



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR


26 January 1973

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

As the cease-fire in Vietnam goes into effect tomorrow, you certainly know how I have admired your handling of this agonizing problem over these many months. There remains only to wish you warmest and heartfelt: WELL DONE and CONGRATULATIONS!

As an adjunct to this note, I want to commend the excellent support provided by Agency personnel to this successful effort in bringing the Vietnam war to an honorable conclusion. I touch on this subject because I know that often the intelligence input on an urgent policy matter such as Vietnam is incorporated into policy recommendations rather than being sent directly to you as separately identifiable entities. Some measure of the quality and timeliness of the Agency's field reporting in recent months can be gained from the following examples:




*Which Belmont
Excellent job -
Pass a "Well done!"
to all hands -*

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-- Our analysts contributed to studies which pinpointed the communists' main force concentrations and which suggested the best positions for placing international control commission teams.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick".

Richard Helms
Director

~~SECRET~~



RN Tape 12/28/72

Dick Helms

Dear Dick

I tried to reach you by phone the day after Christmas but then recalled that you were taking a well earned rest in Mexico. The purpose of my call was to ask you to have a chat with John Connally when you return to get his observations with regard to his visit to Saudi Arabia and also to Algeria. In your position as Ambassador to Iran I would like for you to take as an extra assignment an analysis of the entire Mideast oil situation, analyzing, of course, the relations of American and European companies with the various governments and also the stability of the governments. ~~xxx~~

As I consider the energy crisis we are going to be facing in the next 10 years ~~we must~~ - a continuing supply of oil and gas from the Mideast is absolutely indispensable, not only to Western Europe and Japan but also even to us. The greatest threat to this source of supply, if course, is the instability of the governments in that area. We all remember what happened when Mossadegh^h was in power in Iran. The same thing, of course, could happen in Saudi Arabia, even in Iran today if something should happen to the Shah, and, of course, in the new and highly unstable gulf states.

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I would like for you to make a thorough study of this situation before you leave for Iran and then after you arrive there I want you to visit some of the other countries in the area and give us an evaluation of the stability of their governments and what we can do to shore them up. Before you leave perhaps we can have a further talk on this subject.

With every good wish for the New Year,

Sincerely,



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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12 June 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

[Redacted]

P.S. Mr. President :- I hope you will authorize Henry to share with us impressions of the Russian leader and atmospheres of the meetings

[Redacted]

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we need these insights. ✓/R Dick

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
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

14 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House

1. Per your instructions, I briefed former President Eisenhower 25X1 at Walter Reed for an hour, Thursday afternoon, 13 February, the appointment having been postponed for medical reasons from 10 February.



3. The briefing opened by showing General Eisenhower a series of comparative photographs which demonstrate the remarkable progress made during recent years in satellite photography. As a base point, we used the photograph he had displayed on television in 1960 during the U-2 affair. I believe from what he said that General Eisenhower was genuinely surprised and greatly pleased by the present state of the art. He commented on how fortunate the country now is to have this capability.

4. We then discussed the situation in the Middle East along the lines of my briefing to the NSC. General Eisenhower asked that I not cover Vietnam since he felt he was on top of this situation from conversations with individuals who had recently returned from that area. We discussed the Soviet ABM program and he expressed considerable interest in a photograph of one of the Moscow ABM launching sites. This led him to comment on the human failing in this country to become involved in controversy on such matters without taking the trouble to be adequately informed and to deplore the action of certain Senators

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who distort privileged intelligence information and leak it to the press for their own purposes.

5. Per your instructions, I left with General Eisenhower the paper on Middle East options written for you by Henry Kissinger. He said he would study it.

6. As you had requested, I asked him on what day of the week he would like to be briefed. He was thoughtful about this, then told me to tell you that anyone you wanted him to see should get in touch with General Schultz and arrange an appointment which could be done on short notice. He explained that each day in the hospital was like every other to him and that he had no particular preferences about visits. From his description of his schedule, the afternoon, after 2:30, was the time of day he preferred. Since I gather you have various members of the Administration whom you would like to have in touch with General Eisenhower, I will arrange to see him every other week unless you want me to do it more frequently.

Dick

Richard Helms
Director

SECRET



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House

1. Per your instructions, I briefed former President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch on Friday, February 7. The session lasted one hour. Mr. Walt Rostow was present.

2. I opened by conveying to Mr. Johnson the message you gave me last Tuesday. He expressed appreciation, and stated that he believed that you would be able to work out many of the country's problems that he had not been able to solve. He voiced the hope that a new approach would have advantages which would permit you to make real progress.

3. The briefing covered Vietnam, the Paris negotiations, the Middle East, NPT, the status of possible Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, NATO, Peru and a swing around Latin America, Pakistan, and your upcoming trip to Western Europe. The points made were essentially those I have identified in recent NSC briefings. One comment Mr. Johnson made may be of interest. When I spoke of the note Secretary Rogers had delivered to the French indicating American willingness to participate in four-power talks under UN auspices in support of Jarring's mission, Mr. Johnson said, "Well, I hope it will do some good. But there is one danger in it. Those other fellows are likely to say: 'All right, we'll deliver the Arabs. Now you, Mr. United States, please deliver the Israelis'."

4. I left with Mr. Johnson a number of recent Agency intelligence publications which he said he would like to sample and see what would be helpful to him. Some were of a current intelligence nature, others were studies and National Intelligence Estimates. He will send them back to me via the individual you have talk with him this coming Friday. As I was leaving, Mr. Johnson said, "Please thank the President very much for having you come down here, and please tell him that I've been president long enough so he's not going to get anything but help as far as I am concerned."

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Dick
Richard Helms
Director

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