

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	8	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg.
16	8	7/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Bruce Kehrli To: Charles Colson RE: McGovern Defense Proposal. Includes attatched memorandum describing the McGovern Defense Proposal in depth. 5 pgs.
16	8	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Harry S. Dent To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo. 1 pg.
16	8	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Request of July 19. 5 pgs.

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16	8	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: John C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign Strategy. 8 pgs.
16	8	7/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Larry Higby To: John Whitaker RE: Camapaign Strategy. 1 pg.
16	8	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Update on Campaign Strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs.
16	8	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Dwight L. Chapin To: Larry Higby RE: July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy. 1 pg.
16	8	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: William Safire To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	8	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Bryce Harlow To: Larry Highby RE: Follow-Up on Campaign Strategy. 1 pg.
16	8	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Clark MacGregory To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Convention Questions. 2 pgs.
16	8	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: John Scali To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Election Strategy. 3 pgs.
16	8	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: William Carruthers To: H.R. Haldeman RE: The Republican National Convention. 3 pgs.
16	8	6/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Kenneth Cole To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Opinion on the President's posture and campaign strategy. 4 pgs.

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16	8	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: William E. Timmons To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your June 12th Memorandum. 3 pgs.
16	8	6/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Dwight L. Chapin To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1972 Campaign Memorandum. 10 pgs.
16	8	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Ronald L. Ziegler To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Views and Analyses Requested in Memorandum of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs.
16	8	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Your Memo of June 12. 5 pgs.
16	8	5/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

21 July 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM DOUG HALLET



RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July

I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention. From September 1 on there should be a mix of D. C. -based substantive activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day. On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September, three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on. Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be at least theoretically government-related -- and he would appear talking about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHUCK COLSON
FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI *BAK*
SUBJECT: McGovern Defense Proposal

It was requested that you review the attached and note the underlined portion on page 4.

Referring to the underlined section, it was noted that this should always be treated as a \$30 billion cut and we should be pointing out what a cut of this magnitude would do. This should be included in a brief, simple, hard-hitting analysis for use by our speakers.

Please follow up and submit a report on actions taken to the Office of the Staff Secretary by July 21.

cc: Henry Kissinger
Ron Ziegler
H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger /H

SUBJECT: The McGovern Defense Proposal

Senator McGovern's defense proposals may become a major issue in the coming campaign. This memo summarizes the Senator's proposals and evaluates their substance and professional quality.

The McGovern program was apparently designed to reach a predetermined budget total. It purports to support our current strategy and broad reductions in all forces categories are justified in an overly optimistic "best case" analysis of a relatively benign international environment. This is inconsistent with existing intelligence estimates and is highly unlikely because of a total neglect of Arms Limitations and other diplomatic initiatives.

Finally, because of faulty costing, we estimate budgetary savings would be about \$15-20 billion instead of the \$32 billion claimed.

Strategic Forces

Regardless of the outcome of arms limitation negotiations, the McGovern proposal would:

-- Reduce the strategic bomber force by over half and terminate the B-1 bomber modernization program.

-- Halt the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs at 200 and 112 missiles respectively instead of the 550 and 496 currently planned. (This alone would reduce our available strategic warheads by nearly 5000 -- a 50 percent cut in our planned capability in 1975.)

-- Terminate the ABM deployments. .

-- Delete hedge programs designed to guarantee the survivability of our deterrent against unexpected Soviet threats (Hard Site Defense research and bomber rebasing). Only Trident would be continued at a slower pace.

These severe cutbacks are justified by the Senator's belief that in the past, hedge programs have turned into "self fulfilling prophecies" and actually

caused the Soviets to deploy the threat they were designed to counter. He concludes that not planning these hedge programs will lead the Soviets to cut back their forces in the future.

Obviously, this is a weak assumption upon which to base our strategic planning. If the assumption does not materialize, the McGovern program would put us in an unstable and highly dangerous situation of strategic inferiority.

For example, the Senator indicates that if a Soviet threat to the survivability of our deterrent does emerge in the future, we could resort to actions such as launch on warning for the ICBMs and airborne alert for the bombers. The implications of these policies for crisis stability and cost are ignored.

Finally, the Senator's program does not provide the necessary flexibility to support our allies, and reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In fact, he seems to accept a concept of deterrence that is based on a minimum capability to destroy about 200 Soviet cities -- hardly a credible threat in today's situation of nuclear parity.

General Purpose Forces

The same simplistic approach is evident in the analysis of general purpose forces which recommend reducing:

- Both land forces and tactical air forces by 25 percent (four Army/Marine Corps divisions and ten Navy, Air Force and Marine wings)

- Naval ships by over 30 percent and aircraft carrier forces from 16 to 6. Only submarine force levels are preserved.

- Force deployments in NATO are cut by 170,000 men (over half) and 2-1/3 divisions. All troops on the Asian mainland are removed with two carriers continuously deployed in the Mediterranean and one in the Pacific.

- All large modernization programs except attack submarine procurement are terminated.

Despite these drastic force reductions, McGovern's overly optimistic analysis assumes no change in strategy. The unlikelihood of a simultaneous major conflict in Europe and Asia is acknowledged and a priority is given to the defense of NATO.

These general purpose force suggestions would:

-- Provide insufficient reinforcement capability for NATO, increasing the risk of a European conflict escalating to general nuclear warfare.

-- Provide insufficient reinforcement capability to support our Asian allies in both Korea and Southeast Asia unless we were willing to make severe reductions in those forces earmarked for use in NATO.

These weakened general purpose forces imply a heavier dependence upon nuclear weapons in both Europe and Asia -- an implication totally ignored by the Senator's analysis. In fact, these reductions approach a return to the massive retaliation strategy of the late 1950s. Such a strategy is simply not credible in today's situation of strategic nuclear parity.

Effects on our Allies

Diplomatically, the McGovern proposals would reverse much of the progress we have made over this past year and introduce a new and serious instability into the international situation.

In NATO, the removal of 2-1/3 divisions and 170,000 men in two years would cause serious havoc within the NATO alliance. Recent progress towards NATO force improvements and economic offset arrangements would be eradicated. Movement towards mutual balanced force reductions would be halted and tensions in central Europe and Berlin would probably increase. The political reactions of the European nations are predictable. They would quickly adjust their foreign and economic policies to improve relations with Eastern Europe at our expense.

In Asia, the total withdrawal of all troops in Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan would be carried out within two years. This abandonment of our allies in Southeast Asia and complete withdrawal of U. S. military power would have enormous consequences. Our emerging relationship with China would also be undermined and we must anticipate the possibility that the PRC would move to repair its relations with the Soviet Union. It would undoubtedly drive the Japanese both to rearm and to accommodate with the Soviet Union and the PRC.

Recent progress towards the reduction of tensions in Korea would unquestionably also be set back if ROK confidence were undermined by the removal of U. S. troops from South Korea. Neutralist countries throughout Asia (e. g., Indonesia) would fall increasingly under PRC influence.

The Soviets would interpret force reductions as a reduction in our willingness to defend our vital interests. This would almost certainly reduce the credibility of both our strategic and conventional deterrents and lead to an increase in Soviet military and diplomatic aggressiveness. Our resolve would very likely be tested just as it was in the 1961 Berlin crisis and in Cuba in 1962.

Finally, "dormant" nuclear powers such as India, Japan, and perhaps even Israel would feel less secure, increasing the likelihood of their making a decision to build nuclear weapons. Such proliferation would be a most destabilizing development and would increase the likelihood of a nuclear conflict.

McGovern Savings

Despite these unprecedented force reductions, the McGovern budget would not save the ~~\$32 billion~~ claimed. We believe his budget estimates are \$10-15 billion too low because:

-- The assumptions made about Vietnam spending are too high and thus too much budgetary credit is taken for ending the war.

-- The budget provides insufficient funds for training, command, supply, and other support functions. His analysis assumes these functions would absorb 22 percent of the budget in 1975 compared to 30 percent today. For smaller forces, the percentage of funds required for support would likely increase not decrease. Major base closures would be required to reach the McGovern objective, which would have serious economic implications.

A force posture costing about \$55 billion could, of course, be designed but only by making much deeper force cuts -- primarily in manpower (about 300,000 men). This would equate to a force posture of seven or eight Army Marine divisions or about half of today's forces, clearly insufficient to support our national security interests -- even based on McGovern's excessively optimistic analysis.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HS*

SUBJECT: Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo

I still agree with the basic suggestions contained in my June 16 memo. I add these post-convention suggestions:

- 1) A special organization to enlist blue collar workers similar to the proposed Democrats for Nixon organization.
- 2) Play up the snubbing of all the groups not given a quota at Miami--like farmers, blue collars, ethnics, senior citizens, veterans, et al. This can be done at our convention.
- 3) Establish McGovern's campaign emblem as the white flag-- pictures of him with the white flag behind his head.
- 4) Devise a PR program for Wallace people showing that RN got "the message." Voter ID programs and polls should reveal potential Wallace votes for us and how to get them.
- 5) Set up a realignment operation now to exploit switchover possibilities while the convention is fresh and as campaign heats up. This can be continued after the campaign to encourage and speed switching which should be good between now and 1976. The South is particularly ripe on this. If we don't program and plan on this, we won't reap our potential.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

Doug Hallett
~~CHARLES COLSON~~

SUBJECT:

Larry Higby's Request of July 19.

The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memorandum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half a joke.)

The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.

My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt, and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West, and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local, regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homosexuality, our more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our own efforts.

To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets, the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968. More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward, progressive and potential even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.

On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting rigorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues -- Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings, particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example, that is true.

There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary -- how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division, have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?

And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?

In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:

1. Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive duplication of effort, inter-office rivalry, competition, holding back of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
 - (a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's -- 1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson. Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners, funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving organizational and political effort and that can only be done from a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
 - (b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
 - (c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact, White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming, etc.
 - (d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -- perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that one guy.

- (e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and, in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P.R. activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
 - (f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation -- presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
 - (g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
 - (h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the President. Starting now, the President should have a series of afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think, because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the President should be locked in -- and something attached to the President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The same goes for everybody else.
 3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign, with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around with a sense of humor.

4. Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been around the President for more than one campaign.

I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

FROM:

John C. Whitaker



SUBJECT:

Campaign Strategy

This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the President might do from now through November, and Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.

First, there are a number of things that the President can do that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President. He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors (McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)

The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto messages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume, have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that, particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Democratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not

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sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements which we traditionally handle by a 2,000-word handout from Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might better be handled from now to November by the President himself making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.

At the Convention

I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best intelligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be, would probably be more photogenic than the business of the convention. Any interplay between the President and the demonstrators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because, even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound. Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least had the guts to talk to.

Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of

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his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence). I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p. m. EDT people are not off the Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unexpected visit to a separate location where a large, screened youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the President would join them. The point would be to have all under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly "playing President."

If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show, I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought -- if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announcement of the President's choice of a running mate until then? -- That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.

Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice President. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their

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being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the youth forum described above.

General Campaign Strategy

We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost -- and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists who don't buy this.

Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously. The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign without appearing to be doing so. Here is my list of don'ts:

- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
- Don't engage in any debates .
- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.

The press is vital. The President has won when the press was with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).

(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of accessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews with pundits would be good.

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(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe 2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national scribes don't come in loaded for bear.

(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis, Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warning. While the national press would have to be included in these, and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer questions from the more numerous regional reps should predominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick his way through personally. For example, we could cover the southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the New England impact should be worth the aggravation). -- Denver for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest. We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise these in the particular region. The first few we might get away with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance -- buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase the risks.

I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to substantive events. The motorcade can stop occasionally and, if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn.) This will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for rallies that he has used in past campaigns.

One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him. I remember the success of the President's early morning visit to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar "unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a.m. and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.

I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network representatives in a number of international capitols relaying live questions answered by the President here in Washington. This would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers, tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them." A "foreign heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize with the foreign heckler -- a good trap.

Pace of Campaign

Before the convention I think the President should schedule one major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be visible going about the serious business of Government. Right after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his return from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day, although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but because that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor done the same day.

As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more than one trip a week -- and always substantive. The only out-of-country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths of being President.

The First Family

I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.

Theme of Campaign

From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made an important start at restructuring international and domestic affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's?) "Come home, America." The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokesman for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in proposing basic governmental reform, in salvaging the American spirit from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

HIGH PRIORITY

July 19, 1972

EYES ONLY / ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN WHITAKER
FROM: L. HIGBY 
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Bob asked that you forward to him by Friday of this week any updated thoughts or analyses that you have regarding his memorandum to you on "Campaign Strategy" (attached) of June 12, 1972. There is no need to completely redo the memo, just update or alter any of the original thoughts you had in light of the Democratic National Convention.

He also asked that you do a separate memo forwarding your thoughts on the best use from a scheduling standpoint of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie during the period between now and the convention; and during the campaign period.

Attachmant

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT: Update on Campaign Strategy
(In light of the Democratic
Convention)

In addition to what was set forth in my earlier memo, I would argue that the only way we can lose the election is to foul up our own convention.

We must not make Miami Beach an armed camp.

We must tag those who want to embarrass and confront us as McGovern supporters.

It must be a Party convention simply re-nominating the President for re-election --- not a White House operation. The Convention must not disintegrate into youth vs. the President.

How do we accomplish this?

Let's have Republican senators (i.e. Scott, Brooke, Javits et al) take the Senate Floor and insist that McGovern, Eagleton (and the few avowed Democrat senators who support their ticket) ask their supporters to refrain from violence at Miami Beach.

MacGregor and/or Dole should lay down a firm line distinguishing protest from violence. In other words, the Party wants discussion but will allow no disorder.

We should see to it that a large number of our young people move among the demonstrators. A few thousand Billy Graham Dallas-Explo types committed to non-violence could dilute the critical mass of hot and frustrated militants.

The Party should organize a group of young Administration spokesmen as a "communications corps" to offer to talk to demonstrators or be near by any television situation. Young Administration officials and Republican office holders who have had experience handling young, explosive crowds can be sent out where needed to avoid dangerous confrontations and to show the television audience that this Administration does communicate and listen. The group should have the proper racial, ethnic, and sex balance as well as being able to withstand verbal and physical abuse.

Let's have other events at the Convention which show continuity and confidence in our system, and in our Party, like the President meeting with former Republican National Chairmen. This will appeal to a lot of organization Democrats who have been badly treated and points up the ignoring of the LBJ types so obvious at their convention.

One final thought: Let's not indulge in overkill to the point where McGovern becomes a sympathetic figure. We have enough good, substantive material on the issues without getting into personalities.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

2:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

DWIGHT L. CHAPIN



Regarding your July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy, any alterations I would make in my original remarks are minute. Therefore, I'll let my original memo stand as is.

Regarding a separate memo on the best scheduling use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia and Julie, Parker and I have a memo on the way to Bob. It covers the President plus the ladies and their husbands. That memo will be in to you tomorrow.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
RE: CONVENTION

I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets. That's not good -- will associate us with violence, inability to reduce dissent, etc.

Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup -- President and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights, they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.

Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's, and if it is no good, it loses the audience.

Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him accept that night, and do the President the next night?

This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional, but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first determine the Presidential nominee and have him select the running mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before the Convention, that reason is obviated.

Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night. Worth considering?

cc: Dick Moore

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW
SUBJECT: Follow-Up on Campaign
Strategy

I stand on my previous memo as amended in the two meetings I have just attended with HRH.

(I talked with Mr. Harlow this morning and he asked that I submit this comment.) CaR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972 -- 6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

CLARK MacGREGOR^{CM}

Q-1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

A. The President's posture from July 17th through August 18th should be precisely what it has been during the past five weeks. He should continue to perform as President, with only minimal public visibility as a candidate for re-election.

Q-2. (I will not here repeat the question.)

A. The President should continue his Presidential activities through Friday, ~~October 13th~~. He should not start campaigning until Saturday, October 14th*. From mid-October until Election Day the President should spend each Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday in Washington as President and should campaign each Friday through Monday. During the period October 14th-November 6th, the President should visit each of the top 15 or 16 electoral-vote states, plus a representative and easily accessible number of states with lesser electoral votes (marginal or "swing" states). The activities should be related where possible to events or situations associated with some aspect of his accomplishments as President - or to his hopes for the future.

Q-3. Any general thoughts ...

A. The President's outstanding record of accomplishment on key issues (peace, prosperity, performance) must be constantly emphasized, and the attack must be directed to taxes, welfare, and national security.

Q-4. (... opposition strategy ...)

A. The opposition strategy will be concentrated on domestic policy attacks and will seek to portray Richard Nixon as the Herbert Hoover

* except, of course, for one-shot opportunities for significant addresses such as Detroit on Labor Day.

of the '70's. We will hear a great deal about favoritism for the rich and the corporate giants, insensitivity to the concerns of the elderly and the poor. Every opportunity must be naturally developed to demonstrate the Nixon Administration's performance and plans for progress in aid of "the little man" and the disadvantaged. "The re-election of President Nixon" will guarantee a "fair shake" for every American.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN SCALI 
SUBJECT: Election Strategy

I am not an expert in this matter, but here are my thoughts for what they are worth:

1. President's Posture Between Conventions:

High-level, statesmanlike, tending to the business of running the government without appearing worried or nervous about whoever the Democratic nominee is, or what he is saying. Normal flow of appointments and movements, rather than any hyped-up schedule, but with emphasis on efforts to build a strong military defense for the nation. Vietnam peace negotiations if developments break our way, plus attacks against the cost of living, particularly food prices and unemployment. In the meantime, convention leaders, Governors, Senators and Party spokesmen would be building a platform, in sharp contrast to McGovern's positions, and pledging to work for the President who would continue to be above the battle.

2. After the Convention:

I would favor substantial campaigning with at least two trips to California, New York, Ohio, Michigan and Southern Wallace states if he chooses not to run. Kick-off time for the campaign could be about September 15.

3. Campaign Issues and Points of Attack:

If the candidate is McGovern, he would be extremely vulnerable on national defense, welfare money scheme, plus his incredible posture of begging the enemy or potential foes for mercy, either for release of prisoners or creating a utopian world where magically we could all live in peace. By sharp contrast, the President should bear down on how he has served the nation as a proven leader in the "real world", dealing with Moscow and Peking at the summit from a position of military strength, which is the only way to build a genuine peace instead of an illusion of harmony which betrays rather than serves the hopes of our people. I also suspect it would be possible to build a powerfully effective campaign issue on McGovern's half-baked ideas of welfare and tax reform to show that this threatens to destroy the free enterprise system which has been the springboard for our greatness.

4. Opposition Strategy and Points of Attack:

A. Nixon is an outdated political hack who favors the status quo because it helps his rich friends. He is an isolated, suspicious loner who fails to recognize the massive forces of change sweeping our land, demanding more jobs, a redistribution of wealth, and an end to the Nixon inflation. It is long past time to reduce insane military spending and devote the resources to rebuilding our cities and providing adequate medical and retirement care for all.

EYES ONLY

Mr. Haldeman

- 3 -

June 29, 1972

- B. Nixon is anti-Black, anti-poor, and an enemy of the laboring man, particularly the union member.
- C. The credibility gap that afflicts the Nixon Administration has widened into a chasm. The President relies on Madison Avenue public relations hucksters to hide the real truth from the American people as demonstrated by the Pentagon papers and the India-Pakistan documents. Actually he is a slippery politician who is seeking to make himself a "King" by disregarding Congress and relying on secret diplomacy and foreign deals which he hides from the American people.
- D. Vietnamization is a fraud, propped up by the most ruthless bombing in history, an act bordering on genocide. At best, he is substituting Asian bodies for American bodies. Meanwhile, Nixon has stubbornly resisted the act of statesmanship that would bring this insane war to an end - withdrawal and relying on Hanoi to free the American prisoners just as every foreign government has, once the shooting stops. Instead, Nixon clings to some fictitious "honor" and for four long years has been responsible for the death of tens of thousands of additional fine American boys, proving he lied when he said he had a peace plan.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

BILL CARRUTHER

From the first of July until the evening of the 22nd of August when the President is asked to appear at the Republican National Convention, in Miami, to accept his party's nomination, he should maintain his Presidential posture. In his role as a world leader performing the duties of the most complex and awesome office in the history of mankind, he is operating at a level that obscures the counter efforts of the Democratic candidate. He must maintain the tremendous momentum that he has created in the area of foreign affairs and focus on generating an equal momentum on the domestic side. In order to generate this "domestic momentum", I recommend that we create a series of substantive Presidential events in the key political states. The justification for these events must be to attend to the domestic needs of the people in these areas.

In the period between the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, the President should hold a series of domestic summits at the White House dealing with the key issues and they should be, obviously, widely publicized. Consequently, in his role as the President, he sets the stage for his domestic trips, which should begin shortly after the Labor Day weekend. The sooner we begin to publicize these domestic summits at the White House, the better.

If we create considerable media interest in the domestic summits, we will accomplish the two most important things:

1. We will increase the exposure of these summits between the conventions and, therefore, steal the lead from the Democrats.
2. We will provide credibility to the President's domestic trips following the Republican Convention.

I recommend that we create a media campaign around each of these domestic events. We should provide day-to-day media input to the television and radio stations and major newspapers in these areas each day leading up to, during and following the event. By creating our own regional network in each of these key political areas, we will totally dominate media coverage for a concentrated period of time. Our goal, of course, is to leave a lasting impression with the voter that Richard Nixon is responding to the domestic needs of the people at their level. These trips beginning in early September should continue through the month of October. Each of these major domestic events should be supported with side trips and human interest type drop bys.

The President should avoid attacking the opposition between the conventions. However, that does not prevent the other members of his political family from doing so.

The Democrats will dominate the media during the first two weeks in July. It will be most difficult to steal the spotlight from them, but we should try. One or two dynamic events or announcements could have a devastating effect on the Democrats; i. e., while the Democrats are fighting it out on the convention floor, Richard Nixon continues to implement his far-reaching and inventive foreign and domestic programs.

If we can gain this domestic momentum and maintain our foreign posture, we leave the Democrats with very little to talk about except themselves, and in that respect, no matter who their candidate is, there is no contest.

Our major area of concern is our lack of ability to communicate the President's interest in, and compassion for the people. Richard Nixon has approached the office of the Presidency with great dignity and formality and, in many cases, his Presidential posture has been misconstrued as being abstract, private and secretive. While these aspects of his personality create a certain intrigue around the office of the Presidency, we are being criticized for being out of touch with the people.

I feel that the November Group's media campaign and the Wolper documentaries will do a great deal to offset this thinking, but I also think that it is our responsibility to persuade the voters that Richard Nixon is not out of touch with the people and that he does care for each and every citizen and that he has great compassion for his fellow man.

In addition, whatever hostility the voters have toward their government, they translate it through the incumbent as opposed to the challenger. I believe that the main reason that Hubert Humphrey lost the California primary is because he was construed by the California voter as the incumbent and a representative of the establishment, while George McGovern was clearly cast as the voice of the people and the challenger.

I think the American public wants to get to know their President better and that we have the obligation to provide that contact.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: KEN COLE

This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which requested my views and analysis of the following points:

1. The President's posture between the Conventions.

Most people are "down" on politicians and political campaigning. The longer the President can stay above the battle, the better off he will be. The President should keep being "President" just as long as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.

During the Convention interlude, the President should be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him - follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the success of his economic program and his concern for the still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining legislation proposed by this Administration. This could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee members. In addition, the President could meet with supportive special interest groups.

Meetings such as these would allow the President the opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic legislation and to articulate the principles which support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,

if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the President is trying to correct and how his solution would work. For instance, on the environmental issue, we could encourage the networks and local TV stations to get film of water pollution which could be utilized in their reports of the President's meeting with Congressional representatives to encourage them to pass his water pollution legislation.

Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy and the balance of international power. He needs to re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he's for and against domestically. It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis, but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.

2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to the Election.

Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress is in session will have some bearing on what the President is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President should continue the scenario outlined for the between Conventions period. If it is not in session, then we must find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a problem to go on because of their failure to pass the legislation the President recommended. These trips should be "non-political".

In either event, the President should not start political campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October. If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be stretched to include one trip during the week, although I think it is important to convey the image of the President being in Washington "running the country" while others are out campaigning.

such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.

The President should stay above all of this. He should be on the offensive with issues like peace, the economy and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared, in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposition for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long as the President is not making them. Presidential spokesmen will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than will the President.

We should have our own plan as to how to win this election, and the development of the plan should assume that the worst charges possible are made against the President. We should then operate against this plan, and never, once, deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some false charges, the President should not be rushing out to respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a surrogate handle it.

My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the people of this country desire most a President who is strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit, Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong action to bring the economy back in line is becoming increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything the President does between now and the election must be geared to contribute to this image.

The President's efforts should be concentrated in key states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but he might make some regional visits which would include states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states. He should do events which provide for some kind of encounter with the "average man". Generally these should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging the panel.

3. Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

The President should not attack anyone for anything during the campaign. This should be left to the surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman who has brought peace to the world and economic stability to our country. And, who has applied and intends to continue to apply these same visionary attributes to our domestic problems. The President should articulate only positive things relative to key issue areas and key interest groups.

The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention. What they should be attacking will, of course, be dependent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the candidate is there are two things which we can challenge regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the second is the inability of the Federal Government to produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment, even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.

4. The opposition's strategy and what we can do.

The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and his lack of concern for the average man. They will have absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food prices and high unemployment - and other people issues

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS *BT*
SUBJECT: Your June 12th Memorandum

1. I believe the President's posture between the Conventions should be non-political, statesmanlike, our national leader. However, the President can use those six weeks to set the stage for election issues by taking positions which the public approves, but which contrast with the opposition. He should consider built-in appearances before national conventions and regularly scheduled meetings (Jaycees, Older Americans, Spanish-Speaking, etc.) where he can appear as President, not candidate.

For example, if busing is a campaign issue, the President might meet with school superintendents, hold legislative sessions on his busing proposals, submit a Constitutional Amendment, engage in discussions with parents and students who suffer under excessive busing, etc. In this way, in his proper role as President, the Chief Executive would be building on an issue to exploit in the campaign. The same could be applied to POWs, Vietnam, defense spending, drugs, amnesty, 6th Fleet-Israel, or other issues which may be politically attractive.

Since his opponent will come from Congress, the post DNC Convention period should see implied criticism of the Democratic controlled Senate for not acting on the President's substantial legislative recommendations. Making Congress a whipping boy is always difficult but it will at least highlight the President's initiatives.

Cabinet officers, Congressmen, Governors and other surrogates should use this time to attack the opposition: its candidates, record and platform.

Since Party behavior is the first test of voters, one of the most important activities would be the President's personal and private involvement in getting Democrats to switch parties after McGovern is nominated. I believe there is a possibility in this area and the President could negate the party issue substantially.

EYES ONLY

2. The President, I feel, should hold back from overt political action until early in October, staying above the partisan fights. Then I recommend an aggressive, concentrated campaign for the final weeks.

Earlier, the President will have developed issues and the Surrogates battered the opposition, leaving the President free to revitalize the campaign and deliver the "knock-out" in the closing days.

I think the President should schedule a number of regional addresses, rallies, parades, news conferences, telethons, etc. in major cities like New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, Seattle. Additionally, he should concentrate his time in the target states, planning at least two appearances in each. The "quickie" swings of 1970, stopping in three or four states in one day, provide a good format for a short campaign. Each event should be built around the key campaign issues as they develop to more dramatically focus attention on the President's positions. The President should resist personal attacks on his opponent.

3. Until the Democratic Convention and its platform, specific issues are difficult to guess. Obviously, the Vietnam War will be an issue, taxes, busing, jobs, cost of living, etc. George McGovern has a record in Congress he must defend as well as his positions during the campaign. Careful research will develop his weak points. I think over-all he should be projected as an extreme radical whose wild ideas would destroy the country. With this general strategy every issue can be tailored to make the point. (McGovern is already in trouble over his welfare-taxes proposal and has been backtracking on defense spending.)

4. "Right from the Start" McGovern is considered a one-issue candidate who created a good grass-roots organization to deliver delegates. Should Vietnam be removed as an issue, McGovern would appeal only to a few and certainly not the middle-road. At any rate, we can look forward to the war issue and must publicize the President as the one who is getting us out honorably and most important will never turn his back on our POWs.

EYES ONLY

-3-

I suspect the Democrats are sitting on several potential scandals (like ITT) in the government and will try to show the Administration as corrupt, handling favors, pro-big business, etc. Unemployment and food prices surely will be Democratic issues. The opposition is certain to attempt to use the "trust" issue in an effort to show a credibility gap.

The best defense is a good offense, and several attractive issues should be constantly repeated to drive points home. For example, the surrogates can talk about the President's handling of his job, experience, ability etc.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Memoranda

In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.

It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in. Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda and give you my conclusions.

One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like this for you, I probably should not be requested to do a memorandum of my own on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.

Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing. But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move ahead - not that they are not already there!

BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's "Fort Knox" is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount national concerns.

BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds. The President should not act so Presidential so as to be out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.

A. BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS

1. The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and should continue the same through the Convention period. The general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloofness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the country; increase the number of official meetings – Cabinet, Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. – all which show the President working against the problems of the people.
2. With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to pressure for legislation should be highly visible. The greatest amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive aspects of his foreign policy – however, this should not only be done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT, etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our advantage.
3. When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin. The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform) should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as to justify the equal time.

B. PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS

1. The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously, we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so dictate.
2. Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends - Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible, always return to the White House over night.
3. Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern, at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard attack. (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation. Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head it?)
4. During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what is wrong with McGovern.
5. Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses. We might see if a five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one

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of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.

7. The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum – advance it a notch – and everything falls into place. Our tempo is firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running – but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)
8. The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory. Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish community and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will have to move to a plan on this.
9. Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed to make the evening news versus evening-type events. A key question here is at what point do we saturate and become overexposed? The other question would be at what point does McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown is McGovern helped?
10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get into key locations.

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C. GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND POINTS OF ATTACK

1. Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make our charge about the "McGovern Market."
2. I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes, "How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3. I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend. As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation, as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4. Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists, and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat to our constituency than they do presently.

5. Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.

6. Virtually everyone is on ^{to} the "credibility or trust" attack which is expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility. We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out front a President and an Administration that has done everything possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on, we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising, other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the President's credibility.

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SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS

1. **Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance. The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.**

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION _____

MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION _____

HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM _____

PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM _____

2. **The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.**

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN _____

SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN _____

3. **Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he is for and against domestically." He states a little later, "...he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our domestic philosophy is at this time.**

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

4. It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.

CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER _____

DROP IDEA _____

OTHER _____

5. Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some food chain retailers.

HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS _____

DROP _____

6. Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

CHECK MITCHELL FIRST _____

7. Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it under control?

COMMENT: _____

8. Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this - examples or techniques of how he would go about it.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

9. Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put this together? Under Colson?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____
 COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL _____
 COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ _____
 DROP IT _____

10. Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price, suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.

YES _____ NO _____ OTHER _____

11. Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently on that memorandum.

YES _____ NO _____

12. Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders, abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start cranking into their talks.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

13. In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually the credibility of the President?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS _____

HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS _____

4.

14. Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates. Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic Convention.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT _____

BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE _____

OTHER _____

15. Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".

Should Colson go ahead with this?:

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY _____

OTHER _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: RONALD L. ZIEGLER *RZ*
SUBJECT: Views and Analyses requested in memorandum
of June 12, 1972

There probably is no one who would not say the President should best campaign by being President; that the most effective candidate posture is the Presidential posture. That is not so much a recommendation as it is fact.

The posture exists because it is his posture. It is present because of his accomplishments as a statesman both in his widely approved foreign initiatives and in the less appreciated domestic initiatives.

That posture cannot be split in two. The campaign is what the President wants to do for the nation and the world. So there cannot be candidate actions and Presidential actions, or a Presidential period and a campaign period. He cannot be two people or approach events or actions into two kinds.

So we can direct our attention not to what the President should be, but what opposition strategies will be used in an attempt to diminish what he is. These fall into two areas:

1. Tactics to describe statesmanship as aloofness.
2. Approaches which will grant foreign affairs accomplishments but suggest this has been a preoccupation to the expense of domestic needs.

Taking the Offense

Both strategies should be approached by undercutting them rather than by responding to a series of charges and by taking steps to do so at once rather than waiting for the attack to surface.

1. The charge of detachment from concerns of the electorate cannot be allowed to set in; we must not lose the ability of people to relate comfortably to the man in the office. It is important that he be seen not as someone seeking power -- he already has the power others are seeking -- but that it be understood this power is being used well.
2. We cannot run the risk that people won't know our domestic achievements in the economy, health, nutrition, education, and the other areas of expansion and improvement. These must be demonstrated and greater focus placed on them, and on the unwillingness of Congress to act on many of his initiatives.

And all of this must be done from a position of self confidence and in such a way as to convey our positive posture.

The Advocate's Role

Attention to our positions needs to be drawn not just through travel but through the President's words. What he says in forums about the nation's problems and our solutions will demonstrate action and initiative (focus on) and his words will have to be reported and those reports, coming from periodical press conferences, meetings, appearances, receptions, will get people talking about what he has to say. As the President is an advocate of his programs, his spokesmen and surrogates will gain increasing attention and copy.

In facing a Democrat attempt to portray the Presidency as unconcerned or aloof, Congressional leaders can be called in with greater frequency so that the President can be noted and quoted on what he has put forth.

Receptions for an increased variety of publics and groups can give an opportunity for him to tell them directly his concerns, and again be quoted.

A Cumulative Effect

These need not always be page one or the television lead; they will have a cumulative effect which will force the press to report the actions he has taken and the inaction of Congress in responding in many cases. The forcing of attention should begin now, before Congress adjourns and before activities can be colored as part of the campaign.

None of this suggests that we should not organize ourselves and our statements to achieve news leads nor that activities should not be planned and organized. But they must not appear to be part of a campaign nor an attempt to gain time or space. Presidential activity is not candidate campaigning. (On this point also, it would be helpful for the party-rally and fund-raising kind of events to be started as late as possible.)

Focus on Activism

Without discussion, for the moment, of press bias, we should be aware that the press, seeing the President in his activities, observing -- not necessarily questioning -- him will force them to focus the activism and concern taking place. We should be led to conclusions rather than being presented with them, note what we are doing rather than hear what we say we are doing, hear the President put forth his views instead of others putting them forth on his behalf.

Drawing attention to the Presidential force behind positions and people should not lead to a process of cluttering the President's schedule; periods of 3 - 4 hours, twice a week, begun soon can accomplish this.

Painting the White House Grey

Another strategy which should be undercut is one which the opposition will use to paint the White House a shady grey.

Every appearance of conflict of interest, favoritism or misconduct will be seized upon. Because opponents will have so little to grab onto in foreign policy and domestic activity, and because there is an attitude on the part of much of the press that we are the guys in black hats, it will be extremely difficult to disassociate the President from clumsiness or failures in any of the lower forms of campaign techniques which perhaps must be used.

We should reassess our whole approach to the campaign apparatus in this light.

Do we have adequate controls and checks to prevent blotches from occurring?

Should we have in the White House and EOB the political activists who work with special interest groups or should some of these be transferred to 1701?

I am not advocating these, but I do advocate rigorous examination of these kinds of questions in light of what we can lose through inuendo and guilt by association.

We have been faced with this time and time again, being brought down from a high crest achieved through hard work and true leadership, because of clumsy efforts on matters of secondary importance. I don't know how it happens; only that it must not.

Avoiding Clumsiness

I am not worried about the President's posture and am not presumptuous enough to say what it is or should be. But I am concerned that as an organization, including the campaign structure, we clearly be seen as positive and aggressive, and not as negative or deceptive.

The most counter-productive activities we could undertake are those which would give the Democrats another ITT, or to have them uncover some kind of GOP intelligence operation in their convention as the nation watches.

This is not to say we should be overcautious or that we shouldn't be aggressive and tough. But there are some kinds of activities in which only minimal skill has been shown. Worse, there has been a particularly acute ineptness which invariably leads to linking these activities to the Presidency.

Note on Convention Period

As for the President's activities during the Democratic convention, it should be business as usual, not especially active, but not hibernating; not pre-occupied by what's happening at Miami, but at least mildly interested in the outcome.

About the Press

On the matter of press, my experience as Press Secretary over three years of day-in and day-out dealings with the press corps gives me little doubt that on the whole the press is philosophically untuned to us, biased in their copy and approaches, and often better to work around than through.

Our success in dealing with the press has come from keeping them off balance, proving them wrong when they are, and not permitting them to feel we are on the defensive. There should be no lack of understanding of their motives or attitudes. We have not changed their views entirely nor their methods of operating at all; but they have been kept on the defensive and we have maintained a working relationship.

Righting Wrongs

They should continue to be called when they are wrong. Prompt, fact-filled, firm responses should continue to follow every distortion. The process should be improved in view of the fast-firing developments of campaigns, and our response should not be scattered or fractionalized as has been the case too often in the past. We dilute the effect of our response to media mistakes and distortions when media get called one day by a Scali, next day a Colson, then a Ziegler, Clawson, Snyder, Klein, Shumway and virtually anybody else.

The responses should be sharpened so that the Press Secretary can deal with distortions or omissions concerning the President in the most effective way; the Director of Communications can do so for the Administration.

I am not saying that Dole or Mitchell cannot make a point now and then; I am describing what the White House posture should be for maximum results.

Avoiding Uptightness

The scattered approach suggests to the media an uptight, overly sensitive image which is contrary to the posture of confidence required; thus we find ourselves dealing from a position of weakness rather than strength in these situations. The President is known as a man who understands the press and the realities of the media. He is not affected by their bias -- is more interested in doing a good job. This is what they say and know. That is what will affect the election.

Just as we should give the Democrats no advantage, we should not give an advantage to a press corps which is largely sympathetic to it. We could easily solidify the situation if we were to take on an overt attack on the press as a whole.

Discussing this, there seems to be broad agreement to the above point. Yet a consensus is developing among the press that discrediting the American press is a pillar of our campaign effort. It creates the thought that we are uptight about them and that we can talk about only the press and not the issues. Key advisors often focus more on press than on accomplishments of the President.

This approach would make us look anything but confident; frightened instead of bold; reluctant to be observed rather than proud of demonstrating what we are doing and have done.

We would divert energies which should be used against the opponent rather than against those writing about him. We should be aware of press failings -- weakness, vanity, selfishness, the herd instinct -- but should use these to our advantage rather than simply denouncing them. Any appearance of an organized overt anti-press campaign would help strengthen the press bias, portray ourselves poorly and draw energies off into secondary battles at the expense of the primary objective.

It would invite the press to throw off caution and give the justification it now lacks for being self-righteous.

The media now expect an offensive of this kind; we would appear weak to give it to them.

Who Loves Whom?

If McGovern is the Democratic candidate, I am not at all convinced that the bulk of the press will have a love-feast with him. Should this prove to be wrong, we will have to reassess our position and approach. But it is entirely possible that much of the press will not be smitten and we should be open to that possibility in our thinking and strategy.

SUMMARY

Summing up, we move in an atmosphere of confidence and power to dramatize real accomplishments by drawing attention to Presidential action in such a way as to undercut opposition strategies without appearing artificial

or campaign-oriented. The spotlight on what the President does and says should not be pulled away from him and his accomplishment -- onto clumsiness or appearances which permit the opposition and a largely unsympathetic press to portray whatever characteristics would be least useful to us and least attractive to voters.

Attitude toward the press should reflect the President's own concern on getting the job done rather than what's being said by media. To do otherwise would place those around him and therefore the Presidency itself in a defensive overly sensitive position. Press weaknesses are more to be used than labelled and press distortions should be responded to in a precise and effective manner. Presumptions of widespread press affection for the opposition candidate may be premature.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 12.

In response to your memo of June 12 regarding the campaign strategy, I think you already have my thinking on most of the points you have asked about. You probably have ~~an~~^{had} nauseam in some areas like aid to parochial schools.

Without asking you to go back and look at all my old memos I have written, I am enclosing for your quick perusal my memo of May 17 on "Issue Management". There is nothing issue-wise that I feel any different about nor to my knowledge have we made much progress since May 17. Just ticking through the items in that memo:

1. We have made a little start on the tax issue.
2. We have done nothing separating ourselves from the bureaucracy or attacking the bureaucracy.
3. On busing, we have got to do much better and have an opportunity to begin when the President blasts the higher education bill while signing it.
4. The inflation/food price issue I talked about yesterday. I feel it is coming on us very hard and very fast and I believe we should be prepared with the necessary contingency plans *quick!*
5. Welfare. The President has indicated that he likes the idea of implementing the Talmadge Amendments with a lot of fan-fare which is basically what I had proposed in this memo, but there will be a lot of bloodshed because the faint hearts will fight this to the death.

6. No Fault. This one happily we have done and in fact without much involvement of any of the President's time. We got a good bit of mileage out of it and for once our mechanism produced something.
7. Catholic Schools. Maybe we are coming to grips with this. I will believe it when it happens.
8. Social Security. In my memo of May 17, I said we are "treading water". I said it again yesterday. We are.

In response to the other questions that you raised in your June 12 memo I don't think it is necessary for the President to be travelling between the Conventions. Indeed, I would rather see him remain here while the Congress is here. Perhaps he could do one or two highly visible domestic events; for example, call in the food chain retailers and lay them out in lavender. Perhaps we will have an opportunity for a highly visible veto, but I think we can use that period of time also to rail against the Congress for its inability to deal with major national problems.

I still don't feel that the Jaycees or Rotary type appearances are good. I believe there is more to gain by keeping the President on the pedestal he is on, a little bit aloof and non-political, dealing with the great issues of our time. I disagree strongly with Hallett's point about a foreign trip. There is no way that we can top the last two and it would be transparently political. In short, let's keep the President tending to his knitting. But the most important point in my mind is that he be prepared to move in swiftly, firmly and very decisively to capitalize on any domestic issues that can either be turned into an asset or as to which we can block a negative. Food prices and busing are two that are in this category. If the Congress won't act on the moratorium as apparently they are not, let's take every opportunity between the Conventions to bang them hard. Let's be prepared to do something very dramatic on the food price front. We may have to go way beyond jawboning or attacking the food chains. We may have to have an Executive Order ready to issue to nail this very hard.

I very much like the idea of the President being in California for the first two weeks of July. In fact, there would be nothing wrong with him being there the first three weeks in July. We have no problem with the public thinking that the President spends all of his time relaxing. To the contrary, I think there was even a ripple of concern in the country that he was pushing himself too hard during the Soviet trip.

In any political campaign the most critical strategy call is momentum and timing. July is a month for us to be locking up all of our positions on the issues, exploiting constituency groups, having the President come forward strong and hard on critical domestic issues, but at the same time letting him get some rest, do some thinking and not be moving at a very rapid pace.

I think you know exactly what I believe the opposition strategy will be. They will hit us on the following issues:

1. We are in bed with big business and don't give a damn about the little guy. Off of this they play ITT, a \$10 million secret slush fund, vetoing of Social Security, etc.
2. Ineffectiveness on the domestic front, the President doesn't care about domestic issues and we have no domestic program.
3. The economy is in trouble, prices are rising, people are out of work.

As to these, I have no concern except over point one. That goes to the trust-confidence-credibility factor which maybe one of the most important things that the public uses to measure candidates. Here we have some real work to do.

You said yesterday that everyone was saying that we should worry about complacency. Obviously that is so, but in my mind it is a very serious problem. It is infectious organizationally, it does have an impact on voter turnout, but the worst thing it does is to permit people to throw away their votes. By this I mean the Democrats who might otherwise be frightened to have McGovern in the White House feel they can go to the polls and still cast a straight Democratic ticket because there is no chance of him being elected. This phenomenon was very evident in the Goldwater campaign. Many of my Republican friends said, "I can cast a vote for Goldwater because I know he can't be elected but if I thought my vote made a difference, I would be scared to vote for him!" That is also why Goldwater did better than the polls showed he would do. In my opinion, we have to contrive adverse polls if necessary to let the American people know this is a real test and we have to cleverly find a way to scare hell out of them at the prospect of a McGovern Presidency.

One thing we must do is to store up a whole slue of goodies that we can come out with in September and October. I have been mentioning this in every memo I have written during the past year and have yet to see any evidence that we are doing this. Shipyard contracts, parks to the people, Executive Orders, etc. etc. With a little imagination a program for this is not hard to develop. It does not need the involvement of the President unless we want him to but it gives a steady flow of government activities that have a positive impact on the people. I would like to see us have at least one a day in September and October.

You also know my thoughts on the campaign issue. Assuming it is McGovern and that our strength remains as it is or even close to what it is today, we need a real hatchet operation going on McGovern full time, but far removed from the President. Democrats for Nixon could carry the load. The President himself should go on doing those things which as President put him before the American people, visibly dealing with issues that are of concern to the American people. In short, we want to slide into the campaign period by just doing more of the kind of things that we have been doing. I agree with Hallett that we should only have a few partisan rally type appearances in October.

Lou Harris made a very interesting point this week suggesting that the President meet the domestic issue head on, saying in effect that we have not made as much progress on the domestic front as we would like (this kind of humility would help our credibility enormously), that the President had to deal in the first four years with the most pressing problem which confronted this nation, the search for peace and the strength of America's position in the world, etc. He would then say that he is happy to let the American people judge his Administration on his record in foreign affairs, ending Vietnam, SALT, China, etc. Now that we have made such enormous progress in the foreign field, which programs will continue (SALT continuation etc.) that we are going to turn this energy, imagination, drive, etc. to solving the nation's most critical domestic problems, making government more responsive, lowering the cost of government, straightening out welfare, etc. etc. It is an interesting point because it is disarming and readily acknowledges we have not done everything in the domestic field that we want to. It suggests that the President's enormous skill in foreign affairs, which is well and firmly established in the public's mind, is transferable to handling the domestic issue and it somewhat co-opts the enemy's attack line. It also holds out the promise of things to be done because as Harris points out, people are much less concerned with what has happened in the last four years than what they think will happen to them over the next four years. Hence they are more concerned, even in the

case of an incumbent, with what he hopes to do during the next term than what he did do in the first term. This also keeps us from being put on the defensive.

One other point worth mentioning: Dick Scammon believes the public mood is just right for the kind of speech that Prime Minister McMillan gave in 1959 in the closing days of his campaign which according to Scammon ~~was~~ one which moved the British people and according to Scammon was one of the most brilliant political speeches ever. I haven't reviewed it although I have asked for it. The thrust of it was, interestingly enough, somewhat similar to Harris' point. In effect, "I have shown you what I can do, put your faith in me. Here are the things we need now to do together and you can trust me to do them." It was calming, soothing, low-key. It inspired trust and it suggested that the strong points that McMillan had demonstrated could be used to solve the problems of the British people, which he, McMillan, readily identified -- as I say, somewhat similar to the Harris point.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *W*
SUBJECT: Issue Management

The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having someone, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to the issues we need to pursue, how we are going to pursue them and then let the troops execute.

One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image. The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line" of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum; it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in handling the tough issues.

The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on the substantive follow-through we need.

A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment with government -- i. e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:

1. We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our pension program which we have totally neglected) then we might be able to slide away from the big business label somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible association with big business or establishment-type events should be considered for the President.
2. There is no way politically that we can defend the present tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins" and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million homeowners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.

Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient, inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the most regressive and onerous of all.

We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlichman got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps, the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President. The President should adopt the recommendation that property taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the President can direct a simplification of tax forms and procedures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essential underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in 1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of four or five key elements of the tax package that we will propose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the President should have been seen visibly involved in managing a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach. In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts, Treasury officials, etc. etc.

What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year (and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground out from under the demagogic arguments of McGovern and Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting defensively through the months of September and October.

3. Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put some day light between the President and the bureaucracy. We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect platform to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster, the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things management-wise; now it is time to do a few demagogic things which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the people.

B. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.

In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute, then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we

have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing plans can be undone.

Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly understood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing, but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday, which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).

- C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless. People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price of Ford Pintos by \$30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity that people buy every day -- food. Food prices have been rising so long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we can hope for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand, if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action, perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a significant political upheaval building in the country over this one issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import quotas).

All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either

going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the opponent.

In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that we can do anything about).

- D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger insofar as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem. The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards, (a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric if it were done under the proper circumstances in September. The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot programs in New York and California as we have done to curb excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how we can if we want to.
- E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional substantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive initiatives in this area.

P. R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned -- a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.

- F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will be decided by the over \$15,000 a year, upper middle-class, white suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good, rather appealing little package that could be used especially with certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for exploitation of the good record we have made.
- G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particularly in those states where it has either come into effect or has been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we really have no position.

Key Voter Blocs

In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should come to some subjective consensus.

I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the

self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class, Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal. For example:

1. We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7 or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2. We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas where it too can be a cutting issue.
3. Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous political dividends.

The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security

benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of H. R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property tax issue is also big with the old folks. We are badly treading water in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.

In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics (including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking -- we are doing well in this area) these two blocs could be decisive.

As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day in September and October -- things like maritime contracts, parks being returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc. Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation, and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to remind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the other side can do is promise.