



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Tuesday, April 13.

A reasonably busy day for the President, but a lot of free time in between meetings, so he kept calling me in and out as the day went along. After a general discussion of odds and ends this morning, he got Henry in and, in comparing his problems to those of previous Presidents, mentioned that he had Henry up to the Lincoln Room for dinner last night and that had gotten him to thinking, as they were talking there, about the many problems that other Presidents had, and certainly some of them been-- had been great. Ours were probably more substantial than anyone except Lincoln, whose problems overshadowed everyone's by a wide margin. He commented on the point that Lincoln had the cannons in the street in New York to shoot draft resisters; that his-- he had a rebellious Cabinet; Stanton wouldn't speak to him; his wife's insanity and her two brothers killed in the Southern side of the war, etcetera. And all of those, added up, make our situation look pretty simple.

He then got into a discussion of China policy, arising partly out of Scali's recommendation that we do something to recognize the US Ping-Pong team when it comes back from the tour in China. The thought here is that we're making some progress, but we can't start claiming any success or doing any public events such as that, because it will get in the way of the future progress; and the President wants to be sure that we get full advantage out of everything we do, but not to the extent that it impedes moving to the next step.

He had Scali in a little later in the morning with Henry to welcome him aboard. He made the point to him that he had to work very closely with Henry, and that he should concentrate on the influentials in the TV and press world. He emphasized the need for Scali to not to try to get into full gear for the first couple of weeks and warned him that his job would be very frustrating at times, especially when ideas that he comes up with are not implemented. Scali seems to understand this.

Ehrlichman and I had a brief meeting with him on the Hoover question. John Mitchell had called Ehrlichman to say that Hoover has sent a memo around to the top numbers of the Bureau, telling



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them not to route their domestic intelligence information to Mardian, which is directly contrary to our orders, and also implying that, at the direct order of the President, Hoover has been doing some wiretapping and other high-level surveillance. Neither of these is true, and John wanted to check them out with the President for the Attorney General, so he'll know how to approach the situation.

We got into a discussion, after Henry came in, on Ambassadors and agreed to send Governor Whitcomb to Australia instead of the Philippines, as we had earlier decided. We have to get him out of Indiana, and since we have to get Rice out of Australia, we can put the two together. Then he wants to send Byroade from the Philippines to Assistant Secretary for Southeast Asia, and Porter from Korea to replace Byroade.

He had a fairly long meeting with Connally and called me right afterwards, started to report it on the phone and then asked me to come over to the office. He obviously was very pleased with the talk. Connally had made the strong point that we've got to take somebody on when something comes up. For example, he thinks Rogers should have hit Muskie and Hubert when they attacked the President on-- after his speech on the withdrawal program. Connally feels the problem is that our people don't hit anybody and that we've got to do that. He also made the point again of the failure to show personal concern, no warmth, no human qualities, and that this has to come from the little things, because you can't do it in the big appearances. The President feels the problem is the total coldness of writer-- our speech writers and our failure to broker the little things that we need to get the story through with. Connally told him he felt the press conferences were too competent and cool, that the Howard Smith interview was better and the speech was even better than that.

But then he got back to the Cabinet and made the point that they've got to stand up and fight, not just be positive; they have to attack somebody in order to make news. This led to the discussion-- a discussion of whether we ought to make some Cabinet changes, and the President's inclined to think we should, that we don't have anybody in the Cabinet who really is a first-rate spokesman.



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Connally feels that the Congress is not the place we should look to for getting our attacks answered, that the Cabinet should do it, and that we've got to face the fact that just doing a good job isn't enough. The real question also posed is whether we change the President's own approach to the press conferences and interviews, and so forth, to try to add emotion and warmth to them. He does feel that he can try to get some more schmaltz into the speeches, make them warm instead of brittle, make the anecdotes warm and find a way to work them in.

They discussed Agnew, and Connally feels that he can survive if he stays on his present course and doesn't go overboard. The President doesn't agree. He's told me to have a private talk with Connally regarding the Vice Presidency and start getting him built up and ready for it. He agreed with the idea of considering moving Stans to Finance Chairman and putting a strong spokesman to the Commerce slot. In thinking about welfare, he feels that we ought to really kick up our action on welfare reform, but maybe drop family assistance. He wants me discuss this with Ehrlichman, as well as taking a hard look at the Cabinet with John. The President's favorably inclined toward the fairly wild proposal we made that he fly out to California to welcome the First Marine Division home, and we're exploring ways and means of trying to work that out.

End of February—End of April 13.