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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FREDERIC V. MALIK 

SUBJECT: Critique of the 1972 Campaign

The attached report is an overview of the 1972 campaign. It is divided into several sections, reflecting the chronological development of the campaign:

1. Basic Assumptions at the Start - the assumptions which set the direction of the campaign strategy.
2. Early Strategy - the concepts incorporated in the initial planning phase, beginning in May, 1971.
3. Conduct of the Campaign - I: The Primaries - earliest application of the planned campaign programs.
4. Conduct of the Campaign - II: Between the Primaries and Labor Day - critique of program activities during the summer lead-time before the active campaigning began.
5. Conduct of the Campaign - III: After Labor Day - description and critique of the implementation of campaign programs during the final two months of the campaign.
6. Overall Review - general comments on the conduct of the campaign.

Attachment

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CRITIQUE OF THE 1972 CAMPAIGN

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AT THE START

The Re-election Committee began in May of 1971. With the nomination assumed not to be in doubt, there was a unique opportunity to plan carefully for the general campaign and begin early on long lead time programs. During the next six months, basic plans and budgets were developed for all major program areas. Program directors were added to the Committee staff as their activities became operational.

The early concepts of the campaign were based on four assumptions:

1. The election would be close, with less than 4% separating the top two candidates. Both of President Nixon's prior national campaigns had been very close. The polls showed leading Democratic hopefuls within striking distance. Governor Wallace's plans were uncertain. Finally, the President was seen as a partisan leader of a minority party, particularly after the 1970 Congressional elections.

2. There were some fundamental shifts occurring in the attitudes of the electorate. Certain elements of the New Deal coalition were showing signs of reduced support for the national Democratic Party. In particular, southern whites, blue-collar urban ethnics and Jews had the greatest potential to increase their vote for the President in 1972.

3. The President was well-known by all segments of the electorate. Unlike almost all of the Democratic hopefuls, with the possible exception of Kennedy and Humphrey, he faced the problem of avoiding over-exposure to the public as a candidate in a long campaign.

4. The greatest campaign asset to the President was his incumbency.

EARLY STRATEGY

From the basic assumptions, several strategic decisions were made on key elements for the campaign.

Comprehensive System of Voter Contact. In 1968, the President used television extensively to gain voter support. In 1972, because of his high visibility and familiarity to the electorate, other means had to be found to take his campaign to the people. The decision was made to develop a system of individual voter contact more sophisticated than had ever been used in previous national campaigns. Door to door canvassing, telephone canvassing and targeted direct mail would be carried out on a large scale in the key states. They

would all be coordinated by the use of one common list of registered voters on a computerized data bank. In target areas, selected households, whose demographic characteristics were included in the data bank, would receive persuasive, issue-oriented direct mail in late September. They would also be telephoned or visited door-to-door in September or October. If they were favorable to the President, that information would be transmitted back to the computer center. At the end of the campaign, all favorable voters would receive a get-out-the-vote telegram-letter to augment the turnout activities in the field. It was intended particularly to target and identify Democrats who supported the President. In the remaining states, computer lists and telephone centers were not provided from Washington. They relied more heavily on door-to-door canvassing, using local lists, augmented by more informal telephone centers, where they were established. In all states, the strategy was to identify favorable supporters, rather than to persuade undecided voters by personal contact.

Surrogate Program. The surrogate speaker program was developed as another means of reaching the voters while controlling the exposure of the candidate. Thirty-five public figures, including Cabinet Officers, Senators, Congressmen, Governors, one Mayor and members of the White House Staff, were brought into the program. Schedules of speaking events would be developed so as to give appropriate coverage to media markets of key states over the duration of the campaign. The speakers would be advanced by the Tour Office and provided with speech materials by several sources in the Committee and the White House. As the campaign progressed, these surrogates proved to be effective in presenting the President's record and in attacking McGovern. They received wide media coverage, thus allowing the President to remain above the day-to-day campaign. McGovern made the mistake of taking on the surrogates, further reinforcing his image as a second-level political figure. Later in the campaign, a women's surrogate program, involving Cabinet and White House wives and high women appointees would be implemented to augment the program described above.

Voter Bloc Programs. Because of the potential loosening of the New Deal coalition, special attention was given to several segments of the voting population which have historically supported Democratic candidates. In addition, for the first time young voters represented a new force in the electorate, and were widely believed to be strongly in the Democratic camp. Some normally Republican groups were also deemed to merit special attention, particularly older voters and farmers.

Ultimately, organizations were established to focus on the following demographic voter groups:

Agriculture
Black
Elderly
Jewish
Nationalities
Spanish-Speaking
Youth

At the same time, several groups were formed to focus on specific occupational groups such as lawyers and educators.

The purpose of the voter blocs was two-fold:

a. Persuasion: to focus attention on segments of voters with common characteristics and to gain support for the President from those voters on the basis of their identity with a given group.

b. Provision of Volunteers: to draw on the membership of the voter groups for volunteers to work in organizational activities such as canvassing and "Get-Out-The-Vote".

Advertising. It was decided at the outset to form an in-house advertising group, rather than to use an outside agency. This strategy had several objectives:

- To assure that all persons involved in developing the advertising were loyal to the candidate.
- To assure that the key persons involved did not have conflicting obligations to commercial accounts which would limit their time available for the campaign.
- To bring together the best talent available to focus on the Presidential campaign.
- To reduce the cost of advertising.

The advertising campaign would be designed to:

- Emphasize the competence and incumbency of the President.
- Raise doubts about the competence of McGovern and the soundness of his policies.
- Legitimize, in the minds of the Democrats, the idea of voting for a Republican President. During the campaign, this was done through the vehicle of Democrats for Nixon.

Polling and Demographics. A comprehensive plan for polling was developed to give a continuing evaluation of the state of mind of the electorate throughout the campaign. Polls were to be taken in key states, as well as nationally. The first survey would go to the field in January, before the primaries; the second in June, between the California Primary and the Democratic Convention; and the third immediately after Labor Day. Finally, daily telephone polls were scheduled from September 25 through October 30. In the early development of campaign strategy, the polls were instrumental in identifying the target states. As the campaign unfolded in September and October, they were useful in decision-making on allocation of resources among the states, particularly speakers, media and funds. Throughout, they served to identify the important issues and show how the voters perceived the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. In particular, they gave tangible data to evaluate potential points of vulnerability for both attack and defense.

During the campaign, demographic data was combined with polling information to a greater degree than ever before. Several new demographic tools were available:

- ° The 1970 Census data. Not since 1952 had a Presidential Campaign been conducted so soon after completion of a census, when the information on social characteristics was so current. With the high mobility of the American population, such demographic data rapidly depreciates in value. The 1960 Census, for example, was becoming obsolete by 1964.
- ° Large-capacity computers and sophisticated techniques in direct mail targeting. Mailing lists are now correlated to demographic characteristics within Census tracts. For example, if Mr. Jones lives in a Census tract whose median housing value is \$35,000, he is considered to be of that income group. Other factors, such as number, type and age of automobiles owned, are known to correlate with important demographic characteristics such as age, income, children living at home, etc. With the capability of assigning demographic characteristics to individual voters, by name and address, a powerful method was introduced for targeting direct mail, selecting priority precincts, and many other campaign techniques. This was done for the first time in 1972 in the ten key states (see below).

- Computer Maps. Computers now have the ability to print out shaded maps which present census data, such as concentration of the blue collar workers, on a geographical format. Such maps were produced for major metropolitan areas in several key states. By overlaying several characteristics, such as income, race, occupation and age, target areas could be sharply distinguished.

This refined demographic data, when combined with polls showing the attitudes of various voter groups, allowed very precise targeting of key precincts. These methods were particularly useful in the selection of precincts where Democratic voters were to receive issue-oriented mail from Democrats for Nixon.

These combined polling and demographic techniques were also important in developing the strategy toward "Peripheral Urban Ethnics". The computer maps showed that in almost every metropolitan area there is a black ghetto, surrounded by a ring of blue collar, middle income, Democratic voters, of European ethnic background. Past voting data showed that these voters had given Wallace much of his support in 1968 and in the 1972 primaries. Polls showed that they were close to the President on the issues, particularly the social issues (crime, drugs, busing) and foreign policy. Accordingly, a strategy was developed to give high priority to the ethnic precincts and to target them for the voter contact program, as well as for appropriate issue-oriented material to them through advertising and direct mail. On the basis of the election returns, that strategy was effective.

One shortcoming was that the demographic data was not used extensively by the Political Division or the states. That might have been corrected by better liaison within the Washington Committee and earlier planning for the state campaigns (to be discussed later in this report).

Targeting of Key States. An ongoing analysis of polling and demographic data and electoral strategy yielded a list of ten projected "battleground" states. Relative priorities varied somewhat through the campaign, as updated polls showed large leads for the President in several states; however, the basic list remained the same. The states were as follows (in order of electoral votes):

California
New York
Pennsylvania
Texas

Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
Maryland
Connecticut

The significance of the target states was that they received the full voter identification system, with telephone centers, door-to-door canvass, direct mail and computerized lists of voters. In general, the state re-election committees had more financial resources at their disposal. The target states also had the heaviest scheduling of speakers, most intense local advertising and greatest scrutiny in public opinion surveys. Other campaign programs also gave them top priority.

CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - I: THE PRIMARIES.

As 1972 approached, the President was challenged on the left by Representative McCloskey, and later on the right by Representative Ashbrook. That made it necessary to enter contested primaries, starting with New Hampshire in early March. It also created an opportunity to test some of the programs which had been planned for the general campaign, and to test the abilities of the Committee's organization. In retrospect, the experience was beneficial, because mistakes were made and corrected in the primaries, leading to a much sounder national campaign in the summer and fall.

The objective in the primaries was to overwhelmingly defeat the opposition so as to firmly establish the President's political strength in his own party. That was accomplished by winning New Hampshire with 69% of the vote, at a time when the heavily-favored Muskie was unable to reach 50% on the Democratic side. That campaign was run mainly on voter contact through telephone and direct mail. Every Republican voter in the state was called and sent at least two letters. Subsequent results in Florida, Wisconsin and California, as well as other states, conclusively demonstrated that the President had the strong allegiance of Republicans throughout the nation. In California, the names of over 30,000 potential volunteers were obtained through a mailing to all registered Republicans.

The campaign programs which benefitted the most during the primaries were advertising, direct mail, telephone centers, surrogates, communications and the political division.

CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - II. BETWEEN THE PRIMARIES AND LABOR DAY.

During the early months of the campaign the Political Division was concerned chiefly with designation of state chairmen. By July, the polls began to show a substantial lead for the President. Therefore, the decision was made to concentrate the remainder of the field campaign on the fundamental premise that the President had sufficient support to win the election. Efforts were aimed at identifying favorable voters rather than persuading undecided voters and guaranteeing that the support was translated into votes on election day. Emphasis was shifted to the development in every state of a strong field organization, capable of implementing an extensive program of favorable voter identification, registration and turnout.

An evaluation in July indicated that only half of the states had approved budgets and that there was not enough money in those budgets to finance storefront headquarters and the voter contact program. Likewise, there appeared to be shortages for other activities, such as the absentee ballot and ballot security efforts. In late July and early August, substantial time and effort were devoted to correcting these deficiencies and bringing the state organizations up to speed.

Another serious problem facing the campaign as of the first of July was the absence of a specific plan of action in the states. A State Chairman's Organization Manual had been prepared and distributed in early June to local leadership, but there was no agreement on how to implement its contents, or the amount of emphasis to be given to the program. In July, a standard plan for voter identification, registration and turnout was launched immediately with a series of orientation and training conferences in Washington to give state leaders a clear concept of the campaign and the responsibilities which they were expected to meet.

The delay in establishing state budgets and developing a standard plan for the state campaigns set back the lead time in several key programs. In the absence of specific guidance from Washington, some of the states had begun to implement their own plans. In most states it was not possible to accomplish adequate organizational staffing and training in time to conduct the voter identification program to the full extent desired.

Many of the voter blocs had developed their programs to the point of implementation before state plans were in place. In some cases, they had begun activities in the states before other programs were finalized. The result was a distortion of priorities and misallocation of resources all of which had to be re-oriented in July and August. That re-orientation was never fully accomplished. The fault here was not with the voter blocs, whose directors were moving ahead with their specific areas of the campaign, but in the belated completion of the other state plans.

During the late spring and summer, extensive preparations were also made for the other elements of the voter identification system. Lists of registered voters were acquired from local officials in target states. Computer systems were designed to process the names so that they could be printed out on precinct canvass lists and on direct mail. This was the first time that a national campaign had attempted to purchase such lists for target states. The lists were scheduled to be sent to the local storefronts and telephone centers by Labor Day. Because of the long lead times required to obtain and process the lists, many locations did not receive them until later than anticipated. That delay was costly in lost campaign momentum after the Convention. In addition, there were technical problems with the computer lists in several localities. Some had to be discarded and reproduced in corrected form. In future campaigns, the computer data system should be started as early as January prior to the election, rather than in May. The present system can be used again, if it receives minimum maintenance during the intervening years.

In the telephone campaign, the lessons of the primaries were incorporated into the program for the general election. This was the first time that a national campaign designed and provided complete instructions, forms, procedures and materials for telephone center operation. The program was carefully refined so that volunteers could operate the local centers effectively with very little training or supervision by state or national telephone leaders. A center in Westchester, New York was run just like one in Sacramento, California, and their results could be compared against the same standard. A system of reporting and accountability allowed continuous management review at the state and national levels. Here, again, the required lead-times for design and production of materials were underestimated, and the national staff had to work under heavy pressure of deadlines. That effort should have started in April, rather than in June, after the California primary.

The telephone campaign proved to be a highly efficient means of contacting voters. In a campaign such as this one, where identification rather than persuasion is the purpose of the voter contact, the telephone is ideally suited. In retrospect, an even larger program, covering more states, might have been a wise use of resources. In Texas and Michigan, where the Senatorial candidates were included on the telephone identification canvass, the Republicans ran well against strong opposition.

Other parts of the Committee also prepared for the fall campaign. The November Group developed the theme and slogan for the advertising and promotional materials. A system of distribution was set up for the buttons, brochures, bumper strips, etc., which was designed to avoid the failures of the past. By Labor Day, however, it was clear that

stocks were inadequate and that orders by the states could not be filled promptly. Those delays and back-orders caused a great deal of ill-will and resentment in the field and seriously hampered the implementation of other important campaign programs at the local level. In any future campaign, the materials distribution problem must be given the highest priority and be organized with plenty of lead time to spare.

CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN - III: AFTER LABOR DAY.

By the kickoff of the fall campaign, the operating pattern had become one of intense activity in the field, backed up by national programs which kept the President and his record before the American public without over-exposing the candidate.

A nationwide Canvass Kick-Off was held on September 16, to intensify the push for all-out effort by state organizations on door-to-door canvassing. Surrogates participated in fifty local headquarters throughout the country and received wide media coverage. This event highlighted the grass-roots campaign and motivated the state organizations to push their canvassing efforts.

The people-to-people programs sought to generate increased activity at the local level to offset over confidence in the state leadership. Gradually abandoning the "trickle-down" approach, with its extensive reliance on official state campaign leadership, the Committee moved toward greater direct contact and activity at the local level, through mailings and telephone calls to county leadership and increased numbers of national personnel working in the field to assure effective implementation of the core organization programs.

Local storefronts were used in the programs of voter identification, registration and turnout. Approximately 2,000 such headquarters were open for the final eight to ten weeks of the campaign.

Meanwhile, other national programs were also being activated as the campaign progressed. The telephone campaign established 250 centers in the ten key states. Contrary to the experience of several primaries in the spring, it became difficult to recruit volunteers for telephoning in many areas after Labor Day. The President's large lead in the polls had created considerable apathy among his supporters. Other potential volunteers had turned their attention to state-wide or local races. In this scarce market of volunteers, the telephone program found itself in competition with the door-to-door canvass effort.

In the original Washington Committee organizational structure, the Political Division, responsible for the conduct of the campaign in the states, had been placed under one Deputy Campaign Director. National programs, including the telephone program, had been placed under the other Deputy Campaign Director. The Political Division had direct responsibility for the door-to-door canvass, and they tended to press the states to give that top priority over other volunteer-oriented activities. The telephone centers thereby suffered, not being a part of that Division. Later in the Campaign, the two programs acquired a better balance and both did well. In a future campaign, it would be better to have the telephone program as a part of the organization which is responsible for the field activity in the states. That would encourage more cooperation between the various canvass programs leading to a more effective overall effort.

In general, the voter identification canvass was most successful. On the basis of an average of two voters per household contacted, some 45 million voters were reached through this activity. The two central purposes of the canvass were clearly fulfilled: (1) identification of a sufficient number of the President's supporters to fuel an effective voter turnout effort; and (2) development during the canvass in September and October of a field organization capable of delivering a strong Election Day effort. While all states did not perform as well as they might have, the key and battleground states, where canvassing could have meant the difference, performed well beyond early expectations. The final results are summarized in Tab A.

The Surrogate program required more time than anticipated from the staffs of the state re-election committees. The arrangements for speaking appearances, advance work and coordination with Washington often demanded time which had to be taken from other important activities. In future campaigns, if an extensive surrogate program is used, the state committees should be better staffed to fulfill their responsibilities. It seems clear, however, that the surrogate program was extremely worthwhile and proved to be one of the most effective weapons for keeping McGovern on the defensive.

The Advertising program succeeded in reinforcing the President's image of competence, while creating doubts about McGovern's ability to meet the demands of the Presidency. In the latter effort, John Connally and the Democrats for Nixon were particularly effective.

In July, when the decisions were made to give top priority to programs in the field, major cuts were made in the advertising budget. As a result, it was not possible to conduct a strong media campaign until the last week of the campaign. There should have been more financial reserves kept for advertising; the campaign was vulnerable if McGovern had begun to gather momentum in September.

The television advertising was delayed until late in September. From then on, a pattern of gradually increased media exposure was implemented. The President's radio and television appearances were a part of the pattern and served to project him into the campaign arena just enough to keep McGovern on the defensive. Throughout the campaign, the Presidential strategy of limited campaign appearances and maximum use of his office left McGovern no target and no opportunity to close the great gap in public support.

To keep McGovern on the defensive and to coordinate public relations efforts against him, the Attack Group met each morning to plan tactics for the day. This group orchestrated the attack plans of the Communications Division, the surrogate speakers, the White House Staff, the Vice President and the RNC. The Communications Division prepared press releases, speech materials, audio feeds for radio, and television film service to aid in implementing the attack plans, as well as to publicize the positive side of the President's record.

Throughout the campaign, one consistent game-plan was followed. That was to keep McGovern identified with his earlier statements and never to let him get off the defensive. At the same time, the President's strengths were constantly reinforced. McGovern, on the other hand, never did adopt a consistent strategy, except possibly to keep attacking on Watergate. He was never able to position himself firmly on the right side of a policy issue.

The final pre-election day organizational activity of the national campaign was the October 28 Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) Kick-Off. This event was held in 44 areas in 22 key and battleground states. Surrogates visited storefronts and telephone centers in these areas to emphasize the importance of GOTV and to participate in the actual work of preparing for Election Day. For the most part, the GOTV Kick-Off accomplished its main purposes:

1. It forced the end of the voter identification effort and oriented field organizations for the coming get-out-the-vote activity.
2. It demonstrated the high priority to be placed on GOTV and publicized the need for, and importance of, volunteers.

Early experiences demonstrated the necessity of deploying more national staff to the field in areas where the core program was being inadequately implemented. Beginning with preparation of the September 16 Canvass Kick-Off, the Political Division and the Telephone Campaign, in coordination with the RNC, dispatched an increasing number of Washington staff members to assure necessary local performance.

By mid-October, most voter bloc activity was concentrated in direct assistance with the voter turnout program in the priority areas, and substantial numbers of voter bloc staff were assigned to the field to assist with the final effort. By the end of October, almost 100 national Committee staff members and another 25 from the RNC were in these states helping to implement GOTV activity. This strong performance at the local level by so many Washington staff members was a high point of the campaign. In retrospect, the deployment would have been even more effective if it had been started a few weeks earlier.

OVERALL REVIEW.

In large measure, the campaign succeeded in its objectives. The voter contact programs of door-to-door canvass, telephone canvass, direct mail and get-out-the-vote were particularly successful. Frank Mankiewicz has said,

"To sum it all up: When we talk about the McGovern campaign, we ought to look at the Nixon campaign, which was a model. It spent an inordinate amount of time and money that originally was ticketed for television and ended up on the street in one of the best get-out-the-vote operations in terms of direct mail and telephoning that many of us have ever seen. I have a feeling that the time we spent on election day getting out the vote was in part responsible for turning out so large a Nixon vote.

"I would think the figures will show that the Nixon campaign beat us at what we do best--getting out the vote. It's probably the first time a Republican campaign has ever done that so successfully. It was a remarkable job."

On the other hand, several improvements could have been made. Generally, the campaign could have been run better if the states had had less autonomy. Comments have been made previously relating to the timing of state budget approvals and completion of plans for the field programs. Some of that planning should have been started early in the life of the Committee, in 1971. One of the original staff members should have been experienced in precinct politics, and charged with the planning of that program. The detailed program should have been completed by August or September of 1971, well before the state organizations became active.

Many new procedures had to be developed to meet the requirements of the new campaign spending act. Although it did create several new layers of record-keeping and administration, it also gave Washington far greater control over the state committees. That factor was very instrumental in the unprecedented success of the nationwide grass-roots programs of telephone and door-to-door canvass and get-out-the-vote. Even more control could have been exercised, however. The extraordinary leverage of an incumbent Administration, heavily favored to be re-elected, with patronage and programs to administer, was not used to its maximum advantage. Better performance could have been required and achieved from the states.

Another means of improvement in the state campaigns would have been to have had a larger field staff at the national level, which could have been deployed early. Valuable time sometimes passed before Washington was able to determine that a local organization needed help and then to provide it. This field presence would have been particularly useful in interfacing with target Senate campaigns.

Throughout the campaign there was a massive cash flow through the Committee. Frequently, long delays occurred in processing and writing checks for expenditures previously approved in the budget. It might have been better to have had the disbursement side of the Finance Committee as a function of the Campaign Committee, where it could have been more responsive to the time requirements of the various divisions. The total cash flow could still have been controlled by the Finance Committee.

It is too early to analyze completely the performance of the Voter Blocs and Citizens Groups. However, it can be said as of now that the persuasive campaign was successful. The activities of the Voter Blocs, such as Youth, Jewish, Ethnics, Older Americans and Spanish Speaking Americans, received excellent coverage in national publications such as Time, Life, etc. In addition, results indicate that the percentage of the vote received by the President in various Voter Blocs increased considerably over 1968. One of the most dramatic increases was in the Jewish Community where the President received approximately 40% of the vote in 1972.

The success of the second objective of the Voter Blocs/Citizens Groups campaign, volunteer recruitment, varied from state to state. On the national level, it was not particularly successful.

Some of the voter blocs performed well and meshed their own programs well with those of the overall campaign. Others persisted in fragmentary efforts among their constituencies which competed with other programs and drained limited management resources in the states. It would have been more productive if the voter bloc leadership had directed greater

effort toward mobilizing volunteers from their constituencies for the basic voter identification programs in the field.

This election was different from most in that the candidate had two major organizations involved in the campaign. The White House staff was responsible for speeches, policy on issues, the candidate's personal travel, etc. The Committee had charge of the programs relating to the conduct of the campaign. In general, the liaison and coordination between the two was good. There were some cases of conflict where both organizations sought to develop strategy or operating guidelines, but these were generally resolved satisfactorily. The dual structure did necessitate lengthy review and approval procedures which sometimes made it impossible to meet desired deadlines.

Another important area of coordination was with the RNC. Generally good liaison was established during the early planning phase of 1971. Some friction developed, however, as the campaign became operational during the 1972 spring primaries and the months leading up to the Republican Convention. Strong efforts at that point by the Committee's Political Division restored a good working relationship for the remainder of the Campaign. The RNC made significant contributions with its Answer Desk on political issues, in providing extensive demographic data for the campaign, in working with the Political Division in the development of plans for the campaign in the states, in the work of their field organization in helping to implement the grass-roots program, and with the publication of Monday.

An area of disappointment in the campaign was the poor showing of many statewide and local Republican candidates in the wake of the Nixon landslide. As discussed earlier, the President's campaign extended beyond the normal Republican constituency to other voter segments which had historically voted Democrat. Moreover, these groups had been propelled toward him by their active opposition to McGovern. Candidates who successfully positioned themselves close to the President, or their opposition close to McGovern, were generally successful. Tower of Texas and Griffin of Michigan merged part of their campaigns with the President's, as has been mentioned. Helms in North Carolina created coattails for himself by running very closely to the President in his own campaign, and invoking the President's name frequently.

From the beginning, it had been determined that the President's campaign would not give priority attention to concurrent statewide and Congressional races. Accordingly, mechanisms were not set up for liaison with local campaigns for monitoring the standings of

the various Republican candidates, or for providing technical and campaign management advice. It was not until very late in the campaign that active concern was turned toward these races. By that time, it was difficult to get reliable intelligence on the races and quite late to reverse negative trends. Some close Senate losses might have been averted if one of the early Committee objectives had been to work closely with the state-wide contests.

In summary, the campaign had considerable room for improvement, as all campaigns do. On the other hand, it was probably superior in every element to that of the opposition; moreover, it helped sustain and then deliver to the ballot box the full measure of support that its candidate had gained from the voters.

FINAL CANVASSING RESULTS

The final results of the door-to-door and telephone voter identification canvass are as follows:

Total households in the U.S.	63,316,000
Total households in priority counties	48,149,000
Total households contacted door-to-door	16,075,000
Percentage of priority households canvassed door-to-door	33%
Total households contacted by telephone	6,543,000
Total households contacted door-to-door and by telephone	22,618,000
Percentage of total households contacted	36%
Percentage of households in priority counties contacted	47%

As shown below, key state results are particularly good:

Number of households in priority counties	25,924,000
Households canvassed door-to-door	8,284,000
Percentage of priority county households canvassed door-to-door	32%
Households canvassed by telephone	6,543,000
Percentage of priority county households canvassed by telephone	25.9%
Total households canvassed	14,827,000
Percentage of priority county households canvassed	57%