

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	9	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH June 12 Memo. 10 pgs.
16	9	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Donald Rumsfield To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your memo of June 12th on the president and the Campaign. 6 pgs.
16	9	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Peter Flanigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to your request for views on President's posture between the conventions. 2 pgs.
16	9	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Herbert G. Klein To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign 1972. 4 pgs.

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16	9	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: MacGregor Strategy Meeting-July 11. 4 pgs.
16	9	7/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Second Wave Polling Results. 4 pgs.
16	9	7/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Arthur J. Finkelstein To: Dr. Robert H. Marik RE: Priority States. 5 pgs.
16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Gordon Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: TV Convention Group. 1 pg.
16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: J. Bruce Whelihan To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session-Wednesday, July 12, 1972 Democratic National Convention Observations. 6 pgs.

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16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Alvin Snyder To: Dwight Chapin RE: The Democratic National Convention Coverage. 1 pg.
16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Russ Freeburg To: Dwight Chapin RE: Third Session, Democratic National Convention. 2 pgs.
16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Democratic Convention Third Session. 2 pgs.
16	9		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Leonard Garment To: Dwight Chapin RE: Reaction to and opinion on McGovern's Interview. 2 pgs.
16	9	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: William Carruthers and Marke Goode RE: Democratic National Convention July 12, 1972. 2 pgs.

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16	9	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: RN Posture. 3 pgs.

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E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By emp MAR, Date 8-19-87
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: Response to HRH June 12 Memo

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

ANSWER

- Continue non-political approach
 - Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements in office.
- Example:
- Tricia to China
 - Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
 - Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)
 - First week after Democratic Convention, offer their candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
 - One or two half day trips to key states, i. e. Ohio Armstrong Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
 - Remain every bit the President.
 - A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate. Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the Democratic support on our side.
 - If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured, if this is possible, so the least amount of political brutality is expanded upon. A sloppy move here no matter how well planned will have serious consequences.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election?

ANSWER

- He should move into and out of the Convention in a way which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level. The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their great President. He should be aloof from the political hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance, (unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change-- and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his appearing before the Convention).
- After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after the Convention which only the President can handle and that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.
- In the second week of September, go to California, hold the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in September or the first of October. Then let him break loose.
- The President will want to campaign hard and should.
- The obvious which everyone will say is, the President should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.

- A. When should he start campaigning?
- All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the Surrogates will start on Labor Day.
- B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?
- This really depends on the polls. I would envision his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the four regions once. Our current key state list would probably be the most logical list of locations. Where he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling data.
- C. What type of activities should he engage in?
- This is probably the most important question.
 - Only the President can have "Presidential press conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or once every other week activity.
 - Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.
 - Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks on a network we put together. This would be in addition to one or two national T.V. talks.
 - Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.
 - Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight in the White House.
 - His schedule when in Washington should include items only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news we want to hypo.
 - Quadriad or CCEP meetings
 - Cabinet meeting on a key subject

- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
- An emergency meeting with another head of state - i.e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt, or Golda.

Special Note: As with 1968-- except even more so-- we should strictly limit his activity putting time against only what counts. Figure our news cycles-- have one national event per day and keep any other activity regional oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

ANSWER

There are three general points.

- We should not launch all of our issue attack rockets too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily plans in the T.V. area).

Our tendency is to use the sledge hammer approach and we should have a calculated release of issue positions and attack so that halfway through October we still have something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.

- We should keep the debate on issues (if the war is not over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one issue which everything we do and say (beginning now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon. Our surrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our

printed materials -- everything should build credibility. Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary infers and once again directly states, "we need a President we can believe in." The President has credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it-- once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very difficult to recover.

- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am for third party persons or organizations attacking him lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience and understanding of the institution of the Presidency. There is no reason to let the Honest George image keep floating.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

ANSWER

The Attack on the President

- Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must move on.
- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say it hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- Nixon did in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a divisive President. He wins by dividing Americans. The people want to be brought together. We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.

- The most isolated President. Makes decisions alone, doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House constantly -- no consultation with Congress.
- And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility. Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother Don, anything that helps to point negatives.

Response to the attack

- The President never takes on McGovern by name or directly. If he does it should be during the last days of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservative Democrats who are popular in key states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell. We can use them in the State where they're popular just at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works - under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which should be made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the basis for the McGovern attack.) We must make sure our attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR and build him into a martyr.)

- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena. Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)

What the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades. They are organized, have good supporting people, great merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal," an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must recognize they have much going for themselves.

- The first most important strategy for the opposition out of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of the country holding private unity meetings and striking deals.

Response:

State by state McGovern should be hit by sign carrying mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers (\$1000 to everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up for air from the time he leaves the convention.

- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President (if Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see him, Brezhnev, Golda, Heath, Pompidou?

Response:

Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other governments know confidentially our displeasure at any such meetings.

- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels - Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention and forces the President into highlighting his domestic program. We would be very much on the defensive.

Response:

A PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a stunt early in its planning.

- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress, the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a good idea - for them!)

Response:

Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?

- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always do (like the right wing).

Response:

Early on our surrogates - everyone - should say - I wonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack. It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a joking way.

- As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car, throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.

Response:

Pray all is o.k.

- Television is paramount. It is the single most important element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California. Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers, the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish all this T. V. has been the key.

We must assume crowds, events - everything will be staged effectively for television. It has got to be their feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a regional, or state by state basis can defeat the President.

Via television they will show:

- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public - understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American, you name it, rallying around one man. The one man who really can "bring us together again" and unite the nation.
- They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good solid T. V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach - after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.

Response:

Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should look very seriously at how we would run a T. V. campaign against the President. This exercise on our part might give us some specific thoughts.

- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket will be running their own campaign against the President. I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.

Response:

Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups who are for us. Or, we should get readings on those groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next we should set up front groups playing to the same constituency, using a similar name and launch some back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right direction.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DONALD RUMSFELD *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to your Memo of June 12th
on the President and the Campaign.

1. The President's posture between the Conventions--

The President should:

- Be Presidential;
- Not engage in partisan activities;
- Use the platform and power of the office to show a President governing--let the distinction be drawn between a partisan Democratic office seeker versus an incumbent President governing;
- Travel only under the mantle of "official business";
- As suitable occasions are developed, be photographed with prominent non partisan citizens (Democrats, citizens, etc.)
- Keep his options open. It will be a tough election. Maintain a moderately active profile, unless spectacular opportunities for greater visibility occur.

2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to the Election -

- This will depend somewhat on who the Democratic nominee is and who the Vice-Presidential nominees are, as well as the situation in Viet Nam.
- In general, and importantly, the President should remain Presidential. Richard Nixon, the President of the United States, is a winner. Richard Nixon, campaigning as another office seeker, would create unnecessary problems.
- To the extent possible, the President should be involved in campaign travel as part of some "official business". To the extent that a campaign event is secondary on a trip he could travel as early as six or eight weeks before the election.
- However, travel throughout the election should be moderate. Avoid the impression of a frantic, hectic three or four campaign-stop pace on a given day. The target states, and enough others to show breadth, need to be visited and appropriate events can be developed for such visits.

3. Strategy for the President's campaign -

The theme, "Re-Elect the President", is sound. If the campaign is consistent with that theme we should avoid conjuring up the image of Richard Nixon the office seeker. Activities where he is functioning as President should be highlighted. A great deal will turn on how accurately the President is portrayed as a competent, and bold, forward-looking and effective President. Enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric.

The opponent will be a member of the Party responsible for a number of the problems of this country, and his solutions will be fuzzy and unsound, but there are plenty of people available to make the attack besides the President.

Issues the President should emphasize:

- His Foreign policy leadership
- A strong America versus a weak America
- Performance versus promises (results versus "effort", "concern", "commitment", etc.)
- Avoiding crisis versus crisis management (Action versus reaction)
- The importance of the individual, individuality, diversity, and pluralism versus centralization and control.

4. The opposition's strategy -

- If the opponent is McGovern he will try to hold the left (his enthusiastic corps of workers and media support) by holding to his Viet Nam position and calling for an end to "senseless killing." He will move to the middle on other issues to gain labor support, a degree of legitimacy in the south and the support of the Democratic power men. He will be less idealistic and more practical. Hopefully, the Convention struggle will dramatize his problems in this respect.
- He will pound the so-called bread and butter economic issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty and inflation. (Larry O'Brien talks about almost nothing else.) I can hear him now:

"When Nixon came in, unemployment was under 4 percent--after 4 years of Nixon it is up to 6 percent."

"When Nixon came in, your dollar was worth a dollar--after 4 years of Nixon, it is worth 90 cents."

He will portray the President as the handmaiden of big business and special interests.

"Jack Kennedy did battle with big steel,
Nixon gives loans to Lockheed."

"The Democratic Party pushed for higher
Social Security benefits for the elderly
and higher minimum wages for workers, Nixon
makes deal with ITT in return for contribu-
tions."

"Democratic Presidents like Roosevelt,
Kennedy, and Johnson found jobs for millions
of unemployed Americans, Nixon freezes wages."

"Nixon means high unemployment and high
inflation -- your wages are controlled and
business profits soar and taxes, rents and
food prices climb."

How to meet the opponent's strategy:

--McGovern's weakness will be a lack of "competence".
If he is elected it will amount to "on-the-job
training" - that is risky for the country.

--We should seek some of the Wallace, McCarthy,
McGovern support that wants change, by driving
home the President's record on reform -- govern-
ment, draft, etc.

The way to do it is to take on Congress -- they
have failed the people. The laundry list of their
failures is persuasive. This will associate the
President with a desire for some change and his
hope to make things better.

--Administration spokesmen can associate McGovern
with his unpopular extreme supporters and positions,
but the President should not.

A FINAL THOUGHT -

--The President has hopes and ideals yet correctly
understands human characteristics. He knows that
to actually move the maximum distance toward those
ideals, those hopes of most human beings, you have
to be tough, pragmatic, courageous. That's what we
need as President, and we've got it. Thank God.

- But, as the President has said, not every voter fully understands that. People can be moved and persuaded by appeals to their hopes and aspirations even though the approach is fuzzy, impractical, even counterproductive or dangerous.
- The President effectively communicates his toughness, strength and pragmatism. More can be done to show that those qualities are necessary. More can be done to show why the President is this way--because that is how to move toward those idealistic goals of peace, etc. He knows there are damn few short cuts, that "caring", "wishing", or "hoping" is not enough.

Further, more can be done to show that he has those same hopes and ideals. We should seek some opportunities for him to dramatize his interest in individual human beings, his personal concern where personal concern is justified, his ideals, his hopes. A chunk of the American people must have the feeling that he personally cares about their problems, not in general but in the specific--about them, about the kinds of concerns they have for themselves and their families. Only then can many be sure he is leading where they want to go. There are such opportunities, but they must be seized.

The President knows that feeling moves some people. He is capable of doing it and does it well. But our Administration does it only reluctantly.

A danger for our Administration is in its competence we seem harsh, in our strength we seem tough, in our pragmatism we seem goalless and idealless.

McGovern is weak and would be a disastrous President. But his warmth, concern, decency are appealing because people dream, hope, aspire, and want to be better than themselves, want better for their children, and because they have fears.

The campaign must scrupulously avoid going "over the line." Our "reservoir", in this respect, is shallow. The more people "feel" and believe (as opposed to understand) that the President has ideals, hopes and concerns, the more they will accept his approach based on the vital qualities of strength, courage, brilliance and competence, because they will feel he is going-- and taking them--where they want to go, and doing it skillfully.

And when a human being walks into the voting booth pulls the curtain, shrugs his shoulders at the complexity of the mechanism and then votes, that's what he wants - to know and or feel, or at least hope that that man, Richard Nixon, is leading him where he wants to go.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PETER FLANIGAN 

This memo is in response to your request for my views as follows:

1. The President's posture between the conventions should be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that period.

To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians", political activity by the President would be a negative. To the extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a positive.

2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid. Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to get on with the business of politicking. This President, however, can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary. Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage of time dedicated to campaigning:

- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
- From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the President's time.

-2-

With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of movement available to a President, as well as the national and regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political" activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The 1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for the incumbent.

3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover, I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through to the end.

4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt to move to the middle.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN
RE: Campaign 1972

Between Conventions

1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform and the Democratic performance in Congress.

I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the environment and to point up his legacy of parks program while people vacation. The trip should include a stop in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer facilities, see some animals, etc.

Post Convention

2. After the convention and into the fall the President should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis on rallies and quiet talk on television.

I would use the week after the convention for meetings with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong Presidential interest. I believe the President should launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity in key states during the first week in September. This would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington, invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only. We also have the fund raiser on September 26.

In early October I would step up the President's campaign activities to travel one or two days during the week and then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I think this should lead up to intensive travel and campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it won't appear to be last minute panic.

Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but particularly in September, it should emphasize places which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble. Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some time in California, Texas and Illinois.

Some of the first week of September activities should be rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the President will be leading in the polls. We have the early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some events to tours of facilities such as high trade manufacturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't done this. He should have one or more events each emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would

avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities, particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice President should work these areas hard, also.

General Thoughts

3. I would hope that the President personally would use informal television considerably, interspersed with short, direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most rally television even on a state basis. If the President is to answer questions on television, either regionally by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the other programs.

I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses should be of high tone--the Presidency and the record. A contrast should be built between professionalism, calm competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism, uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream. A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.

4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank new face which is credible. They will try to focus on distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.

One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an idea I had: After this was printed without attribution, several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.

In a more major way, I believe the President should spend most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if Q and A television is used, the President could do this to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they are organized.

My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate to me that at this moment, the people are interested more in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates (particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.) and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even three months ago.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

MacGregor Strategy
Meeting - July 11

Clark MacGregor met with the Campaign Strategy Group (Teeter, Magruder, Malek, Dailey, Marik, Finkelstein, and Miller) to discuss the Key States in light of Wave II polling results.

MacGregor opened the meeting with two comments. He said he planned on meeting with Mitchell, Connally, and possibly Colson to determine how the Democrats for the President would be arranged. Second, he advised the group that an appropriate approach was being made to Mayor Daley and that you had been informed.

MacGregor told the group that Governor Love and Secretary Morton would be in Miami Beach to welcome disenchanted Democrats. They will also push the line that McGovern heads an extreme elitist machine that has replaced the "party of the people". The Democrats cannot be allowed to keep that label. Many liberal Democrats are calling MacGregor to indicate their concern about McGovern.

MacGregor agreed with Teeter that the campaign should concentrate on the great national issues and McGovern's extreme positions. It is Teeter's view that McGovern's perception will be set in the minds of the American people in the next 2-3 weeks. MacGregor said the campaign will continue to hit McGovern through MacGregor's "Issues and Answers" appearance this Sunday, the distribution of the Wicker article, and the Pierre Rinfret discussions with economists. When Malek pressed for a single person within 1701 to run this operation, MacGregor deferred.

The Key State discussion focused on the three attached memoranda. There were two views expressed. Some thought the results showed the President so far ahead in Illinois, Texas and Ohio that the primary effort should be placed in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, New York and Michigan. All agreed Washington should be dropped. Malek led the argument to work in the big states regardless of what the polls indicate. MacGregor concluded that there should be three states for maximum effort -- California, New York and Pennsylvania. New Jersey and Cook County in Illinois should also receive First Priority attention. The Second Priority states would be Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Maryland and Connecticut.

MacGregor also emphasized that the campaign would not shift its attention to Senatorial or Congressional races because if the President wins by 54-55%, Congressional races will be helped naturally.

TALKING PAPER

In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group, established three groups of priority states for the campaign:

Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources, and focus of management attention. "Must win" states.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
California	45	+0.2	+3
Illinois	26	-0.3	+3
Texas	26	-2	-1
Ohio	25	+6	+2
New Jersey	<u>17</u>	-1	+2
	139		

Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
* New York	41	-6	-5
Pennsylvania	27	-2	-4
Maryland	10	-8	-2
Michigan	21	-2	-7
Connecticut	8	-8	-5
Washington	<u>9</u>	+3	-2
	116		

Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
Missouri	12	-0.5	+1
Wisconsin	11	+4	+4
Oregon	6	+6	+6
West Virginia	<u>6</u>	-6	-9
	35		

The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic nominee, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing in the large population states.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors to be considered include:

1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.
2. How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large states must we win in order to carry the election.
3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking-- How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 3, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: Second Wave Polling Results

Attached are the sample ballot results from the second wave polling. The interviewing for this polling was all done between June 14 and June 25. I have noted differences in the two Nixon/Humphrey races from the first wave where applicable. We did not measure McGovern in the first wave which was done in December and January.

I will have the results from the National poll later today or tomorrow morning, the New York data in about ten days, and the Indiana data in about three weeks. The New York and Indiana polls were delayed to begin after the primary in New York and the State Nominating Convention in Indiana.

Generally these results are very optimistic and indicate that the President has improved his position since January. I think it is particularly significant that his committed vote is above or very near 50% in the two-way races against McGovern in the top priority states. This, as I am sure you are aware, has been a problem in the past.

While our situation has improved, we still appear to have some problems in Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington.

Also I just got an advance report of a telephone poll taken by Becker Research for the Boston Globe in Massachusetts which will be published tomorrow. It shows McGovern with 47%, Nixon with 44%, and 9% undecided. This is obviously a most optimistic result.

We will have the complete data from this second wave polling by July 15.

I will be happy to discuss these figures and the first wave data at your convenience.

Note: I will be giving these results to Gordon Strachan of Mr. Haldeman's office on the telephone at 5 o'clock, Pacific Time, this evening.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>U.S.</u>			<u>ALABAMA¹</u>			<u>CALIFORNIA</u>			<u>CONNECTICUT</u>			<u>INDIANA</u>			<u>ILLINOIS</u>			<u>MARYLAND</u>			
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	
Nixon	54			47	65	+18	47	47	0	--	56	----	53			--	56	----	49	58	+ 9	
Humphrey	40			18	20	+ 2	40	40	0	--	32	----	38			--	34	----	45	36	- 9	
Undecided	6			35	14	-21	13	13	0	--	12	----	9			--	11	----	5	6	+ 1	
Nixon	48			29	34	+ 5	44	42	- 2	--	50	----	47				45	48	+ 3	44	48	+ 4
Humphrey	35			14	15	+ 1	37	35	- 2	--	27	----	33				36	28	- 8	43	29	-14
Wallace	12			36	43	+ 7	6	13	+ 7	--	13	----	11				7	15	+ 8	8	17	+ 9
Undecided	5			21	9	-12	13	11	- 2	--	11	----	8				12	10	- 2	5	6	+ 1
Nixon	--			--	63	----	--	48	----	--	54	----	--				--	56	----	--	52	----
McGovern	--			--	23	----	--	42	----	--	37	----	--				--	35	----	--	42	----
Undecided	--			--	14	----	--	11	----	--	10	----	--				--	10	----	--	6	----
Nixon	--			--	35	----	--	42	----	--	47	----	--				--	47	----	--	44	----
McGovern	--			--	15	----	--	39	----	--	33	----	--				--	31	----	--	35	----
Wallace	--			--	43	----	--	11	----	--	10	----	--				--	12	----	--	16	----
Undecided	--			--	7	----	--	8	----	--	10	----	--				--	10	----	--	4	----

1 First wave figures from a survey for Winton Blount, June, 1971.

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>MICHIGAN</u> ¹			<u>MISSOURI</u>			<u>NEW JERSEY</u>			<u>NEW YORK</u>			<u>OHIO</u>			<u>OREGON</u>			<u>PENNSYLVANIA</u>		
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>
Nixon	--	49	----	43	48	+ 5	54	52	- 2	50			53	58	+ 5	48	50	+ 2	49	49	0
Humphrey	--	39	----	45	42	- 3	36	38	+ 2	40			40	37	- 3	38	31	- 7	43	41	- 2
Undecided	--	12	----	12	10	- 2	10	10	0	10			8	5	- 3	13	19	+ 6	8	10	+ 2
Nixon	--	36	----	37	37	0	49	44	- 5	47			48	50	+ 2	43	44	+ 1	44	43	- 1
Humphrey	--	30	----	40	35	- 5	33	30	- 3	39			38	30	- 8	36	24	-12	41	35	- 6
Wallace	--	24	----	12	20	+ 8	8	18	+10	5			8	15	+ 7	9	18	+ 9	8	13	+ 5
Undecided	--	11	----	11	8	- 3	10	9	- 1	9			7	5	- 2	12	15	+ 3	8	9	+ 1
Nixon	--	45	----	--	44	----	--	49	----	--			--	56	----	--	42	----	--	49	----
McGovern	--	45	----	--	46	----	--	42	----	--			--	38	----	--	45	----	--	42	----
Undecided	--	10	----	--	10	----	--	9	----	--			--	6	----	--	13	----	--	9	----
Nixon	--	33	----	--	35	----	--	41	----	--			--	47	----	--	37	----	--	42	----
McGovern	--	36	----	--	37	----	--	36	----	--			--	33	----	--	39	----	--	38	----
Wallace	--	23	----	--	20	----	--	16	----	--			--	15	----	--	15	----	--	12	----
Undecided	--	8	----	--	8	----	--	8	----	--			--	6	----	--	10	----	--	8	----

1 First wave figures from a survey for Robert Griffin, February, 1972 with Muskie, not Humphrey, as opponent.

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%

<u>MICHIGAN</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>MICHIGAN</u>	<u>1W</u>
Nixon	41	Nixon	38
Muskie	42	Muskie	40
Undecided	17	Wallace	7
		Undecided	15

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>WASHINGTON</u>			<u>WISCONSIN</u>			<u>TEXAS</u>		
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>
Nixon	45	---	---	46	56	+10	49	55	+6
Humphrey	39	---	---	46	35	-11	40	35	-5
Undecided	16	---	---	7	9	+2	11	10	-1
Nixon	38	---	---	44	48	+4	42	43	+1
Humphrey	32	---	---	42	31	-11	36	28	-8
Wallace	17	---	---	8	12	+4	12	22	+10
Undecided	13	---	---	7	9	+2	11	7	-4
Nixon	41	---	---	44	44	---	44	54	---
McGovern	45	---	---	52	52	---	35	35	---
Undecided	13	---	---	5	5	---	11	11	---
Nixon	34	---	---	39	39	---	42	42	---
McGovern	39	---	---	47	47	---	29	29	---
Wallace	16	---	---	10	10	---	22	22	---
Undecided	12	---	---	4	4	---	7	7	---

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 7, 1972

TO: Dr. Robert H. Marik
FROM: Arthur J. Finkelstein *AJF*
SUBJECT: Priority States

Please find attached several charts depicting my thinking on the electoral vote situation that would exist in a Nixon-McGovern contest. As you can tell the Nixon total electoral vote surpasses by 16, the 270 votes needed for election. Further, there is an additional 188 electoral votes which realistically can still be considered undecided. Due to recent information, states such as Illinois, Maryland and Ohio have been added to the safe Nixon total. Wisconsin, Oregon and Missouri have been added to the McGovern total. Of the 188 undecided electoral votes, on the basis of recent information and past election analyses, it can be assumed that 104 are leaning to Nixon. With New York State's 41 electoral votes kept completely in the undecided column, the President receives a stunning 390 electoral votes, the making of a real electoral landslide.

Considering the possibility of an electoral landslide, it would make great sense to solidify those states which would clearly give us the margin of victory. Therefore, our priority states should be those which are not sure states but large electoral states now leaning slightly to the President. California, Pennsylvania and New Jersey fit this criteria. I would also add Connecticut, New York and Michigan because of the very nature of the closeness of this election.

You will note that I suggest dropping five presently targeted states either because we have secured them or because to win them would take more effort than frankly is essential or necessary for this campaign. Three of those five states dropped, Texas, Illinois and Ohio, account for 77 electoral votes which should be constantly kept track of. I would suggest greater than normal emphasis upon the states organizationally and the use of the telephone operations.

Dr. Robert H. Marik

July 7, 1972

Finally I include a list of third priority states which are chosen because of the strength of the President. None of these ten states are target states. All of these ten states will have senatorial contests in 1972, where Republicans can either hold on to a seat (Kentucky), or as in the case of the other nine, gain a seat. In each of these states with the exception of Rhode Island, a Nixon--Senatorial Candidate Campaign would be helpful to the Republican Senatorial candidate's chances. Since the Republicans only need to gain five or six seats in the Senate to take control of that body, I would strongly suggest that the campaign strategy develop which would emphasize in these areas the ideal Republican ticket.

A. J. F.

AJF:kvf
Attachments
cc: J. Magruder

PRIORITY STATES

First Priority

A	{	1. California	-	45
		2. Pennsylvania	-	27
		3. New Jersey	-	17
B	{	4. Connecticut	-	8
		5. New York	-	41
		6. Michigan	-	<u>21</u>
				159

Second Priority

1.	Texas	-	26
2.	Illinois	-	26
3.	Ohio	-	<u>25</u>
			77

Third Priority

1.	Alabama	-	9
2.	Georgia	-	12
* 3.	Kentucky	-	9
4.	Montana	-	4
5.	New Hampshire	-	4
6.	New Mexico	-	4
7.	North Carolina	-	13
8.	Oklahoma	-	8
** 9.	Rhode Island	-	4
10.	Virginia	-	12

TOTAL STATES

	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>U</u>
Alabama	9		
Alaska			3
Arizona	6		
Arkansas	6		
California			45
Colorado	7		
Connecticut			8
Delaware	3		
D. C.		3	
Florida	17		
Georgia	12		
Hawaii		4	
Idaho	4		
Illinois	26		
Indiana	13		
Iowa	8		
Kansas	7		
Kentucky	9		
Louisiana	10		
Maine			4
Maryland	10		
Massachusetts		14	
Michigan			21
Minnesota		10	
Mississippi	7		
Missouri		12	
Montana	4		
Nebraska	5		
Nevada			3
New Hampshire	4		
New Jersey			17
New Mexico	4		
New York			41
North Carolina	13		
North Dakota	3		
Ohio	25		
Oklahoma	8		
Oregon		6	
Pennsylvania			27
Rhode Island		4	
South Carolina	8		
South Dakota			4
Tennessee	10		
Texas	26		
Utah	4		
Vermont	3		
Virginia	12		
Washington			9
West Virginia			6
Wisconsin		11	
Wyoming	3		
	<u>286</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>188</u>

UNDECIDED STATES

	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>U</u>
Alaska		3	
California	45		
Connecticut	8		
Maine	4		
Michigan		21	
Nevada	3		
New Jersey	17		
New York			41
Pennsylvania	27		
South Dakota		4	
Washington		9	
West Virginia		6	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	104	43	41
Safe	286	64	--
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	390	107	41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: July 13, 1972

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Chapin's TV Convention group submitted these memoranda.

The L.A. and N.Y. Nielsen Overnights are not yet available. They will be dexed as soon as available.

July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: J. BRUCE WHELIHAN

SUBJECT: Third Session - Wednesday, July 12, 1972
Democratic National Convention
Observations

The nominations of, and the balloting for, the Presidential nominee of the Democratic Party was not good television. The world knew by 7:00 p.m. last night who would get the nomination. There was no contest, so the only people that were watching were die-hard Democrats and McGovernites. It will be interesting to compare the ratings of this session with first and second session, when there was a contest, and with tonight's session, when "their" man will appear.

Cronkite did a poor job anchoring the CBS coverage. He did not have control of his players (reporters) at all. Chancellor and Brinkley did a much more masterful job anchoring, but the NBC reporters on the floor didn't quite do the job that the CBS team did.

The point I wish to make is that all attention is focused on the floor - because the networks are focusing their coverage there. There is an important lesson in this. There will be no contest on the floor at the Republican Convention, but we can create a great deal of interest there by programming the appearance and interviews of surrogates, Cabinet members, contenders from '68 (Reagan and Rockefeller) and key Republicans, such as Ford, Scott and other former National Chairmen, Buckley and Bailey.

I'm sure you are already moving on this, but I wanted to raise it again, as I think it is damn important. Also, we should make a great effort to focus coverage on Republican women and on those with identifiable constituencies - such as Javits and Brooke. The networks are going to want to get to all these people anyway. If we know when they are going to appear, it can help greatly in pacing the entire Convention.

Tally

The networks have pooled their resources and they are using one tally system. It is not fast enough. You can do the arithmetic in your head, often, faster than they are doing it on the screen.

Podium Chronology

The anchormen are not giving an account of what goes on, or is supposed to be going on at the podium. There is no possible way, from reviewing last night's coverage, to know what the agenda was for the entire evening. We should be sure the networks have a run-down well in advance of air time - so that they may prepare graphics for the evening's program if they want to. For example, if entertainment is going to be offered from the podium time and time again, they may want to make up a slide to flash on the bottom of the screen during interviews, stating that entertainment is in progress - or that platform debate is being offered, etc.

Issues

Television has paid very little attention to the issues. The coverage of the Republican Convention provides us with our last opportunity to get out in front on issues. McGovern has stayed away from specifics. We will have a monopoly on the air waves during the period of the Convention and should make appropriate use of this opportunity. How we turn the networks to the discussion of the issues and get them to focus on the issues instead of personalities, I am not sure.

McGovern has said that he is going to run a campaign on the issues. From his performance to date, it seems that he is going to run the campaign around the issues. Last night, all he did was listen and attempt to establish in the minds of his audience that there was an exchange of views taking place - from which all would benefit. Such "openness", is very deceptive.

McGovern is turning into the great Pied Piper. Maybe we ought to say as much. He is starting to peddle a very simple tune - taking a very simplistic approach, even glossing over the details of what were originally "his" issues. I wouldn't be surprised if McGovern runs a "meet the people" campaign. This didn't work with Harold Hughes, but then he didn't have guaranteed TV coverage. He established this last night in his television interviews after his confrontation in the lobby of the Doral. The other thing that the Democrats established,

which disturbs me, is the precedent of extensive coverage of the candidate watching the proceedings on television.

No doubt, the networks are going to press for coverage of the President and First Family viewing the proceedings. I am sure they are going to want to light the outside of the House, and have a live camera (pool) - either to show the President and family observing, or to show the President cloistered.

I am not sure how we get around this. The family could go out to dinner, the President could be at Grand Cay, he could go to Bebe's for a cook-out, or he could be working in his study with Kissinger. Naturally, there could be pictures of Kissinger coming and going - carrying hamburger patties and cottage cheese.

Naturally, I prefer Grand Cay. He could go fishing with David - or have meetings with Kissinger and Rogers - and even go over to Walker's Cay and talk with the pool.

JBW

FOR RAY PRICE

FROM: LEN GARMENT

CONVENTION NOTES

A brief summary of the points I discussed with you on the phone Saturday - plus a few others.

1. The only thing that emerges with sharpness from the collection of essays on convention themes is Bakshian's phrase: "A Better Future For All." The conventional, and correct perception, is that for the voter what's done is done and the past is relevant only as a prologue to the future. The convention themes should therefore be future-oriented, and pointedly so. While this is hardly a revolutionary idea, it's important to have it in mind when executing things like Jack McDonald's platform presentation. The function of parts 1 and 2 of his outline are to reinforce belief in the President's special capability to carry out part 3 ("The Unfinished Agenda"), and, as a general guideline, more weight should go to the last than to the first two.

2. I doubt that there's any single theme that will do a great deal for the convention or the campaign. The important thing (and this relates not only to themes, but to everything else in the convention and campaign) is to do appropriate things, and not to charge off in wrong directions, striking strident notes, overstating the case for the President ^{against} the Democrats, stretching credibility, straining nerves, and, in the process, alienating independent support.

3. The cross-pressured complexity of the contemporary U.S. scene not only makes it risky to put too many eggs in any one thematic basket, but peculiarly difficult to define that basket. There are very few rallying points of a positive nature these days. The "President as Peacemaker" is one, of course, but beyond that the going gets uncertain - and even the President's foreign policy accomplishments have to be tied to domestic concerns - to jobs, to inflation, to the availability of resources to deal with domestic needs, etc., and not merely to "abstract" issues (for today's U.S. electorate) like national security and the U.S. "role" in the world.

As Irving Kristol points out, one of the main qualities of populism is that it is paranoid and therefore simplistic, xenophobic, and anti-bureaucratic. McGovern is therefore building his appeal to a coalition of these feelings rather than to conventional issues and groups. The intense personal feelings Kristol identifies are the McGovern target. An understanding of these feelings and sympathy for the specific grievances they represent should be reflected in the convention and campaign themes and materials. (It occurs to me that on the whole basic subject of Presidential accomplishments the foreign policy/domestic policy dichotomy is not only a false one but a harmful one, and a deliberate effort should be made to overcome it. I think we should talk about this little bit of detail.)

4. A good theme (like a good slogan) should convey the feelings of an equation. It should be logical, simple, unambiguous, non-verbal in its thrust. It should not invite argument. It should have an apparent quality of inevitability, and therefore capable of producing the widest immediate concurrence. That was the value of "Nixon's The One" and "Reelect the President." Compare, "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) and McGovern's "Demand the Truth" (very sound). The problem with "Now More Than Ever" is that it is ambiguous (and on the negative side), slightly mysterious, slightly threatening, sets up a debate, etc. All of which is to say that "A Better Future For All" strikes me as ^{an} appropriate convention theme, just as "Reelect the President" strikes me as an effective campaign-slogan. But none of this is of crucial importance. In fact, it might be best - given the lack of a rallying issue - to float several slogans around the convention. They might work together in a helpful way.

5. The tone of the convention materials should be crisp rather than emotional, confident without being smug or complacent, lively and factual rather than grandiloquent and self-serving. We should demonstrate not only a grasp of the kind of concerns for the future that are widely shared, but should also make clear that there are specific programs under way to deal with each of these concerns. We've talked about a structural metaphor: The President designed the Nixon Doctrine to build a new foreign policy structure in order to create safer conditions in the world so that life will be better in the United States. Payoff examples of this comprehensive Presidential design are beginning to emerge. The Soviet Summit has produced a market for \$750 million in U.S. grain. The China meetings have led to the sale of jet transports. Trade and currency negotiations similarly translate into dollars and jobs for Americans. And so on. These links are matters best handled by explanation, not by exhortation. The role of the Republican Convention is basically to report on an Administration very much at work,

not to prepare for a political fight with the Democrats. Whatever conveys this sense of continuity, of work in progress, of a professional President assisted by a highly professional Administration, of quiet long-range planning; that is now surfacing results, will serve to highlight the "better future" theme. (Max Ways has an interesting essay in FORTUNE about the new international economic complexities, i. e., a profoundly important shift has taken place from a world preoccupied with military issues to one focussing on economic competition and this promising change is the proximate result of the President's first-term diplomacy.)

6. To sum up: The McGovern strategy is to unite "the dissatisfied" across all conventional political lines and to propose fundamental change even at the risk of social and economic convulsion. But most of "the dissatisfied" want a sense of order and personal security, and are open to a program that offers "change without chaos" - and this is what the Nixon philosophy is all about. Whether the problem is an overactive Court, an omnipresent bureaucracy, the ineffective rendition of costly government services, excessive commitments and contributions to foreign countries, etc., basic change is, in fact, taking place and without wrecking the system upon which Americans depend for the cake which so many now want to eat and have as well. Getting across the details of this message is the job of the Republican Convention and the campaign which it keynotes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1972

10:45 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: ALVIN SNYDER AS
SUBJECT: The Democratic National
Convention Coverage

I believe the Democrats have succeeded in drilling home to the viewer the picture of a new vibrancy within the party, due in large measure to delegate selection and floor procedures banning "old style" demonstrations. McGovern's top spokesmen, including Gary Hart, are fresh young faces and lend credibility to pronouncements of great nationwide reform within the Democratic party. This may be the single most important message left with the American public, through the dullness of it all.

There is something to be said for reviewing the matter of floor demonstrations, and whether they fit into the look we want to achieve. At the same time, our floor information booth, or hospitality suite, if we have one, ought to be manned with spokesmen such as yourself, Don Runsfeld and others who come across well on TV, underlining before the TV cameras the youth and vitality of our group. Others such as Stan Scott, Gregg Petersmeyer and Dave Parker would also be there to be seen and perhaps interviewed. This might also be the place the President comes to following his nomination for a staff pep talk.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM TO:

DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM:

RUSS FREEBURG *RWF*

SUBJECT:

Third Session, Democratic National Convention

McGovern and the SDS.

I think it was bad judgement for McGovern to go to the Doral Hotel lobby for a face to face confrontation with angry SDS members just before his nomination. He looked tense and fearful, although he personally handled himself well. However, he could not control the manners of the SDS members, therefore he appeared in a weak position as a candidate for higher office. A candidate cannot win popularity or build confidence with the public by confronting demonstrators that have no intention of compromise. The fall out will always be anti-candidate. The candidate is reduced to the demonstrators' level, the demonstrators are never raised to the candidate's level in the public mind. The SDS is discredited in the public mind generally therefore a candidate mingling with them is automatically discredited somewhat by associating. Demonstrations are no longer chic. The public is about three years beyond inquisitiveness about demonstrations. It was not worth the risk for McGovern to expose himself to such a miniscule, unpopular part of the electorate. He had much to lose and really nothing to gain by appearing in the lobby. The appearance will not increase his vote getting ability with normal voters. I think the appearance was a minus for McGovern with most voters although some of the media will picture him as heroic to go into a lion's den.

McGovern Nominating Speech.

The only plus in Ribicoff as McGovern's nominator was religion. This might have been counteracted to some degree however, immediately by the blandness of the speech. Ribicoff did not make a good case for McGovern. He appeared unemotional and aloof. His speech was not well structured. It was rambling and did not bring the main points together sharply. The speech was a blur of disconnected reasons to have McGovern as President.

The Seconding speech by Valerie Kushner was better structured. The only phrase of both speeches that was really fresh and catchy was Mrs. Kushner's - McGovern would bring her husband home; BRING AMERICA HOME. I think it is pretty poor pickings when you can get only one phrase out of two speeches that has any schmaltz.

McGovern Nomination.

It was interesting that Shirley Chisholm could not bring herself to mention McGovern by name when she appeared on the podium after his nomination. When Mrs. Corretta King was interviewed by Dan Rather, I thought her comment that McGovern probably did not really understand black problems because he came from South Dakota where there are few black people, was an interesting comment and indicated only lukewarm

MEMORANDUM TO
FROM
Page Two

DWIGHT CHAPIN
RUSS FREEBURG

July 13, 1972

backing and not frenzied all-out support. I do not suppose it could have been expected that McGovern's nomination would ever be by acclamation, but I think it is interesting that no one ever raised the motion to make it unanimous.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1972

10:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

SUBJECT: Democratic Convention
Third Session

This morning's Washington Post has a story on page 14 which says, "To TV viewer, it's been a dull show." I think this is very true of last night in particular. The only real highlights were McGovern going into the lobby of the hotel and confronting the SDS types (a move that I feel was staged and worked to McGovern's favor in order to separate him from the radicals), the interview with Mrs. McGovern in the box when McGovern went over the top and the demonstration for McGovern after O'Brien announced the numbers.

Walker and Timmons have made the point that it's a very dull convention there on the scene. Evidently, there is very little hooplah and spirit. If we can find the magic combination of having our delegates radiate enthusiasm and dedication to the President without looking staged our convention might seem much more lively than the Democrats.

What we need are one or two lively or very controversial things which cannot damage the President but yet can create enough public suspense and interest to help us generate and maintain some interest on the part of the public in our convention.

How we use the First Family during the prime time hours is extremely important. We have watched how they cover Mrs. McGovern, Mrs. Humphrey, Wallace and other VIPs who have appeared at the hall and we know that we have a golden opportunity to score a lot of points by using the girls and Mrs. Nixon during the prime time hours. All of this is obvious.

I was amazed that McGovern would go on the air to be interviewed immediately after the nomination by Ribicoff and thereby eliminate for awhile coverage of the POW wife seconding him on two of the major networks. It was a stupid mistake.

McGovern obviously feels that any exposure that he can get at this point is good since he is still such an unknown quantity and, therefore, overexposure is not a problem. They also are struggling desperately to pull him more toward the center through the free time vehicle they have in the convention.

Whelihan makes a constructive point that we should give one-liners to the people who will announce the votes for President Nixon from the various delegations. For example, when Michigan comes up, the head of their delegation may say, "Michigan, the State which represents where America stands on busing, casts its 100 votes for President Richard Nixon". We can play off of positive points which we want to emphasize by feeding these one-liners to the various heads of the delegations.

I was intrigued with the fact that they did not have a large demonstration at the conclusion of Ribicoff's speech and prior to the seconding speeches. If we go with Rockefeller doing the nomination and then have a very small demonstration, gavel the convention back to order quickly, move on with the seconding speeches which will probably be done from the floor if it can be staged properly, then on to the vote, and end with the massive demonstration at the end of the evening, it may work more in our favor. This is something we're going to just have to debate and come in with a plan on.

I was surprised that McGovern did not go to the hall. I do not believe it would have been anti-climatic for him to have appeared last night and then again tonight. It would have seemed to me that they would have gone for the picture of him at the hall on the podium for today's papers (assuming they could have still made most of them) and then the picture of McGovern with the Vice Presidential nominee for tomorrow morning's papers. They may have been banking on use of his appearance in the lobby of the hotel. However, that does not appear in the Washington Post.

~~DRAFT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: LEN GARMENT

I was home administering true-false questions to Grace at 8:00 last night - she is taking her final exam in an Economics Course today so that she can earn a degree and start supporting me. Accordingly, I missed all the excitement in the lobby of the Doral. This morning I heard a variety of different reactions to it, then saw it on videotape and had these reactions:

1. It probably annoyed some people who felt the SDS loudmouths should have been thrown out of the lobby or, in any event, ignored by a Presidential candidate. But these are people who are lost to McGovern under any circumstances.
2. It almost certainly impressed a great many more people with McGovern's coolness; and this would include a lot of people who don't like what McGovern says and stands for, and are unlikely to vote for him under any circumstances.
3. The incident, in short, was one more piece in the mosaic of impressions and feelings that constitute the McGovern campaign so far and no doubt, to come. This particular impression - a tough, nervy and very cool "handler" of troublesome kids, ^P particularly because it happened in such an attention riveting setting - ^{it} struck me as a definite plus for McGovern.

¹
The rest of the evening must have been a big anti-climax; it was to me, and I didn't even see the lobby incident. Again, the only item of interest

was McGovern's ability to concentrate on a badly-timed hotel-room interview during the only useful speech of the evening (and one he obviously wanted to see) namely, the seconding speech by the wife of the POW.

That's the dominant impression of the Convention that persists: a cool, convinced man and a calm professional crew imposing a ^{surprising} ~~surprising~~ degree of order on a crazy-quilt new-type convention. (It reminds me of the sense of surprise I felt when I read the LIFE cover interview. There has rarely been a more skillful combination of talking, writing and editing to achieve a precisely-targeted effect.)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: BILL CARRUTHERS
MARK GOODE
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
July 12, 1972

Observations on the third session of the Democratic National Convention are:

1. Personal Exposure by McGovern: It was our feeling that McGovern's "impromptu" question and answer session in the hotel lobby was not effective. True, he showed himself again to be interested and a good listener; however, his responses were not strong, and the total effect did not inspire confidence.

It seemed almost incredible that he would allow a live television camera into his hotel room to photograph his reaction during the balloting.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from both of these incidents is that he and his people have decided to accept almost any exposure offered. These appearances can serve to dilute the impact of his acceptance speech tonight. McGovern is not a strong speaker. His primary media campaign has been centered around his being an interested listener, receptive to the "problems of the people." It is felt that he has been intentionally cast in this role due to his not being a dynamic speaker.

2. Spirit - The convention to date has reflected good discipline and greater unity than was expected. It has, however, lacked excitement. Tuesday night's session became a total bore. Last night's did not even reach a crescendo when the nomination became official - there was some show of enthusiasm, but no real excitement of the variety which becomes contagious to the television viewer.

It is essential that we create an overriding spirit of enthusiasm for Richard Nixon from the very outset of the convention. This spirit must build at each session and climax with his nomination. We must limit and carefully weigh each appearance he makes prior to his acceptance speech. The feeling of the President at work as President during the convention can be used to advantage.

3. Impressions: - The Democrats have thus far left a better impression on the viewing public than expected. They have generally been more business-like than many observers anticipated. It is incumbent upon us to leave an even stronger impression of efficiency and organization. Without sacrificing spirit, the key to our convention must be brevity. Let's get into Miami, do our business, and get out!

4. Roll Calls: - The traditional system of conducting roll calls in alphabetical order should be preserved. The strange, out of sequence system employed by the Democrats is confusing.

5. V. I. P. Hotel Interviews: - Experienced television people should be assigned to check out all set-ups for V. I. P. interviews in hotels. Those surrounding the Democratic convention have all been sub-standard.

6. Seconders: - We should hand-pick all individuals who will make seconding speeches, not just for variety of background, but for physical appearance. The first seconder for McGovern was outstanding ... an attractive, articulate, P. O. W. wife. Her appearance and delivery attracted the networks to stay on the seconder, rather than immediately cutting away for interviews or commentaries.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --

A) Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal, eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana, abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again, however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine this.

B) Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention, a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign. Since our strength is foreign policy in a world where there is a deep desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings, high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan argumentative campaign.

C) RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible. Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.

D) Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised address by the President, or V. P. stating the "differences" between the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual messages on the stump.

E) Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government vs. less Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)

F) Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all. The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences -- but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us. The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters in this election -- who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.

G) One thought. Why not have the V. P. candidate, assuming that it is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understands that what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs (we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class, many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.

(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by liberal bureaucrats.)

H) On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in hand. However, just some reminders:

1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto the serving board.

2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains." We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the general election of 1968 or of 1970 -- the flexibility to shift gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto another.

OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK

Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust" thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to move off their "tinkertoy proposals." They don't want their man to be in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of them fear that worse than the radical charge.)

Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack -- accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character assassination against the President of the United States -- and demand that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us on the issues, I don't see how --- if they are clearly and politely and consistently made -- we can lose this one.

Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning is essential; plans are worthless.

Buchanan