

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	13	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: RN's campaign posture and strategies to use against his Democratic opponent. 6 pgs.
20	13	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman answering election questions previously posed by Haldeman. Original Haldeman memo attached. 4 pgs.
20	13	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman laying out general campaign strategies. 3 pgs.
20	13	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman laying out critical campaign issues and general strategies. 4 pgs.

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20	13	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finch to Haldeman presenting an analysis of the Democratic opposition and RN's presidential posture during the campaign. 4 pgs.
20	13	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Clawson to Haldeman RE: major campaign themes, including RN's professional posture, key issues, and opposition strategies. 5 pgs.
20	13	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: substantial campaign strategies. 2 pgs.
20	13	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Klein to Haldeman RE: campaign strategies, including presidential posture and voter perception of the candidates. 4 pgs.
20	13	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the 1972 campaign and how to prepare for the opposition. 5 pgs.

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20	13	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: RN's image as president and how to overcome difficulties during the 1972 election season. 3 pgs.
20	13	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's visibility in 1972 and critical campaign strategies. 5 pgs.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DONALD RUMSFELD 
SUBJECT: Response to your Memo of June 12th
on the President and the Campaign.

1. The President's posture between the Conventions--

The President should:

- Be Presidential;
- Not engage in partisan activities;
- Use the platform and power of the office to show a President governing--let the distinction be drawn between a partisan Democratic office seeker versus an incumbent President governing;
- Travel only under the mantle of "official business";
- As suitable occasions are developed, be photographed with prominent non partisan citizens (Democrats, citizens, etc.)
- Keep his options open. It will be a tough election. Maintain a moderately active profile, unless spectacular opportunities for greater visibility occur.

2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to the Election -

- This will depend somewhat on who the Democratic nominee is and who the Vice-Presidential nominees are, as well as the situation in Viet Nam.
- In general, and importantly, the President should remain Presidential. Richard Nixon, the President of the United States, is a winner. Richard Nixon, campaigning as another office seeker, would create unnecessary problems.
- To the extent possible, the President should be involved in campaign travel as part of some "official business". To the extent that a campaign event is secondary on a trip he could travel as early as six or eight weeks before the election.
- However, travel throughout the election should be moderate. Avoid the impression of a frantic, hectic three or four campaign-stop pace on a given day. The target states, and enough others to show breadth, need to be visited and appropriate events can be developed for such visits.

3. Strategy for the President's campaign -

The theme, "Re-Elect the President", is sound. If the campaign is consistent with that theme we should avoid conjuring up the image of Richard Nixon the office seeker. Activities where he is functioning as President should be highlighted. A great deal will turn on how accurately the President is portrayed as a competent, and bold, forward-looking and effective President. Enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric.

The opponent will be a member of the Party responsible for a number of the problems of this country, and his solutions will be fuzzy and unsound, but there are plenty of people available to make the attack besides the President.

Issues the President should emphasize:

- His Foreign policy leadership
- A strong America versus a weak America
- Performance versus promises (results versus "effort", "concern", "commitment", etc.)
- Avoiding crisis versus crisis management (Action versus reaction)
- The importance of the individual, individuality, diversity, and pluralism versus centralization and control.

4. The opposition's strategy -

- If the opponent is McGovern he will try to hold the left (his enthusiastic corps of workers and media support) by holding to his Viet Nam position and calling for an end to "senseless killing." He will move to the middle on other issues to gain labor support, a degree of legitimacy in the south and the support of the Democratic power men. He will be less idealistic and more practical. Hopefully, the Convention struggle will dramatize his problems in this respect.
- He will pound the so-called bread and butter economic issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty and inflation. (Larry O'Brien talks about almost nothing else.) I can hear him now:

"When Nixon came in, unemployment was under 4 percent--after 4 years of Nixon it is up to 6 percent."

"When Nixon came in, your dollar was worth a dollar--after 4 years of Nixon, it is worth 90 cents."

He will portray the President as the handmaiden of big business and special interests.

"Jack Kennedy did battle with big steel,
Nixon gives loans to Lockheed."

"The Democratic Party pushed for higher
Social Security benefits for the elderly
and higher minimum wages for workers, Nixon
makes deal with ITT in return for contribu-
tions."

"Democratic Presidents like Roosevelt,
Kennedy, and Johnson found jobs for millions
of unemployed Americans, Nixon freezes wages."

"Nixon means high unemployment and high
inflation -- your wages are controlled and
business profits soar and taxes, rents and
food prices climb."

How to meet the opponent's strategy:

--McGovern's weakness will be a lack of "competence".
If he is elected it will amount to "on-the-job
training" - that is risky for the country.

--We should seek some of the Wallace, McCarthy,
McGovern support that wants change, by driving
home the President's record on reform -- govern-
ment, draft, etc.

The way to do it is to take on Congress -- they
have failed the people. The laundry list of their
failures is persuasive. This will associate the
President with a desire for some change and his
hope to make things better.

--Administration spokesmen can associate McGovern
with his unpopular extreme supporters and positions,
but the President should not.

A FINAL THOUGHT -

--The President has hopes and ideals yet correctly
understands human characteristics. He knows that
to actually move the maximum distance toward those
ideals, those hopes of most human beings, you have
to be tough, pragmatic, courageous. That's what we
need as President, and we've got it. Thank God.

- But, as the President has said, not every voter fully understands that. People can be moved and persuaded by appeals to their hopes and aspirations even though the approach is fuzzy, impractical, even counterproductive or dangerous.
- The President effectively communicates his toughness, strength and pragmatism. More can be done to show that those qualities are necessary. More can be done to show why the President is this way--because that is how to move toward those idealistic goals of peace, etc. He knows there are damn few short cuts, that "caring", "wishing", or "hoping" is not enough.

Further, more can be done to show that he has those same hopes and ideals. We should seek some opportunities for him to dramatize his interest in individual human beings, his personal concern where personal concern is justified, his ideals, his hopes. A chunk of the American people must have the feeling that he personally cares about their problems, not in general but in the specific--about them, about the kinds of concerns they have for themselves and their families. Only then can many be sure he is leading where they want to go. There are such opportunities, but they must be seized.

The President knows that feeling moves some people. He is capable of doing it and does it well. But our Administration does it only reluctantly.

A danger for our Administration is in its competence we seem harsh, in our strength we seem tough, in our pragmatism we seem goalless and idealless.

McGovern is weak and would be a disastrous President. But his warmth, concern, decency are appealing because people dream, hope, aspire, and want to be better than themselves, want better for their children, and because they have fears.

The campaign must scrupulously avoid going "over the line." Our "reservoir", in this respect, is shallow. The more people "feel" and believe (as opposed to understand) that the President has ideals, hopes and concerns, the more they will accept his approach based on the vital qualities of strength, courage, brilliance and competence, because they will feel he is going-- and taking them--where they want to go, and doing it skillfully.

And when a human being walks into the voting booth pulls the curtain, shrugs his shoulders at the complexity of the mechanism and then votes, that's what he wants - to know and or feel, or at least hope that that man, Richard Nixon, is leading him where he wants to go.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --

A) Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal, eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana, abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again, however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine this.

B) Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention, a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign. Since our strength is foreign policy in a world where there is a deep desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings, high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan argumentative campaign.

C) RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible. Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.

D) Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised address by the President, or V. P. stating the "differences" between the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual messages on the stump.

E) Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government vs. less Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)

F) Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all. The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences -- but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us. The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters in this election -- who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.

G) One thought. Why not have the V. P. candidate, assuming that it is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understands that what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs (we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class, many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.

(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by liberal bureaucrats.)

H) On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in hand. However, just some reminders:

1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto the serving board.

2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains." We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the general election of 1968 or of 1970 -- the flexibility to shift gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto another.

OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK

Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust" thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to move off their "tinkertoy proposals." They don't want their man to be in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of them fear that worse than the radical charge.)

Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack -- accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character assassination against the President of the United States -- and demand that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us on the issues, I don't see how --- if they are clearly and politely and consistently made -- we can lose this one.

Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning is essential; plans are worthless.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

Eyes Only

MEMORANDUM FOR: .PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

It has been requested that you summarize your views and analysis on the following points:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions? *Note*

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc. *Note*

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it. *Note*

Note
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p. m. Friday, June 16.

Pat:

Bob realizes that your "Assault" memorandum covered some of the questions above. Anything you would like to add should be included in your response to this memo.

Thank you.

Larry Higby

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By EP ----- WARS, Date 3-12-82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

confidential

June 14, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT: Campaign

You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff, etc., and I will not belabor that point.

Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E. Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.

1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists," as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-nothing 80th Congress." With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation -- in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public interest.

If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.

2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.

For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.

I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning. It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Convention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into "I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes."

We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either; the President should begin to say now, well before the convention, that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.

Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:

If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews: Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175,000 of those wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan, about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on oldtimers who have a defeatist attitude about Nixon and Jews -- this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.

We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should, for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every week between now and November. We tend to think of our Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh chance there.

I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (Whenever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.) The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemployment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a smart opponent.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: Campaign 72



I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here for a starter:

1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential, statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take the position that there's work to be done running the country, and there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course, will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and McGovern the politician.

2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathetically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an opportunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others

carry the attack -- and make maximum use of outside organizations, individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of government, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign -- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the United States, on the world, and on the next generation.

3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc.: Assuming McGovern to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.

McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only afterwards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not what people want in a President.

We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he already has begun to do. Our aim should be **fourfold**:

-- To cement the identification of him with positions that are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;

-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is backing off, not merely "clarifying;"

-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted with the power of the Presidency.

-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his principal issues: trust.

4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as callous toward the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President, who needlessly sacrificed 10,000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable -- jobs, inflation, taxes.

A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN; that he's a calculating political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for political purposes first and for public purposes second; the President of IT, of secret campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against the little guy.

I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote (including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California). This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political

persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics. If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side, we can get in real trouble.

As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven performance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust" issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to popular stands.

Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger reflection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for President." The central focus of our campaign should be on one thing: to make people proud of their President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Point 1: What should be the President's posture between conventions?

In my mind, there is no question but that the President should remain "the President" not only between conventions but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late in the campaign as possible, the President should be a "working President," remain mostly in Washington attending to the business of the nation.

From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be ripened for Administration support. Careful use of Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the stage to capture these disaffected voters.

Point 2: What should be the President's posture during the campaign?

Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe should be the keystone of most of the early campaign. Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney." The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided. We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President does move, it will have a heightened impact.

Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the President's position -- up to a point. In order to orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have better communication with campaign headquarters and the White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking world events.

As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates" should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic nominees will be formulating their strategy during that period and the Administration will have an opportunity to capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher percentage of their votes.

These early efforts should be limited to specific constituencies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early, especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type campaign, are all too real.

With the base already established, we should use the Republican Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's re-election. With special mailings, highly structured organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President, building in momentum, until the President himself does decide to enter the lists.

Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?

To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs and issues sort out under these two broad headings.

The media would have us believe many Americans are totally dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists. That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment," i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class

Americans have obtained a standard of living that their parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the midst of their success many middle class (and especially lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse, busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health care. For many of these voters irritation has led to frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a visceral reaction against the "ins."

These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or the security of strong leadership. The President has laid the groundwork brilliantly for this case.

An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration achievements and proposals can advance the image of responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the fullest.

The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract support. We should not be seduced into attempting a "charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the President accurately display the courageous and bold qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real results because the President bargains from strength.

Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food" and "unemployment." The food cost affects every American family and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we can do about food costs except what has been done and obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting the voters to think about other issues.

Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy. Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.

Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.

A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South, for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the McGovern organization in the South will admit.

A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes in industrial states where the election might be close. But some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help the re-election of the President where he does appear on the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters will support Wallace.

As we saw in the televised debates during the California primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total lack of ability to lead this nation.

Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package. The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for the President.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMIN. NATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12812, Section 6-102

By CP _____, Date 6-12-82

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON

SUBJECT: '72 CAMPAIGN

BETWEEN CONVENTIONS

The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party platform planks for ammunition -- although never publicly identified as such -- the President should focus on his compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused to pass.

I think the President can remain above the partisanship involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.

POST GOP CONVENTION

I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period, the President should, as much as is politically possible, maintain the posture of the professional, business-like Chief Executive going about his very important duties; and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at no time should the President drop to the level of the contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.

I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him, that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.

That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of the President be maintained regardless of how much or how little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition. That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function that would be politically desirable.

After the Convention, it seems to me that the President ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional and local Party officials to give them his personal marching orders. This should be done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely about what is going on, thereby providing for our own Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may be in the wind.

Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions. However, I still think that as much as possible, the image of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained as long as possible.

To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the President should be highly selective of the activities involving himself and that they should have a broader gauged *raison d'etre* other than partisan politics for as long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment. The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional stress on the economic issue.

I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling the concept that economic conditions in this country are good and that the economy will actually be better than our ability to convince the public of this fact.

I propose that we seriously create an almost separate, well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will be solely to create an image of economic well-being in this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it be done.

Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that this government has itself caught in a position where mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly career civil servants. This routine economic reporting is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that the economy is better than it seems to them.

As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are better off economically at this particular time than at any other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should ask their audiences to look inward and make their own judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer to that question is that indeed most people are better off now than ever before.

If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny. With the resources of this government, there is no excuse for there existing a single miniscule detail about George McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff and/or his mistress escaping us.

I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators who have already compiled everything there is to know about George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate. If there isn't, one should be established immediately.

There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we should do everything within our power to woe the American trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on congressional, state and local campaigns and should not be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is not even ideologically compatible with the principles of trade unionism.

To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election. I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise to see him deny labor's resources.

OPPOSITION STRATEGY

It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets: (1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an instinctive support from the liberal news media.

With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend it all in every area.

Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions

just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard, I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee should be established to hold regular press conferences and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.

We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel who commit documentable instances of being McGovern "sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is productive, but every time we can prove media bias or inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the specific error or article to which we are addressing.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PETER FLANIGAN 

This memo is in response to your request for my views as follows:

1. The President's posture between the conventions should be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that period.

To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians", political activity by the President would be a negative. To the extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a positive.

2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid. Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to get on with the business of politicking. This President, however, can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary. Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage of time dedicated to campaigning:

- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
- From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the President's time.

With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of movement available to a President, as well as the national and regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political" activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The 1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for the incumbent.

3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover, I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through to the end.

4. The opposition will of course attempt to attack Vietnam and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt to move to the middle.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By 24 NARS, Date 3-12-72

June 17, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN

RE: Campaign 1972

Between Conventions

1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform and the Democratic performance in Congress.

I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the environment and to point up his legacy of parks program while people vacation. The trip should include a stop in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer facilities, see some animals, etc.

Post Convention

2. After the convention and into the fall the President should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis on rallies and quiet talk on television.

I would use the week after the convention for meetings with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong Presidential interest. I believe the President should launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity in key states during the first week in September. This would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington, invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only. We also have the fund raiser on September 26.

In early October I would step up the President's campaign activities to travel one or two days during the week and then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I think this should lead up to intensive travel and campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it won't appear to be last minute panic.

Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but particularly in September, it should emphasize places which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble. Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some time in California, Texas and Illinois.

Some of the first week of September activities should be rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the President will be leading in the polls. We have the early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some events to tours of facilities such as high trade manufacturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't done this. He should have one or more events each emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would

avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities, particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice President should work these areas hard, also.

General Thoughts

3. I would hope that the President personally would use informal television considerably, interspersed with short, direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most rally television even on a state basis. If the President is to answer questions on television, either regionally by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the other programs.

I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses should be of high tone--the Presidency and the record. A contrast should be built between professionalism, calm competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism, uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream. A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.

4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank new face which is credible. They will try to focus on distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.

One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an idea I had: After this was printed without attribution, several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.

In a more major way, I believe the President should spend most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if Q and A television is used, the President could do this to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they are organized.

My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate to me that at this moment, the people are interested more in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates (particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.) and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even three months ago.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HSD*
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Suggestions

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

The President essentially should continue the present strategy of being a professional President working to solve national and international problems. From now until the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period might be right for some non-political type travelling to important states not to be visited in the campaign--appearances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.

Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket and the issues.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel..., where..., what type...?

The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted with the Truman style. The approach should be one of humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy. Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President should address himself in appearances to his vision of the

kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change horses in the middle of this dream."

Of course, the President would envision an America with a realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforcement; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated by the opponent, in the right way.

The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a short campaign in the public interest. We should start this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.

Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and at least two big rallies in each region so no area should feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19 visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.

The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as possible without hurting the candidates, especially key prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.

Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At these affairs, the President could be honored with key leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician. He should be depicted as the statesman building a better and more stable USA and world.

Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on

the type forums or activities available or which could be created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.

3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern statements, policies and record on the line through speakers and advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party leaders should be charged with undermining the President's efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote to condemn the President in a time of international crisis (mining). We should contrast peace through strength with peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on stability, individual and national security, and public safety.

The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public saturation in every good detail.

Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these times, based on a solid record of performance under very adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize all the obstacles in the President's path.

Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from

the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.

We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that this determines the success of everything else. The big line of difference should be drawn on this issue.

4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

The opposition strategy will turn on these major points: Vietnam, tax reform, haves vs. have-nots, unemployment, cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensitivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).

If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate and the campaign.

Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the President's solid record of achievements could blunt most of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968), the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more to show that the higher percentage today is due to the influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy. With war we can get unemployment statistics down but casualties back up (jobs vs. lives).

Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation administration with all the black, chicano, women, et al, appointments contrasted with previous, ending of sectionalism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can put together a paper on this.

Trying to pit the have-nots vs. the haves can be made into a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare-- also, they have promoted race vs. race and section vs. section, all ended now under RN.

Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack. Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately, McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.

Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based on opportunities, that further underscore the President's credibility and get them well publicized. The record of withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word. Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means also finding ways to stress the President's personal characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and how much it meant to his family.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

BILL CARRUTHERS 

From the first of July until the evening of the 22nd of August when the President is asked to appear at the Republican National Convention, in Miami, to accept his party's nomination, he should maintain his Presidential posture. In his role as a world leader performing the duties of the most complex and awesome office in the history of mankind, he is operating at a level that obscures the counter efforts of the Democratic candidate. He must maintain the tremendous momentum that he has created in the area of foreign affairs and focus on generating an equal momentum on the domestic side. In order to generate this "domestic momentum", I recommend that we create a series of substantive Presidential events in the key political states. The justification for these events must be to attend to the domestic needs of the people in these areas.

In the period between the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, the President should hold a series of domestic summits at the White House dealing with the key issues and they should be, obviously, widely publicized. Consequently, in his role as the President, he sets the stage for his domestic trips, which should begin shortly after the Labor Day weekend. The sooner we begin to publicize these domestic summits at the White House, the better.

If we create considerable media interest in the domestic summits, we will accomplish the two most important things:

1. We will increase the exposure of these summits between the conventions and, therefore, steal the lead from the Democrats.
2. We will provide credibility to the President's domestic trips following the Republican Convention.

I recommend that we create a media campaign around each of these domestic events. We should provide day-to-day media input to the television and radio stations and major newspapers in these areas each day leading up to, during and following the event. By creating our own regional network in each of these key political areas, we will totally dominate media coverage for a concentrated period of time. Our goal, of course, is to leave a lasting impression with the voter that Richard Nixon is responding to the domestic needs of the people at their level. These trips beginning in early September should continue through the month of October. Each of these major domestic events should be supported with side trips and human interest type drop bys.

The President should avoid attacking the opposition between the conventions. However, that does not prevent the other members of his political family from doing so.

The Democrats will dominate the media during the first two weeks in July. It will be most difficult to steal the spotlight from them, but we should try. One or two dynamic events or announcements could have a devastating effect on the Democrats, i. e., while the Democrats are fighting it out on the convention floor, Richard Nixon continues to implement his far-reaching and inventive foreign and domestic programs.

If we can gain this domestic momentum and maintain our foreign posture, we leave the Democrats with very little to talk about except themselves, and in that respect, no matter who their candidate is, there is no contest.

Our major area of concern is our lack of ability to communicate the President's interest in, and compassion for the people. Richard Nixon has approached the office of the Presidency with great dignity and formality and, in many cases, his Presidential posture has been misconstrued as being abstract, private and secretive. While these aspects of his personality create a certain intrigue around the office of the Presidency, we are being criticized for being out of touch with the people.

I feel that the November Group's media campaign and the Wolper documentaries will do a great deal to offset this thinking, but I also think that it is our responsibility to persuade the voters that Richard Nixon is not out of touch with the people and that he does care for each and every citizen and that he has great compassion for his fellow man.

In addition, whatever hostility the voters have toward their government, they translate it through the incumbent as opposed to the challenger. I believe that the main reason that Hubert Humphrey lost the California primary is because he was construed by the California voter as the incumbent and a representative of the establishment, while George McGovern was clearly cast as the voice of the people and the challenger.

I think the American public wants to get to know their President better and that we have the obligation to provide that contact.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour -- i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.

The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidential. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,

the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i. e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.

3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's \$110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential

appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.