



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, March 27.

Day started with a call from Connally saying Perot had called him saying that he had to see the President because he'd had a report from one of his agents in Hanoi, saying that there may be a breakthrough on the sick and wounded and that Perot would not go through the chan-- normal channels to discuss it. He'd bring it up only with the President. I knew the President wouldn't see him, and tried to figure a way out, finally raised it with the President. He suggested that we have Dick Walters handle it on the basis that he's handling all the top secret things that are handled out of the bureaucracy and that Perot should deal with him. So we're going to take a stab at that.

ITT is back up big today, mainly on the question of the supposed White House call to ITT. It has obviously bothered the President and he raised the point several times during the day that we were going to have to do something to check that out. He had me call Finch and Klein to see if they had made such a phone call, which both of them said they had not. General feeling is that it was either a call from Jack Gleason that Dita Beard misunderstood as White House, or a call from the--Bill Timmons, checking on Convention arrangements. Anyway, we've got a problem. Also need to check into whether we can get Eastland to close down the hearings. The President wants to be sure the Committee report is a written report so we have something to use for the campaign.

And he raised the question this morning, of our getting into the whole plan of Kleindienst's confirmation tactics. As the day went on, it became more clear to the President especially, that Kleindienst wasn't going to be confirmed and that the thing for us to do was make a grandstand play and close it off. If possible, force the thing to a vote, which would be the best thing, even if he was turned down, because then he'd be rejected and we could use that as an issue. If we can't get a vote though, we pretty much concluded that we'd have Kleindienst issue, in effect, an ultimatum saying he had asked for these hearings, they had been turned into a farce, and that the only way he could see to bring some sanity back to the thing was to announce that he has not going to continue past April 15th if they hadn't voted him up or down by then, he would ask the



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President to withdraw his nomination. President then said to be sure not to put any more nominations up to the Senate because we shouldn't buy any more fights even on relatively sure posts like Ambassadors and so on.

He was concerned on why we can't rifle files on Anderson the same way he is on us, get some stuff going on him, feels we've lost our moxie on this. Colson still grinding away on it, but not really making too much progress at this point. Told Ziegler to handle the questions on the phone call with a "no comment." And see if we can't get something moving on our own initiative.

Got into the problem of Butz, who's getting into an unnecessary hassle with the consumer people because he keeps whacking high price complainers and this comes through the wrong way in the news. We've got to turn it around so that we're looking like we're fighting high food prices, while at the same time Butz is standing up for the farmer.

President had done a lot of schedule and PR thinking over the weekend and had dictated a long memo on the subject covering his concerns that we need to do more and better with the family, plus better use of Connally, Agnew, Kissinger, Scali and the other big guns. That we haven't done enough in the major states on this that we've got four major issues to work on. First, to hit back on Meany, which Connally and Rumsfeld should be doing. Second, busing, which is a regional effort. Third, drugs where we have to hammer hard. And fourth, and most important, a "Man of Peace", that Kissinger, Scali and Rogers ought to be building. He said again we're losing the whole China story, and that Rogers should be out making speeches around the country on "Man of Peace" in China and that we should rethink the whole use of the Cabinet and the VP in terms of regional TV and all, because of being blanketed out of the New York-- out of the national stuff. He's concerned about Connally's leadership idea that with the Democrats whacking us and Congress all screwed up, the President's got to come on once a week in a positive move of his own.

We had a-- he had meeting with Rog Morton on the Alaska pipeline and was concerned ahead of time that the idea of running it through Canada was not good because we're losing jobs in



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Alaska, and even though Alaska's not important it's going to sound bad here. The thing of it being good internationally is useless to us and the environmental pluses are questionable, at least. And jobs are more important than either one of those. So the question is whether it's worth breaking it off in Alaska now or should we just screw around on it until after the election, and this will just delay a decision. He also raised the problem of Flanigan on the Alaska pipeline, because he's supposed to be doing some of the negotiating. President feels Flanigan should do no negotiating. He should be kept out of it, and it should be kept out of the White House. Wants me to explain to Pete that we're doing this to protect him, to get out of the line of fire, that's why the President raised this. Later tonight Colson told the President, Flanigan had done a CBS interview which was on tonight. President apparently went up the wall, very upset that Flanigan had given them the interview at all, which he certainly should not have done.

End of March 27.