



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, January 3.

President had a full schedule today, getting ready for California departure. He agreed to meet with Peterson's International Economic Policy Group this afternoon and then wanted me to check with Connally, because he wants to be sure that the line he's going to take with them is right. He- His intention is to drag his feet on any legislative action on international trade this year, but he feels that he should get this meeting out of the way and therefore is going ahead and talk with them. Wanted to be sure Connally agreed with that strategy. I was never able to reach Connally on it however. President had called me in at 8:00 in the morning. He was up early and obviously hadn't had much sleep because of the reaction to the TV last night, and he was pretty antsy. He kept me in until about 9:00, and then we both went into the morning staff meeting. He talked with them about the press mainly. Said that the staff had done a remarkable job last year.

He referred to Rather in his interview and made the point that in spite of all we had done, Rather sort of piled it all up to what has to be done this year. He then told him the anecdote about Pat Hillings at the Benson Hotel in '52 when they were trying to get the President off the ticket, and Hillings said the only way to handle this is to beat them. He said that's the way we've got to handle the press and our critics now. He said we have to realize that our favorable notices from the press, when we do get them, are for a reason, which is that they praise one of you in order to screw someone else. The group in general felt the TV had come off extremely well and that seems to be the general response. President, however, was concerned about the technical side of the TV and got some reports, which were confirmed by some of our others, that the picture wasn't as good as it ought to be. The camera work not good, so on.

I had Frank Shakespeare in for discussion of his resignation, which he had submitted several weeks ago. He said that his reasons for resigning were, first, that he wanted to get back to the business world. That he couldn't stay beyond this year anyway, but secondly, and undoubtedly far more important, was his disagreement with our basic foreign policy in terms of our failure to accept the Soviet threat as such. His third reason was the exclusion from knowledge and



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participation which makes it impossible for him to function, especially since his views run counter to those of the establishment, although parallel to those of the President. He said our problem is that we've got to make a basic decision. Either we do or don't want an independent USIA. The State Department, of course, wants to take it over and keep it locked up under its wing. If we do want an independent USIA that represents the President and his policy, then we've got to have the right director first, and secondly, the director must know why we are doing things in foreign policy. He has to be present at all NSC, Cabinet, and Washington Special Actions Group meetings, both so he'll be informed, and so that the bureaucracy will know that he's part of the estab-- internal establishment. It's essential that he be fully informed on policy and the reasons for it, so that he knows how to formulate what's disclosed. He says Kissinger has a clear policy of exclusion of the USIA by plan, and it's obvious to him that this is the case. And that-- as long as that policy exists, you are not going to be able to maintain an independent USIA. He feels it's too late to try to make such a shift now, and that rather than do that, we should just conduct a holding action this year and move in to take over next year at the same time that we make major personnel changes, etcetera, at the State Department. His recommendation then would be to move Loomis up to Director and Ken Towry up as Deputy to hold the line and try to keep the Shakespeare conservative team in there. I later discussed this with the President on the plane, and he-- I guess it was, yeah-- and he agreed to that recommendation.

Later in the afternoon President and I met with the Attorney General for what was supposed to be an hour meeting and ended up going for about two hours. AG covered his regular political things: the New Hampshire announcement plan, the situation with Stans, the need to find a job for Schneider from Indiana, the idea of Peter Flanigan for Under Secretary of Defense, but then we got into the Kissinger-Rogers situation. The AG had breakfast with Henry this morning, so he had the latest batch of Henry's input, although I had met with Henry also during the day today. Henry boiled it down to the point that he's got to have his demands met. First of all, that Rogers has to understand that any attack on Kissinger by the State Department or any of its people is a direct attack on the President. Secondly, that all cables and communications out of State must be



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cleared at the White House first. Third, that there is to be no communication between State and the Soviets without prior knowledge of the White House and without a Memcon afterwards summarizing everything that was discussed. Henry feels these are probably impossible demands, and therefore he'll have to leave, but he won't do so until after the Russian trip. In discussing this, the President understood Henry's view. I went further than the Attorney General and told the President about Henry's further view that the President had lost confidence in him and that the evidence, at least to Henry, was the fact that the President was constantly trying to butter him up and keep him happy and was not really getting into the nitty-gritty of foreign policy anymore. Henry sees this as a slippage in his own standing, and that probably is what worries him more than anything else. That, plus the fact that he knows he made the mistake in India-Pakistan and doesn't know how to cope with it. In any event, the President agreed that we should put the ultimatum to Rogers and agreed with my recommendation that Mitchell and I do it as soon as we get back from San Clemente. Then Mitchell and I are to meet with Henry as soon as he gets back, later in the week, next week, to lay out to him the fact that he can't keep going through these tirades and everything. That he's got to get in line, too. I don't know whether it'll work, but I don't see any other solution at this point.

On the plane going out to California this evening, Henry said that Flanigan had been discussed with Laird as Under Secretary, and he won't take him. Henry thinks that the President's idea of Eberle for that job would be ideal. On the discussion about the plan for the Vietnam announcement, the President now decided to go on the basic announcement of troop withdrawal on the 13th and will do that on a pretty low key basis. Probably just going to the press room in the afternoon and giving the three month figure of another 70,000 troops out. Then he'll wait until the 18th, the day Congress comes back, and that noon announce that he'll address the nation that evening in a major foreign policy statement. Then the plan will be to go on TV, review all of our peace overtures and then publicly make the offer that we have already secretly made to the North Vietnamese. This he figures will be a major blockbuster on the Vietnam thing, and that it'll



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be especially effective because the first announcement will suck all the peaceniks out, and the second move will chop them all off. The bombing reaction has done some of that already also.

He called me after we got back from San Clemente in great glee to report that the-- he was right that the dining room table at the house there only seats 10. So he's going to have to get a new table for the Japanese dinner Thursday night, because we're having 12 guests.

End of January 3.