

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
15	13	12/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a project designed to analyze public opinion toward political parties. Information on the role of political parties in the 1972 election and notes attached. 8 pgs.
15	13	12/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Strachan RE: an attempt to measure public opinion on political parties. Handwritten notes added by Strachan. 2 pgs.
15	13	12/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: whether or not to transfer control of a valuable database to the RNC. Memo from Morgan to Magruder attached. 7 pgs.
15	13	11/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Letter	From Sam Wyly, through Haldeman, to RN RE: an important database used during the campaign. 3 pgs.

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15	13	12/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	Talking paper from Strachan to George Bush RE: the transfer of a direct mail list to the RNC. 1 pg.
15	13		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Page of notes, possibly authored by Strachan, relating to thank-you letters for important campaign figures, as well as other campaign matters. 1 pg.
15	13	12/4/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From George Collins to Strachan RE: legal and statistical information on the database. 11 pgs.
15	13		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Other Document	Resume of James W. White. 3 pgs.
15	13		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Other Document	List of volunteer and contributor files for various states. 1 pg.

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15	13	12/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a preliminary analysis of voter turnout in 1972. 5 pgs.
15	13	11/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bob Marik to Malek RE: the fate of various Republican candidates for office in 1972. 3 pgs.
15	13	11/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Rick Fore to Malek RE: various Republican Senate defeats. 4 pgs.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

December 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Political Parties Project

You wanted the question of the public's attitude toward political parties considered. This would include a review of the CRP campaign surveys and the private ORC materials.

I discussed the project at length with Bob Teeter and Tom Benham independently. Both were intellectually intrigued by the project. Both want to spend substantial time and personal effort on the project. Teeter is further along in his thinking because I talked to him shortly after Larry discussed the project with me on December 3. Teeter has submitted the attached rough statement of his initial thoughts. Tom Benham was on vacation until December 11 so has only begun thinking about the project. He will submit his thoughts hopefully early next week. Both have begun the computer work on their respective previous data. Both want to spend the next two to three weeks going over already available data before submitting recommendations on whether or not to conduct a new survey on the entire subject. This three week thought time will not delay the survey should you eventually decide to conduct one because both strongly recommend against interviewing during the Holidays. They cite last year's Wave I surveys conducted in December as examples of the problems that develop. You may recall that several states were late, had to be re-interviewed and then weighed heavily to obtain reliable data.

As to costs that Benham and Teeter may incur, I told them that we would pay them at an appropriate, to-be-negotiated rate. Neither considered this a problem because all campaign polling bills have been paid. Also, both are so professionally fascinated by the project that we will receive a substantial amount of personal effort and commitment unrelated to the details of interviewing costs, etc.

GS/jb

## POLITICAL PARTY ANALYSIS AND REALIGNMENT

The 1972 election was unique in several ways:

1. A Republican President won with over 60% of the vote.
2. There was a further trend toward ticket-splitting. There was more ticket-splitting than in any previous election and it appears that a disproportionate share of the new ticket-splitters came from the previous Democratic core.
3. Turnout was extremely low with only about 55% of those eligible actually voting.
4. A major new segment (18-24 year olds) was added to the electorate for the first time since women's suffrage.
5. It was the second consecutive election in which the Democratic candidate for President received less than 45% of the vote. Clearly the coalition which had made the Democrats the majority party since 1932 has broken up.

The fact the "new majority" was apparent only at the Presidential level and that it was accompanied by an unprecedented amount of ticket-splitting raises several fundamental questions about the future of the present political parties in the country. Among these are:

1. Is this increase in ticket-splitting over the past several years transitory and the means to realignment or is it permanent brought about by the increase in information the voters receive? Should the objective of the President's political apparatus be increase the base Republican vote or to hold what we have and increase ticket-splitting among Democrats.
2. Can the new majority be consolidated under the Republican banner or will it have to be done with some other device?
3. Do the present major political parties serve any useful purpose? What are they? What is their influence on voting behavior?
4. What should be the role of political parties in the future? How can they increase and maximize their influence on voting behavior?
5. Should they promote ideological realignment?
6. What affect does the addition of a major new segment (18-24 year olds) have to the electorate?
7. Should a new political party be formed? If so, how, when? How should it be positioned?

Given the results of the 1972 election a detailed study of changes in voting patterns and attitudes toward political parties should be made with the objective being to determine how the President's new majority can be consolidated and built into a new long-term political force which will support the President's positions and which can be repeated electorally nationally and at state and local levels.

I think such an analysis should have five components?

1. Voting Analysis

A detailed voting analysis to clarify what actual changes in new voting patterns occurred and where the President increased his strength disproportionately compared to a state or the nation as a whole. The voting data, along with census data should tell us if the President actually created new voting patterns in addition to simply increasing his strength everywhere, and where, and with whom those patterns occurred.

In addition to providing some additional insight into the 1972 election this data is critical to campaign planning in 1974 and 1976. We used this data for many major decisions during the campaign but had to collect and analyze it on a crisis (and incomplete) basis in June because no one had done it after previous elections.

This is something that could and should be done by the RNC with some guidance. They have the staff and EDP capability to do and are the only permanent continuing operation where it could be kept and updated after each election. Ed DeBolt and his staff did an excellent job in helping us with this type of analysis during the campaign. It is all public data and not particularly sensitive.

It should be done on two levels. The first step is to collect and analyze the county data and the ward and township data for the major SMSA's. It is the easiest to get, there are no comparability problems, and consequently can be combined easily with the census.

Second, the present data for all the states should be collected along with complete sets of present maps. This would allow a finer level of analysis and be of tremendous use in future elections. This data has to be collected early next year as we found much of it unavailable for 1968 when we tried to go back and get it this year.

This analysis should look at turnout, the Wallace vote, increase in ticket-splitting, and changes in base party strength. The first phase could be completed fairly soon if the staff help were available to collect the data but the second will take several

months due to severe and varying data collection problems in the different states. This is, however, the time when it should be done as many of the precinct maps and much of the data will be unavailable two or four years from now.

2. Further Analysis of 1972 Polling Data

Although we didn't study attitudes toward the parties in the campaign polling, some further analysis may give us additional insight into the President's majority. It would be particularly useful to look at the similarities and differences of those people who split their ticket for the first time and those who have been splitting in past elections but largely for us.

It also appears that the conventional liberal and conservative ideological groups are breaking up. This is particularly true of those whose vote for the President was their first Republican vote. They appear to be ideological hybrids who hold fairly conservative views on some issues but fairly liberal views on others. It is no longer possible to predict where a voter will stand on a given issue from his position on another issue. This point will be critical to building the new majority.

3. Post Election Studies

There are at least four good sources of reliable post election data. We (MOR) have done five states (Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania) on our own and the data will be available in early January. They were all telephone panels and the interviewing was done within two weeks after the election.

AMPAC (American Medical Political Action Committee) had DMI do several states (California, New York, Colorado, South Dakota, Tennessee) and this data will be available in mid January. They did not collect much information but it should at least tell us who voted for who in those states.

Gallup did a national after-election which has been published in part and presumably will be published in his printed January report.

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan did a very comprehensive after-election in which they questioned about the major parties. It will be the most useful data of the three but will not be available until about April 1. I have their questionnaire and will have access to their data.

4. A search for other data on realignment and attitudes toward parties should be made. This should include talking with those academics who are studying this phenomena. To my knowledge the SRC at the University of Michigan and William Dean Burnham at MIT have done the most in this area and I have dates to see them both in January.

I don't, however, think the academics will be of much help to us as most of them are Democratic theologians at heart and are trying to keep this old Democratic coalition together.

5. The primary data along with the voting analysis should be a national poll designed for this purpose. It would give us detailed data on the public's attitude toward parties and test various hypotheses of how we can consolidate the President's majority. It should give us good data on the geographic regions and on those groups which the voting data and after-election surveys indicate have actually changed their voting behavior.

This study should identify the commonalities of the two groups of ticket-splitters who emerged in this election. Prior to this election we have had a group of white upper-middle ticket-splitters who have voted for more Republicans than Democrats and who were fairly liberal before issues like busing, drugs, crime and property taxes became acute. This year a new group of voters, largely previous Democrats, split their ticket for the first time. This was apparently because the President represented most of their social values while the Democrats threatened them. Both of these groups now have many of the same values and I think can be forged into a majority along with the present Republican base. The one common characteristic of them we observed in the campaign polling is that both groups were comprised largely of people who had recently or were in the process of moving up a socio-economic class. They are the ones who are realizing the American dream.

We also need to find out if we can rid the Republican party image of its rich big business aspect. The one common attitude among all of the elements of the old Democratic coalition is their dislike for wealth and big business.

It should also pay particular attention to non-voters. The rate and way they might enter the electorate in the future could easily determine the majority party for the next generation. When major new coalitions have been formed in the past it has often been done by bringing new groups into the electorate. This was true of the recent Democratic majority. Prior to 1932 many blue collar laboring people didn't vote and when they entered the electorate in 1932 they helped form the Democratic majority that lasted over 30 years. We are currently doing a small scale study of non-voters in Ohio as part of our after-election poll.

Other areas the poll should cover:

Basic attitudes toward parties.

What function do they serve? If any?

Does party affect voting behavior?

What function do people think parties should serve?

What do Republicans and Democratic parties stand for?

Does either represent them?

Is a new party needed?

Around what principle should it be formed?

What should it be called?

How should it be created?

What would attract people to it?

What groups would be available to a new party?

What should tie be between national and local parties, candidates?

Do voters want ideological realignment?

Are conventional ideologies definition valid?

What are the social values of the new majority?

Are Wallace voters significantly different from other new majority voters?

The county level voting analysis could be and should be done immediately. I don't know how long it will take to complete due to the data collection problems but can work out a schedule with the RNC people. The precinct level analysis should be started now to insure comparability with the county data but will probably take at least six months to complete.

The analysis of the campaign and after-election polling could be done concurrently with the voting analysis and completed in January. It will take some money for computer time to rerun the data but should not take a lot. The data is all in computer readable form at MOR.

The poll should be done as soon as these projects are completed. The results from them should improve the design of the questionnaire and provide some hypotheses to test. This poll should be a personal interview study and should be large enough to provide a reliable sample of both voters and non-voters. Separate questionnaires should probably be used for voters and non-voters.

I think this analysis will also refute the liberal establishment claim that the election was the defeat of McGovern personally and of his campaign and not of his ideology. I think we can prove that the election was a defeat of the far left and a victory for the middle who support the traditional American values.

I also think our state after-election studies will prove that there was very little or no relationship between the President and most of the state and local races. It appears from the data we have now that most voters viewed the Presidential and state elections as two completely separate events that just happened to be held on the same day. I see no evidence in our after-election surveys that indicates Republicans stayed home because of the President or that a disproportionate number of Democrats turned out to vote for the President and voted straight Democratic on the rest of the ballot.

~~ETA~~

(L)

12/3

- need polling data to get broad sense re Parties -

- Rep, Dem, Ind, Unaff

- Party Image

Where another party should be formed.

Maybe get all our pre election data

- Race data - how identify correlate w/ lib + conser + w/ R/N vote

Over last yr, how has trend of lib/conser gone

- Where post-election survey

Shandle.

How pay for it

Where \$50 shed by our funds over next 4 yrs for poll etc

- - Could we clean thru through

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN  
FROM: L. HIGBY *L*

*Poll  
not  
set*

As I discussed with you on the phone, we need to give some consideration to developing a poll that tests the general feelings people have with regard to images of party, etc. For example, how many people now tend to consider themselves Republicans, Democrats, Independents? What do these parties stand for in their minds? What are people's general feelings about parties, why is there a trend toward Independents? Do people feel it's time for the formation of a new party? How would they feel is the best way to go about the formation of a new party, etc.?

In addition, we should take a look at our pre-election data and try to get what information we can out of that as to what people identify themselves with in terms of Republican, Democrat. One way to do this also would be to divide it up between the pre-September data and the post-September data and compare this. Another thing to do would be chart the trends on Republican, Democrat, Independent over the last year from our data. It's important here we use the raw data since the weighted data would reflect a different situation.

*Tester  
O'Neill*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

QUESTIONS

Two of the questions that should be included on the poll on parties are:

Do you believe that one of the two major parties (Republican or Democrat) basically represent your views or do you feel there should be a new party?

If so, would you consider it to be a Liberal or Conservative party?

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

December 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Computer Data Base  
Assets at CRP

The CRP collected and used 31 million names for the direct mail programs. The information related to these names -- address, income, make of car, etc., is stored at UCC of which Sam Wyly is Chairman. In addition to Wyly, access to the information is limited to Jeb Magruder, Bob Marik, and Bob Morgan.

After November 7, Magruder asked Bob Morgan to prepare a proposal on the value of maintaining the data base. Morgan's proposal is at Tab A. The proposal makes two essential points. First, the mobility of Americans results in 20% moving each year. To maintain accurate, usable lists they must be mailed and cleaned periodically. Second, no one currently at the RNC has the loyalty or talent to use the lists correctly.

The value of these lists should not be underestimated. Bob Dole's first comments to the press after the election included reference to seeing White House Staff members to get the lists to the RNC. The Democrats use the Minnesota-based firm of Sherman-Valentine, which reportedly has 30 million names which are used at Humphrey's direction. Sam Wyly has written the President urging him to maintain and use this resource for the 1974 Congressional and State races. (Letter at Tab B.) Magruder has been in touch with Wyly to indicate that he will be advised of a decision soon.

Now that it is public information that George Bush will be taking over the RNC on January 19, you should consider

transferring these mailing list assets to him. They will substantially increase his clout and remove one of the last points of dispute between the CRP and the GOP. For the assets to be maintained and used correctly, we need one technical person familiar with the collection and use during the campaign. The candidate recommended by Magruder and Morgan is Jim White, who worked during the campaign for Morgan. The salary recommended is \$30,000, which is too high. He probably could be obtained for \$25,000.

To transfer these assets to Bush at the RNC with appropriate emphasis of who is to direct their use, I recommend that you call George Bush. A talking paper is attached at Tab C.

GS/jb



RECOMMENDATION:

That at the first Board of Directors Meeting of ISI, the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President assign ownership of the Data Base, systems, and all other computer files of volunteers and contributors to ISI, including the Finance Committee lists.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMENDATION:

That a General Manager be named. The General Manager should be a marketing-oriented systems expert able to sell these services, as well as plan orderly, sophisticated improvements.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

I personally recommend Jim White for the position of General Manager at ISI at a salary of \$30,000 annually, plus expenses. Jim was a Project Manager on the Political Direct Mail staff and as such, was the trouble shooter in the systems area. His background includes both marketing and systems experience so he fits the needs perfectly. The fact that he is knowledgeable about the Data Base makes him uniquely qualified for this assignment. His resume is attached as TAB C. This could be a self-supporting program if --

- Republican Senators and Congressmen utilize the list for monthly segmented franking mail at \$15.00 per thousand.
- The Administration uses the list for polling and other selective mailings through ISI.
- The list is used by commercial mailers through the Direct Mail Standard Rates and Data Book.

RECOMMENDATION:

That services be sold to all approved Republican office-holders and candidates at \$15.00 per thousand as a base price, and that computer services be made available at breakeven costs.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

It seems more logical to expect a loss of \$50,000 to \$100,000 in 1973, however, the loss would be made up in 1974. Breakeven could be expected in 1975, and substantial savings accrued for the 1976 Election. A pro rata Profit and Loss Statement is shown at TAB A. TAB A shows that if only 5,000,000 names were used each year from 1973 through 1975, \$31,750 would be lost versus creating a new Data Base in 1976 for over \$1,000,000. If between 10,000,000 and 30,000,000 names were used each year through the franking privilege, gross profits would be generated that could be put back into the system to develop voter registration lists in other battleground states.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Data Base for eight (8) states be registered in the Direct Mail Standard Rates and Data Book for lease at \$30.00 per thousand.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

In order to determine public reaction and opinion to various domestic and international issues, stratified samples including all voter types, could be retrieved from the Data Base. The sample size should vary with the reliability desired. Selected samples could also be retrieved for opinion to specific programs, i.e., older voters, urban voters, ethnics, youth, etc.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administration sources request that polling samples be purchased through ISI. (Just provide the source, not conduct the poll).

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

PRESENT VOTER IDENTIFICATION DATA BASE SUMMARY

The Political Direct Mail Department developed a Voter Registration Data Base of approximately 31,000,000 registered voters in nine (9) key states at a total cost of \$1.1 million without any application of overhead costs. During the first phase, individual vendors were contracted to collect the voter registration lists of specific states and to computerize this information into a standard format. Standard edit programs were supplied to each vendor to validate the data. In the second phase, at University Computing Company in Dallas, the Voter Registration Data Base was expanded with specific demographic information added.

In the nine (9) key states, those non-Republicans who were identified as favorable to President Nixon were indicated on the file. These states are:

<u>STATE</u>	<u>NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS</u>
CALIFORNIA	8,626,372
CONNECTICUT	1,373,465
ILLINOIS	2,682,289
MARYLAND	1,349,118
MICHIGAN	1,688,634
NEW JERSEY	3,196,192
OHIO	3,381,464
PENNSYLVANIA	5,157,088
TEXAS	3,970,274
 	<hr/>
TOTAL	<u>29,736,262</u>

Additionally, partial lists of registered Republican voters were developed for four (4) states. These are:

<u>STATE</u>
FLORIDA
MASSACHUSETTS
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW YORK

#### EXPENDED EFFORT IN DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT

The development of the Voter Identification Data Base initially began in those states which conducted Presidential primaries. The effort for the nine (9) key states took about 3 1/2 months to obtain, convert and edit the voter registration lists. Another month was spent updating the names of favorable non-Republicans.

#### COMPUTER LISTS DEVELOPED AS BYPRODUCTS

The Committee for the Re-election of the President presently has computer files containing over 56,000 names of contributors and volunteers and 51,000 names of active youth volunteers. These Contributor/Volunteer Lists are presently being converted to the

standard 200-character format. TAB D shows the "Survey of Volunteer and Contributor Files" outlining the title, format and quantity of records for each list.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR/VOLUNTEER LISTS

There are several lists of contributors and volunteers that are potentially available from the 1972 Campaign organizations. These lists are:

- Telephone Program Key Leaders Lists (approximately 2,400 names)
- Telephone Centers' Volunteer Lists (approximately 75,000 names)
- State Chairmen's Volunteer Lists (approximately 170,000 names)
- Finance Committee Contributor Lists (quantity unknown)
- Democrats for Nixon Volunteer Lists (from other than Direct Mail returns)

Another alternative would be to turn the Data Base and systems over to the RNC. This alternative is not suggested for these reasons:

1. President Nixon loses direct control.
2. The Republican National Committee does not really have a professional staff for control of the systems.
3. The Republican National Committee does not get involved until after the candidate is nominated and the President might want to support a candidate early in the primary campaign.
4. The system in 1976 must be developed in January 1976, at the latest or a useful product will not be ready for voter identification after the Republican Convention.

Attachments:

TAB A  
TAB B  
TAB C  
TAB D

cc: Dr. Robert H. Marik

14  
Mrs. Fulbright

**SAM WYLY**  
P. O. Box 6228  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75222

November 28, 1972

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

My family and associates are most grateful for America's overwhelming affirmation of your record of accomplishment and powerful leadership.

While it's fresh in my mind, I want to call to your attention the existence of a very powerful direct mail campaign tool in the combined data base, programs and expertise which exist in the Committee to Re-Elect and in University Computing Company.

This asset was created by work that was done for the sole purpose of your re-election this year (and in retrospect you most certainly would have won without it or most any other specific campaign investment for that matter), but it is an asset that can be used to add Republican Congressional support for your Administration in 1974 and to assist the Republican Presidential nominee in 1976 and in later years.

But unless you make a decision to maintain this resource with a few people and a small budget over the next two years, its value to you will quickly dissipate.

Bob Morgan (under Jeb Magruder) knows those resources in detail.

Sincerely,

  
Sam Wyly

P.S. The obvious answer seems to be to turn it over to the Republican National Committee. But the talent to make good use of this system, and to improve it, simply is not in the Republican National Committee at this time. It is in the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

cc: Mr. John Ehrlichman

**SAM WYLY**  
P. O. Box 6228  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75222

To The President

Through Mr. Bob Haldeman

TALKING PAPER FOR GEORGE BUSH

Re: Direct Mail Lists -- Transfer to RNC

1) During the campaign 31 million names were collected and used in the direct mail, get-out-the-vote program. The President sent 9 million telegrams based on these lists.

2) The lists and backup computer information are currently held at UCC (Sam Wyly). Only Jeb Magruder and two technical people have access. These assets must be maintained and used to make them fully effective in 1974 and 1976.

3) The GOP through Bob Dole has expressed a desire for them to be transferred to the RNC. The President has decided to do this, but I must emphasize that in every respect these assets, which cost \$5 million to develop during the campaign, are his personal property to be used as I direct.

4) One person who worked on the collection and use of these assets during the campaign is Jim White. As you re-staff the RNC you should consider hiring him at the approximate salary of \$25,000.

GS  
12/14/72

Sherman-Valentine - Miami based  
H+ work orig in 20  
~~very~~ no genl work for MCG,  
the some see local cans

p 4 - 18,626,372 - # of regis voters  
15,600,000 - # of households  
92% of the voting  
36 big cities in Cal - tape has  
all Regis voters - not broken  
by who favor or opposed P.

Thank-you letters - punch up on  
computer - same time  
Jones → Fore + Mail  
- all on Morgan's lists  
- Balsden - non-edited lists  
Sld all be under 1 format  
- all contrib lists on std  
form + edited  
- Use overhead of Pol Data Base

Sent 2,000,000 - pieces - 9 mil in  
NJ + Cal.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date 12/4

TO: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: GEORGE COLLINS

EVEN though you're now  
with USIA, IT MIGHT BE  
BEST FOR YOU TO DIRECT  
this

DATA BASE STATEMENT

TAB A

1974 NAMES USED

1975

IN	1973	1974	1975
10000	10000	10000	10000
15000	15000	15000	15000
20000	20000	20000	20000
25000	25000	25000	25000
30000	30000	30000	30000
35000	35000	35000	35000
40000	40000	40000	40000
45000	45000	45000	45000
50000	50000	50000	50000
55000	55000	55000	55000
60000	60000	60000	60000
65000	65000	65000	65000
70000	70000	70000	70000
75000	75000	75000	75000
80000	80000	80000	80000
85000	85000	85000	85000
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95000	95000	95000	95000
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105000	105000	105000	105000
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AGREEMENT FOR SERVICES

Agreement, entered into as of the 1st day of December, 1972, in the city of Dallas, Texas, by and between UNIVERSITY COMPUTING COMPANY, having its principal place of business at 7200 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, Texas (hereinafter referred to as "UCC"), and INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, having its principal place of business at Washington, District of Columbia (hereinafter referred to as "ISI"),

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, UCC desires to store and protect two (2) copies of the Voter Registration Data Base (VRDB), and to provide data processing services on as required basis; and

WHEREAS, ISI has need of such services in the conduct of its business;

NOW THEREFORE, UCC and ISI in consideration of the mutual promises and commitments made herein, hereby mutually agree as follows:

A. BASIC SERVICES. UCC agrees to provide the following services for ISI, and in this regard agrees to commit its best efforts to perform hereunder to the satisfaction of ISI, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth:

1. ISI will assign ownership of the tapes and cabinets remaining from the six thousand (6,000) purchased under the Agreement for Services between the University Computing Company and the UCC which commenced to Re-elect the President. This Agreement was executed as of the 1st day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1972, which are more particularly described in EXHIBIT A attached to and incorporated herein by reference.

2. UCC will store and protect two (2) copies of the Voter Registration Data Base (VRDB) for California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas, as well as all other tapes and systems of ISI in exchange for the tapes and cabinets as described in Item 1 above, which are more particularly described in EXHIBIT B attached to and incorporated herein by reference. It is understood by both parties that UCC will store one (1) copy of the VRDB at the UCC facility located at 2910 Avenue F, Arlington, Texas, and will physically protect and preserve the integrity of the VRDB. A second copy will be stored under the same conditions in a separate location acceptable to both parties.

3. As part of the storage of the VRDB, UCC will perform the following maintenance tasks:

a. Store large counties with greater than 100,000 households of the VRDB on single tape reels.

b. Combine small counties of less than 100,000 households of the same state to reduce the number of tape reels stored.

- c. Read and duplicate the primary copy once each year to ensure readability.
- d. Clean and re-wind the second copy once each year.
- e. Upon request from ISI, UCC will make available a copy of the VRDB to their representatives who will be designated to UCC in writing.

4. UCC will provide physical protection through the use of restricted access to the locked areas in which the copies of the VRDB is stored. During periods of maintenance or requested processing by ISI, UCC will exercise the same precautions used in handling UCC private and confidential data to protect the integrity of the data contained in the VRDB.

5. At the request of ISI, UCC will provide data processing services required to process, modify or update, or other similar services associated with the VRDB. In the event such request is made by ISI and performed by UCC, then ISI will pay UCC for such services in accordance with the rate schedule in Part B of this Agreement. ISI in such request of services will use all existing programs such as:

- H0060 Match File Edit
- H0061 Check Digit Match Key
- H0062 Match File Update
- H0063 Match File Update
- H0064 Street Report Formatter
- H0065 Telephone Report Formatter
- H0070 Card Loader
- H0066 Card Edit
- H0072 Data Base Update

Additional programming will be billed by UCC to ISI as indicated in Part B of this Agreement.

B. PAYMENT AND PRICING

1. It is agreed that ISI transfers, assigns and conveys all rights, title and ownership of the work product and materials as described in Section A.1 of this Agreement for the services set forth in A.2, A.3 and A.4 (Less those used for tapes kept).

2. EXTRA SERVICES. All requirements of ISI for service not identified and described as "Extra Services" in the Agreement shall be considered as "Extra Services" and shall be determined in accordance with this paragraph. ISI may make requests for "Extra Services" from time to time after the date of this Agreement. All such requests shall be subject to the mutual agreement of the parties as to scheduling of performance, and charges to ISI for such "Extra Services". All such services, and the agreements as to scheduling and charges in relation thereto, shall be fully described and reflected in ATTACHMENT "A" to this Agreement and subsequent amendments to said attachment as shall be hereafter attached to this Agreement and incorporated by reference. UCC shall invoice ISI for requested services provided on or about the 1st and 15th of each month, as applicable. ISI will make prompt payment of all invoices within fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, remitted pursuant to the instructions appearing in related UCC invoices.

There shall be added to said charges amounts equal to any taxes, however designated, levied or based on such charges or on this Agreement, or the services provided hereunder, including present or future state and local sales, use, privilege, excise or other taxes applicable to the sale of services hereunder.

and any taxes or amounts in lieu thereof paid or payable by UCC in respect of the foregoing, exclusive, however, of personal property taxes assessed on UCC's real estate and taxes based on UCC's net income.

C. LIAISON. UCC and ISI agree that the key to UCC's successful rendering of the services under this Agreement is continuing and effective cooperation and liaison in all areas related to data processing and the prompt, effective support from ISI and all involved third parties. ISI agrees to designate in writing to UCC the identity of qualified personnel whose direct assignment will be to work with and give direction to UCC personnel in the implementation of this Agreement, and when decisions are required, to make available officers or authorized representatives of ISI who shall have the authority to make such decisions in a timely manner. UCC will also designate in writing to ISI the identity of its qualified personnel whose direct assignment will be to work with ISI and to make required decisions in a timely manner.

D. PROPRIETARY NATURE OF SUBJECT MATTER. UCC agrees not to sell, reveal or otherwise distribute copies of any informational, technical, or other materials to be provided pursuant to this Agreement. All tapes, software and information belonging to ISI are proprietary and UCC has no rights whatsoever in ISI's data.

E. WARRANTY DISCLAIMER. Both parties agree that this is and shall be construed to be a contract for services only, regardless of the tangible form

in which or by which the services may be from time to time presented to ISI. The parties contemplate that their cooperation pursuant to this Agreement should produce performance of the data processing requirements at the lowest feasible rate of error, and both parties agree to use their best efforts in achieving this goal. ISI holds UCC responsible for all reports and programs generated and hence, any decisions based on information given to ISI from UCC has to be considered correct and proper. UCC will be held responsible for financial losses based on incorrect data generated.

F. LIMITATIONS. Notwithstanding the form (e.g., contract, negligence, express or implied warranty or otherwise) in which any legal or equitable action or claim may be brought or alleged against UCC, UCC shall be liable for all seeable liability for damages, including, but not limited to special or exemplary damages. UCC's liability, if any, arising out of or in any way related to its performance of the services or furnishing the supplies covered by this Agreement shall not be limited to the actual damages incurred by ISI as the result of UCC's failure to perform as agreed or otherwise implied. UCC shall not be liable for any damages caused by ISI-furnished data base, data or programs.

G. EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE. Neither UCC nor ISI will be liable to the other for non-performance of contract terms, damages or delays prominently caused by fire, electrical failure, stroke, boycott, war, civil disturbance, sabotage, risk, Act of God, governmental orders or regulations, or other causes

similar to any of the above, which is beyond the control of either party. UCC will not be responsible for schedule delays or other non-performance under this Agreement when caused by incorrect, inadequate or incompatible data furnished by ISI or those third persons designated by it, or when ISI is in breach in any term or condition of this Agreement.

H. TERM AND TERMINATION

1. This Agreement is effective as of the date first above written and shall continue in effect until November 2, 1976, at which time it shall expire unless terminated earlier as hereinafter provided:

2. EARLY TERMINATION. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of the above paragraph, this Agreement may be terminated at any time at the option of ISI. In the event of such early termination, payment will be made to ISI by UCC at a rate of Thirty-One Thousand Dollars (\$31,000) less Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$750.00) for each month that this Agreement has been effective.

3. In the event notification is received from ISI for permanent or early termination, all data, magnetic tapes, computer programs and other technical materials used will remain the property of ISI and UCC will provide such data, tapes, programs and other materials to any third party designated in writing by ISI. UCC has no title or interest in said data and said magnetic tapes, said programs and said technical materials.

I. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. In the performance of its obligations under this Agreement, UCC shall be an independent contractor. However, ISI reserves the sole right to approve all management and technical personnel; supervise management; control direction, procurement and performance by UCC; and further, ISI reserves the right to approve all subcontractors

I. NOTIFICATION OF INTENDED USE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR BY UCC.

Notification of the intent of UCC to use a subcontractor in the performance of services for ISI must be in accordance with the notice provisions set out in this Agreement.

J. GOVERNING LAW. This Agreement and the performance thereunder will be governed by the laws of the State of Texas.

K. NOTICES. Any notice required or permitted to be delivered hereunder shall be deemed to be delivered, whether actually received or not, when deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, registered or certified mail, addressed to the parties hereto at their respective addresses as they may hereafter designate by written notice delivered pursuant to this article.

IF TO UCC:

University Computing Company  
P.O. Box 6171  
Dallas, Texas 75222  
ATTENTION: General Counsel

IF TO ISI:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

L. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. The entire Agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof is contained in this Agreement and the attachments hereto. Any terms and conditions to any letter, memorandum, purchase order or other instrument issued prior to the Execution Date (specified below) by ISI or UCC in connection with this Agreement which are in addition to or inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall not be binding on either party. It is understood, however, that the terms of any written amendment or other written agreement executed by the parties subsequent to the Execution Date of this Agreement shall be binding notwithstanding the fact that they may be in addition to or inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

EXECUTED as of the date first above written.

ATTEST:

UNIVERSITY COMPUTING COMPANY

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WITNESS

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WITNESS

ATTEST:

INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED

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WITNESS

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WITNESS

JAMES W. WHITE  
1400 South Joyce Street  
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Phone 703/521-6098

#### EDUCATION

B. S.            Psychology and Business, Florida State University

M. B. A.        Industrial Management, Florida State University

                 Graduate coursework in Management Information Systems  
                 Wharton Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania

Honors         University Teaching Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania  
                 Graduate Assistantship, Florida State University

#### EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

7/71 - present        INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT

As a self employed consultant, he has consulted with various commercial and local government organizations concerning the planning, design, and implementation of computer information systems. Primary clients have been: Data Dynamics, Inc., Knowledge Networks International, Inc., the City of Tallahassee, Florida, and GTE Information Systems.

8/68 - 6/71            COMPUTER DATA SYSTEMS, INC.

##### Director of Marketing and Public Relations

In 1970, he was promoted to direct the marketing and public relations activities of the corporation including client relations, stockholder relations, new business development, technical proposals, and governmental relations. His primary effort was devoted to meeting the management of commercial and government organizations and defining their management information needs in order to begin the system analysis function as consultants.

##### Director of Advanced Programs

For 18 months he had responsibility for the direction of all new consulting and contract programming activities of the firm. He was Project Director for a large information retrieval system for the National Institutes of Health, where he supervised a staff of 35 professionals. He was Project Manager for the design of a MEDICAID Eligibility and MIS System utilizing S/360-50 with OS, MFT, BTAM, FASTER software.

Manager, Management Information Systems

As MIS Manager, he was responsible for the analysis, design, and programming of three management information systems: a Financial Management Information System utilizing S/360-OS, BTAM for the NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, an Intelligence Reporting System utilizing S/360 NIPS for the U.S. ARMY COMBAT SUPPORT Management Information System to define the entire routing air mail utilizing S/360-OS for the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT.

7/66 - 8/68

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION SYSTEM  
PENTAGON SUPPORT CENTER

Management Information System Project Manager

Responsible for the design and programming of a major MIS for budgeting, direct costing, indirect costing, cost modeling, the operations of a \$70 million per year operation. The project was completed in 18 months on schedule. He designed the sub-systems for independent operation by separate departments utilizing an integrated data base. The system operates in the on-line updating mode using BTAM and produces both printed reports, CRT queries, and hard copy graphics.

Senior Systems Analyst

He served as a systems analyst and programming supervisor for the design and programming of the sub-systems of the NMCS Management Information System. Additionally, he conducted hardware feasibility studies, cost benefit analysis, computer equipment evaluations, and wrote management plans for installation of five IBM S/360 Model 50's and 65's.

9/64 - 6/66

WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE  
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Instructor in Industry

Teaching courses such as Industrial Management, Management Systems, and Social Psychology of Industry. Conducted research and programming in the area of computer simulation.

9/61 - 8/64

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS  
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Instructor in Management

Teaching courses such as: Principles of Management, Business Policy and Decision Making, and Human Relations in Business. Also worked as a Research Assistant and Computer Programmer for Argonne Research Foundation.

UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

1. "Management by Exception and the Computer", Regional Conference on Management Information Systems, 1968.
2. "Redundant Simulation Games For Cost Control Training", 1968, Institute Working Paper.
3. "A Study of Predictability of Performance on Business Simulation Computer Games", 1964, Master's Thesis, Florida State University Graduate School.
4. "System Design of A Financial Management Information System", 1969, National Science Foundation.
5. "System Design Specifications for the NMCS Management Information System", 1968, NMCS Technical Publications, Classified.
6. Other:

In the past five years, Mr. White has written numerous technical proposals for the analysis, design and development of information systems. Some of them are:

- Implementation of a Legal Information Retrieval System for the State of California.
- Data Processing Requirements for On-Line Systems, City of Tallahassee.
- Statewide Criminal Justice Information System, for the State of Delaware.
- Regional Criminal Justice Information System, for the City of Jacksonville.
- City Criminal Justice Information System, for the City of Nashville.
- Design and Implementation of a Management Information System for the National Science Foundation.
- Development of Message Switching and Data Management Systems for the U. S. Navy, NAVCOSSACT.
- Job Bank Retrieval System, States of New Jersey, Delaware, and Texas.
- MEDICAID On-Line Eligibility Information Retrieval System, City of Washington, D. C.

SURVEY OF VOLUNTEER AND CONTRIBUTOR FILES

FILE	VENDOR	FORMAT	QUANTITY
Director Turn Cards - Republican	Nichols	OPSCAN	26,000
Director Turn Cards - Democrat	Nichols	200 CH.	5,000
Yearbook List	Nichols	LABEL	54,500
Florida Volunteers - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	4,300
Florida Contributors - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	5,000
Maryland Volunteers - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	6,057
Maryland Contributors - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	77
Michigan Volunteers - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	849
Michigan Contributors - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	453
New Hampshire Volunteers - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	227
New Hampshire Contributors - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	580
Wisconsin Volunteers - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	1,500
Wisconsin Contributors - Primary	Donnelley	150 CH.	850

TOTAL: 107,460

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

December 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Preliminary Election Turnout  
Analysis

A substantial amount of information has been received concerning voter turnout on November 7, 1972. Some reliable information on turnout in certain demographically interesting political units has been analyzed. Preliminary conclusions by Tom Benham, Bob Teeter, John Davies at Gallup, and Fred Malek are presented below.

A great deal more definitive information will be received during the next four weeks. John Davies has promised me the opportunity to go through the demographic tables of the Gallup post-election survey. Although Davies has not yet delivered on his promise, I plan to insure my access. Bob Teeter's partner, Fred Currier, is supervising part of the Survey Research Center's post-election study. Preliminary results will be available in early January, in spite of the fact that the formal study will not be available until April. Bob Teeter also conducted post-election surveys for unrelated clients in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. In Ohio an additional survey will be conducted only among those who did not vote. The first data will be available the first week of January. Finally, precinct abstracts from most counties are required to be certified by states during December.

To summarize the currently available information and conclusions:

- 1) Tom Benham says the addition of 25 million 18-20 year old voters to the rolls substantially reduced the overall percentage turnout. Under 30 year olds historically

have the lowest turnout percentage and the addition of this low vote turnout group brought the percentage of the entire population down. Only 12 million of the 25 million youth vote went to the polls, confirming the pattern of only 50% turnout by the under 30 year olds. Teeter calculates this only accounted for 2% of the 7% national turnout percentage drop.

2) Benham believes there was a low level of interest in the election. His discussions with the Gallup Organization confirm that there was apparently little enthusiasm for either the President or McGovern. Benham's personal view is that the generally low morale of the regular Democrats and their losses resulted in little effort to turn out their voters.

3) Benham also believes that many dedicated Wallace voters would not vote without their candidate on the ballot. McGovern also lost some of his most ardent supporters because of his post-Democratic Convention activities (Eagleton, waffling, etc.).

4) Benham contends that the general trend in turnout percentage since 1960 (1960-64%; 1964-62%; 1968-61%; 1972-54.5%) has been accentuated by the increased mobility of people which disenfranchises them because they do not get re-registered. Benham again relies heavily on the Gallup post-election survey which indicates that 38% of the 45.5% didn't bother to register or were prevented from registering by residence requirements.

5) Bob Teeter has reviewed the demographic information gathered by the RNC on the top 15 SMSAs (statistical units that are basically the large metropolitan areas). The conclusion is clear that in big cities there was a significantly lower turnout. Teeter theorizes that this was attributable to the decline of big city machines, disenchantment of labor losses with McGovern, and apathy among the suburban, upper-middle income ticket splitter.

6) Teeter does not believe that the decrease in turnout was partially attributable to the fewer number of statewide contests. Many states have shifted to electing their Governors in non-Presidential years. Some people argue that the statewide races increase the percentage of turnout for the Presidential contest. Teeter cites Ohio

and Pennsylvania where there were no Gubernatorial nor Senatorial races. In 1968 the Ohio turnout was 63% compared with 56% in 1972. Pennsylvania had 65% in 1968 and 55% in 1972. Yet in Illinois where both Senatorial and Gubernatorial seats were contested the turnout in 1968 was 69% and the turnout in 1972 was 58%, a drop of 11% compared with Pennsylvania's 10% drop and Ohio's 7% drop.

7) Teeter says that states which have historically high turnouts dropped in 1972, while states with historically lower turnouts remained relatively constant. For example, the Minnesota turnout trend is 1960-76%, 1964-76%, 1968-74%, and 1972-64%. New York continued its downward trend: 1960-67%, 1964-65%, 1968-60%, and 1972-57%. Yet the New Mexico trend is 1960-62%, 1964-62%, 1968-61%, and 1972-59.8%. In the South the historically low turnout did not drop precipitously. In Alabama the 1960 percentage was 31%, in 1964-36%, in 1968-53%, and in 1972-44%. So the 1972 deviation from the 1960, 1964, and 1968 averages was not great.

8) Concerning the toughest question of whether the Republican Party, both organizationally and in high Republican precinct areas, delivered their vote, the tentative conclusion is no. The most accurate information available is from Ohio. Malek considered it one of his best states, organizationally. Yet the percentage of total turnout dropped from 63% in 1968 to 56% in 1972. In Teeter-identified core Republican precincts which in 1964 and 1968 turned out 91-93%, in 1972 only 85% turned out. However, in a poorly organized state such as Pennsylvania, the drop was 10% (1968-65% to 1972-55%). Malek argues that the organizational effort kept Ohio from dropping from 7% to 10%. The CRP efforts could also be credited with holding the California turnout drop to 2% (1968-60%, 1972-58%). In those states where a purely Republican organization was responsible, the drop in turnout was even more precipitous. In Idaho, the 1968 turnout was 73% and in 1972 it was 57%. Even in states with statewide races and limited CRP efforts, the drop in Iowa was from 70% in 1968 to 63% in 1972 and in Kansas the drop was from 65% in 1968 to 56% in 1972. Both of these drops are more than the national average of 6.5%.

9) On the more theoretical level, Teeter has discussed the reasons at length with Jack Saloma, the MIT political science professor and author of The Parties. Neither can point to any specific factor, but both agree that the intensity of opposition to McGovern convinced many to vote for the President and many not to vote at all. Also, the President held a fairly firm 20% lead which increased the apathy/election sewed-up attitude. Finally, neither can establish that the Watergate and related incidents had any substantial influence on the turnout. Sindlinger of course contends otherwise.

#### CRP Analysis

Malek received two detailed commentaries on the 1972 election. One was prepared by Rick Fore, who wrote the original analysis of the McGovern California campaign. Fore analyzed the individual Senate races. The other is by Bob Marik who supervised all the research, direct mail, and telephone operations at 1701. Marik's memorandum describes the plans for complete analysis of the 1972 election. Malek approved all aspects except the nationwide post-election survey. Both memoranda are attached. Several of Fore's comments on the Senate races deserve your consideration:

1) Republican Senators lost seats because of poor individual campaigns;

2) Alabama -- The President carried Alabama with 76% while Blount received 34% to Sparkman's 66%. Wallace and major newspapers endorsed Sparkman. Alabamans felt there was no White House support for Blount. Blount's personality and media campaign turned voters off;

3) Maine -- The President received 70% and Smith only 47%. Her age had been an issue in the primary. She would not accept assistance from the Administration or CRP. She campaigned only on weekends while Hathaway campaigned aggressively;

4) Kentucky -- The President received 65% but Nunn received only 48%. GOP infighting in Kentucky became a liability. Nunn's tax increase resulted in him being tagged "Nickle Nunn".

5) Colorado -- The President received 64% and Allott 49%. Allott was over-confident until it was too late. Allott was old and was on the wrong side of the ecology issue and Winter Olympic referendum;

6) Georgia -- The President received 75% and Thompson only 45%. Thompson's poor campaign staff did not tie in with the President's advertising, canvassing, and get-out-the-vote efforts;

7) Iowa -- The President received 59% and Miller 45%. Miller was over-confident and a poor campaigner. Miller did not cooperate with either the CRP or GOP, and had voted against Butz;

8) Delaware -- The President received 60% and Boggs 49%. Biden's aggressive personal campaign was made more effective because of good media. Boggs' age and tie to unpopular Governor Peterson were negatives;

9) Montana -- The President received 60% and Hibbard 49.8%. No one in Washington thought Hibbard had a chance and so no money, surrogates, or effective CRP leadership were sent to help;

10) South Dakota -- The President received 54% and Hirsch 43%. Abourezk was a popular, good campaigner while Hirsch's chances were over-rated because he had poor name identification, no professional management and little money;

11) Rhode Island -- The President received 53% and Chafee ran away from the President to 46%. Chafee had poor management and an ineffective personal campaign.

Committee for the Re-election of the President


MEMORANDUM

November 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FRED MALEK

FROM:

BOB MARIN 

SUBJECT:

Analysis of the Coattail  
Effect on the 1972 Election

This memo outlines recommendations for analyzing why Republican candidates for statewide and local offices did not fare better in the wake of the landslide for President Nixon.

The election of 1972 had several unique aspects:

- . A landslide of unprecedented proportions for a Republican President.
- . Unexpectedly poor showings by Republican candidates for Senate, Governor, Congress and state legislatures.
- . The lowest percent turnout of eligible voters for a Presidential election since 1948.
- . The participation of 18-20 year olds for the first time in a Presidential election.
- . One of the most concerted person-to-person grass roots effort ever conducted by a national Republican campaign.

Kevin Phillips has suggested that large numbers of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents stayed home on Election Day, possibly because of Watergate. Others have suggested that the President's overwhelming lead in the polls created apathy on the part of his partisans. Conversely, many candidates for statewide and local races felt that the Committee turned out many Democrats who voted for the President and then voted for Democrats on the rest of the ticket.

The last minority party Presidential landslide took place 16 years ago. Since then, the voters have become much more sophisticated in the splitting of their ticket. In addition, some profound party realignments appear to be in progress. Elements of the Roosevelt coalition, especially blue collar ethnics, Southern whites and Jewish voters are showing increased inclination to vote for the Republican Presidential candidate. At the same time, upper-middle income suburbanites, the "high-end" ticket-splitters, are tending to vote more often on the Democratic line.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the generalizations of the past relating to landslides and coattails may not fit the 1972 voting results. A careful, in-depth analysis of the election returns must be made before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the President's effect on the rest of the ticket.

#### Proposed Method of Analysis

Three projects are contemplated to analyze the election results.

Post-Election Poll. Bob Teeter has proposed a poll to be conducted on a nationwide sample of registered voters. The purpose is to determine the reasons why support was given to the Presidential candidates, and how that support extended down the ticket. The survey will also examine the reasons why the non-voters stayed home. The questionnaire is projected to go into the field on November 24 or 25. It will require about ten days in the field and another ten days to two weeks for analysis. Early results would be available by mid-December, with the completed analysis by the last week of the month.

In addition, several post-election surveys are being conducted in separate states. Market Opinion Research is conducting polls in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Indiana. California and Colorado are being surveyed by ANPAC. Those results will be available within a short time.

Analysis of Voting Results by County. Dan Evans of Bob Teeter's Re-election Committee staff, is collecting voting results for all counties across the country. He will compare these turnout results with 1968 statistics, and construct maps to graphically display the trends. Although this analysis will be too coarse to discern detailed patterns, it may uncover some of the basic factors which combined to yield the extremely low turnout of 1972. The county analysis is useful because that data is available much earlier than precinct data in most states.

Analysis of Voting Results by Precincts. Precincts will be selected to analyze turnout patterns by voter segment. For example, high Republican precincts will be studied to see whether Republican turnout fell off more than proportionately from 1968. High Democratic precincts which supported the President will show whether those Democrats turned out in high numbers and contributed to the defeat of local Republican candidates. A complete grid of all important voter segments should be constructed, so that the relative turnout and ticket-splitting of each type can be analyzed. Some of the more important characteristics are:

#### Party

Republicans

Democrats

Pro-Nixon

Pro-McGovern

Pro-Wallace in primaries

Social Group

- Young Voters
- Older Voters
- Blacks
- Jewish
- Middle-income urban (Peripheral Urban Ethnic-type)
- High income
- Peripheral urban ethnics (blue collar)
- Spanish surname

Location

- Urban
- Suburban
- Rural

Impact of Campaign

- Precincts of high telephone/door-to-door canvass/direct mail
- Precincts of low campaign activity.

Bob Teeter has already begun some analysis of Ohio precinct results. This work is being coordinated with this overall project to avoid duplication. The RNC is also collecting and analyzing local election data. Their activities should also be brought into the context of one coordinated effort. I am working with Ed DeBolt to accomplish that objective.

Data for many precincts will not be available until after January 1, 1973. Therefore, the analysis will have to extend until mid-January or later. Interim results would be available sooner.

Most of the people now associated with this project will be working at other jobs by January. A project coordinator is needed who can maintain continuity and give professional judgment to the analysis.

Recommendation

That Bob Teeter be engaged, in a consulting role, to oversee the precinct analysis until its completion. Bob is already coordinating the first two parts of the overall post-election evaluation, as well as doing some precinct analysis. The RNC would provide the staff to perform the data collection and tabulation. Bob could spend a few days per month to give the required overall direction.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

*Jordon Strachan*

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FRED MALEK

FROM: RICK FORE

SUBJECT: U. S. Senate Race Losses

In my post-election memo to you, I pointed out that our Senate race defeats were cases of poor individual campaigns rather than a pattern. After checking with our campaign leadership across the country, we found that most of the losing campaigns had negative factors.

Following is a list of Senate races, along with the reasons that we feel each Republican candidate lost,

ALABAMA Nixon 76%

Sparkman 66%

Blount 34%

1. Sparkman ran a strong campaign in a Democratic state.
2. Major newspapers endorsed Sparkman.
3. Wallace endorsed Sparkman more than nominally.
4. Alabamans felt there was no real White House support of the Blount candidacy.
5. Sparkman reminded people that if he lost, Proxmire would be the Banking Committee Chairman. This strategy brought Sparkman a great deal of money for his pre-election TV and newspaper blitzes.
6. Blount was not a good personality for campaigning.
7. Major criticism of TV advertising. The more exposure Blount received, the more he lost.

MAINE Nixon 70%

Hathaway 53%

Smith 47%

1. Smith ran campaign alone. Little if any coordinated effort with GOP or CREP.
2. Refused all type of help from administration -- money, etc.
3. Smith's relationship to her administrative assistant.
4. The greatest negative of the race in Maine was the fact that Senator Smith was 75 years old. This was an issue that carried over from the GOP primary.
5. Smith campaigned very little -- mostly on weekends.
6. Hathaway campaigned aggressively in 482 communities.

KENTUCKY Nixon 65%

Huddleston 52%  
Nunn 48%

1. The GOP infighting in Kentucky proved to be a liability.
2. The greatest negative of the Nunn campaign was that he reneged on his promise of no new tax increase during his term as governor. In raising the sales tax from 3¢ to 5¢, the Governor became known as "Nickle Nunn".
3. Another negative from Nunn's term as governor was his use, or misuse, of patronage.
4. Huddleston was a clean candidate with no reasons for Democrats to dislike him.
5. The incumbent administration of Governor Ford used all possible leverage to assist Huddleston.

COLORADO Nixon 64%

Haskell 51%  
Allott 49%

1. Senator Allott was over-confident and did not feel he needed the help until it was too late.
2. Allott upset farmers and ranchers by siding with ecologists on the predator issue.
3. Allott supported a referendum for the Winter Olympics coming to Colorado. This was defeated by the voters overwhelmingly.
4. Like many other races, Senator Allott's age of 65 years old was a negative.

GEORGIA Nixon 75%

Nunn 55%  
Thompson 45%

1. Poor campaign leadership and staff.
2. No tie with President in advertising, canvassing and get out the vote.
3. Thompson did not campaign on issues of concern to the voters, but rather engaged in name calling with the opponent. He failed to present himself as a statesman to contrast with Nunn.
4. Got caught abusing Congressional financing privilege.

IOWA Nixon 59%

Clark 55%  
Miller 45%

1. Miller was tremendously overconfident.
2. He was not a good campaigner
3. Huge lead in polls, 35% in spring, 20% sixty days before November 7.
4. Operated alone; no cooperation with CREP or GOP.
5. Clark ran an excellent campaign. Walked across the state for P.R.
6. The greatest negative was a Tax Exemption Bill introduced by Miller. Clark used this as a "special favors" issue.
7. Turned off press - Des Moines Register battered Miller, endorsed Nixon, Ray and Clark.
8. Miller voted against Butz.
9. In six months, Miller lost 40 points.
10. Miller is 56 years old.

DELAWARE Nixon 60%

Biden 51%  
Boggs 49%

1. Biden was aggressive, youthful and personable. Outspent Boggs. Good media and lots of personal contact with the voters. (\$70,000 supplied Biden from COPE, rumored.)
2. Boggs remained on the Senate floor and did not return to the state often to campaign.
3. Boggs campaign, especially in King County, was tied too closely with the Governor's campaign. This was harmful as Governor Peterson was not popular and was also defeated.
4. Boggs' age -- 63 years old -- was a negative.

MONTANA Nixon 60%

Metcalf 50.2%  
Hibbard 49.8%

1. No one in Washington ever thought we would have a chance to win, Senatorial Campaign Committee, etc.
2. Montana CREP leadership was weak. They also did not believe Hibbard had a chance.
3. There was little liaison between the Nixon and Hibbard campaigns.
4. No major surrogates were sent to help.
5. Hibbard was only average as a candidate, his campaign manager was less than average caliber.

SOUTH DAKOTA Nixon 54%

Abourezk 57%  
Hirsh 43%

1. We overrated Hirsh's chances originally.
2. Abourezk was popular and a good campaigner.
3. Hirsh did not have money; poor name identification.
4. No professional campaign management.
5. Bitter Primary.

RHODE ISLAND Nixon 53%

Pell 54%  
Chafee 46%

1. Pell ran a most effective campaign.
2. Chafee ran away from the President -- misjudged the temper of the electorate.
3. There is a tradition of liking WASPish Newport Set.
4. Pell was non-controversial.
5. Chafee had poor, amateur campaign management.
6. Wouldn't effectively campaign -- wasn't warm.
7. Rhode Island is one of the most Democratic states in the U. S.

cc: Jerry Jones  
Gordon Strachan ✓