations can be made about the Johnson style. He has been intensely interested in alternatives of staff organization. One of the first things he did in the White House was to hold a long session with Clark Clifford about the transition in general in which the organization of the White House Office was a primary topic. Moreover, he began to look around the Government in an effort to find some good staff prospects. He did not hesitate to rob Secretary of Defense McNamara of one of his most able men, Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

President Johnson has clearly kept firm personal control over the work of the White House Office. Although Jenkins and Moyers were key assistants, they were not chiefs of staff. Johnson would not be capable of working with the Eisenhower kind of staff organization. More than any President since Roosevelt, he needs a staff which is intensely personal and absolutely tuned to his own work habits and needs.

Perhaps as a result of the difficulty President Johnson has had in developing the White House Office into the type of staff service he needs, he has turned to outside advisers more than any President since Roosevelt. Although he has found some advisers in executive branch positions, most of them have been from the private sector. The most important of them have been the three Washington lawyers: James Rowe (a Roosevelt Administrative Assistant), Abe Fortas and Clark Clifford. The

latter two men have of course been brought into government positions during the Johnson administration.

The Johnson staff men, like the Kennedy men, have been in the public eye with the result that White House Office professional staff positions have now become among the most glamorous positions in government. There can be little doubt that too much publicity can seriously impede the effectiveness of any presidential staff member. In fact, it may almost be stated as a firm principle that the more publicity White House staff members get, the less useful they are to the President. Only the very rare assistant can be his own man and serve the President at the same time.

Conclusion

As I concluded an interview with one of the Truman respondents, he perceptively remarked, "Your project can't make recommendations or draw organization charts. You can only say what has been done." This is certainly the case. Even the keenest observer of Presidential staffing practices could be of only limited value in advising a President about the organization of his office. History has not produced a model system. Each President must develop the staff organization and staffing practices which can be the most useful to him. The White House Office exists to serve the President in a very personal manner. That has never been in doubt since 1939.

However, any President could learn much by studying the staffing practices of his predecessors. He will not find all of the alternatives which will be available to him in their experience. There is still plenty of room for innovation in Presidential staffing practices. But he will get a general idea about the alternatives available to him and he may be able to reject some of them immediately on the basis of the experience of his predecessors.

Each President since 1939 has had a distinctively different White House Office operation. However, each President has also learned from and built on his predecessors' work to some extent. Thus Truman rejected the disorder of the Roosevelt staff but he followed its most salient characteristics as he gathered a group of generalists around him and, carefully guarding his own position as President, personally supervised their activity. And although Kennedy rejected the basic tenets underlying the Eisenhower staff organization, he found that particular aspects of the Eisenhower experience could be useful for him, and he incorporated them into his own organization.

In spite of the major differences which existed among the staffing practices of the five Presidents studied here, a strong thread of continuity does carry through each administration from Roosevelt to Johnson. The central structure of each White House Office has been oriented around the recurrent legal and political duties of the President. The titles and the incumbents' approach to their work have been different from one administration to the next, but such functions as appointments, press relations, and patronage have steadily formed the spine of the Office.

Each President's personnel decisions for the White House Office have been

chan to recruit Cabinet members. The criteria which the staff member must meet are frequently more restrictive than those necessary for prospective Cabinet members. Moreover, the application of the criteria can require some very subtle and difficult judgments on the part of the President. The 169 men who have served on the White House Office's professional staff during the period of this study have been a very able, well-trained group. It is very difficult for anyone other than the President himself to judge the effectiveness of their performances. However, there have been very few abject failures among them.

Each administration has also contributed an increased workload to the next. The Roosevelt staff members worked hard and for long hours but between periods of high pressure they had moments in which to relax. For the Kennedy-Johnson staff members there have been few moments for relaxation. Every day is a high pressure one. Every assignment is urgent. Each mistake is costly. The workload of the President and of his staff has increased enormously since 1939. Even when measured in such simple terms as the number of telephone calls and pieces of mail coming into the White House each day, the workload in 1967 is staggering.

The size of the staff has also increased to some extent -- especially in the number of men backing up the front-line staff men. However, the size of the staff has not expanded as rapidly as the workload. Moreover, in order to serve the President effectively, the personal staff has to be relatively small. Even in the Eisenhower Administration, where staffing practices permitted a larger staff than the other four Presidents found useful, the total number of staff members seldom exceeded twenty-five and the respondents in this study agreed that additional staff members in their respective offices would not have been useful.

The increasing workload has made the question of effective staff services for President Johnson in 1967 much more important than the question was for President Roosevelt when he received the report of the Brownlow Committee in 1937. The data presented here would seem to indicate that the availability of expanded staff services has not significantly altered the basic nature of the Presidency. The "personalized" Presidency has clearly survived the expansion of the staff. In the one instance in which staff organization and practices had a significant impact on the nature of the Presidency itself, the Eisenhower Administration, the President himself deliberately decided to operate his office in that fashion. He made the choice. The people reelected him for a second term. More important, his decisions were not binding on his successors and they were free to interpret the Presidency and develop it as they saw fit.

During the past three decades then an expanded personal staff in the White House Office has not prevented the President from being "both in law and conscience . . . as big a man as he can." In fact, the White House Office staff gives the President a chance to overcome the many limitations on the Presidency to an extent that his own personality can be felt as fully as possible in the office and in the government. The staff has not helped to narrow the gap between the President's authority and his responsibility but it has helped to make the responsibility bearable. It has made the chain of decisions easier, and the consequences of them a bit

FOOTNOTES

* Many of the interviews which provide the basic data for the study of which this paper is a part were conducted while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study of The Brookings Institution during the summer of 1966. I am grateful to George Graham and his colleagues at Brookings for making their incomparable facilities available to me. In addition, the study has received support from Tulane University and the University of Virginia.

1. The McKinley incident is reported in Edward H. Hobbs, Behind the President (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954), p.86.

2. See the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937).

3. For two excellent accounts of the Committee's work and its impact see Herbert Emmerich, Essays on Federal Reorganization (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1950), pp. 61-90; and Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

4. Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, op. cit., p.3.

5. Ibid., p. 46.

6. President Roosevelt's Message to Congress, January 12, 1937, as quoted in Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), V, 668.

7. See Hobbs, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

8. This estimate was given by Bill Moyers in a news interview in which he was describing White House economies. New York Times, January 12, 1966, p.14.

9. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), p. 30.

10. See Louis W. Koenig, "The Man and the Institution," The Annals, Vol. 307 (September, 1956), 13.

11. Rossiter, op. cit., p. 100.

12. See Edward S. Corwin, "The President as Administrative Chief," The Journal of Politics, Vol. I (February, 1939), 17.

13. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (New York: New York University Press, 1957), Fourth Edition, pp. 302-303. See footnote sixteen, p. 495 for his specific response to Rossiter.
14. Ibid., p. 304.
15. The expression is Woodrow Wilson's from his famous lecture at Columbia University.
16. See Edward H. Hobbs, Behind the President, op.cit.; "An Historical Review of Plans for Presidential Staffing," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXI, 663 ff. Richard Neustadt, "The Presidency at Mid-Century," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXI, 641ff.; "Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII (1963), 855ff. Louis W. Koenig, The Invisible Presidency (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). Rexford G. Tugwell, The Enlargement of the Presidency (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960). J.C. Heinlein, Presidential Staff and National Security Policy (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 1963).
17. The "professional staff" category is a difficult one to define. It does not include such positions as Physician to the President, Military Aide to the President, Social Secretary, or Personal Secretary to the President unless the men and women in these positions were involved in aspects of White House Office work not ordinarily within the province of their position. Some of them were so involved and have been included in the study. Note that the total number of staff members in the tables in this section may not total 169 because the Roosevelt men who stayed with Truman and the Kennedy men who stayed with Johnson for more than six months were counted as a member of each staff.
18. See Dean E. Mann, The Assistant Secretaries: Problems and Processes of Appointment (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 16-17; John J. Corson and R. Shale Paul, Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 22; W. Lloyd Warner et.al., The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 165-170.
19. See W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 157.
20. Compare Mann, op.cit., pp. 18-19; Warner et.al., op.cit., pp. 39-55; W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, Big Business Leaders in American (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 177-196.
21. Ireland 4, Canada 2, Austria, Malaya, Russia, Japan.
22. See Mann, op.cit., pp. 19-20; Warner et.al., op.cit., pp. 107-146.

23. See Warner et. al., Ibid.
24. Several others who had been in the White House Office since January, 1953 resigned in 1960 in order to accept appointments to other positions in the executive branch.
25. Richard Neustadt, "Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK," APSR, LVII, 856.
26. Ibid.
27. See Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 381-456 for an interesting account of the early years for Howe and the Secretaries in the White House.
28. Two of them, Daniel J. Tobin and Lowell Mellett, were on the staff for only a few months under rather special circumstances.
29. See Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 366-541.
30. See Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).
31. Koenig's account of Corcoran is a fascinating one. See his The Invisible Presidency, op. cit., pp. 249-298.
32. Both Sherwood and Rosenman give interesting accounts of these sessions. See Sherwood, op. cit.; Rosenman, op. cit.
33. Grace Tully, F.D.R., My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 354.
34. See Truman's account of the transition, Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), pp. 9-52.
35. Truman regularly held Cabinet meetings every Friday when he was in Washington and, apparently, they were frequently fruitful sessions.
36. Clifford was no longer in the White House and Murphy was not particularly interested in this aspect of Clifford's work.
37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), p. 114.
38. Sherman Adams, First-Hand Report (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961),

39. Robert Keith Gray, who held three major jobs under Adams (patronage, Appointments Secretary, and Cabinet Secretary), gives some very helpful accounts of Adams in his Thirty Acres Under Glass (New York: Doubleday, 1962).
40. He also held the title of Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board.
41. Robert Cutler and Gordon Gray were the two appointees to the position.
42. Dulles was the only Cabinet member who could always enter the President's office without appointment and unannounced. Eisenhower once scolded a new Appointments Secretary for announcing Dulles.
43. Adams gives a detailed account of his work during the illnesses. See Adams, op. cit., pp. 180-201.
44. Eisenhower's account of his decision to ask for Adams resignation differs in some respects from Koenig's account. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), pp. 311-318; Koenig, The Invisible Presidency, op. cit., pp. 389-399.
45. Ibid., p. 399.
46. See Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 232.
47. Theodore Sorenson, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 17.
48. Sorenson, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 259.
49. All three were Jews. When Sorenson felt that it was necessary to appraise Kennedy of this fact, the President replied, "So what? They tell me this is the first Cabinet with two Jews, too. All I care about is whether they can handle it." Ibid., p. 252. This story illustrates the fact that no President has ever felt the need to "balance" his White House Office staff because of political considerations. There is no expectation in any political quarter that he should do so. Instances in which politicians have tried to influence appointments to the President's staff have been rare and seldom successful. The staff appointees, of course, are not subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
50. The Kennedy respondents in talking about Feldman invariably referred to Kennedy's statement, "if Mike Feldman ever sold out, we could all go to jail." As quoted in Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 70.
51. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

52. Although Schlesinger's account of the Kennedy Administration is not as useful as Sorenson's on our topic, his volume is a fascinating one. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965).

53. Sorenson, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 262.

54. Schlesinger indicates that Kennedy said at the start of his Administration that he did not want "his staff recording the daily discussions of the White House." However, after the Bay of Pigs, Schlesinger reports the following conversation with the President: "Then after the Bay of Pigs he (Kennedy) said, 'I hope you sent a full account of that.' I said that I had understood he did not want us to keep full accounts of anything. He said, 'No, go ahead, you can be damn sure that the CIA has its records and the Joint Chiefs theirs. We'd better make sure we have a record over here. So you go ahead.' I did." Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. x-xi.

55. Sorenson, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 261.

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August 15, 1968

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dick:

You will probably recall that during our talk in New York in January, I told you something of the Harvard study on the problems of transition from the present administration to a new administration which Philip Areeda (chairman), Ernest May and I have had under way since last September. As a part of this study we have had meetings with several people who have lived through past transitions, including Robert Lovatt, Matthew Ridgway, Andy Goodpaster and Mac Bundy. We have also had access to many of the files and studies relating to past transitions from one administration to another.

The attached memorandum contains some of our conclusions from this study. It is specifically addressed to that which might be done before the election to prepare for the transition and to make it more effective. We plan to develop further memoranda during the next three months. We hope these will interest and assist you, and would welcome any observations or suggestions as to specific transition problems you wish us to think about.

III

During our conversation in January, you suggested that you would welcome some early work to collect names (especially of younger men) which the new administration might draw upon in filling its roster of appointments. On the assumption that you think we might be helpful to you and your personnel advisors, we are beginning a modest effort in this direction. We would hope that you will also ask other individuals and groups to do this and more.

Specifically, we hope we can make some useful contributions in:

- identifying key posts to be filled.

August 15, 1968

- identifying some of the unusually able current appointees in these jobs who might be retained temporarily, to help in the transition, or who might even be retained beyond the transition.
- identifying a few key civil servants in each of the major departments on whom the new administration might rely in getting the "straight story" quickly.
- beginning to develop lists of names which your new administration might find generally helpful in selecting candidates.

We emphasize that we will have limited capabilities here, and if you are to adopt the proposal in the attached memorandum for the appointment of one or more personal advisors, we would, of course, provide them with whatever we are able to develop.

In developing names, we would want to consult discreetly with a small number of people who have unusually broad knowledge of people and their qualifications. Because I think you probably would not want this to appear as being directly commissioned by you, I would propose to indicate your interest to these people in the following terms:

"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indicated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-started' with the hope that advance work will help him and his advisors meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administration."

Please let me know whether it would be helpful to you for us to continue along this course, and what degree of knowledge of the study on your part we might use in talking discreetly to others. Obviously we would do everything possible to avoid any public notice, but we cannot absolutely guarantee this.

III


You may remember Phil Areeda who was at the White House as Assistant Special Counsel from 1955 to 1961, and is now Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School. Ernest May is Professor of History at Harvard and a consultant to RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses. Stephen Ross knows him well. Henry Kissinger was also a member of the group originally but dropped out subsequently to work on Nelson Rockefeller's campaign. He

August 15, 1968

could rejoin us later. I think you know my own background, which included work for Baruch at the U.N., the Harter Committee and ECA, the CIA, and the management consulting firm of McKinsey and Company before becoming head of Ittek.

If you would like to discuss any part of the transition problem at any time during the next few weeks, we will be glad to try to meet with you at any time and place you suggest.

Sincerely,



FAL:dmc

Attachment

Chr

August 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NIXON

PREPARING FOR THE POST-ELECTION TRANSITION

Until November, you will be preoccupied with winning the election. A few steps taken now, however, can give you a headstart on meeting the wholly different, and almost impossible, demands that face a President-elect.

There are only ten-plus weeks between election and Inauguration. Within that period, and in many cases within the first few weeks of it, you will face some of your most crucial decisions.

First, you will have to make a few dozen top appointments. You will entrust the nation's fate and your own place in history to men you may not know, after a selection process necessarily less thorough than that of any professional firm, business organization, or university.

Second, you must initiate the alterations in government organization most critical for your objectives.

Third, you must formulate the substantive positions necessary to make best use of the "honeymoon period," to engage the enthusiasms of a divided nation, and to deal with early crises.

The quality of your administration may be determined in the ten weeks before you take office.

Advance preparations are therefore imperative. But there are two problems. First, you and your immediate staff must give top priority to the campaign. Second, advance preparations might be misunderstood as overconfidence of victory. (There would be little risk of such misunderstanding if it were known that both major candidates were undertaking advance preparations.) Both problems can be overcome if you entrust these preparations to discreet and trusted personal advisers not immersed in the campaign.

The four areas requiring advance work are personnel, substantive program, government organization, and transitional arrangements.

I. We recommend that you now ask at least one person to begin identifying possible appointees for specific key positions. If his activities are to be of real use to you, a personnel adviser must enjoy your complete trust. He should have a wide circle of acquaintances and possess good judgment about people and about the qualities needed for effective government service. In addition, he must understand the particular qualities demanded by particular positions. He must be known to be a man of great integrity with no tendency to "play favorites." Hopefully, he would be intimate enough so that you and he could discuss specific individuals in candid detail. He ought also to enjoy the full confidence of your staff.

It should be understood by the adviser and by any others who might learn of his activities that he does not select, but only gathers names

yes
 and information for you. This adviser might or might not be useful in the post-election period when you may wish to entrust larger scale recruitment to a different person, possibly one now more actively engaged in your campaign. Two or three pre-election advisers, acting separately, might be equally or even more useful. We describe in a later section these key appointments which require decisions almost immediately after the election. If you undertake this preliminary effort, you will be much better prepared for that ordeal.

II. We recommend that you request substantive studies on issues which may be in crisis during the first three to six months of 1969, issues likely to demand some early response from your administration, and issues otherwise likely to be important in your first year program, particularly those to be stressed in your Inaugural Address and other early messages. To some extent, the campaign apparatus is now doing this, but additional steps outside the campaign effort may be vital for three reasons: First, there are issues which may be important to you as President, but which are not important campaign issues. Second, campaign priorities usually preclude the pursuit of issues in sufficient depth or concreteness to provide for specific executive actions or legislative proposals. Third, such an effort might enlist participants or consultants who would not be available for the campaign itself. It is difficult to identify the issues worthy of special pre-election inquiry, but we offer some suggestions in a later section.

III. We recommend that you solicit selected studies on government organization. The success of your administration in carrying out your

policies will depend primarily on the quality of people selected. The division of responsibilities among executive departments and between the departments and the White House Staff could, however, influence your choices for particular posts. You may need to determine how you expect to handle national security policy or welfare-urban-labor-transportation problems even before you make your major Cabinet and Staff appointments. Your personal preferences and working habits will determine the kind of White House Staff that would best serve you and would bear strongly on the other questions as well. You will have little time to pursue or even discuss these questions before the election, but prior staff work in these three areas at least (national security, urban problems, White House Staff) should facilitate the actions you must take immediately after November 5. You might, for example, wish to ask a man experienced in each area to recommend sensible approaches that could be implemented within existing statutory authority and thus be of immediate relevance to you. We offer further observations later.

IV We recommend that prior to the election you prepare administrative arrangements for the transition period. You will need someone to deal with the old administration after the election, or, if President Johnson suggests it, earlier. You and your appointees will also need advice on useful past transition experiences and on methods of moving smoothly and efficiently into power. These are clearly temporary functions. More generally, you will need staff services other than those required during the campaign and similar to those you will soon need in the White House. We would be prepared to offer suggestions in a later memorandum.

Handled for [unclear]

I

APPOINTMENTS

1. An impossible task. In the brief period between election and Inauguration, you will have to select most of the several hundred top-level appointees upon whom the fate of your administration will largely depend. No President-elect can know beforehand more than a handful of men qualified for these posts. Many of those he chooses will be strangers. The number of appointments to be made, coupled with the shortness of time, impairs the selection process. Further complicating the President-elect's almost impossible task is pressure to reward faithful service to campaign or party. The authors—who have never felt the heat—believe that the dissatisfaction of disappointed office-seekers and their supporters are transient and minor compared to the harm to the country, and to the President, resulting from appointees of modest competence or mere acceptability. The next President's responsibilities are too grave to be entrusted either to the bureaucracy or to the merely competent.

A. Large Scale Talent Hunt

2. You will need a large-scale talent hunt primarily for the several hundred sub-Cabinet posts you must fill. For your Cabinet, you will probably draw on your intimate advisers and other major political figures. These sources in turn may suggest to you people whom you will want to use, but whom you may know casually, if at all. It may be instructive to

recall that the original Cabinets of your predecessors included men not at all well-known to the President-elect. (Rusk, McNamara, and Day fall into this category among Kennedy's 1960 appointees, George Humphrey is the obvious example in Eisenhower's 1952 Cabinet.)

A well-conducted pre-and post-election talent hunt could turn up prospects for Cabinet as well as sub-Cabinet posts. Its major targets, however, would be potential sub-Cabinet Presidential appointees. In addition, your Cabinet and Agency heads might find the results of this research of use to them in making their own important personnel selections.

3. A committee. Unless you have available an ideal recruitment chief, you might proceed by appointing a small screening committee. This method offers the advantages of multiple sources and multiple evaluations.

You might think in terms of three to five men of roughly equal stature. Elder statesmen beyond personal ambition would be useful, but they may be somewhat out of touch with younger generations. But also sufficiently beyond ambition for these purposes are many persons established in secure and relatively prestigious positions (such as a substantial industrialist or financier; senior professor, or leading partner in a major law firm). Your adviser or advisers--whether or not a committee is used--need a wide personal acquaintance in industry, finance, the professions, government, universities, etc.

You may wish to instruct your personnel advisers to consider not only registered Republicans but also qualified independents and even Democrats. (It is particularly important not to insist unduly on political

credentials for younger persons, lest the opportunity be lost--as in 1953-1960--to draw new vitality into the party.) They should seek not only the more senior people who would be appropriate Presidential appointees but the younger men who might be their deputies and assistants, or who might be useful later in the administration.

The places to look are many. Among the more obvious sources are (1) foundations, (2) boards of directors of national companies (and especially of the insurance companies that often expend considerable effort to secure broadly qualified and public spirited national representation), (3) metropolitan law firms, (4) major investment banking firms and other financial institutions, (5) universities, and (6) such business organizations as the Committee for Economic Development. The latter may be of particular aid in identifying able middle-level corporate executives.

B. Seminars with Prospective Appointees

4. The traditional method by which Presidents-elect have selected appointees has been the private interview. In some instances, your interests could also be served by arranging for a few seminars to be conducted by small groups, including some possible appointees.

The format of such seminars should not be uniform. To one on domestic and international financial matters, three to six men might be invited; most would be "experts" in the sense of having qualifications for appointment to the Treasury, Commerce, or the Council of Economic Advisors. They could receive invitations and be given agenda a week or so in advance. In an hour or two with such a group, you could inform yourself on complex,

technical subjects, and at the same time obtain impressions of how these men might perform as members of your administration.

In a less technical area, you might alternatively invite a few possible appointees to join you in a briefing session conducted by representatives of the departing administration. You could find it profitable to see how these men interact with experts and with each other. This device is available before the election as well as later, and it could both extend the range of your knowledge and spare you some fruitless private interviews.

C. Appointment Priorities

5. Earlier the better. To be ready to operate the government upon its inauguration, the new administration must be formed as much before January 20 as possible. The new appointees need time to familiarize themselves with the fundamentals of their offices before assuming actual responsibilities, to get to know one another, to extricate themselves from their previous occupations, and to make the necessary personal moves. Although it was once customary to announce the Cabinet on Inauguration Day, major appointments should now be made as soon as possible after the election. We have divided appointments into "immediate" and "less-immediate" categories and arbitrarily placed the dividing line at fifteen days after the election. All major appointments should be completed by mid-December.

6. Superior positions first. It is generally preferable to name a department's Secretary before naming its Assistant Secretaries. This might seem obvious, but President Kennedy tried the opposite in order to "plant his own men" in the departments and thus provide alternative

channels to the departments. The Kennedy effort did not accomplish that purpose but tended to impair effective working relationships within the departments; the Secretary's position was made ambiguous both with respect to his nominal subordinates and with respect to the White House. That is not the way to make the departments effective entities (and especially not in State with its chronic organizational difficulties). The President-elect should, of course, participate in selecting major departmental appointees--especially the Deputy or Undersecretary. But we believe he will achieve a more effective administration if he accords the Secretary-designate some role in this process.

7. Criteria for immediate appointments. Before naming the positions that should be filled immediately--a list that is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive--we enumerate some relevant criteria. Prompt appointment seems required for positions with one or more of the following characteristics:

(1) The agency is concerned with matters in which decisions are required and in which wrong decisions may have disastrous consequences. Here the appointee must be given the utmost time to prepare. (State, Defense, and perhaps Justice)

(2) The agency is so complex, so ill-organized, or so poorly staffed--or all of these--that successful mastery by the new administration requires the longest possible preparation. (State, Defense, and, depending on your plans, HEW, HUD, or Transportation)

(3) For these or other reasons, early preparation must be undertaken by second and third level Presidential appointees whose appointment

requires some attention from a Secretary-designate.

(4) The agency is likely to be confronted by early urgent demands for executive action or legislative recommendations such that concrete agency preparations must begin at once. (Treasury and others)

(5) The position is so prestigious or of such controversial policy importance that the leading political figures in the party are regarded as contenders. Until such positions are assigned, the President-elect will have difficulty obtaining impartial advice regarding the many other posts he must fill.

(6) The position requires early appointment for psychological or symbolic reasons. (UN Ambassador)

8. Early staff appointments. Your own staff needs for the transition period must be attended to. Summarizing matters of great complexity, we would suggest that you will need one assistant or more for each of nine functions. Since you will require permanent White House Staff to handle all but two of these functions, you might appoint to your transition staff men whom you are considering using in the same roles after January 20. The transition period can then give you an opportunity to find out in advance whether they have the special capacities needed to help you carry your post-Inauguration responsibilities. The functions to be performed for you both during the transition and later are:

a) Management of your calendar and of administrative arrangements for yourself and your staff. This could be your permanent Appointments Secretary.

b) Contact with the press and advice on public relations. One

man usually performs both functions and he could become your permanent Press Secretary.

c) National security liaison and advice--a role similar to that performed by Rostow for Johnson, Bundy for Kennedy, and Gray and Goodpaster for Eisenhower.

d) Liaison for and "translation" of military and intelligence documents.

e) Personnel advice. There might be need for two persons: one concerned with the general talent hunt and the other handling patronage recommendations.

f) Oversight of task forces and similar substantive work. This might be done by a general aide for policy and programs--by a man with the breadth of jurisdiction (though not necessarily the powers) of a Sherman Adams or Theodore Sorenson. This function could be divided among several men who would also collect ideas and prepare initial drafts of your Inaugural Address and later public messages. Actual assignments depend, of course, on many factors including the distribution of literary talent.

g) Special contact for Senators and Congressmen. This could be done by your permanent Congressional liaison assistant(s).

The following functions need to be performed only during the transition and for a short time thereafter. You might assign them to men whose wisdom you want but who, because of business commitments, age, health, or some other reason, will not accept long-term appointments.

h) Advice on organization and reorganization.

i) Advice on transition questions and transition contact with the old administration.

Among decisions which you will have to work out before or during the transition period will be some regarding organization of your White House Staff. You will have to determine how much access each assistant is to have and, for example, whether there is to be a staff coordinator like Adams. You will have to decide whether your best interests will be served by giving each assistant a strict functional assignment or by using them to some extent interchangeably. Since the purpose of the White House Staff is to give the President the extra eyes, ears, and hands he needs for his incredibly difficult task, your decisions on these questions and others related to them could have profound effects on your presidency. We hope to describe the issues in greater detail in a subsequent memorandum.

9. Early appointments in the national security area. Most of the following positions meet several criteria for early appointment: *

a) Secretary of State and two Undersecretaries. The qualities you seek will depend in part on your conception of his office. See Par. 21 below. **

* Lest we presumptuously state the obvious, we relegate to the footnotes our limited observations on the qualities needed for certain offices.

** Also, we believe it important that the top team in State have the capacity to advise the President, to guide the Department, to deal with friends and critics in Congress, and generally to explain administration policies in ways that will maximize public understanding and support. Dulles, Herter, and Rusk each possessed some of these qualities, but the lack of confidence, communication, and team spirit at the top level of the Kennedy-Johnson State Department is not a happy precedent.

b) Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary. ***

c) Central Intelligence Agency Director. If you intend to appoint a new Director during your first few months, he should be appointed early. You might wish to continue Mr. Helms, who is a CIA official with, we understand, an excellent reputation. That course requires no immediate action; you would simply have to ask him sometime before Christmas to stay on and to announce that fact. (Either an indefinite reappointment or a commitment of six months or so would seem courteous in such a case.)

d) Ambassador to the United Nations. If you wish to continue the symbolic importance of this position and to fill it with a prominent figure, then the appointee will have to be named about the same time as the other high national security officials.

e) The JCS. The terms of both General Wheeler, the Chairman, and General McConnell, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will expire in 1959. Following the precedent set by President Eisenhower, you could indicate before Inauguration, or even in November, your choices for these posts, or you could defer action. Your decisions both on individuals and on timing will require careful consideration. These decisions will be taken as indicative of many of your policies. They will also be read as suggestive of your basic attitude toward the military establishment and can influence the amount of cooperation you and your appointees

*** The prescription is easy to state: judgment and wisdom plus Clifford's reputed ability to deal with both the Congress and the JCS and McNamara's reputed analytical ability.

obtain from the inner reaches of the Pentagon. Many complex issues are involved, especially if, as a result of your decisions on Vietnam, or for other reasons, you were to contemplate asking the other two chiefs to step down or to take other posts. (Admiral Moorer's term as Chief of Naval Operations runs to 1971; General Westmoreland's as Chief of Staff of the Army to 1972.) We are prepared to submit an additional memorandum on this subject.

f) The field commander in Vietnam? We raise the question because reconfirmation or replacement might have significant effects in Saigon or Paris and on your concepts for the conduct of the war within Vietnam.

10. Early appointments in foreign operations.

a) The Ambassador to Moscow is an important bridge between the two governments. Not only are his functions important, but he may also be a symbol to the Russians of your administration's prospective attitudes. Moscow is no place for an inexperienced academic or other amateur. Unless early inquiries persuade you otherwise, you will want to consider reconfirming the present ambassador as a symbol of continuity. If there is to be a change, the new appointee must be highly qualified. In any event, an early announcement would be desirable to permit the new appointee to consult fully with his predecessor.

b) Ambassador to Saigon. This post will remain important for the foreseeable future. If you intend to continue the incumbent, it could be wise to announce it early to preserve his effectiveness in Saigon. If you make a change--perhaps necessary as a symbol of the popular mandate

for change in Vietnam policy--the successor should have a maximum time to prepare.

c) Paris negotiating team with North Vietnam. Your actions here will appear to signal the direction of your policies toward the negotiations and the war. You will want to consider with your Vietnam experts the appropriateness or manner of changing the Paris team. If you continue them for the near future as a symbol of a continued "tough" negotiating position (if that would be its meaning), it would be advisable to announce your decision quickly.

d) Ambassador to Paris. The country is important to us, but its government is so highly sensitive and difficult to deal with that an early appointment is advisable.

e) Ambassadors at large. These positions, as such, do not require immediate attention unless you have particular functions in mind.

f) Most other ambassadorships can probably be deferred until after Inauguration in favor of more pressing work. A few caveats are, however, in order: (1) The State Department's views on the relative urgency of other positions should be considered. Bonn and Tokyo, for example, might be thought to require early attention, as might London, Prague, Warsaw, Rio, or the special ambassadors to NATO and the OAS. (2) The governments not receiving immediate attention may feel slighted and undervalued by the United States. To preserve feelings, you might dispatch special envoys to explain the delay and give assurances of our interest. (3) Most ambassadors would be asked to continue (i) indefinitely,

(ii) for a few months, or (iii) briefly. This will present few problems for career officials who would stay or for political hacks who won't be missed. Others may require gentle treatment if you wish them to remain.

(4) The longer such posts remain unfilled, the greater will be the pressure for political appointments. Your Secretary of State-designate could form an advisory committee to identify the ambassadors who should be dropped quickly (former political appointees of modest quality), those who should be retained (the best career people and those non-career ambassadors who have served with unusual distinction), and to screen names proposed for vacated posts.

11. Early "domestic" appointments.

a) Budget Director. This agency's name does not connote the breadth of qualities required by the office. The Budget Bureau and the White House Staff provide the President's principal protection against departmental and congressional special pleading. Only with their help can he make the executive apparatus serve his purposes. The Budget Director should be the one man in government with an outlook virtually as broad as that of the President, and he must be able to judge not only costs but also relative importance among competing programs. The office needs a man of wisdom and vision with understanding of many policy issues. Though no particular professional background is vital, all testimony we have taken suggests that economists have proved unusually effective in this post. An early appointment is crucial to master the current budget and to gain early use of the invaluable resources of the Budget Bureau.

b) Secretary of the Treasury.* It is likely that the problems of balance of payments, taxation, and the general state of the economy will argue for a November appointment. If the economic front is quiet, however, it may be possible to delay this appointment until December.

c) Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. This post should be filled early if the Treasury is. The Department is a powerful agency and its Secretary has tended to consider himself the President's primary economic adviser. In any case, it may be useful to have the Chairman of the CEA at hand from the beginning.

d) Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and/or Secretary of Housing and Urban Affairs.** The new administration has two problems in this area: it will encounter strong demands for action and legislative recommendations to deal with the "urban crisis." Because it is important

* A Republican administration enjoys the presumptive confidence of the financial community. Thus, your appointment need not be specially directed to assuring them. But a different audience may need reassurance: your appointee should not only understand compensatory fiscal policy; he should be able to speak the language and perhaps even appeal to the economists and economic critics who do most of the popular and serious writing in this area and who thus tend to shape the general reception of an administration's economic program--often in the long-run as well as the short. This "criterion" is almost certain to be satisfied by your CEA Chairman.

** These are critical agencies for the new administration. This is the area of key and explosive domestic challenges with the least assurance of "solution" in principle or legislation in practice. Innovations are necessary, but innovations (e.g., the "negative income tax") may be costly and irreversible even though experience or later analysis may prove them unwise. Yet, the pressure for action from politics and "the streets" will be enormous. And it is a Republican administration in particular that needs to win acceptance, trust, and confidence in this area. These agencies require at least as much attention and care as are customarily assigned to the State

Barroco?

to respond and because a failure to push affirmative proposals will force it into an unhappy defensive posture, the new administration must be ready to move. Secondly, a Republican President has a strong need to demonstrate concern with poverty, urban decay, and associated problems. An early appointment could dramatize your concern. Certain outstanding appointments could induce opposition critics to "wait and see" and to give the administration a chance "to prove itself." And the earlier the appointments are made, the sooner you can begin to ask your administration for results.

e) Secretary of Agriculture. There seems to have been a sweeping partisan turnover of Agriculture personnel in 1961. If similar turnover is to occur in 1969, the Secretary should be appointed early to allow time for departmental recruiting and orientation.

12. Other appointments.

a) Attorney General.* He is involved in matters that are intrinsically and politically of great importance: civil rights, criminal

and Defense appointments--and even more because the qualities required are even rarer. It will be difficult to find the man who can manage the departments, who can delegate but not too much, who can both reign and rule, who can react and appraise but who can also innovate and generate enthusiasm, who can refrain from bucking every demand up to the White House, who have sufficient idealism and clarity of purpose to demonstrate "concern" and "commitment" and indeed to push for improvement but who are also sufficient team players to accept intra-administration "defeat" without leaving all or resigning in a huff. Whether such persons exist outside of heaven, we cannot say.

* The Attorney General can be a much more important asset to an administration than is commonly realized. (1) Presidents may lament the subsequent behavior of their Supreme Court appointees without appreciating the frequent

procedure, riot control, organized crime, the FBI. The course of the campaign, in particular, may require an early appointment for symbolic purposes. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has relatively less need than, for example, the Secretary of Defense to master the technicalities of ongoing problems, or to prepare for early crises (at least if riots remain infrequent during the winter).

b) Secretary of Labor.* Appointment before Thanksgiving would

source of their problem: they relied for advice on an Attorney General who did not learn or appreciate the significance of an appointee's judicial philosophy but who relied instead on others' conclusionary appraisals of quality and political opinions. A President may have his most lasting impact through his judicial appointments (including the lower courts); the Attorney General will have a role in that process. It is important to have an Attorney General who will do you and the nation credit in that role. To do so with appropriate attention to Senatorial and other patronage requests requires great judgment and finesse. (2) The Solicitor General's office traditionally attracts brilliant talent from law firms and law schools. With appropriate leadership from the Attorney General, the Department can do the same both at the level of Presidential appointees and below. This resulting reservoir of high-powered talent can multiply the Department's effectiveness and also serve, by loan or otherwise, other departments and the White House. (3) The Attorney General's rectitude, vigilance, and readiness to inquire can give you an important defense against corruption within the government.

*This position has commonly been viewed as "labor's voice in the Cabinet." When important matters are at stake, however, union leaders want to deal with you and your representative. And, of course, neither management nor Congress will respect a mere union labor spokesman, whatever his title. To advise you, to serve as a buffer and (when appropriate) mediator on industrial relations matters, to supervise the mediation services, and to deal (as appropriate) with the National Labor Relations Board--your appointee must be tolerable to labor but probably not a union man. You might find the right man in industrial relations; among respected arbitrators, mediators, or umpires; or even in a Business School, Economics or Law faculty.

not seem necessary unless (1) there is or might be pressure for federal involvement in important national strikes in progress or prospect before March, or (2) you intend to take a very early position on "wage-push" inflation.

c) Secretary of Transportation.* Nothing inherent in this post requires that appointment be made in November rather than December.

There is a serious organizational problem on the domestic welfare front. As one interim approach, you might insist that the Secretaries of HEW, HUD, Labor, perhaps Transportation, and perhaps others form a subgroup of the Cabinet and work very closely together to formulate and implement policy. If that is to be done, it should be done from the beginning and calls for roughly simultaneous appointments. Thus, if one is appointed early, all should be. (Alternatively, if you intend to give one Secretary primary responsibility for the overlapping welfare functions of the several departments, he could be appointed early and the others late.)

* A trouble-avoiding holding operation may not be too difficult in this department. It will not be easy, however, to find a man who can promote innovation and cope with it in the effort to keep the country livable notwithstanding its expanding and increasingly-concentrated population. More common than creativity, but still rare enough to emphasize is the strength to stand up to the special interests, such as the "highway lobby" or the protagonists of the merchant marine or supersonic transports. He will also have to consider the desirability of new steps to consolidate or coordinate Executive Branch operations with those of the "independent" Civil Aeronautics Boards and Interstate Commerce Commission. Whether new steps would be both wise and politically practicable is not clear, but your appointee should be one who can both answer the question and carry out any necessary steps.

d) Postmaster General. Appointment before Thanksgiving is not required unless you must take a position in your first few months on the proposal of the recent Presidential Commission that the postal service be performed not by a regular government department but by a public corporation. If delay would impede reform, your appointee cannot begin soon enough to appraise the substantive merits and political possibilities of reform.

e) Secretary of Commerce. There is less need for appointment before December. The basic question is whether you can make something more of this post than it has been in recent decades. If you are considering merging the Labor and Commerce Departments, your appointees should be made aware of this at the time of appointment.

f) Secretary of the Interior.* Again, early action may not seem necessary.

g) White House Scientific Advisor. The "scientific community" attaches great importance to this post and became very restive about President-elect Kennedy's intentions until the post was filled in 1961. The same sensitivity can be expected today. A strong and relatively early, though not necessarily immediate, appointment can reassure this community of your respect for them and help gain their respect for your White House and thus facilitate the recruitment of top scientific talent in Defense and elsewhere.

* In addition to the usual functions, it's worth noting that the man who can cleanse our rivers, save our parks, and conserve our natural spaces in the face of growing population will make a President's place in history—and in the here-and-now as well if it doesn't cost too much. And the man who can please public and private power portfolios and keep the oil and mineral interests off the President's back will be doubly precious.

h) FBI Director. Unless you are persuaded that you want Mr. Hoover to continue, judicious silence about this post should give him ample opportunity (which he might welcome in view of his age) to indicate that he does not wish reappointment. If a new appointment is to be made, it must receive the greatest care, for you cannot later remove the Director without being charged with "political misuse" of an agency that should be "above politics." For an agency long subject to single control, there is reason to appoint an outsider who could look at the Bureau with a fresh eye. At least, there should be no automatic presumption that a present Bureau official would be better than a first-rate urban police chief, an effective administrator not now in police work, or an elder statesman who could serve for a short period, reassure the public and give you a breathing spell in which to assert your control over this important but currently semi-sovereign agency. Although your Attorney General should probably have a voice in the appointment, its importance requires your close attention.

i) White House Liaison with the academic community. Your two predecessors had resident academics in the White House presumably in the hope of generating a sympathetic chronicle and a bridge to "intellectuals" at large. The first function is unsure (compare Schlesinger with Goldman) and the second silly. You reach "intellectuals" not by having a special communicator for that purpose, but by the actions and statements of your administration. By all means, do not neglect academics in your operating and staff appointments. And, of course, their use in pre-

10/5/54
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and post-Inauguration task forces is both (1) an effective and easy way to impress "intellectuals" and (2) useful on the merits.

13. Immediate action by new appointees. Many of your appointees will need time--perhaps six to eight weeks--to extricate themselves from other affairs. Even so, all appointees should be asked to begin immediately, if only on a part-time basis, not only to familiarize themselves with their new jobs, but to confer with members of the outgoing administration, meet the civil servants who will work for them, and learn the routine of their agencies.

D. Political Criteria Generally; Holdover Personnel

14. Political considerations have an inevitable place in appointments. Many excellent candidates will also enjoy excellent political credentials. But not all those with political support will be worthy of important responsibilities.

a) Though judgeships need no special caveat since everyone understands their importance, regulatory agencies do. They are often viewed as convenient "dumping grounds" for persons of minimum qualifications, the assumption being that a commission of five or seven members can carry a few weak members. Often, however, most of the members turn out to be weak. Even when this is not the case, the weak appointees vote, and not always wisely. It has reached the point where well-qualified men frequently decline to serve on regulatory commissions. To correct that situation, the new President would need to instruct his personnel recruiters in unequivocal

terms and, in order to induce a good man to join an agency, he may have to give assurances that he will fill future vacancies with men of similar high quality.

b) There are positions---often wasteful and unnecessary---of some prestige that can be filled with persons of minimum quality without undue damage to you or to the nation. A thorough (and secret) pre- and post-election attempt to identify such positions would be useful to you.

15. Some personnel and patronage advisers have, in past administrations, appeared to insist on political credentials for every Presidential appointee and for every lower position at the disposal of such appointees. Such an approach will deprive your administration of valuable services and will miss the opportunity to win independents to the Republican cause. There is obviously reason to avoid highly partisan Democrats, but independents and even nominal Democrats should be welcomed with open arms even as Presidential appointees and especially at lower levels. And if acad mice who supported Democrats are excluded from task forces and from consultation, an important resource will be lost.

16. Continuing old officials.

a) At least one Presidential appointee in each agency should be asked to remain for a few days after inauguration in order to provide each department with an "Acting Secretary" to perform the formal departmental functions that cannot be performed by your appointees prior to their official Senate confirmation.

b) Some Presidential appointees in the outgoing administration are essentially career men of a quality you will wish to retain. (This is especially likely in such departmental positions as the Assistant Secretary for Administration--who will be useful for a few months at least.)

c) Some non-career officials of the outgoing administration might be of such outstanding quality that you would want them to stay. Your pre- and post-election personnel advisers should make the effort to identify any such persons.

d) The preceding considerations are applicable with even greater force to those non-Presidential appointees occupying positions that are at the disposal of the new administration.

II

SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PLANNING

17. We have refrained thus far from mentioning the Bay of Pigs, though that episode dramatizes the dangers facing an administration that takes office ill-prepared for the exercise of power. We refer to it now because it illustrates some problems almost certain to face you in your early months in office.

(1) Elements in the bureaucracy will refurbish and attempt to sell ideas studied and rejected by the previous administration or, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs plan, represent as beyond the point of no return programs about which the previous administration had, in fact, been skeptical, reserved, or undecided.

(2) Your appointees will be less willing than later to go against what seems a consensus among departmental experts. As with the Bay of Pigs plan, they may feel hesitant to express doubts. In other instances, they may hesitate to question bureaucratic advice that something or the other cannot be done.

(3) Your appointees will be less prone than later to recommend courses of action involving risks of public or Congressional criticism. With each hoping for maximum accomplishments, each will be reluctant to see you incur political costs except in behalf of his program. After six months or so, your appointees will hopefully have become not only more realistic but more conscious of how their departmental interests fit into the whole program of the administration.

18. From mere mention of these problems, several obvious conclusions emerge:

(1) Your appointees should identify as quickly as possible the hobby horses of otherwise valuable and trustworthy men in the permanent government. They should also make every effort to learn from their predecessors the exact status of issues likely to arise between January and July, 1969.

(2) Your appointees will need to acquire as much advance knowledge as possible about higher-level personnel in their agencies and about the major issues which they are apt to face in the settling-in period.

(3) To cope with the third problem, your appointees will need better understanding than has been the case in the past of what the President expects--of what you expect.

This means that you will need to make a number of early decisions about policy issues and to communicate these decisions as clearly as possible to your prospective and actual appointees. These decisions will concern not only policy positions, many of which will be developed during the campaign, but also relative priorities, tactics to be followed (i.e., a push for legislation, an effort first to stimulate public pressure, or simple administrative action), and desired timetables (e.g., some symbolic action on cities before the summer even if high priority measures have to come later).

19. With this as prologue, we suggest below some of the more obvious issues on which you might want to initiate serious pre-election study, with a view to helping you make the tough decisions on policy and tactics which you will want to make as soon as possible after November 5:

(1) A first group of issues would be those which could be in crisis in early 1969: Vietnam, Thailand, Berlin and East Europe, the Middle East, urban "ghettos," federal-state-local welfare programs, monetary policies, threats to wage-price stability, and the balance of payments.

(2) A second group consists of issues with continuing or long range ramifications requiring early decisions. This category does not admit easy definition and is perhaps better described by example. General defense and space programs, NASO, ABM, banned bombers, relations with Cuba and Red China, long-range anti-crime policies, and relations with regulatory agencies all illustrate in several ways matters upon which you may have to make early choices that will set in motion programs lasting the length of your administration.

(3) A third group of issues would be in those areas in which you plan early legislative proposals. You, of course, know what these will be; any guesswork on our part would be irrelevant.

A considerable body of experience exists with regard to task forces and how to get the most out of them. We would be happy to prepare a summary on this subject if it would be of use.

III

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

20. In a number of key policy areas your ability as President to formulate, coordinate, and execute programs will depend on putting into particular posts men who can do what you want the occupants of these posts to do. Given the number of high level officials that must be named soon after the election, you might usefully have some pre-election attention given to the division of responsibilities most compatible with your purposes as President. The following paragraphs will identify two major issues bearing on your prospective appointments.

A. Responsibility for National Security

21. Prior to choosing your Secretary of State, you might well consider the extent to which you will want your Secretary to be your principal adviser on all foreign policy problems, including military, financial and economic policy. This decision will affect both the qualities you will seek in a Secretary, and the breadth of charter you will assign to the National Security adviser on your own staff.

You face many alternatives, each involving complex considerations. We are prepared to develop a further memorandum on the subject.

a) Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that if you choose to give your Secretary of State a broader mandate, the consequence will be twofold: First, the Secretary-designate must be a man who wants this role and who understands what he has to do to perform it effectively. Second, the State Department would have to recruit a staff of men able to think of foreign policy not merely in terms of diplomacy, but in much broader terms.

b) If State does not perform this role, such a staff must be part of the White House or National Security Council staff under the direction of a national security adviser. Thus, resolution of this issue affects not only the requirements for a Secretary of State, but also those for your national security adviser and their personal staffs.

22. In any event, there are personnel organizational problems within the State Department which in the past have prevented it from being as useful to the President as it might be. In particular, the relationships among foreign service and non-foreign service men, the regional desks and functional bureaus, and the foreign service on the one hand and program groups such as AID on the other, need to be rationalized. The Secretary-designate must understand that you care about the efficiency of State and that he must address this problem, or at least entrust it, to an Undersecretary with genuine delegated power. You will want to be sure that your top team in State has the interests and resources to perform both the policy and the management tasks.

B. Organizing to Deal with Urban Affairs

23. The ability of the federal government to respond to urban problems is reduced by the diffusion of responsibility and power in this area among many governmental departments and agencies. No matter how much responsibility is transferred to states or localities, the federal government will remain concerned with inter-urban transportation, assistance to local police, and other forms of grants-in-aid. Moreover, the transfer of other responsibilities will require considerable study and, at best, will take time. In short, the problem will continue.

24. The major issues here are whether and to what extent federal responsibility for dealing with urban affairs should be centralized, and if so, whether the centralization should occur within the existing departmental framework, within the White House or Executive Office staff, within some other agency, or within a super-department created by merging existing departments and agencies. Any such steps would, of course, affect your personnel requirements for Justice, H. C. , OEO, and White House assistant(s) primarily concerned with urban affairs.

25. If you contemplate reorganization requiring Congressional action, preliminary studies looking toward proposals for legislation might well be undertaken prior to election. And if, as you have indicated, you are to provide encouragement to the development of locally owned housing and business in black communities and to enlist private industry in efforts to rebuild the ghettos, then pre-election studies of how the White House could

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