



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Friday, December 15th. The President's foot is still bothering him. He said this morning he had taken his bandage off and he felt that he probably had a splinter or broken bone. It doesn't hurt when he stands on it or when he's sitting, but does hurt when he walks, so he's limping very badly and is concerned about any events that require him to do any major walking. He got into some personnel questions--, on the foot, he refuses to see a doctor or do anything about it, says wearing a shoe is just as good as having a splint, and he doesn't want to make a big fuss about it.

On personnel, he got into the ambassadors' thing...

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...changed his mind and does not want to make Sweden a black post after all. He wants to give it to a hard line right winger who will be very strong on draft dodgers then put a black in Norway or Denmark instead.

Now he's come up with definitely wanting to move Ed David to NASA, so he can make a move on the, put the woman in charge of the AEC. We went through a whole round of ambassador things with Kissinger and decided to put Hill in the Assistant Secretary spot for Africa, Kubisch for Latin America, Farland for the Mideast, and Godly for East Asia. Move Sisco to Pakistan, Macomber to Turkey, Whitehouse to Laos, and Martin to Saigon.



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He made the point that he wants to be sure Scali to know he's to go to mass regularly, see Cook frequently, and wanted to develop the question of whether he's the first Catholic to go to the United Nations.

Then we got into the whole question of Kissinger's briefing. He had Ehrlichman in, or Ziegler in first thing this morning. Said that they should go ahead on the Kissinger briefing at 11:30, but that there should be no extravaganza over in the White House, it should just be in the press room. Then Ziegler should plan to do the bombing and mining briefing on Saturday, making the point that these are just precautionary measures in the face of a North Vietnam buildup. The President has stated that bombing and mining would continue until we get our minimum conditions of POW's and cease-fire, and he says that the point is that bombing for a couple of weeks would put us in a good position. Ron raised the point of the *Time* magazine Men of the Year thing. The President said Kissinger is not to see them under any circumstances; that I'm to order him to do no interviews, social, return calls, or anything to *Time*. And he told me to call the White House operators to turn those calls off to Henry, which, of course, I can't do. He's written a long memo to Kissinger, which he was having typed up while Ron and I were meeting with him regarding guidance on the thing.

He had Ron and Henry and me in a little later in the morning, and Henry had convinced him he should not have his press conference today, because of some statements by the North Vietnamese and other general developments. So the plan was to hold, the original plan was to have the press conference today, then start the military actions tomorrow, and the massive bombing on Sunday. But then Le Duc Tho said this morning that they'd agreed not to comment on the talks and that he remains optimistic. So Henry thinks we have an alternate course of letting it ride today, and then Kissinger going on tomorrow, start the minor action on Sunday and



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the massive action on Monday. One problem with following the original scenario would be that we would be bombing while Le Duc Tho was in Peking, which would cause a heavier reaction.

The President then read his entire memo, which must have been four or five pages, read it to us, then he told Kissinger he wants to make the President appear to be the tough guy all the way through; that we should set it up today for Kissinger to go tomorrow. The President said I would rather bomb on Monday, unless you think we really need to do it on Sunday. He didn't like the idea of having a Sunday church service while he was bombing. Kissinger said he feels better than he has in weeks, because now we're in control of things again, instead of being in the position of the rabbit with two snakes at hi—one on each side. The President got back to discussing what Henry ought to do. He said to be nonspecific on the details, and did a lot on building up of his spirit and all. The President was obviously trying to maneuver Henry into the right frame of mind on how to approach the whole thing. And he said that...

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...as of January 1, the war is over. We'll just continue to bomb and mine until we get out POW's back. But, we have to have the Soviets and all the rest think the President's is the meanest in the world, and the only good thing regarding the settlement now is that we get the POW's.

He told Ziegler again, to work Henry over on all these points and not to let him drop the ball. After they left, the President made the point that he was very concerned about Henry's mood and



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said, well, he's happy now, because we're going back to the bombing, but that's the wrong approach. He wanted to be sure that Henry had a very hard briefing before he goes out to the press tomorrow, because his press things have been disasters. He must try to be effective, rather than being brilliant. He wants to be sure that we have Colson and his crew geared up for a full support of the bombing thing, if we, when we start in on it.

He then got into the point he's been making quite frequently the last several days, that we've got to get hold of the government, and he's concerned about Kissinger, Ehrlichman, Whitaker, and Flanigan. They're just, they don't get the point that as to how we've got to do it, and with Shultz, you just have to go through the agony, but on the others, maybe we can make the point to them, that it's far more important to get the government lined up, and therefore, the President ought to get the people into the office from time to time, that that's more important than preparing for a press conference. Maybe we should be doing memos like we did last night for Kissinger. And he says so I need my time cleared away, so I can give these people guidance. He keeps saying he has the feeling that the government's out of control; that the people we have don't know what to say and don't know how to say it, so we aren't getting our points across. I don't quite put those two things together, but anyway. He says Flanigan and Whitaker have no subtlety or pizzazz, and even though they're loyal, they don't get our points across.

He called Mike Mansfield while I was in the office, referred to his meeting with Hugh Scott, then said when you all get back in June, instead of the President being tied down to the weekly meeting with the GOP, we'll have monthly or biweekly GOP Leaders' meetings. But would like to have a fairly regular occasion, if we can get the right small bipartisan group to sit down, and talk about things: maybe Scott and Griffin, Ford and Arends, plus Mike and Byrd and Alliton, the new leader in the House, to just chat about the general work load and so on. I don't want to get into the Congressional-White House confrontation. I'd like you to think about this, how we



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would do it. Also, I want to continue the two man meetings with just Mike and the President, also Carl sometimes. For example, on reorganization that we're doing now, it doesn't involve the Congress, just the President and the Departments, and we should bring in the key chairmen and talk it all over. There are a few special problems, such as Long and Mills and Mahon that I'll have to handle directly. We want a meeting, I want a meeting with Mike alone, right after January 2nd, regarding the best way to go about doing this. I'm not suggesting any permanent honeymoon, but there are some areas where we can work together, such as Energy; Scoop Jackson was in to report on his trip and also covered the whole energy thing, which cuts across all lines.

As we look at the political scene, for instance, Connally thinks that in the years to come, people are going to be voting men, not parties, so we can't act on a party versus party basis. We have an opportunity to think how we can work with a divided government to find areas to agree and to reduce the partisan thing. A few sensitive people should talk and work it out. We do have some problems with our partisans on both sides, but let's at least talk about it. It's based, he's basing this conclusion on Timmons's view and his recommendation, because Bill said we can't go ahead with the President just meeting with the GOP, we have to do more than just work with the minority. He told Mike he was at liberty to discuss this with anyone he liked, but not to let it get into the press. He also told him to call Korologos and talk it over with him and said that if Truman dies, we'll be in touch with him to work out the arrangements on that.

I had a whole series of personnel meetings today. I met with Anne Armstrong and she came in with the pitch that, based on what the President seemed to be trying to accomplish in the meeting yesterday, she had an idea. She had gone home and looked over the White House staff roster and discovered to her great surprise that I wasn't the top person on the staff, it was Finch and Rumsfeld, because of being counselors and with Cabinet rank. She said if you really want to



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build up the women thing, why not make her a counselor, give her Cabinet rank and solve all your problems? I completely agreed with her, and told her I would discuss it with the President. She had some other ideas on women personnel things that she also reviewed with me.

Then I had a meeting with Finch, who was worried about the GSA facility in Laguna Niguel that we should be pushing for the President's interest. He pushed Firestone for Ambassador to Britain. He was worried about the Voluntary Action thing merging with the Urban Coalition, which is some deal Romney's promoting, and thinks we ought to put Gregg Petersmeyer in the NRC, to build up a cadre of young people.

John Connally called. He on his way to Saudi Arabia said he'd call Malek on people ideas. Covered a lot of items and mentioned several of them to me that he wanted followed up.

I had a long meeting with Stans on his whole campaign thing. He reports that on the financing deal, we spent \$47.5 million, but we had budgeted \$43 million. And he thinks there's another million, maybe in, at the most, in backup bills. He says he collected \$51 million, so he's got something like \$2.5 million or \$3 million in overage, and he's concerned about what to do with it. Thinks he should transfer it to a cleanup fund before December 31, use what's needed to pay for litigation, contingent liabilities on taxes if we have to pay them, and some refunds to noisy contributors who were upset about appointments. Then he had eight alternatives for use of the funds: one, return to the contributors at about 5 percent; two, carry it to '74; three, carry it to '76; four, turn it over to the RNFC; five, turn it over to the Senate and House campaign committees; six, distribute it to the Republican State Committees; seven, pay off campaign debts; and eight, establish a GOP endowment fund to earn money for the Party. He says Dominick and Wilson both say that money was no problem in any case they know of among the candidates that lost. He



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says he's got half to a million in commitments that can be capitalized on for '74. He went through a whole schedule of how he wants to handle the recognition of major contributors, and his bad list of guys that need to be whacked. He wants to be sure that Malek's working with him on personnel stuff.

End of December 15th.