



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Wednesday, December 22.

Peterson raised the problem at the staff meeting this morning of the fact that, in Bermuda, Rogers made an announcement that we would be putting in a trade preference bill in January, which Peterson feels puts us in a bad political box. Especially in an election year because we can't control what goes into a bill once we put it in. This is what State's been pushing, but it's bad from our viewpoint. The question Peterson had is whether it's an Administration commitment. I checked with the President, and he says we are committed to a trade preference bill because of our Latin American promise. We will have to put it in, but we won't push it. This isn't going to make our trade-type people very happy.

We had a session with Flanigan on Ambassadors, and the President told Pete to go ahead with Fred Eaton for Japan and to tell him he just has to take it. He said no on Hillman, because that kicks our friends in Pennsylvania. He'd rather have Galvin than him. On Argentina, he wants someone who speaks Spanish and who's not a State Department man, someone that he can depend on.

We had a long session this afternoon with the Attorney General, John Ehrlichman, and David Young on the NSC security leak problem, which was quite interesting because they have now tracked the thing all the way through. And it turns out that Admiral Welander, who replaced Admiral Robinson on Henry's staff as the Joint Chiefs liaison, was taking the material that the yeoman was stealing from Henry's briefcase and the burn bags and all other sources, sorting it out and transmitting the pertinent things directly to Admiral Moorer. This creates a highly sensitive situation, since it's directly tied to the fact that the yeoman was also transmitting the India-Pakistan stuff to Jack Anderson, who was running it in the columns. So we have a clear breach of security that's actionable. Although the yeoman hasn't admitted it, his polygraph makes it clear that he did it, plus all the other circumstantial evidence. The President said that Ehrlichman and I should get together with Henry and move on the thing with him. And the President was particularly concerned because Henry and Haig had not raised it with him,



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although it was such a clear security problem. He can't figure out why they didn't do this, when they do know at least some of the particulars. Laird apparently is trying to shut it off completely, and there will undoubtedly be a monumental hush-up all the way around on it.

We had a meeting with the Attorney General on general politics, particularly the problem of working out Stans' move to RNC finance, but the President agreed we should meet his conditions and get him moved over there. Also worked out the plans for the New Hampshire announcement—on the basis of a letter from Dwinell to the President—when the President will confirm that he should be left on the ballot.

The other big flap is the problem of Kissinger and Rogers. Henry keeps bouncing in. He's absolutely convinced now that Rogers is engaged on a total plan to destroy Henry and that he's putting out all the stuff that makes Henry look bad. There's a real problem here, because Henry's now at a point where he's so emotional about the issue that he's not really thinking it through clearly; and he's much more convinced with what's being done to him, than what the problem is for the President and, therefore, is not handling it in the right way.

End of December 22.