

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/SALT~~

National Security Decision Memorandum 1164

May 1, 1972

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Additional Instruction for the Strategic Arms  
Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII)

The President has made the following additional decisions for  
Helsinki (SALT VII).

Defensive Limitations

1. The Delegation is authorized to present the following new proposal  
on ABM levels in the context of the Soviets agreeing to include SLBM  
launchers in the Interim Agreement:

a. Each side may deploy ABM components only within one national  
capital defense deployment area and one ICBM defense deployment area.

b. A national capital defense deployment area is a circular area  
of 150 kilometers radius centered on the party's national capital. It  
may contain no more than 100 ABM interceptors/launchers, no more  
than \_\_\_\_\_ Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s, and those  
mechanical-scan, dish-type ABM radars operational on the date of  
signature of the treaty. (For the number of MARCs, see paragraph 2.)

c. An ICBM defense deployment area is a circular area of 150  
kilometers radius, containing ICBM silos which are west of the  
Mississippi River for the U.S. and east of the Ural Mountains for the  
U.S.S.R. It may contain no more than 100 ABM interceptors/launchers  
and no more than \_\_\_\_\_ MARCs. (For the number of MARCs, see  
paragraph 3.)

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d. In addition to (but not instead of) MARC limitations for ICBM defense deployment areas, the ABM radars should be smaller in power-aperture than our Missile Site Radar (MSR). However, there would be a specific exception for our Phased-Array Radar (PAR) and MSR now being deployed at Grand Forks. (The Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, propose this as a separate agreed understanding.)

2. For ABM defense of the national capital, the Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, propose up to eight MARCs.

3. For ICBM defense deployment areas, the Delegation should continue to press to get Soviet acceptance of the principle of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC). Moreover, the Delegation should seek to keep the number of MARCs to eight or less per ICBM defense deployment area. However, the Chairman of the Delegation may propose, at his discretion, up to ten MARCs.

4. With regard to our proposed addition to Article XV of the Joint Draft about withdrawal if the follow-on negotiations fail, the Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, proceed with the scenario outlined by the Delegation. (USDEL SALT VII 1227 as amended by SALT 1235.)

#### Offensive Limitations

5. The Delegation should seek the inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement, the effect of which would be the following:

a. The Soviets, during the duration of the freeze, could have operational or under construction up to 62 modern ballistic missile submarines with no more than 950 SLBM launchers.

b. In order to reach the numbers above, each new Soviet SLBM launcher on which construction is started, after the freeze date, must substitute for an existing SLBM launcher or an existing older, heavy ICBM.

c. The U.S. should have the option to replace its 54 older, heavy ICBM launcher (Titans) with up to three ballistic missile submarines and 54 SLBM launchers.

d. There should be agreed provisions governing the manner in which SLBM launchers would be substituted for the missile launchers to be replaced. (The Delegation should propose, for Presidential decision, appropriate replacement provisions. These provisions should include: (i) notification to the other party when the new SLBM launcher construction begins of what missile launchers will be destroyed or dismantled, and (ii) the procedures and timing for the destruction or dismantling of the old missile launchers. The Delegation should draw upon the work in the interagency paper on "Procedures for Replacement of Old Missile Launchers.")

6. With respect to duration, the Delegation should propose: (i) that the Interim Agreement remain in force for five years unless replaced by a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms, and (ii) that it could be extended by mutual agreement.

7. The Delegation should continue to press for including our proposed language in Article V/VI regarding covered facilities for submarines.



Henry A. Kissinger