

**Timothy Naftali**

I'll just introduce the interview. My name is Tim Naftali; I'm the Director-Designate of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. It's March 23, 2007. We are here today to interview Jeb Stuart Magruder for the Richard Nixon Oral History Program. I'm joined today by my colleague, Paul Musgrave. Mr. Magruder, thank you for joining us.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Good to have you here in beautiful downtown Columbus.

**Timothy Naftali**

Beautiful downtown Columbus. Let me start by asking you a little bit about yourself and -- you went to Williams College?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

And, there you met William Sloane Coffin.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about William Sloane Coffin, please.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he was -- he came in my, I think it was my junior year where I'd come back to Williams. I had been in the Army for two years, volunteered for the draft, went to Korea and then came back to Williams, had the GI bill and so on. I like to say I was one of the poor kids at Williams. There weren't many poor kids at Williams. And Coffin came as the chaplain. And he was always a very controversial person; he took positions at that time on the -- I think it was the Vietnam War. I got to know him mainly because I became his babysitter for his child. He was married then to Anna Rubenstein, Arturo Rubenstein's daughter. And she was quite a character. I remember having him up to my fraternity house for -- Wednesday night was guest night dinner. And she was nine months pregnant, and she was a ballet dancer. She did a ballet split on the floor at the, and we all were saying, "Oh, let's hope we don't have a delivery right now," which we didn't fortunately.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did her father ever come to play the piano? Did he ever come to Williams?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, no, I want to say he was gone by then. I'm not sure, but he certainly didn't come to Williams.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you meet James McGregor MacGregor Burns?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, Burns was my major professor.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about Burns.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, Burns, in fact I was at Williams a couple of years ago doing a lecture series for them, and Burns was my host, and he's still doing quite well considering his age, which he was a professor when I was a student, so he's got to be way up there. And we had a great time, a couple of good dinners at the Alumni House and so on.

**Timothy Naftali**

So he was your major professor?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, he was my professor.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us how you came to be interested in politics.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think it probably started at the dinner table. My father had been a WWI veteran, in fact, quite a hero. I have citations from his days in the Army. And so this was during the second world war period and so the discussions at dinner tables were always about the war and about Truman and about Roosevelt and so on, what was going on. And that sort of peaked my interest in politics. And I was active politically in high school, I mean, in an amateur sense. I was treasurer, I think, of the honor society and so on. And then when I went to Williams, I majored in political science and that got me going so that when I ended up in Kansas City after finishing Williams, I ended up working for a large

paper corporation. And I ended up in Kansas City, and I worked in the '60 Nixon campaign as a ward chairman. And then I went to Chicago to get my MBA at the university and while I was there I got to know Don Rumsfeld. And that was the first major campaign that I had a major role in.

**Timothy Naftali**

Would you spend a moment to tell us about Don Rumsfeld in 1962?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Don was a very interesting guy, very pleasant, very smart, did very well in that campaign. He upset the incumbent. It was unexpected and he did very well. He asked me to be chief of staff after he won, but I didn't want to go to Washington that way. And you guess who he picked as his chief of staff?

**Timothy Naftali**

No.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Dick Cheney, rather ironic.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes. We should call you Mr. Vice President. But, it's been a long time, I know, but what issues did he win on? How did he win? Was it just magnetism, personal magnetism?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think it was he just worked hard. We did an original door-to-door type campaign and very active getting the vote out and so on, which was somewhat unique then. Politics have gotten much more sophisticated now than it was then. So he just got a lot of volunteers. I couldn't tell you an issue that he ran on.

**Timothy Naftali**

When was your next big campaign?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

That was '64, the Goldwater campaign. I'd like to forget that one. It wasn't very good. I ran the 13th congressional district for Goldwater. Then in '66 I ran Dick Ogilvie's campaign for governor; he won, and --

**Timothy Naftali**

With which state?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Illinois.

**Timothy Naftali**

Illinois.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

And then in '68 I worked for Nixon and got to know Haldeman primarily. And out of the blue Haldeman said, "Why don't you come down and talk to us in Washington?" This was after he'd won. And so I went down and he said, "I'd like you to be Special Assistant to the President." And I said, "Now, is that an appointee position or is that a, you know, a hired hand position?" It was an appointee position. So who would turn that down?

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about, well first of all how did you meet Haldeman in the first place?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He was from California and I was in California at that time. That's a gap there I left out. I went from Illinois to Southern California to work for a large department store chain. I had gotten my MBA. And so I met him through the California connection. He and Ehrlichman were running the campaign for Nixon, and I got to know him through that context.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was your first, when was your first meeting with Richard Nixon?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It was in San Clemente probably early in the campaign.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you recall that meeting at all?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know I don't recall the meeting. I recall meeting him and having some time with him, not a lot of time but some time. And that's more or less how I ended up in the White House.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you have any recollections from the '68 campaign that you want to preserve? It was a close campaign.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It was a very close campaign. In fact, if it had gone one more day we would have lost. But it didn't go one more day, so we won.

**Timothy Naftali**

Why do you say that? Is it just the polls were changing?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh yeah, he was way ahead of Humphrey. And then it kept getting closer toward Election Day. Nixon was not a particularly charismatic individual, and that came out in the campaign. And he just barely squeaked by.

**Timothy Naftali**

What were the lessons that you learned from that campaign? We're going to talk about of course the '72 campaign, but what lessons did you glean from that experience?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think what I learned from that campaign was you better be very well organized, and you better have lots of troops in the field, and you better have your campaign well documented as to what you were going to do, particularly if you had a candidate who was not particularly charismatic. Now if you had John F. Kennedy that would be, that was one thing. I mean that's how Kennedy won, on his charisma, his personality. Nixon didn't have that going for him.

**Timothy Naftali**

And then he was well aware of it.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, I think so, yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

You're in California. Tell us a little bit about Bob Finch, because he was an important player in the California campaign.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he was one of the early Nixon people. And stayed with Nixon through the campaign and then became secretary of what I think is now Health, Education and Welfare. But he lost his power to Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Kissinger in a sense. Although in the White House it was really divided.

Kissinger had foreign policy, Ehrlichman had domestic policy and Haldeman was chief of staff. And Finch lost his easy access to Nixon.

**Timothy Naftali**

When you were asked to join the White House, what was your first task? What did they want you to do?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, my first task was to organize the communications structure. There was a director of communications that's now -- I think his name is Bartlett. And it was not well put together in the old days. And at that time Herb Klein was in a sense the director of communications. And he and Haldeman never had a close relationship and so in a sense Haldeman sent me over there to shake the department up and to get it moving as a real communications department separate from the press part of the White House. Ziegler over in the West Wing was the press secretary. And Klein was the communications director. Klein's role was a much broader role. Ziegler and every press secretary since then was fairly narrow, deal with the press corps every day, try to convince them of Nixon's policies or the President's policy. And if you listen to Tony Snow now, he's basically doing that. The communications director has a much broader role in working with all the cabinet officers, trying to get them places on television shows and so on. And other people who are connected with the administration aside the cabinet.

**Timothy Naftali**

What were some of the projects that you worked on for Herb Klein that you might remember?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

The main project that I worked on was literally reorganizing the communications department. We didn't have any structure. We didn't have -- people weren't really aware of what their real function was. And so I spent most of my time with Klein organizing the department. And got it off the ground, sort of dealt with the turf wars between Klein and Colson and so on. And after doing that for a couple of years I guess, I think Nixon was pleased with what I had done, and Haldeman was, and so they asked me to go over. And I was the first person to start the '72 campaign.

**Timothy Naftali**

Before we move to the '72 campaign, I wanted to ask you about some of what you did for Herb Klein. Do you recall working on the response to the "Silent Majority" speech?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

The "Silent Majority" speech. Well, with a lot of those speeches that Nixon made, we geared up letter writing and telephone calls and so on to show public support for what Nixon was doing. And I probably spent most of my time making sure we were organized well enough to, you know, get 5,000 letters out the day after the speech.

**Timothy Naftali**

But this was so the White House could announce that 5,000 people sent letters saying they supported the speech?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Basically, I mean it was hopefully more sophisticated than that. But the idea was to try to show the ground swell of support for Nixon. Because remember he didn't have the personal support that Kennedy had. So he had to rely on a lot of what we did for him to show that his policies were working, and we were getting out of the war and so on.

**Timothy Naftali**

But these 5,000 people, were they --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

By the way, that's just a number --

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, that's just a number, but these people that would write letters, were they people that you would just call on that you knew? How -- Where did these people come from?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

We had a whole setup in every state where we had people who in a sense worked for us, not paid, but worked for us, worked with us. And they were the people we went to. They might have been a state chairman, they might have been a congressman, they could have been any number of people like that. Bob Dole particularly one who we were very close to. He was a senator from Kansas then. So we used those resources to do just that.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you create a mailing list of people?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh yeah, we had huge mailing lists. At that time it was probably the most sophisticated kind of organization to get the word out. We, I, was very pleased when Haldeman asked me and the President asked me to run the campaign because it acknowledged that we had put together a very effective communications structure.

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it one of your challenges creating a better relationship between Richard Nixon and the media?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

That was a challenge. That was probably the greatest challenge. It was no love lost between the media and the President.

**Timothy Naftali**

Across the border, or --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, there were obviously some people in the press that were, and some newspapers that were supportive. But on the whole both the news editorials and the TV, that was when the evening news was becoming a major part or factor of communication, were not pro-Nixon people.

**Timothy Naftali**

And how did you -- did you decide to go around them because they couldn't be shaped? Or was the strategy to somehow, to reshape their views of Nixon?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, we tried to do both. And we were fairly successful in getting that, particularly the TV anchors and people like that, to at least acknowledge the work we had been doing. If you think about it we were the first government in revising social security and other activities that I now forget. There were a lot of major issues that we dealt with and we were quite successful in getting the President's view across.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you -- what role was the Vice President to play in dealing with the media?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, the Vice President didn't play a particularly major role. He was effective with a certain group of people, and he mainly went to the beat of the drummer who was Richard Nixon. And Haldeman had much more power than the Vice President had, as did Ehrlichman and Kissinger. I mean they were decision makers. The Vice President carried out things the President wanted done.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was the connection if anything between policy and this effort to create a better image for the President?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Say that again.



**Timothy Naftali**

Well, did polls, what role did polls play in shaping what you did?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Polls, Nixon was very big on polls.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

We were taking polls all the time, and that was part of my job. We had independent pollsters, and we used the national pollsters. And they would always talk to us about what were we interested in knowing about and so on. But the polls we counted on, particularly in '72, were the polls that we did. We financed it privately. They were not Gallup and who else was, a couple other major.

**Timothy Naftali**

Paris. Harris

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Paris. Harris

**Timothy Naftali**

But did you get a sense, I mean in retrospect do you think your pools were more accurate or as accurate? It's just you were polling a lot more than they were, I suppose.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think their polls were accurate, and I think ours were, too. Ours were more specific. We got answers to questions they didn't particularly care about. We were trying to be sure we knew how to get Richard Nixon re-elected. They were more interested in letting the public know or telling the public what they thought about Richard Nixon. And, of course, the war was the big issue, and that took a terrible toll on the President at that time.

**Timothy Naftali**

Could you explain? On his popularity or a personal toll on him?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think it was both. The war never seemed to end. I mean it kept going and going and going. I was over there on two occasions, and the generals wanted me to go to the officer's club and drink beer with them. They didn't want me going out and seeing what was going on in the villages and in Saigon and so on. It was interesting because I took a bike trip from Hanoi to Saigon a couple of years ago, and it was interesting to see the change in Vietnam from when I was there with the government and today.

**Timothy Naftali**

What will be interesting is knowing, is we've talked with a number of people about Kent State. We talked about the reaction to Cambodia and most everyone we've talked to said it was a shock. They didn't realize the public would react the way they did. Since you were still in the office of communications in 1970, can you remember Kent State? Can you remember that period?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh yeah, I would agree with the general feeling that all of a sudden Kent State happened, and there we were stuck. We didn't have any idea, we weren't involved, we had nothing to do with it, but of course we got basically blamed for it. And Cambodia, of course -- that was us, and we did it. Did we know that we'd get a negative reaction? Probably not to the extent that we did get.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did your sense of who was opposing the war change? I mean there's a feeling earlier that it was just radicals, people to the far left who were opposing the war. Some might argue that by 1970 it was a much broader.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think that's right. I think the public -- I mean we're seeing it now in Iraq, same kind of problem. The longer it goes on, the less success we seem to have. Or at least you know the President says we can win the war. I don't think he or many people, commentators or the public in the polls see that. They don't see us winning. They see us maybe -- I think the public today would like us to get out. And how we get out, obviously the President doesn't know how to get out now. But the public is saying, "We've had enough of this." Same kind of problem. Maybe more of a problem in Vietnam because there were so many more people. Fifty thousand I think was the number that died in Vietnam, and we're up to what, 3,000 plus in Iraq. But I don't think people are particularly interested in the numbers, they're interested in the results. And the results in Iraq haven't been positive. And every day, in fact it may be even worse today in a sense because the news media is so much more effective. They're there, and they've got their cameras there, and you're seeing all of this happen right at six o'clock or the 6:30 news, whereas before it was not as direct. You saw it but you didn't see it like you do today.

**Timothy Naftali**

When did you meet John Dean for the first time?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

John and I were both two of the young comers in the White House. He was a lawyer. I was not; I was one of the few who wasn't a lawyer. And John was very effective in carrying out what the President wanted done legally.

**Timothy Naftali**

When did you meet Charles Colson for the first time?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, we all met, we all sort of joined the White House staff at about the same time. I joined the staff I think in January of '73. Colson, in fact Colson and I, I think, started the same day. I don't remember when John started, but it was all around the same period of time.

**Timothy Naftali**

'69.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

'70, well --

**Paul Musgrave**

'70, because you were hired in late '69?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Late '70, no late '69. When was the election? The election was '68.

**Timothy Naftali**

The inauguration was January of '69.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

So it was '69 we're talking about.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay, in 1971 you are asked to run the campaign. Nixon was not ahead when you were asked to run the campaign was he, in the polls?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No.

**Timothy Naftali**

Please tell us a little bit about the challenge you faced in 1970.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, what we had to do is just what we had to do in the White House, was to build a structure that could communicate what the President had done and was doing, not who the President was personally

and that he was a likeable guy and you'd want him -- there was a saying in the White House and then in the campaign, you didn't want to go out and have a beer with Richard Nixon. I mean I think that encapsulates sort of the view of the comfort level. It was always -- not uncomfortable -- it was always difficult being with the President. It wasn't a warm kind of friendly, Jeb my old buddy, my key communications guy; it wasn't that at all. It was much more business period, and that was it. And I cannot remember, and I went to a lot of state dinners and a lot of those things, but I cannot remember ever being invited on the second floor. And in fact I think Haldeman said in his memoirs that he had never been invited. And he was Nixon's closest aide.

**Timothy Naftali**

Where did the campaign slogan, "Nixon's the One," come from.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

That's a good question. Probably from our advertising agency. We formed our own agency for the campaign. Pete Daly had his own agency in California. He and Phil Varner [phonetic sp] who was in New York, large firm, became our advertising agency. They built up a whole agency so -- I'm taking a guess that the slogan came from the campaign.

**Timothy Naftali**

Again, to get back to the question of -- the President felt he was behind in 1971 in the campaign. Please tell us who his opponent was? Likely Democratic opponent.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, McGovern ended up being his opponent.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes, but MuskeeMuskie. There was MuskeeMuskie.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes, MuskeeMuskie, of course, was first.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes. Was the President concerned about MuskeeMuskie?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Muskee Muskie was ad phonetic sp], and of course there were all kinds of rumors that people in the Nixon White House did him in.

**Timothy Naftali**

But, but they're just rumors.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I was not involved. I wasn't -- that wasn't my job. My job was to get the campaign set up and going.

**Timothy Naftali**

I want to talk with you about some members of your team at the Committee but before I do, you can help history by helping us understand what you called yourselves. We've heard it's the Committee to Re-elect the President. Did you call yourselves 'The Committee? Did you call yourselves CREEP? Who called you CREEP? What's that story?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

CREEP came out of -- just because you took those initials, Committee to Re-elect the President, you ended up with CREEP. I was, I thought it was funny. It didn't bother me at all.

**Timothy Naftali**

But what did you call yourselves, in the office?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, we were just the Committee to Re-elect.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay.

**Paul Musgrave**

Not 1701?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Not 1701, no.

**Timothy Naftali**

So --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Some people may have said 1701. We were right catty-corner across the street. My office overlooked the White House, EOB.

**Timothy Naftali**

Mitchell was your boss. Tell us about John Mitchell, please.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think John Mitchell unfortunately has got, in a sense, a historically bad rap. I think he was a very competent person who was tough and very straightforward but very easy to work with. I found him -- you know, every -- twice a week I'd go over -- when he was still attorney general -- I'd go over with 20-30 decision papers for the campaign, you know. Who was going to do this, how we were going to do the polling and so on and so forth, the advertising, et cetera, and I found Mitchell very receptive and very easy to work with.

**Timothy Naftali**

So it was clear he would be the head of the campaign but he was making decisions for the campaign while he was still attorney general?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about Herb Kalmbach, what role he played?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Herb was more of sort of a policy wonk. I mean, he didn't get particularly involved in the day-to-day efforts of the campaign although I remember spending a lot of time with Herb. But, to be honest with you, I have a hard time 30 years later, whenever, remembering about what.

**Timothy Naftali**

There was a gentleman named Sloane who was the treasurer.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember anything about him?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he was the treasurer. He was on Maurice Stans's side, who was running the financial side, and there probably wasn't love lost between the Committee and Sloane.

**Timothy Naftali**

What about Bart Porter?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Bart worked for me. He was very effective. He was an old advance man. Not an old one, he was a young advance man, and he was just very helpful, very effective in getting done what we needed to get done.

**Timothy Naftali**

**Robert C.**

Rob Odle?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Same, Rob was my first assistant, basically. He came with me from the White House. He was working in Klein's office so when I went over, I brought Rob with me.

**Timothy Naftali**

Bob Merrick?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, Bob was excellent, brilliant man, more of a thinker than a doer.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did Fred Malek play a role?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, Fred came over after Watergate and when they started getting nervous. And he took the -- Mitchell left -- and Malek took the state organizations and that part of the campaign, and I continued with the advertising and the communications and the polling and all of the other parts of the campaign.

**Timothy Naftali**

What role was political intelligence going to play for the committee? I mean, how important was collecting political intelligence?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, from our standpoint, it wasn't particularly important. There wasn't that much we had to collect but the President just devoured intelligence. He wanted to know everything there was to know. So it was more driven by the President than by the staff.

**Timothy Naftali**

And how did you come to know this? Did you get instructions from the President or did it come from Haldeman?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, almost all of it came from Haldeman. But I knew that because I'd been in the White House and it was the same in the White House. I mean, nothing changed. I mean, I moved over to 1701, but it was the same as it was when I was in the White House.

**Timothy Naftali**

One of the challenges for the historian is to know when compartments exist and don't exist. How informal was this? I mean, how often would -- would Colson and Haldeman just come by Klein's office and talk to Klein and you? Is that how it would work or would you have structured meetings and when did you meet? I mean, when you were back in the Communications Office, did you have a weekly meeting with Haldeman and Colson? Was there a communications group that met to discuss because a lot of you had overlapping responsibilities.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, there was an eight o'clock meeting. I want to say every day but I'm not sure it was every day but it was frequent. And it was John Dean, Chuck Colson, myself and Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger when he felt it was important to talk about foreign policy, what our roles should be in dealing with that. So, in the White House, there was both structured meetings and then just lots of times when I'd get a call from

**Lawrence**

Larry Higby who was Haldeman's aide, you know, "Jeb, could you come over? Bob wants to see you about X or Y." So there were both.

**Timothy Naftali**

So this is how you would get a sense of what the President liked to have?



**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, and we saw enough of the President ourselves, not like Haldeman did, but you knew what he wanted.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you sense that this was because of a concern he had that, you know, that his re-election was not a given?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think early on that was true. In fact, as you said, Muskie Muskie was ahead of us. If Muskie Muskie hadn't -- what did he do? He had a famous speech that he seemed --

**Timothy Naftali**

He seemed to cry.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Cry, yeah, and did him in.

**Timothy Naftali**

So, what element -- so you had pressure on you to provide political intelligence. Were you told what you could and could not do to get it?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

We weren't told. We developed methods that Haldeman would be aware of. I mean, Haldeman knew everything. Everything went over to Haldeman in some kind of memo form, and he'd either say yes or no, and we'd go from there.

**Timothy Naftali**

But wasn't there -- was there any head-butting between Mitchell and Haldeman over these things?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Mitchell was a senior person in many ways, but because Bob was right there with the President every day, over a period of time, I think he ended up having more influence than Mitchell did.

**Timothy Naftali**

Because before -- when Liddy comes -- we'll talk about Goyess [phonetic sp], Gordon Liddy. When Liddy comes to work for the committee, he finds there are already operations going on. They're minor, but they're operations.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, Bart Porter was basically gathering intelligence in a minor sense.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, Liddy may make this more dramatic than it was, but he talks about the fact that Muskee's Muskie's chauffeur --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, yeah, Muskee's Muskie's chauffeur was our guy.

**Timothy Naftali**

What do you mean?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

We hired him. [Laughter]

**Timothy Naftali**

How?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, I forget. It was just too long ago. But he was our guy, and he would tell us what went on when he chauffeured Muskee Muskie around.

**Timothy Naftali**

And then there was another fellow who was -- well, there was

**Donald H.**

Segretti.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Segretti, yeah. He was Chapin's guy. I didn't know Segretti.

**Timothy Naftali**

But wasn't some of his stuff feeding into Haldeman?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Through Chapin.

**Timothy Naftali**

Through Chapin. So that wasn't your guy. What about this fellow Ken ReitzRietz?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he wasn't doing -- Ken was our youth guy. I don't remember Ken doing much intelligence gathering.

**Timothy Naftali**

Liddy mentions that he was doing something.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't think -- Ken may have picked up information going around the country setting up the youth organizations, but that was not his primary role, at all.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were

**John J.**

Caulfield or Orlosowitz Ulasewicz ? [phonetic sp] doing stuff for the Committee?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Not for me. I think for Colson -- I'm not sure. You'd have to tell me.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you have Haldeman running some of these, you have Colson running some of these, the committee is running a bit of them, some of them, all feeding intelligence to the center.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

All in to Haldeman basically and Ehrlichman, as well.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's been a long time, I know, but in the case of what Bart Porter was doing, was it a regular reporting system or was it when you just got something you sent it along?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think he had -- there were things that would come up that I'd ask him to check on it and find out what he could. It was sort of a -- I don't want to say, well it was -- sort of a day-by-day kind of thing, not overly organized, more just Bart netted it, I would want it, you know, anything he found out what was going on with Muskee Muskie and so on.

**Timothy Naftali**

You talk in your own book about how you wanted to make the 1972 campaign scientific. In a sense you wanted this to be the most professional campaign that ever had been run. A lot of you had -- a number of you had business experience. You knew what it was to run a company, at least, from a certain level you did. And yet you end up having to work with people like Liddy and others who -- and I'm wondering the extent to which you tried to make this intelligence gathering operation scientific or you just realized it was going to be something very different that didn't really fit.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't think I thought about it in that context. I think we did run a very effective campaign. The results tell us that, and that's what I was interested in. This other information gathering kind of was to me a side line, something that the President wanted or Haldeman wanted, something I could have cared less about. My job, to me, was to win the election.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember when you met G. Gordon Liddy for the first time?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

John Dean introduced me to him. Something about, "He's a lawyer." I said, "Well I don't need another lawyer. I've got more lawyers over here than I could shake a stick at." He said, "Oh, he has other talents." And then Gordon came over and explained to me that he had these intelligence-gathering talents, and he and I -- I was never a fan of Gordon Liddy. He probably wasn't a fan of mine either.

**Timothy Naftali**

What's interesting is that a lot of people don't seem to have been a fan of Gordon Liddy's, but he gets moved around. We talked to Bud Krogh. Gordon Liddy had been involved in the plumbers Plumbers operation.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right.

**Timothy Naftali**

And the break-in to the Dr. Fielding's office had been a nightmare. It was not apparently what Krogh had expected, and Gordon Liddy did this on his own with E. Howard Hunt.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right.

**Timothy Naftali**

At least that's how Bud explains it. So he's a problem in 1971.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, I thought he was always a problem.

**Timothy Naftali**

And yet he ends up talking to John Mitchell. Why wasn't he walled off?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He didn't talk to Mitchell very often. I can remember, I would meet with Mitchell eight o'clock -- When Mitchell came over to actually manage the campaign -- his office was in his law firm was a floor above ours -- and he and I would meet at eight o'clock in the morning, and I can only remember one or two instances where Liddy was involved. And that was just checking on some things Liddy was supposed to have done. In fact, as I remember, Mitchell gave him a hard time over something that he had not been able to do. I can't remember what it was, but he wasn't happy about it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us please about -- so it's Liddy who comes up with this idea of a large political intelligence operation, that what he would later call Gemstone. Where does that come from?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Gemstone was his code word for what was eventually Watergate. Where did it come from? That was Liddy. That [unintelligible] Liddy. He saw himself as the super sleuth person who would know everything about everybody.

**Timothy Naftali**

And he comes with a one million dollar price tag originally.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He came with a million dollar -- that's right, he came with a million dollar, price tag, but it got down -- we said no. It got down to five hundred thousand, we said no, and I think we settled at two-fifty, which was even more than I thought we should be spending for Liddy and Ogden [phonetic sp]. And he had these people from Cuba who had been involved with Hunt and the Bay of Pigs. They were his boys.

**Timothy Naftali**

Why did the committee take this risk?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Because we knew that the President wanted as much information as we could get, and the more information we got, the happier he was. We wanted to make the President happy.

**Timothy Naftali**

And these operations were viewed as potentially successful? I mean, later on the President would complain, so why would anyone want to bug the Democratic National Committee?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he did, at the time.

**Timothy Naftali**

I don't believe you said that in your memoir, so what do you remember of that?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think a few years ago I indicated that, and I had never talked about it before, that he had talked to Mitchell. Mitchell and I were in Key Biscayne and Haldeman and Nixon were in Washington. Haldeman and I talked about some things, and Haldeman talked to Mitchell, and then the President talked to Mitchell, and after he got off the phone is when he told me to give Liddy the money.

**Timothy Naftali**

Now was Fred LaRue in that meeting?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Fred was there, but he wasn't sitting there. He was sort of taking care of things so that Mitchell, myself and others could have our meetings without interruption and so on.

**Timothy Naftali**

So he actually wasn't in the room at the time.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't think so.

**Timothy Naftali**

Because I think he was asked about this after I guess you mentioned this in the PBS, you know, interview and he then said, "No, I don't recall that at all." So it was just you and Mitchell?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes, I think that is right.

**Timothy Naftali**

Because as you know the President would later say that nobody -- that you weren't going to get good intelligence from the Democratic National Committee from those phones. Why was there this interest in bugging

**Lawrence**

Larry O'Brien? There was some speculation that it wasn't simply the he was head of the Democratic National Committee, but there was also some concerns about that he went back to Howard Hughes and those issues. Do you remember?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

There was a connection with Hughes, but I don't recall specifically whether Hughes -- well, O'Brien was a consultant to Hughes, and to be honest with you, time has gone by, and I can't remember exactly why we, why the interest between Hughes and O'Brien.

**Timothy Naftali**

The famous -- well, first of all before we get to the break-in, were you aware, do you remember this, whether you were aware when Liddy comes to you with this project, were you aware of the plumbers operation, what he had done with Hunt?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, I don't remember whether I did or didn't. My book would be the best source for that, okay?

**Timothy Naftali**

The famous break-in that, of course, would result in the arrests in June of 1972, was the second time that the Cubans had entered the DNC headquarters. Apparently there was some intelligence produced by the first break-in, and the reason they went in the second time was to fix some bugs that were not operational. From the tapes -- from the White House tapes -- it appears that some of that intelligence was being shared at the White House. Do you happen to recall seeing the information those bugs produced?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

And how did you treat it? In other words, where would it go and how was it shared?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It went to Haldeman.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you have a special op -- this stuff was pretty hot, so how did you get it?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I got it from Liddy.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were you the action officer? Would he give it to you or was it Porter?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, it was me in this case. I don't think Bart -- he may have had something to do with it, but I just can't recall.

**Timothy Naftali**

I will have to ask, I will have to ask Liddy, but I apologize for the weeds question but this stuff, these were bugs so somebody had to transcribe so we're talking about, we're talking about -- because you weren't listening to these tapes, so you were getting transcripts, weren't you? Just raw transcripts.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right.



**Timothy Naftali**

Was anybody analyzing them? Did you have anybody on your staff who would just sit and read them to make sense of them or?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I couldn't tell you. I can't remember whether what I got was edited version of the tapes or the whole tape.

**Timothy Naftali**

Now one of the things you go into some detail in the book about is the money, the money to pay for these operations, and that was a very dangerous element to this. Do you recall before the break-in -- I know, again, it was a long time ago if you don't that's fine -- but do you recall before the break-in anybody saying my goodness, these cashiers checks, this whole system of laundering money to get money to them, that could be a major problem someday?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't remember whether that was an issue. It certainly could have been, would make sense.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay, because --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Remember, I tried to avoid as much of this as I could. I mean, I was interested in running the campaign, not running G. Gordon Liddy and this intelligence gathering, which I didn't think was necessary in the first place.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember anything interesting from the take, from the stuff that was overheard in the DNC?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, I really don't.

**Timothy Naftali**

Was that the only aspect of the Gemstone operation that actually was put in, that was implemented? Because that actually had several elements to it, all kinds of semi-precious stones was what I remember.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, that was Liddy's plan, the only thing that ever happened with Gemstone.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell me about -- tell me the day you heard about the arrests of the Cubans. Where were you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I was in Los Angeles. Mitchell and I and some others from the campaign were in Los Angeles at the Beverly Hills Hotel. We were having a fund raiser that night for -- the governor was having a fund raiser for us, and a waiter comes over with the phone. It's Gordon Liddy, and he said, "You've got to get to a secure phone," and I said, "What do you mean a secure phone? Nobody's listening in here, I don't think." I said, "Look I'll go out and go to a pay phone and call you back," and that's what I did.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did he say?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, he told me what happened. And I said, "This is the end, my friend."

**Timothy Naftali**

And what did you do? Who did you tell? Did you tell Mitchell?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I told Mitchell and LaRue and then that Monday, after I got back to Washington, I want to say Dean, Dean and I met with Haldeman.

**Timothy Naftali**

And there is some discussion of that meeting, of you and Dean and Haldeman. What are you -- I know it's a long time ago -- but what were you planning to do? What kind of damage control could you do?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, at the time, we didn't -- I don't think we had a specific idea of how to control the problem at the time. It developed over a period of time.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were you -- did you sense that you were in immediate legal jeopardy yourself?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you, did you talk to your wife about it? I mean, how did you personally react to it?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I didn't talk to anybody about it. Finally we had two lawyers, O'Brien and somebody else -- I forget the other person's name -- became the lawyers handling the problem for us. So I talked with them and, of course, I talked with those in the committee that had been involved and that -- You know, all you have to do is take a list of those who went to jail, and those were the people we talked to.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's the summer of 1972. You just learned about the break-in and the fact that the men had been caught.

[off camera voices]

Just, before -- You put the mic accidentally instead of the other. And that's okay it's just going to sound muffled. There you go.

**Timothy Naftali**

Sorry about that. Not that my voice is that important, but thanks. You needed to do something with the Gemstone documents. What happened? What did Mr. Mitchell want you do to with those materials?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Get rid of them, which we did. We shredded them as I remember. I burnt one copy of the Gemstone files in my fireplace at home in June. I still remember my ex-wife asking me why we were having a fire at midnight on June 19th or 20th or whatever it was. And I think the other copy was shredded.

**Timothy Naftali**

Are we talking about lots of stuff, or just a file? I mean was it a big fire, or not?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It wasn't that big of a fire. Nah, it was probably about that much stuff. I don't really remember.

**Timothy Naftali**

And then did you just hold your breath and hope for the best, or --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, no, that's when we, when the FBI started to come around to talk to us and all we realized that we had a problem. And we had better come up with an answer. And that's how we came up with a cover-up.

**Timothy Naftali**

Can you walk us to the extent you are able to remember, can you walk us through that a little bit from your angle?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, the FBI came in to see me, and I realized they were seeing everybody else. So I'm not sure who exactly, probably Porter, myself and probably Gordon Strachan, who was Haldeman's aide then, and Dean, probably Dean more than anybody came up with the story that -- what was the story that we came up with? It was a good story.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, one of them -- I don't know if it was at your level. What's complicated for students of Watergate is that there are so many stories at once. But there's the story that the Cubans were so worried about McGovern becoming President that they did this on their own.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

That's just not true.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, it was one of the stories, but so you don't remember which cover story you were -- that was just one of them.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Tell me the most logical one. It probably is the one.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well there was, there was one that this was a CIA operation. Another one was that this was a self-generated Cuban operation.

**Paul Musgrave**

It was Liddy who was just going to prove that he was a big guy and do this all on his own.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes, and that you would just authorize money saying, "We need some information." But nobody told you how you were going to get that information. So it turned out that, "Oh my goodness," --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think the story, now that I think of it, was that we gave Liddy the money not so much for the intelligence gathering, but for other things that he was doing for us. It may have been that. Again my book's the best recollection of what -- because that's accurate.

**Timothy Naftali**

At what point did you sense that you might be the sacrificial lamb?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, fairly early on. I was a natural. You know I was the director of the Committee to Re-elect, Liddy worked for me. I was a natural.

**Timothy Naftali**

You were called to testify before the grand jury. There is evidence that John Dean worked with you on your testimony.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right.

**Timothy Naftali**

What advice did he give you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

To tell a good story. I mean I don't remember exactly what advice, but he and I worked on a cover story together. Because he knew he was in trouble, too. And if things fell apart Dean would get caught in the middle as well.

**Timothy Naftali**

What about Mitchell? What did he, he knew he was in trouble.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think by that time, I don't want this in -- can we go off the record as far as being on tape?

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, we can stop the tape if you want.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Can we stop the tape for a minute, I'll just --

**Timothy Naftali**

How much mental energy was John Mitchell able to put on the problem of the cover up?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

As the past attorney general trying to get back into the law business and because of other personal issues, he was very distracted.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did he look to you for some guidance into how to manage this?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well I think we both worked together to manage it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you see a lot of each other in the days following?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, yeah we were very close. I'd see Mitchell every day almost.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did that, in those early moments, do you remember Mitchell being concerned about the effect on the President?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't know. I don't know that there was a direct reference in that context. I think we all knew that if this thing got out of hand then the President was in trouble.

**Timothy Naftali**

Was there some concern about its effect on the re-election? The election was still some weeks away.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, I don't think -- I mean, I certainly wasn't worried about the re-election. This made things a little more complicated and if we hadn't done it, of course, but as it occurred Woodward and Bernstein had been fairly effective up until October of '69, '68. But then they lost their effectiveness.

**Timothy Naftali**

You mean '72.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

'72, that's right. Then they lost their effectiveness. The story dried up and went to bed basically. And it wasn't resurrected, that's a good theological term, it wasn't resurrected until --

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, McCord.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Until when McCord decided that he wasn't -- he saw Dean and I coming out as heroes in the election, and here he was in jail. He wasn't going to take it alone.

**Timothy Naftali**

To what extent did the DNC's civil lawsuit complicate matters?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't remember it being a problem.

**Timothy Naftali**

So now in October though, that's when the first major network coverage. I mean you get a little bit on television before but it's in October that information leaks about the money chain, about the Dahlberg cashier's check, the money from Duane Andreas. But that was put to bed?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, I don't think -- It's nothing that I can recall as being critical.

**Timothy Naftali**

So would you say, would it be fair to say that at the start of 1973 you were convinced that you were home free, or you felt home free?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I thought we were home free. I was asked to run the inaugural, and it was a very successful inaugural in all terms. So I thought we were maybe home free. And then I went over to the commerce department sort of in a holding job just to let things wind down.

**Timothy Naftali**

Is that why you were put there? Because that was the time when the President requested resignations from everybody and was sending White House people out to various departments and agencies. John Whitaker for example went to Interior, at that point.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No mine wasn't part of that. Mine was go to a safe place and hide for a while.

**Timothy Naftali**

Why didn't you just leave the administration?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I thought about doing that. And I could have. The Marriotts wanted me to go to work for them, and I would have done that. Bill Sr., the founder, was the chairman of the inaugural. And I had had as much to do with that, and he and I had become good friends. So I could have gone to Marriott Corp. or whatever. Of course that wouldn't have solved the problem.

**Timothy Naftali**

Art Linkletter I believe was the master of ceremonies for one of the major galas that was in '70. He told us a great story of trying to get Frank Sinatra.

**Male Speaker**

Let's yeah, I was going to suggest maybe --

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay. [off camera voices] So can you tell us a little bit about planning the 1973 inaugural, what you remember of that?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, it was, we had a great time. We had won 49 out of 50 states. Everything sold out, I think we had five balls, and we had all sorts of events and they all worked and everybody was happy.

**Timothy Naftali**

The President, though, was disappointed that he didn't have any coattails. Because Republicans didn't do as well as he had hoped further down the ticket.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh yes, that's true, yeah. I thought when you said coattails I said --



**Timothy Naftali**

I wasn't referring to what he was wearing on the inaugural day. But can you tell us a little bit about that?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think we were all disappointed that more Republicans didn't do well because we had done so well.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were you a little bit disappointed that you didn't beat LBJ in the popular vote, the percentage that you won in the popular vote? Do you remember that being an objective at all?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't remember that. I didn't even know that he did.

**Timothy Naftali**

Oh.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I mean, I did know, but I had forgotten.

**Timothy Naftali**

So it's early 1973, and McCord sends his famous letter to Judge Sirica. And then what happens to you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I either had already hired a lawyer or lawyers, which I may had done for other reasons related but not directly related to McCord. And my attorney said, "The jig's up. The best thing you can do is go down and make a deal," which is what I did.

**Timothy Naftali**

He thought the jig was up? What was it that had come out by that point that meant that it was -- I mean the judicial process was continuing all through this period.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

But again, the jig was up. I knew the jig was up.

**Timothy Naftali**

Now when your lawyer gave you this advice, did you talk to anyone in the White House?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Probably, maybe Bud Krogh, maybe John Dean.

**Timothy Naftali**

But he was also coming under a lot of pressure at that point.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right, yeah there was, going on there was a sort of a who's going to get caught and who's going to get away with it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Mr. Krogh said that people in the White House tried to discourage him from pleading guilty. Did you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't know. I wouldn't know that.

**Timothy Naftali**

No, but did anyone try to discourage you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about the experience of --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Not that I recall, by the way. Somebody may have, but I don't recall.

**Paul Musgrave**

Did you ever speak to Mitchell before you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, we talked. I went up to New York, I remember. We talked about that, you know, it was -- the jig was up; we were all in trouble.

**Timothy Naftali**

He was fatalistic?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

That would be Mitchell.

**Timothy Naftali**

But he was that --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He was that kind of person, pretty practical, a lawyer who saw the handwriting on the wall and knew that we were in trouble.

**Timothy Naftali**

You told us a really important story early on at the beginning of this interview about your knowledge of the President's knowledge of the Gemstone Plan. He wouldn't have known it as that, but the bugging. I want to be sure for the record we just have that chain of events clear. Mitchell reported to Haldeman about the proposal. Haldeman reported to the President, the President --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Mitchell and I were in Key Biscayne. Haldeman and the President were in Washington. Haldeman and I were on the phone talking about something, some things, whatever, and obviously Watergate came up then. And Haldeman wanted to talk to Mitchell, which he did, and the President got on the line, and when he got off Mitchell said, "Give Liddy the money."

**Timothy Naftali**

So it was not unusual for you to be talking to Haldeman about Liddy and these kinds of plans?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, that was an unusual plan. I didn't spend a lot of time with Haldeman on things that Liddy might have done other than that. But this was involving \$250,000.

**Timothy Naftali**

When you, when the jig was up and you basically had to testify, why didn't you tell the story?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

The President had indicated to us somehow or other we'd get a pardon. And also that I guess I had this feeling of loyalty to the President and did not want to get him in trouble directly. It was one thing about Haldeman or myself, or even Mitchell, but the President was the President. I think that those were the two most cogent reasons why. And, of course at that time, by the way, I didn't know that the President would end up having to resign.

**Timothy Naftali**

After all this happened, after you came out of jail, that's still the reason you -- I mean you didn't tell the story until just a few years ago.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, there was no, nobody asked me the story. It's true; I never was asked the question. And since I wasn't asked the question and from my standpoint I had told the story. That was the only blank in the story. And I'm sure I don't know that I thought this, but my guess is that it's over, it's done with, move on, don't cause any more issues. And I'm not even sure why I brought it up in that PBS show. I mean I just don't know what the reason was. Maybe I had gone through my ministerial career and, you know, felt it was important to tell the truth.

**Timothy Naftali**

What were you and Mitchell doing in Key Biscayne? Usually one would think if the President --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right, yeah. Well, Mitchell liked the President and all, not as frequent, was a friend of Bebe's and Bebe always had one of his houses available for Mitchell or Nixon or whoever. So that's where they went.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember what time of year this was?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, it had to have been probably -- the break-in was in June. There was some need to get Liddy the money, according to Liddy. He had to get things going so it was probably January or February or something like that.

**Timothy Naftali**

'72.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

So we're now in the spring of '73, and things are falling apart. Did you ever have any conversations with Colson? Did Colson know about the Watergate operation?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I'm sure he did, but you'd have to ask him. I mean he and Hunt, Hunt was his -- they both went to Brown together and they were old buddies. Colson was one who pushed me in getting Hunt hired, so I'm sure he had a certain amount of knowledge, but I don't recall specifically what.

**Timothy Naftali**

He wanted you to hire Hunt for this operation or just to hire Hunt in general.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I wouldn't remember exactly why.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did you think of Hunt? You must have met him.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, I had met him a number of times. He was a typical ex-CIA guy, that's about all.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us what you recall, and I'm sure a lot of it's a blur, but of the investigation, the investigative period. What was the climate? How did people treat you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, on one hand I think until McCord's letter came, I was treated fine. After McCord's letter came and Dean and I decided to cooperate, we were not on the state dinner list anymore.

**Timothy Naftali**

What were you -- how were you thinking about all of it? How did -- I mean, did you feel guilty?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, it wasn't that I felt guilty; I knew I was guilty. It was more, it was a factual issue as much as a feeling issue, because if it's a feeling issue maybe it would go away, but this wasn't going away.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you were preparing yourself for prison? Well, you thought you might be pardoned.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

There was talk of, that in fact on the tapes President Nixon mentions a pardon for you.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right, but it never came.

**Timothy Naftali**

You didn't know about the taping system, did you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Pardon?

**Timothy Naftali**

You did not know about the taping system? You didn't know the White House taping system.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right, no.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was your reaction when you heard that there was a White House tape?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It wasn't surprising. Knowing Nixon, that would fit in to his desire to have everything down. And in many ways it was a good idea if it hadn't been for Watergate. I mean he'd have had a historical record that he could use in his memoirs.

**Timothy Naftali**

Why do you think that Haldeman -- Haldeman was -- He gave the impression of being a very careful gatekeeper. And yet he got the President involved, he let the President get involved or got the President involved in a number of risky ventures. He's there when the taping system is put in; he may have suggested the taping system. To what extent did Haldeman act as the gatekeeper to the President?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think he was the gatekeeper, no question about it. And he was also usually very careful. But I think, and this is not unusual I don't think. We're seeing that in Iraq, sort of a hubris, feeling we're above the law, above the problem. We're the government; we're the President.

**Timothy Naftali**

And did he have a touch of paranoia, Haldeman?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I never thought he did. He may have, but if he did he hid it very well.

**Timothy Naftali**

But you've said that he had an interest in political intelligence.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

But I think that was because of, well how much was his, how much was the President's? That would be just a guess on my part. It was more the President, I'm sure. And he had worked for the President for a long time.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about your day in court. Which one, which one? Your choice.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, it was pretty straightforward. Went down to the judge. He and I had played golf once and knew each other slightly and he, I think, liked me and felt that I was one of the good guys that got caught up in this problem. The day in court, that day in court was very short, a four-year sentence. And then seven months, eight days, 11 hours later he let me go.

**Timothy Naftali**

You shared -- you actually were in prison, when you were in Fort Holabird, I guess.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes, I was there.

**Timothy Naftali**

With Colson.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Colson was there.

**Timothy Naftali**

And Dean?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Dean.

**Timothy Naftali**

And Kalmbachk.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

KalmbachKalmbach, right.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us what it was like to be in prison together. What did you talk about?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, we certainly didn't talk much about Watergate, that's for sure. You know we all had private rooms at Holabird, and I spent my time running and trying to stay in shape. I don't think I spent that much time with any of them. I probably spent more of my time with the other -- well, the rest of them were mafia hit men who cooperated with the government.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were you angry then?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, not angry. You know, I had enough education to understand that what happened was something that was not only illegal, but it was very detrimental to the country.



**Timothy Naftali**

In your, I think it's in Colson's memoir, he talks about the fact that many of you, that you prayed together, that you talked about Scripture. Was it at Holabird that you, we haven't asked but did it make you a more religious man?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Chuck, his was a "Road to Damascus" experience. At least that's how he writes about it, talks about it. I had been active in the church forever, so it was much less dramatic.

**Timothy Naftali**

Your old friend William Sloane Coffin wrote an op-ed in "The New York Times." When did you see him? After you had got out of prison did you see him again?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I saw him once. Went up to New Haven and saw him.

**Timothy Naftali**

Would you share with us that experience?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It was okay. That op-ed, as I remember, was very negative.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

And so it was okay. It was sort of a closing the door for finishing that part of my life.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you reach out to him at all during the -- when you were in the administration when he was one of the leaders of the anti-war movement?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't think so. I didn't, we spent a lot of time on the war, but I didn't spend any time with the anti-war people.

**Timothy Naftali**

Jeb, you wrote a stirring memoir, and your memoir is the most contemporary of them.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You wrote it before you went to jail.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did that happen? You wrote it fast, first of all.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I had plenty of time. I wasn't doing anything at that time. I was unemployed.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you keep good notes or was it because it was so fresh in your mind?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, there were both. I had all my memos. I had that kind of information, as well, that was as you said very current.

**Timothy Naftali**

You worked with, was it Patrick Anderson?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

And he's a novelist?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, he's -- you know, I don't know what he does now. I haven't seen --

**Timothy Naftali**

No, but then. I mean, how did you get in touch with him? Was it the publisher who put you in touch?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, I don't know how I got in touch with him. But he was very good, very helpful.

**Timothy Naftali**

You caught some flack, not that -- there was a lot of criticism of you in that period. You were criticized for being able to do this book and sell it. Were you allowed to go with -- did you tour with -- I mean, you were just about to go to jail. Were you in jail when it came out?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It came out about a week before I went to jail.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you do any publicity?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

There was a book, whatever, thing in Washington, happened to be that week. And I did that. I remember that singularly. And then I went to jail, correct, and didn't do much in jail.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you get any response from your former colleagues? Did they read it, talk to you about -- did anybody talk to you about the book, that you can recall?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, plenty of people talked to me about it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you have a few anecdotes you can tell us about that, that you recall now?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think the reviews were very good about the book, that it was truthful, well-written, straightforward. So on the professional side was, you know, I caught up to number five or six on the bestseller list, and --

**Timothy Naftali**

It as was one of the first Watergate memoirs.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It probably was --

**Timothy Naftali**

Was the first.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Of the key characters, yeah. And that was part of the -- I think the publisher knew that I had to get out first because if Haldeman or Ehrlichman got out before I did, I would overshadow.

**Timothy Naftali**

For some reason, Spiro Agnew's speechwriter, Vic Gold, wrote a nasty article about it. Did you know who he was?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Who?

**Timothy Naftali**

Vic Gold. He was -- some people claimed that the Watergate defendants, the convicted members of the Watergate conspiracy got better treatment in prison than others, although in doing our interviews we're discovering that, that wasn't true. What were the conditions like for you? You were in two prisons, right? You went to --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, in the first prison, I almost got killed twice. And that's why I ended up in Holabird. Now, Holabird's a safe house. And, you know, people, the core group of prisoners in a place like Allenwood where I was were mainly people coming down from Lewisburg, which is a maximum/medium security prison. And then they go to Allenwood on their way out, sort of to get them back into society, hopefully. Well, those people didn't -- they hated Nixon, that was just automatic. And I think probably I was lucky. I got put in a job where I was safe. And I was relatively safe at night. But I was lucky.

**Timothy Naftali**

What job did they give you?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I was a clerk. And I used my manager's or managerial skills to run the farm, the business part of the farm operation. It was a farm, basically. And so, we had to put information together for Lewisburg, to tell them, you know, how many cows we killed, and how many whatever you did.

**Timothy Naftali**

And some would come at you with a knife? Is that what they -- Would some come at you with a knife? Is that what they --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, that's the usual way. Yeah. It's usually at night.

**Timothy Naftali**

At night, they'd --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

And the guards, you know, they're not overwhelmingly supportive of any of the prisoners, you know. I mean, I don't know what they would have thought if somebody had killed me. But I don't think they would have gone home and been sad about it.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you shared a cell? Or did you have your own cell?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

No, in Allenwood, it was dormitories.

**Timothy Naftali**

Oh.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Which in many ways was much worse because you were out in the open --

**Timothy Naftali**

I can imagine.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

-- 40, 50 people in each dorm. I think there were four or five dorms at Allenwood, and 40, 50 people in each dorm.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you do any writing at all then? I mean, did you -- I mean, you had finished your book.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I had finished that book and hadn't started my second book. It was not an atmosphere to write. You were protecting yourself mainly.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you get any news of what was going on outside?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I mean, we had the availability of newspapers, and TV, and so on.

**Timothy Naftali**

Were you there when the President resigned?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yes, the place went up in an uproar. They were so happy. Each dayroom had a TV set. There was a dayroom in each -- the dormitory. And all I remember was they were just ecstatic.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did you feel?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

At that point in time, I think I was too numb to feel much of anything other than protecting myself. At that point I was in Allenwood. And I had already had some threats on my life. And so, I don't think I had any great feeling one way or the other. You know, it was over for me. I was long gone. As you saw the one picture of Richard Nixon and I at Woody [Hayes]'s funeral here, that's the only time -- I mean, we didn't correspond with each other and write love notes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let's talk about, since you mentioned, let's talk about that funeral. Tell us about, that's Woody Hayes's funeral.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Woody was in Columbus. Woody is an icon, still is. I mean, he and Bear Bryant and, you know, the two great college coaches over a long period of time. And Woody turned Ohio State into a powerhouse, which it still is today. And Woody here in this town was just an icon.

**Timothy Naftali**

The funeral was at your church.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did that happen?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He was a member of our church.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you knew him.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Could you give us a minute about Woody Hayes?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I -- when I knew him, I knew him as minister to church member. He was not somebody who came into your office for counseling or things of that kind. But he was there quite a lot.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was the name of your --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

First Community Church.

**Timothy Naftali**

And the denomination?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It's a combination United Church of Christ and Disciples of Christ. It's a 4,000-plus members. It's a large church here in town.

**Timothy Naftali**

How was it that Richard Nixon gave the eulogy at Woody Hayes's funeral?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Anne Hayes called me and said that Woody and the President were close friends, had talked a lot on the phone, and maybe even spent some time personally together. I can't remember that part. And she said would I call him and ask him to say a few words. I called New York, and got through, and the second person is Nixon on the phone. And, "How are things, Jeb? Hear things are great. You're now a minister. And you're doing wonderfully well." And I asked him to come out. And he said, "Love to." Came out, flew in, flew out, did a very good job.

**Timothy Naftali**

And that's the only time you ever saw him after Watergate?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yep.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you chat at all with him when he was here or --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, yes, but nothing substantive.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you reminisce with any of your other colleagues from that era? Did you ever get to talk to them about what happened?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, the most current time was being with Dean doing this taping, "In the Shadow of History," which was done in L.A., and I want to say New York, but at least it was done in L.A. And I remember talking with Dean. But I don't remember what we talked about, though. But it was about that period of time.

**Timothy Naftali**

There are a couple of incidents I'd like to ask you about just out of the blue that don't follow chronologically. But they're great stories, and I'd like to get them on tape, if possible. One is the story of you playing tennis with Agnew. You talked about playing tennis with him a number of times. And finally you play tennis with him, and you play tennis with him in a very important moment in history. Tell us about that one tennis match that you had with Agnew.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, that was the night I burned the Gemstone files. And the files were in my briefcase. And I made sure I put them on the tennis courts where I could keep my eye on them. All I remember was when I



said that I had to leave Mitchell's apartment, I said, "I'm going to go play tennis with the Vice President." He said, "Well, just make sure you burn the files."

**Timothy Naftali**

So you're going and play -- where are you going to play tennis with him?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

It was an indoor tennis facility someplace.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you bring these in your briefcase. You have the Gemstone file. And you play tennis with Agnew. But Agnew wants to ask you something, doesn't he? He wants to know something.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, yeah, he asked me. And I said, "No, no." He said, "Did we have anything to do with that?" And I said, "Oh, no."

**Timothy Naftali**

You had just come from Mitchell's apartment, so the Gemstone file you took from your office, you went to Mitchell's apartment, did you show it to him? Is that why you --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

To who, Agnew?

**Timothy Naftali**

No, no, Mitchell.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't know if I showed it to him. He had seen it before.

**Timothy Naftali**

But anyway, I'm just trying to get the sequence. So you go to Mitchell's apartment. You tell him you've got a tennis game with the Vice President. You carry the briefcase with you. You go to the Vice President. You go to the game. You play the game. You've got the briefcase right there.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Right next to the net.

**Timothy Naftali**

And it was a doubles match, wasn't it?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think so, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

And --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

He keeps giving you questions.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, he actually asked me if it was a singles match. But I seem to remember it was a doubles match. That was a doubles match so --

**Paul Musgrave**

That's [unintelligible] what's important. Did you win?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

You know, I don't remember. I probably lost purposely. Well, you win some, and you lose some.

**Timothy Naftali**

There were two weeks of "Doonesbury" cartoons. William Sloane Coffin was a favorite of Garry Trudeau's. He appears all the time, which may be the reason why Garry Trudeau decided to give you two weeks of cartoons that --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, I had the originals. They were stolen.

**Timothy Naftali**

That was a bummer.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I've got one of them up there. You see my son, one of my sons on a camel, right next to the camel.

**Timothy Naftali**

Oh, yeah. The other is an anecdote that may not be true at all from Gordon Liddy's book, where he talks to you about Jack Anderson. He says in his book you had a bee in your bonnet about Jack Anderson.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, Jack Anderson was not our favorite. That was for sure.

**Timothy Naftali**

No, according to Liddy, you talked to him about actually getting rid of Jack Anderson. Well,

[unintelligible]

that's true or not so --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I mean, I did a lot of things I shouldn't have done. But that was not one of them. I didn't tell anybody to get rid of anybody.

**Timothy Naftali**

You were talking about how there are no do-overs in history. What would you have done over?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I would have said, "No."

**Timothy Naftali**

But were you ever asked to say, "Yes"?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, yes, in an indirect way, yeah. President wants to get information on Larry O'Brien. Liddy had already proposed the plan. So it wasn't a question of, sort of, yes or no. There was a plan. Liddy had said a million dollars. When it got down to 250,000, Nixon said, "Okay."

**Timothy Naftali**

But very few people of your generation, who worked for Nixon, left before the trouble started. You mentioned Stephen Hess as an exception.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, yeah. Well, you knew that if you didn't follow Haldeman/Ehrlichman directives, you were gone.

**Timothy Naftali**

And why did you follow them?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I don't think I thought that was very important. In retrospect, I was a moral disaster. But at the time it didn't seem important.

**Timothy Naftali**

What didn't seem important?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

The break-in, I mean, it seemed somewhat innocuous in the context of what was going on at that time. There was the war. There was all this hassle going on. And Larry was not our friend.

**Timothy Naftali**

Larry O'Brien. Was there a certain climate in the administration? I think what's difficult, I mean, the historian has to recapture the period. And what are the elements of that period that you would want people to keep in mind when they judge what happened?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think the negative feelings that fell onto Nixon primarily because of the war on one hand and his personality on the other. I mean, if the Vietnam War was over, it would have been different. But the war kept going. And it was, you know, a very negative event in our history, and negative against us because we continued it after Johnson left instead of getting out.

**Timothy Naftali**

How would you describe your politics back then?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Back then?

**Timothy Naftali**

I mean, you were Republican, certainly.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Republican.

**Timothy Naftali**

Where did you fit?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Moderate. Never been an ideologue.

**Timothy Naftali**

There were ideologues in the administration.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yep.

**Timothy Naftali**

What role did they play in shaping the message that you gave the public in '72 for the reelection?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I'm not sure that they gave me or -- I didn't use a lot of what some would have liked to have used. I just wouldn't use it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you recall any example? I mean, when you say, "they," I guess we're talking about Pat Buchanan?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Buchanan, Colson, probably others. I just, you know, offhand can't -- the people I hired that worked at the committee were reasonable people, American, people like that, and the advertising people. So the only person we had to tailor it to was really to Haldeman and Nixon. We didn't have to tailor it to Colson, or Buchanan, or anybody.

**Timothy Naftali**

What do you think Nixon's -- what were Nixon and Haldeman's politics?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

They were very pleased with the campaign. I mean, it was a great campaign. Can't win 49 out of 50 states and --

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it a surprise that you did as well as you did?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think I was surprised that we did that well. It was clear after McGovern was nominated that we were going to win the election. It wasn't clear to me that we were going to win it in that, with that kind of majority.

**Timothy Naftali**

Nixon later speculated that the Watergate story might have had an effect on the turnout, on the number of people who voted for him. Do you think it had any effect on the outcome? In '72, that he might have won more votes if it had not been for Watergate?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I think prior to the election time, Watergate was a non-issue.

**Timothy Naftali**

What about the third party candidate, Schmitz?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, that was a joke.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yeah.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did the Democrats make any -- what mistakes did the Democrats make that you were able to --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

They put up the wrong candidate. He was not a good candidate. And he didn't have good people running the campaign. So it was much weaker than Humphrey's campaign in '68.

**Timothy Naftali**

When you in your book described going over to 1701, this is before China and Russia.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Russia.

**Timothy Naftali**

What role do you think they played in bolstering the President's chances for reelection?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Oh, I think they were very helpful. Obviously, Russia and China were the two -- if it wasn't for Watergate, Nixon would go down as one of the great Presidents, and still may because of Russia and China, because if you remember that was a -- I mean, the Cold War was still on. And Nixon gets a lot of credit for starting the breakup of the Cold War, and then we're -- you know, continued more with Reagan than with Carter. But Nixon certainly should get a lot of credit for that.

**Timothy Naftali**

And yet, one burglary.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yep, one -- what's the saying?

**Timothy Naftali**

Third-rate.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

What?

**Timothy Naftali**

Third-rate burglary.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

A third-rate burglary, to top it off. No, but the saying that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you ever have the chance to talk to Haldeman after you came out of prison? Did you ever --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I ran into him in San Francisco once, briefly. But I don't think we talked about Watergate or anything of that kind.

**Timothy Naftali**

There were people --

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I mean, in a sense, when you think about it, what do you say? "Gee, Bob, it's too bad we both went to prison, you know. Isn't that great?"

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, I don't know what you would say.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Better to say nothing.

**Timothy Naftali**

Better to say nothing. The President was trying to build a new Republican majority in '72. And your campaign was supposed to do that. How was that majority supposed to look? Is it what the Republicans built in the '90s?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well --

**Timothy Naftali**

Or late '80s or '90s?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

The majority that I'd hoped we were building was a moderate view of the world, and an ability to deal with people like Russia and China, and domestically to move the Republicans out of this view that the Republicans were only for big business and didn't care about the common man. And I think we started doing that and was to some extent helpful, although now we're back where we were.

**Timothy Naftali**

Who do you think worked with you to do that? Who were the people who were likeminded and shared that vision for the party?



**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

People like Krogh. I think Haldeman had that vision.

**Timothy Naftali**

Although he wanted to rename the party, didn't he? He wanted to call it the conservative party.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Yeah, but that was a throwaway, I think. I don't remember that specifically. And I don't think that was serious. I mean, he may have liked the idea, but I can't believe he thought he could do that.

**Timothy Naftali**

Are there any other anecdotes or moments from that administration, anecdotes that you'd like to share with us to put on the record that would -- we've spent a lot of time, unfortunately, talking about Watergate -- but that have to do with the other aspects of your government career, that we just didn't include, that you'd like to include?

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

Well, I think, except for that activity at Watergate, I think we did a lot of good stuff. I think we ran a good administration. I think we had good people, and so on the whole it was to me a very positive situation. And, of course, unfortunately, well, a lot of people don't even know what Watergate is now, you know. And younger people don't even know much about Watergate. So, but I was very pleased with how things were going until the end.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, Jeb Magruder, thank you very much. We appreciate your time today.

**Jeb Stuart Magruder**

I appreciate your good questions, good information from your side, which is not always the case.

**Timothy Naftali**

We try to prepare. Thank you. Thank you.