



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Saturday, October 14th. The President got into the question of the promotion plan for the Connally television, and then I went into it with Clark MacGregor. We're all very strong on getting the maximum push out of this. MacGregor is concerned about raising the money, because Stans is giving him a bad time, so I suggested that they should run the show for a group of Democrats, and then hit them afterwards. Maybe one group in New York and another one in Chicago on the basis that they've got to put up a million dollars immediately to get this on the air and properly promoted, etcetera. Clark's going to take a stab at that.

The President had Ray Price and John Ehrlichman in at noon to review the whole radio speech situation. They went through the various subjects, and he agreed to going ahead with the paternalism speech next week, and then developing a foreign policy speech for Sunday the 29th, the end of the campaign, making the point that we can't do it while Kissinger's traveling, although he didn't tell him Kissinger was traveling. We also agreed on tax reform this week and then possibly the education one, although he's not too happy with it. He is strong on the New Federalism thing, working in opportunity and the high ground, the kind of country we want. He doesn't like the idea of urban affairs, but does like reform, renewal, restoration, and so on. He made the point to Ray that these speeches should be more like the spending ceiling one and less like the crime one, in that they shouldn't be too hard-hitting; they need three or four quotable lines, but they are to philosophize a bit. They should be as non-partisan, non-political, and non-negative as possible. Uplifting, like the Atlanta line where we direct attention to the hopes and dreams, the hopes and dreams that unite us, rather than the hates and fears that divide us. He went through some specifics on the other things, making the point that the tone should not be defensive or campaigning; there should be no reference to the other side. Then he shifted into his regular spiel on the thing that people don't love each other and we're not all the same and we can't approach things on that basis. The whole secret and the philosophy we have is based on the fact that we live in an explosive world; there are differences between people. Then he went into his anti-college-education spiel and back to the point that people are different, so are nations; the



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secret of the American experience, experiment is that they learned to deal with, they learned that the things that unite us are more important than the things that divide us. He then got into his feeling for the South, that because of going to school there, he had a close feeling, and that they resent always being put down by the Northerners. That it's wrong to set the South as a region apart. He feels that the sweep of the South is the most important thing in this election, and getting Wallace out was the most important single event. He makes the point that union leaders are like the South, they want to abide by the law, and they respect the Presidency. He then said the theme to development is in regard to the heartland, the South, the ethnics, not as antagonistic groups. The FDR coalition was that they were brought together for power. Our New American Majority appeals across the board for the same reasons to all people; the basic American values: a strong United States, patriotism, moral and spiritual values, anti-permissiveness. They are turned off on welfare, because it's wrong and because they are anti-elitist, plus they have selfish motives; they are Americans to the core. The Southerners are more so than the rest of the United States, because they are not poisoned by the elite universities and the media. But we're also high in Polish, Italian, mountain areas, farm states; weak in the suburbia, big cities, because here the people are soft.

Our support from May 8 didn't come from businessmen, educators, and media, they all said it was horrible; the strength was from the areas that the elitists all look down their nose at, the South, farmers, ethnics, labor. Teeter's view of the suburbs overlooks this; our gains in voting don't come from there. We hold our own, but the turnaround is from different areas, and the analysts miss the point that the "Movement" has had it: the people that are for permissiveness, anti-US, and so forth. That square America is coming back, and that we didn't just gather a bunch of haters. The real issue is patriotism, morality, religion; not the material issues of taxes and prices. If those were the issue, the people would be for McGovern rather than for us.



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Roy Ash called with a report...

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...that he had met with Franz Josef Strauss of Germany while he was over there at Strauss's request. And he asked Allen--, Ash to convey a message that he had met, he said he had met with Kissinger relatively recently, but this new matter had just arisen, and he has not talked to Kissinger about it. And he preferred a separate communication to the President, not through Kissinger, although he was very judicious about saying this. It's regarding the November 19 Bundestag elections in Germany. Strauss has learned through an intelligence agency of another country directly to the south, that a representative of Willy Brandt's is in Moscow to enlist their support to allow West Berliners to elect members with full powers to vote in the Bundestag. This would shift the balance of power to Brandt. It's now fifty-fifty, Brandt versus Barzel. And Strauss, of course, is behind Barzel. The shift would arise because the West Berliners would support Brandt. That this is not done, the election could well go to the CDU and Barzel. The fact of Brandt's representative to the Soviet is not known in Germany. Approval for West German, or West Berlin's full voting power would require Four Power approval. And the argument that'll be billed is this is one more step toward rapprochement, and they believe the French will agree with this. And that they'll get together to try to present it to the US in a way to force us to okay it.

The alternatives are for us, if we don't want to do it, are: first, to say that it's very interesting and we'll consider it, but not to act until after the November 19 election; or second, to say it's a good



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idea, but let's complete it by making West Berlin a full state of West Germany. The Russians would then veto this, and we'd accomplish our purpose and put the onus on the Russians.

Ash sees the problem as first a trap going on now with the Soviets. And secondly, he doesn't know who we're for, maybe we're not for Barzel, although he is more our direction, and, and a Conservative. Also, the fact that Strauss brought this up creates a trap. Our relations depend on the role we take: the traps cuts both ways and we can't win either way. Strauss gives Ash a lot of reasons why we should be for Barzel. Strauss wants communication back from the United States regarding what our position would be. He thinks the US and the CDU interests are mutual.

I asked Ash's evaluation of why he didn't put it through Kissinger and Roy says it's probably because he sees Henry as inscrutable and he's not sure what Henry's position is and thus the President might never hear of it. Strauss said to Ash that he does question our actions with the Soviet Union and wonders if they're not a result of the US trying to develop a counterforce to the resurgence of Western Europe. He said that he, we don't want Germany to become a Taiwan. Ash countered that he thought there was nothing to his worry.

Roy cautioned that I not get him in trouble on this and that we not embarrass Strauss regarding the way this was raised. But the last time Ash had a message from Strauss, he tried to pass it to Kissinger, and Kissinger refused to take it, saying Strauss knew him, and if he wanted to talk to him, he could call him.



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Ash said he's happy to be of any use on any basis, if we wish to instruct him. I reported this. Well, that's the end of that one.

We had problems with Congress today as they were struggling towards adjournment. Weinberger called, all concerned about the spending ceiling details and wanting to talk to the President about it. I forced him off onto Ehrlichman who's handling the strategy on this, and the way it ended up Congress didn't adjourn. We didn't get what we wanted, but we did get a partial spending ceiling bill. HR 1 was killed, which we were glad for.

Henry called regarding the Vietnam negotiations. He's concerned about whether he's handling the settlement right and then he raised an alternate scenario, in which he would get the process dragged on a little with new demands, but he'd still go through the whole schedule, but not sign the final agreement until November 15th. The problem is, we'd have to stop bombing from the time of his trip until the election. I told him my concern there was trying to carry the period between the trip and the election, with all the speculation and so forth. He says if we get Thieu enthusiastically with this, then we, it's okay and we can go ahead...

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...but, if we have to brutalize them, it would be bad, and can't be done before the election, and we'd be in a shaky thing for a couple of weeks.



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If Thieu turns it down, he feels we would have been better to have been hung up on a North Vietnam negotiating point than on a, letting them know that we're hung up on trying to keep Thieu in. I said I didn't think any of this delay was possible if he went on to Hanoi, but he basically refuses to consider cancelling it; feels he's got to go through the whole route, in any event. On that basis, I felt it was impossible to make any change in the scenario as it's now laid out.

End of October 14th.