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30 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 25 March 1970

PRESENT: Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, and General Cushman.
Mr. Mitchell was out of the city; his views on the agenda items were obtained prior to his departure.

Mr. William Broe was present for Items 1 and 2.

Mr. Archibald Roosevelt was present for Item 3.

[REDACTED] was present for Item 4.

Mr. Wymberley Coerr was present for Items 1 through 4.

Mr. Thomas Karamessines was present for Items 1 through 5.

1. Chile - Political Action Related to 1970 Presidential Election

a. Mr. Broe briefed the Committee in detail on the close three-way presidential election race in Chile between Alessandri, Allende, and Tomic. He noted that the joint State/CIA consensus is that the U.S. should not provide direct support to any presidential candidate. Rather, the covert effort should be confined to spoiling operations undertaken against the Popular Unity (UP) electoral front, a coalition of Communists, Socialists and leftists supporting Allende. Mr. Broe described the operations, mechanisms and secure funding methods to be used and noted that total estimated costs of these efforts through September 1970 would be \$125,000.

b. In the ensuing discussion, cognizance was taken of the fact that following an electoral poll to be conducted in Chile in April, the Ambassador and the CIA Station Chief might recommend additional action, possibly even including direct support to one candidate.

c. The members were unanimous in approving the proposal as described in the CIA paper dated 5 March 1970, including the funding level.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 PER 3.3(b)(1)

NLD 02-21/SB PER. HR 7/23/10
By W.L.H. NARA, Date 10/22/10

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MEETING SAN CLEMENTE 27 June

2. Chile - Political Action Related to 1970 Presidential Election

a. Mr. Broe outlined what had been done so far in the Chilean election campaign and what the current situation was as election day approaches. He went on to describe the Korry proposals which, those present agreed, were really two separable concepts.

b. At the present time, the Chilean Congress divides as follows: for Alessandri, 43; for Tomic, 75; for Allende, 82.

c. The most recent poll, which is 99% complete, shows the voters leaning toward Allende 28.4%, Tomic 29.9%, Alessandri 35.6%, and the remainder undecided. If a clear majority is not obtained, under the Chilean constitution the two highest vote-getters are dumped into a selective process by the Congress.

d. Mr. Broe indicated that Alessandri was slipping and was conducting a campaign based on the past; Tomic's program lacked clarity for the Chilean voter; Allende seemed to be gaining a head of steam with an attractive package of promises for the have-nots.

e. Mr. Kissinger, the Chairman, wondered why more active support of Tomic would not cause the most damage to Allende.

f. Mr. Broe replied that "ground rules" in Chile had prevented our dealing with Tomic's Christian Democratic Party mechanism, and infusion of support at this late date would have to be direct to Tomic, an approach entailing obvious risk.

g. Mr. Johnson said that Messrs. Meyer and Crimmins from ARA were negative on both Korry proposals and that he himself had philosophical reservations. In these times when we are getting away from traditional election management, he compared Chile to the Italian situation where there was plenty of money within the country if it would only mature politically. The Chairman's comment was, I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.

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h. It was agreed following the lengthy exchange of views: (1) to approve Part 1 of the Korry proposal for the infusion of \$300,000 more for anti-Allende activity, and (2) to defer any decision on the buying of congressional votes should the election go to Congress; nevertheless, the CIA should proceed with detailed plans toward identifying "persuadable" individuals in Congress. The risks in eventually embarking on this course were apparent and no action would be undertaken without further deliberations by the 40 Committee.

i. The critical indicator for Korry's second proposal would be, if at the end of the election, Alessandri's margin fell below 5%.

j. The Committee will keep close watch on Chilean developments from now until September.

3. Guyana - CIA Support to the People's National Congress Party (Status Report)

a. The Committee approved the continuation of the subsidy to Forbes Burnham citing progress made in political party-building during the past year, at least in a Guyanan frame of reference.

b. A discussion took place when Mr. Johnson recommended that Burnham be told that the subsidy would not be continued after this year and was not a commitment by the USG. The Committee decided conditions in Guyana might or might not necessitate future support-- this cannot be determined now and the thought should be conveyed to Burnham that the subsidy concept would be examined closely next year in terms of real need.

4. Colombia - CIA Support to the Counterinsurgency Activities of the Government of Colombia (Status Report)

The Committee noted the termination of the three-year, seed money counterinsurgency project. Mr. Broe pointed with some satisfaction to the fact that whereas the USG had provided some \$373,000, the Colombian government put in \$828,000.