

**Timothy Naftali**

This is our second interview with Barbara Hackman Franklin. It's June 23rd.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

No, it's 26.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's June 26, 2007. We're at the Watergate -- How much fun is that? -- in Washington, D.C. I'm Tim Naftali, Director-Designate of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, and I'm delighted to be with Barbara Hackman Franklin again. Barbara, we're just picking up a few questions that we didn't talk about last time, and I'd like to start with when "Ms." as a title was used in the Nixon White House.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Well, you know in the '70s, "Ms." was just starting to be used in common usage around the country, and there was "Ms. Magazine," and it was a kind of a statement. Well, I decided that it would be kind of a good idea, because we were relating to women and we were contemporary, to use it on the correspondence that was coming out of my office, which of course was recruiting women and relating to women's groups. So, I started to use it. And one day, I hadn't used it very long, I got a -- one of my letters came back with a big circle around the "Ms." from Rose Mary Woods, and she said, "We don't use that title here. You are 'Miss' or 'Mrs.'" And that was the end of the use of "Ms."

**Timothy Naftali**

Had anyone else tried to use "Ms."?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Not to my knowledge. I think I was out there by myself. Maybe they did, but in any case --

**Timothy Naftali**

Was this in '69, right in the beginning?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

No, this would have been probably somewhere in '71, would be my guess, probably beyond the summer of '71.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you, by any chance, have copies of "Ms. Magazine" hanging around?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Well, I had some, sure. And that was all, you know, hot stuff then, hot topics and people were talking about the magazine and about equality. I mean, there was just a lot of talk. And this title was just part of the environment at the time, but we were going to be traditional in the Nixon White House, and we were.

**Timothy Naftali**

Your project to recruit women involved women of all types to reflect our country. Tell me about recruiting Sallyanne Payton.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Actually, I can't take credit for Sallyanne. I wish I could. But somebody else did that, and I think she might have been there when I got there. She had been to law school, a very bright woman, and she was in the policy -- the domestic policy side of the House. We were on the admin side of the house. So, I can't tell you about recruiting her at all or who did. I'm not sure. She was in John Ehrlichman's shop.

**Timothy Naftali**

We'll have to ask her.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Sorry, you'll have to ask her how she got there.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us, though, about Hobart Taylor.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Oh, interesting little snippet of a story. After I was put in front of the press, after being in the White House for maybe two weeks or three, and there was a rather large article in "The Washington Post" that was, I would say, even-handed, and there was a photograph and what we were trying to do and all that stuff, I got a call from Hobart Taylor. I had no idea who he was. He introduced himself and he said, "You know, I did something similar in the LBJ White House trying to build relations with African-Americans and bring more African-Americans into the administration." And he said, "I think perhaps I can help you, because what you're doing now is a bit similar." And so I had lunch with Hobart Taylor and there ensued a friendship that really was very important. What he knew was how the white man's world worked. He had become very successful after the LBJ White House, was on a bunch of large public company boards, was just a very successful lawyer, and he helped me to

understand some things about the white male world that I would not have known otherwise. The point here is that when you're something different in a place, it really helps to have someone decode what the culture is. And he had gotten -- he was ahead of his time. He decoded that culture and helped me not only in the White House but beyond in my career as I entered the corporate board world later. Hobart was very helpful. And he died at a very young age. He was maybe 60 or 61. So that's been -- how many years ago is that? Twenty five, nearly 30 years ago.

**Timothy Naftali**

It was just wonderful that he reached out to you like that.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

It was unusual. He wouldn't have had to do that. And he was on the other side of the aisle. I mean, he was a Democrat and could have said, "Well, you know, sort of what the heck. Let them flounder around." But I thought it was a really generous act and I really appreciated it. He was that kind of a man though. He was generous and he wanted to see those who hadn't had an equal chance.

He wanted to help, whether that was a gender-equal chance or a minority-equal chance. I think he had a lot more to do with what occurred in the era of civil rights legislation than he would ever have admitted to anyone. But he was there during that, too, but in an establishment role. And this, too, was interesting because I was in an establishment role, because that's what a White House is. And there were those who were making noise and were part of the women's movement who were outside of the establishment, and there always needs to be -- if you're going to have change, you need some people on the inside who have the power to make some things happen. You also need those on the outside. You need both. But anyway, I learned a lot from him in a variety of ways.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you find the people on the outside came to understand your role on the inside?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Some did, some didn't. Depended. Some wanted to understand, wanted to help. And there were a variety of women's groups who stepped forward and did. Business and Professional Women had a talent bank and they were willing to share the whole thing, which they did. And Virginia Allan, who I think had been their chairman or was still active, was very helpful. And there were a number of people like that. But there were some who didn't really want to help. Some of it had to do with a political agenda and that we were coming up to the election of '72. And I would say that some of those loudest voices out there -- I mean, I think of a Gloria Steinem or a Betty Friedan, particularly Gloria, I guess. I've tried a variety of ways to get together with her and she always kind of ducked. I think she just didn't want to do it. They had a different definition from where we sat of equality, and that was that if - - you weren't really a "feminist" unless you also were for getting out of Vietnam and a whole slew of other things. My feeling and our side of the coin felt that you were diluting the concerns about equality for women if you started to throw in a whole lot of other issues. So, there were some other agendas at work is the bottom line here. It just didn't coincide with ours even though we wanted to have a big tent with everybody moving in the same direction for women's equality. But, you know, even someone like Bella Abzug, and I visited with Bella Abzug on the Hill, and Bella in her hats and her great character,

she was someone who was inclined to be more supportive than some of the other folks who were on the outside of the governmental establishment.

**Timothy Naftali**

Since we're mentioning 1972, tell us about the women's equality button that you designed.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

The button.

**Timothy Naftali**

The button, because it's a great artifact.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

There were not too many of these. This was a limited edition. Of course, we were getting into the campaign. I was still in the White House, of course, but there were all kinds of buttons being made, as you saw the "Pretty Girls For Nixon" and "Chinese For Nixon," a lot of these things. Anyway, I had one commissioned that just said "Nixon" but with the equality symbol through the "O." And that got some circulation but it was not a big seller. Once again, I think it was in the same category as "Ms." on the letterhead or something. It was just going a little too far. And really the juxtaposition of "Pretty Girls For Nixon" with that button, I think, is a classic. And we still have some; they're wonderful relics. Actually, as I was leaving the White House I had a bunch of those buttons and I got them put into Plexiglas, whatever you call them, containers, and there were a variety of people who had helped -- I felt, helped me and what I was trying to do and helped the whole Presidential effort, and so I gave one of those to a whole bunch of these people.

**Timothy Naftali**

That's wonderful. How did Republican women's groups react to what you were doing when you would go and talk to these in their groups in every county or most every county?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Yes, a good reaction, a good reaction from Republican women's groups. I really don't remember any negativity from -- now, maybe there was some that I didn't see or didn't hear, but I mean, we were talking about jobs and equal pay for equal work. We were talking about non-discrimination. I mean, how can you be against these things? And they weren't. They really were not. I felt a lot of support and enthusiasm coming out of those groups. It was good.

**Timothy Naftali**

I was going to ask you about Harvard Business School and Margaret Hennig.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Oh, that was kind of a discordant note. There were some friends, and Margaret Hennig was a HBS classmate of mine and she and I had written a paper together, which we got a distinction on in our second year that had to do with surveying the attitudes of the men towards the women, very few women at Harvard Business School, and then we interviewed all of the women, all however many there were, 25 or something altogether in the two years. Margaret was really a great advocate for women's equality. Went on to found the special program at Simmons College for women. She came to me early on and she said, "You know, you really ought to quit this job. And the reason is that nothing is going to happen and you're going to look terrible. Your reputation is going to be hurt." She was not the only one who said that to me of my phalanx of friends, that "you're endangering your reputation." I thought otherwise because I thought the effort was serious and I thought the cause was a really good one. I believed in this, and so I wasn't going to quit. But it's interesting that there was that perspective at the time. I mean, I think that some were disbelieving that Nixon, President Nixon, was ever going to do anything like this and be serious about it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you have a conversation with her after your government time, your time in government?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Yes, actually. She had me back at the first commencement, this would have been maybe 1980 or so, the first commencement out of that new Simmons program and gave me an award. And said at that time, "You were right and I was wrong. You were right to stick with it because something did happen." She was a Democrat, too, I might add, but that does not --

**Timothy Naftali**

But she did recognize that she was wrong.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Yes, which was kind of nice. She's gone, long gone now. Too bad.

**Timothy Naftali**

But it's nice you had closure.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Yes, exactly, exactly.

**Timothy Naftali**

Speaking of closure, August 9, 1974. Please tell us about that day, what you remember of that day.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

That was a sad, uncomfortable day. I was, by then, at the Product Safety Commission, where I was commissioner and, of course, had my own staff of six. We knew that was going to be the day. I had gotten notification of it with an invitation to come to the East Room. My staff kind of gathered and advised me they didn't think it was a good idea for me to go. Poisonous atmosphere in Washington, and anybody who had ever been in that White House was somehow suspect. And they were just concerned about how this was going to look for me, and there had been some tension between the commission and the Hill and the Democrats in control. They were just worried about that. Advised me not to go. Well, this was first thing in the morning and I never told them where I was going, I just went. And I stood in the -- actually the seats were taken when I got there, but I stood in the back of the room where there were the lights, the TV lights. Pat Buchanan was standing back there and some others of us. And I witnessed the end, his speech and his goodbye to the staff. It's very sad. And then I went back to the office. We never spoke of it at all. That was a private -- a private thing.

**Timothy Naftali**

How long did you stay with the Product Safety Commission?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

I'm not sure. At the Product Safety Commission? Oh, I was serving a seven-year term. I stayed, what, six and a half years of it. Now, I had been appointed by Nixon for a term, which is what those

[unintelligible]

bodies are like; you have a term. And I left just because I thought it was time. By then Jimmy Carter was in office. So I served through the end of Nixon/Ford and a part of Carter. And I didn't want to be reappointed, and I figured the Carter administration wouldn't reappoint me anyway, particularly since I had taken a stance on carcinogens and began to write letters to the President encouraging him to show some leadership in solving this issue. What was going on is that there were, let's see, three or four regulatory agencies and three or four -- how quickly we forget which is which -- research bodies all dealing with carcinogens. Carcinogens were a big deal. Every time you turned around something had a carcinogen in it, hamburgers, almost anything. And it was really a mess. Consumers didn't know what to think. Producers didn't know what to do. And these regulatory regimes were not the same, whether it was CPSC or EPA or OSHA or whatever. So I began to write these letters to the President encouraging him to do something about pulling this all together so we would -- everybody would be on the same page. "The Washington Post" picked this -- my speeches up and began to editorialize, and something happened. The President actually did do something and created a coordinating group of all these bodies to get together on the approach to carcinogen control. So, I figured, though, after that, that I was pleased that that was the outcome. It was the right outcome and I think it really helped, but I didn't think I was going to be reappointed. But by then I had been a regulator long enough. I think you get to a point when you're a regulator that you've -- because there's a quasi-judicial part of it, that you've really done it and you understand the issues but it really is time to let a fresh person come in with a new perspective. And that was really how I felt. So I resigned before my term was up, surprised everyone, I think, including that White House, and then had to leave and decide what I was going to do from there.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you consider running for public office?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

I think fleetingly at one point I did, but it never amounted to anything enough to do it.

**Timothy Naftali**

That's too bad.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Thanks.

**Timothy Naftali**

I want to get on the record a little story you just told me, if you want to. We have -- in the previous interview we talked about your trip to China as commerce secretary for the first President Bush, Bush 41, and I wanted to ask you if you could tell the story of some people that told you it wasn't a good idea for you to go to China.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Well, the situation with China was -- what's the right word? Confrontational? Delicate? There were some people who were very angry with China. Bill Clinton, of course, by then was elected President, hadn't yet taken office, but he had said some very nasty things in the course of the campaign about China and about President Bush about "coddling dictators." Well, President Bush, I think, had the greater wisdom on the subject, and his thought was that I should go to China, reconvene the U.S.-China Joint Commission of Commerce and Trade with my counterpart, do it in Beijing, and in so doing take away one of the sanctions that we had placed on China after the events of Tiananmen Square in June of 1989. His view was the new administration would have a lot more trouble if there was a crisis with China, a lot more trouble solving it if that sanction were still in place. So, we threw this mission together in just a matter of a couple of weeks. Now, it did get out. We weren't publicizing it particularly, but it did get out. And I did get a call from Senator Jesse Helms, who never did like the Chinese much. And he called me and he said, "Miss Barbara, I don't think you should go. They're bad people. They're Communists. We should nuke them." I wrote this down at the time. That's the way that senator spoke. But I knew where his heart was; he really was against this. I said, "Well, you know, my boss, the President, thinks this should be done, and so I'm going to go." There were some other voices like that but relatively quiet. By then the Congress was out, so it was that Jesse had called me from wherever he was, I'm not sure, North Carolina. And then there was a leak that got into "The New York Times." They called the trip a "boondoggle." Some boondoggle, but again, coming from the place that we really didn't want to reconstitute any kind of relationship with China because of the tension. A lot of fear about China, a lot of distrust, and the politics, I would say, were very black and white. Today, we have just a flowering relationship with multiple strands and a big economic relationship. So what I did was to give a green light to American companies that they then could go because the sanction was removed and their government would stand behind them. Now, President

Nixon called me when he saw that article in "The New York Times." Called me and he said, "The hell with them. Go. You're doing the right thing." Then I ask him for advice, and he thought for a minute and then his one-liner of advice was, "Don't slobber over them." I knew what he meant. I knew what he meant. There was tension. Go and do your job, but don't be so overly gushy that it was improper given the situation with our two countries. So, I did. And then, would have been two-plus years later, in '94, when he had the gathering, the reunion, of his first -- let's see, that would be his first inaugural, and I did go and see him there. And he was in a very outgoing, kind of mellow frame of mind, and we talk about that and I thanked him for his help, and he was very complimentary about the mission.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember other conversations at that? That was quite a gathering. I've seen the photographs.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Oh, it really was. A lot of reminiscences and war stories and all of that. And he was in quite mellow, fine form.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did he give a speech at that event?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

He gave kind of an informal talk. I mean, I can't reconstruct exactly what he said. It was the tone of it that I remember most and that was that it was just -- he was very comfortable, and he was comfortable seeing these people. He was not a man who was always comfortable around people, and he really was that day. And, of course, then he passed away very soon afterwards.

**Timothy Naftali**

To go back to your great diplomatic triumph, I mean, in a sense, your first time doing diplomacy, although you'd been diplomatic, no doubt, in the Nixon administration.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

It wasn't my first time, but that was heavier lifting than anything else I had ever done, that's true.

**Timothy Naftali**

The idea for the trip came from where?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Well, the President -- well, let me back up for a minute. It was after the election of '92 and, of course, Bush had lost, and the first thing that I got was a call from Secretary of State then, Larry Eagleburger, who said, "You know we want you to go to China?" And I didn't. And I said, "Why China, why me,

why now?" Well, he hung up pretty quickly. And then I got a memorandum, and about the time I got that I got a call from the President, who said he thought it would be -- in his nice, gracious -- he's a very gracious man -- gracious way, "I think this would be a very good idea for you to make this trip and to do this" and so on. So that was how it came about. Actually, if you go back a step, the U.S., or rather a company in the U.S., had sold aircraft to -- not just a few either -- they were F-15s or 16s -- to Taiwan.

**Timothy Naftali**

I think they might be Boeing. Is it Boeing?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

McDonald.

**Timothy Naftali**

McDonald.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

And they were being made in Texas. And that happened in September of '92. I think there were 150 of them. Beijing was, as you might imagine, not very pleased with this. And there is an assistant secretary -- was an assistant secretary of state for that region, Asia-Pacific region, who wrote a very closely held, as it turned out, memorandum that went literally up the line to the secretary of state, national security advisor to the President, I guess, the chief of staff, too, but nowhere else. Did not get interagency circulation in the sense that a memo like that normally would have, probably because of the sensitive nature of it, but it also was in the mix of the election at that point. And he, in that memo, indicated four things that should happen to mollify Beijing a bit here, and one of them was that some distinguished person, he turned out to be the person, should go to Beijing and make an offer of several other things. Well, one of the things -- he was the one who went. One of the other things that was to be offered was that the secretary of commerce would come -- would come after the election to reconvene the JCCT. But the problem was the secretary of commerce didn't know anything about it until after the fact. And, of course, the President had blessed this. I mean, that is the bottom line here. The President thought this was all a good idea and that this is what should happen, and the President, as we know because of his own experience as the liaison officer in China in the mid-'70s, had a better fix on China probably than anyone else in the administration. He was right. He was dead on in that this was the right thing to do and the right time to do it.

**Timothy Naftali**

I see. That's a great story. Now it makes sense, I mean. But what's interesting is that President Bush decided, even with the campaign done, with the, you know, election over -- he had lost -- that he decided to still follow through on this promise to the Chinese.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

To do this. He could have behaved otherwise except that is not who George Bush is. If he said he was going to do it and he thought it was right, he would do it. It was controversial -- well, some for him, but mostly for me. I was the one in the eye of the hurricane because the media got a hold of this, this boondoggle. I had a very small delegation. It wasn't like I took a ton of people. We didn't have time to -- we wouldn't have anyway. But I had to take -- you know, in other words, to have the right kind of face vis-à-vis the Chinese. I couldn't just walk over there alone. I had to have some semblance of a delegation with me. We had a couple of business people, not many. Once again, we just couldn't have put it together and it wouldn't have been right. But I couldn't go just with nobody either, because the Chinese would have thought that was not quite delivering what we'd promised.

**Timothy Naftali**

The leak to "The New York Times" did not come from the Democrats, right?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

No, I think it came from inside the administration. And that's probably --

**Timothy Naftali**

You don't have to speculate on it, but there were people within the administration that didn't like this idea.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Well, didn't like it, or we speculate there was someone else who for some reason wanted to do it or didn't like it, we're not sure. We're not sure.

**Timothy Naftali**

You brought some contracts home.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

I did, a billion dollars' worth of signed contracts for American companies. And that was a great triumph, I felt. It doesn't sound like a lot today, but back then that was a big deal. This was at the very, really the early stages of all of the trade and business relations that we now take for granted. But it was the early stages of those relationships with China.

**Timothy Naftali**

One of them was for Boeing, right?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

One of them was a big Boeing order that had been put on hold as a result of the sale of the F-15s to Taiwan.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did the American ambassador say to you?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Oh, the American -- was Stapleton Roy.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

A very -- now, he was a real China Hand, actually. He'd grown up in China, spoke the language very well. He has always said that that mission was a pivotal one, crucial, and that after that, because he remained as ambassador even after we left office, that every CEO in America, he thought, wanted to come to China. And so his appointment book was full of dates with CEOs and wanting them to be linked with various people in the Chinese government. So that's when, if you look at what has happened, in '93 is when the upturn in business activity, trade and investment in China began in a big way.

**Timothy Naftali**

Back to the Nixon administration. Are there any other stories that you'd like to put on the record, things that we missed or even, sort of, portraits of people that you worked with who are no longer with us, so we can't interview them to learn about them ourselves?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

A couple of -- I'm thinking first of Dixy Lee Ray, who I did recruit to be the commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission. We may have discussed this before, I'm not sure. She was a bona fide character, well-known biologist in the state of Washington, and she did not think that this President was serious. I got her in an airport and said, "The President would like you to consider this kind of appointment," and she laughed and she thought that was kind of amusing, but she agreed to come and to do that. She was an Independent at the time. She became a Democrat later and then became governor of the state of Washington later. But she came and went through our interview process and was appointed. And she came with her dogs and she wouldn't go anywhere without the dogs, and always wore her blazer and her knee-highs. And she was a real gold-plated character with a very nice style, a nice way of communicating with people, and I think did quite a handsome job on that commission. And then Jim Schlesinger had been the chairman. He was going to go to Defense later and I thought, "This would be a first, to have a woman as the head of that particular commission, which was not exactly a woman's sort of bailiwick." Jim was very much against that, and we just waited him out and waited until he left. And, as was my custom, I interacted with the guy who -- in the other part of the personnel shop, who was the placement person for that agency, and also those who were above me, and we got that done and she served as the chairman. One incident that I remember, I used to have these meetings of women. There were so few then, but we started to expand. We started in the Roosevelt Room until we outgrew the Roosevelt Room. Wanted her to come to one of these meetings

of women appointees, and she wouldn't come unless she could bring the dogs, and the Secret Service wouldn't let her bring the dogs and so she didn't come to the meeting. She was, as we would say, a great piece of work. And I'm sorry that she's gone because that would have been a marvelous interview.

**Timothy Naftali**

That would have been. And so the person who oversaw our nuclear arsenal liked to bring her dogs with her everywhere.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

That's right, and wear her blazer and knee socks. And she really didn't care what anyone else thought. Now, she was truly -- if we look at, again, in the context of the times, she was truly a liberated woman who had her own mind and was going to act as she thought appropriate even though society might not have patted her on the back for doing that. I admired her for it. A real individual. The other person, the unsung hero in this whole effort to advance women, was Bob Finch, who had been, of course -- knew Nixon from California way back, had been the lieutenant governor when Ronald Reagan was governor of California. Came to HHS, what was HEW then, as the secretary. But by the time I got to the White House he had already come to the White House as a counselor to the President. But he definitely had President Nixon's ear. And he was very politically attuned, but he was also someone who really thought equality was right for women, for minorities. He was a true believer. And he had an awful lot to do, I believe, with moving the effort forward that the President wanted to have moved forward, because there were those who weren't quite so acquiescent to the idea, but I think Bob Finch was very instrumental in all of this. And I'm sorry that he, too, is gone. I would like to have known, from where he sat, some of what he had to move around or overcome to get some of these decisions made at the highest level, because I think he really did that.

**Timothy Naftali**

He faced enormous challenges. I mean, he was out as HEW's secretary within, what, 18 months.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Yes, I think he had a rough time. It was not his kind of thing. And that's a very unwieldy department, and I think he was not managerially inclined. But he certainly had wonderful sensitivity and political instincts. And he saw the '72 election coming and thought the vote of women was important. So, that was in the mix. But he also believed in equality. I think he saved my skin, probably, a few times, too, if the truth were known. And I've always wanted to be able to ask him that, because there were some people who would throw little barbs at me once in a while. You know, "Why don't you keep her quiet?" or something, but I was just trying to do my job.

**Timothy Naftali**

Twenty years later, when you become commerce secretary and you looked at the Commerce Department, could you see the effects of what you had started 20 years earlier trying to get more women into executive positions?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Oh, I think by that time, by the early '90s, the idea of women in a whole variety of positions was an acceptable idea. It was not so acceptable 20 years earlier. And there was the dichotomy then in society that, well, you were either having a career or you were having a family, and how were you going to combine these roles? Well, today that is absolutely no issue, and it was maybe a touch of an issue in '92 but not really, but vast difference. So, yes, I think that really a lot of progress has been made and had been made by then. You know, once we got past the '70s, I think the -- and there were still some folks who wanted to turn the clock back. The ERA lost in the ratification of the state process because some women rose up and said, "Oh, we're all going to use the same bathrooms or sleep in the same beds" or whatever. I don't know. So there was some of that sentiment ginned up, but by then, if we say it this way, Pandora's Box had been opened and there was no way that genie was going to get put back into the bottle. And then I think progress has just really been, in terms of women in careers, in sports, and all kinds of places where women had never served, has just been up.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do we still need an ERA?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

There are some people who think we do. And I have visited the Sewall-Belmont House on Capitol Hill, which has this wonderful exhibit of ERA, and of course the National Women's Party was very much for it and its founder, Alice Paul. They've still got a big map up there of the states that could ratify it. I don't know if there's any statute of limitations. If there is not, then if you got just several more states to ratify it, it could be part of our Constitution. Sure, I'd like to see it, but is it really necessary today? No, it really isn't. In a way, we've come a long way and we're beyond it, but, you know, it's always nice to have those guarantees. I don't think it's going to happen, though.

**Timothy Naftali**

Barbara, is there anything else you'd like to add?

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

There was and I just lost it. Who was it? There was somebody else that I was thinking about. There's something else. Whatever it is it's gone. Is there anything else on your radar screen?

**Timothy Naftali**

No, I've asked you all the questions.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

I think we got -- there is something else. We were making an effort back then to recruit minorities, minority women, and had some success at that, more African-American than probably any other kind of minority, but some Hispanic and some Asian. And I'm proud of that record as well, for that era and

with the Civil Rights Act just having been passed, really a decade, not even that, before. So, I'm proud of that part of our record as well.

**Timothy Naftali**

Barbara, thank you very much. Thank you for your time.

**Barbara Hackman Franklin**

Thank you.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's been great.